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This thesis presents a theorisation of the culturally transformative potential 
of play in participatory performance, exploring how play can promote 
reflexivity and enhance participants’ creative volition. It examines how play 
designs can respond to the cultural particularity of players, enabling them to 
express agency in relation to issues of personal concern; it considers the 
relationship between participant-led documentation and pedagogy, as 
memories of play feed into ongoing learning, and it interrogates the 
aesthetics of space and time in play, investigating how a perceptual shift 
beyond the immediacy of here and now might support reflexivity that 
expands players’ creative capacity to engage in culturally transformative 
experiences. The thesis includes discussion of research-led applications of 
live action role-play practices in several projects undertaken by the author 
during 2017-2018. It is situated in the field of performance but applies 
insights on play from game studies and fine art, as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus, Lev Vygotsky’s theories of learning and Baruch Spinoza’s 
theory of affects. This thesis contributes to knowledge in participatory 
performance by presenting design methods that respond to participants’ 
cultural particularity, drawing on habitus as a conceptual tool for exploring 
the dispositions of players as the source material for play frameworks. It 
proposes flexible design structures that foreground the co-creative agency of 
players and foster culturally transformative potential through intersubjective 
exchange. The thesis investigates how participant-led documentation in the 
embodied memory of recurring play activities can support further 
transformative possibilities through ongoing learning. Lastly, it explores 
spatio-temporal reflexivity in play, utilising Spinoza’s concept of affective 
potentia to propose aesthetic strategies that enhance participants’ perceptual 
range and strengthen their capacities for self-determined action. 
Cumulutively, these investigations yield a theoretical model of participatory 
performance design termed anchorage-leverage, which applies an aesthetics 
of spatio-temporal reflexivity to support participants in transcending the 
limitations of their habitus and playing with potential transformations in 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Play is an essential component in the social construction of human 
cultures. This is the core argument of historian Johan Huizinga’s seminal 
account of game play, Homo Ludens. Huizinga’s book discusses the culture 
building function of play from ancient Greece onwards, when, in his 
argument, agonistic contests enabled social structures to emerge and solidify 
as the strong triumphed over the weak and determined dominant cultural 
norms.1 Although Huizinga’s narrative of play in human culture appears to 
be resolutely conservative, many artistic practitioners have used play as a 
means of transforming, rather than simply reaffirming, cultural values. In 
the 1960s, Situationist International originated playful creative strategies to 
overcome passive consumption of cultural artefacts in what Guy Debord 
termed ‘The Society of the Spectacle’.2 Similarly, Augusto Boal’s Forum 
Theatre invited spectators to claim newfound agency as a spect-actors, by 
stepping into the action with the aim of changing pre-determined outcomes 
of the drama to overcome the oppression exercised by those in power.3  
The influence of practitioners like Boal and movements like 
Situationist International have continued to resonate in the twenty-first 
century, inspiring artists to apply playful forms of participation to make 
audience members active agents in artworks. Nicolas Bourriaud’s book 
Relational Aesthetics describes forms of practice that emerged in the 1990s 
which sought to establish spaces of social conviviality as the site and 
substance of the work. This marked a decisive shift away from viewing art as 
an object, to reconceive it as ‘a set of artistic practices which take as their 
theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human relations 
and their social context’.4 The emphasis on placing audiences within the 
                                                          
1 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A study of the play element in culture, trans. by R.F.C. Hull 
(London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1949), pp. 30-31. 
2 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Ken Knabb (Eastbourne: Soul Bay 
Press, 2009). 
3 Augusto Boal, Theatre of the Oppressed, trans. by Charles A. McBride, Maria Odilia Leal 
McBride and Emily Fryer (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 
4 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. by Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods 
with the participation of Mathieu Copeland (Dijon: Les Presses du Reel, 2002), p. 113. 
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work as participants has also impacted on theatre practice. Various forms of 
participatory theatre have emerged in the United Kingdom over the last two 
decades, inviting direct interaction between audience members and 
performers, frequently placing all involved in the same physical space and 
provoking playful actions through which audience-participants might affect 
the performance and its outcomes. Prominent companies within this 
emerging field of practice include Punchdrunk, a London-based company, 
formed in 2000, who have become internationally renowned purveyors of 
immersive theatre works that place audiences within fictional worlds; Blast 
Theory, a Brighton-based company formed in 1991 who are known for 
producing ‘pervasive’ games,5 merging digitally mediated play, dramatic 
performance and navigations of real-world spaces; and Coney, a London-
based company, formed in 2006, who pursue playfulness in interactive 
performance.  
Following on from the innovations in playful participation that are 
noted above, this study investigates how play can be applied in performance 
contexts to create the potential for cultural transformation, with a specific 
focus on the creative practice of live action role-play, or larp as it is more 
commonly referred to. Larp is a form of creative practice that has evolved 
from fantasy role-play games, with Nordic larp emerging in the 1990s as a 
specific sub-category based on role-play cultures in the Nordic countries.6 As 
key characteristics of Nordic larp have developed through practice and 
theoretical discourse, connections between fine art traditions and Nordic 
larp practice have been identified. Game studies theorist J. Tuomas 
Harviainen details extensive commonalities between the Happenings of artist 
Allan Kaprow and larp, such as the production of a written script, or score, 
that provides instructions to guide participatory action, the absence of an 
audience, and the emergent space of possibility contained within the 
structure of the work.7 Similarly, artworks described under the banner of 
                                                          
5 Matt Adams, ‘Uncle Roy All Around You’, in Pervasive Games: Theory and Design, ed. by 
Markus Montola, Jaakko Stenros and Annika Waern (London: Elsevier/Morgan Kaufmann, 
2009), pp. 231-234. 
6 Markus Montola and Jaakko Stenros, eds., Nordic Larp (Stockholm: Fëa Livia, 2010). 
7 J. Tuomas Harviainen, ‘Kaprow’s Scions’, in Playground Worlds: Creating and Evaluating 
Experiences of Role-Playing Games, ed. by Markus Montola and Jaakko Stenros (Jyväskylä, 
Finland: Ropecon, 2008), pp. 216-231. 
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relational aesthetics can be seen as similar to play activities, through their 
provision of social, co-creative spaces of affectivity that are bounded from the 
prevailing rules of the external world.8 This study is premised on the belief 
that there is fertile scope for hybridising play with other artistic forms, 
combining larp methods with fine art and theatre practices to make 
performances that give participants a creative stake in the work and invite 
them to apply their agency in exploring possible transformations of cultural 
values. 
 
1.1 Primary and Subsidiary Research Questions 
Despite the growing prominence of artistic forms that promote playful 
participation, several theorists have questioned the purportedly 
emancipatory nature of participatory art practices. Art historian Claire 
Bishop argues that such artworks often seek to impose a collective 
consensus on their participants9 while theatre scholars like Sophie Nield and 
Helen Freshwater have suggested that interactive performance forms can 
often exert intimidating control on participants10 that functions as a form of 
governmentality.11 In light of these challenges to the notion that 
participation in artistic contexts can be emancipatory, this study explores 
how applications of play in participatory performance might foreground 
participant agency to enhance the potential for generating culturally 
transformative experiences. Consequently, the primary question that this 
thesis addresses is as follows: 
How can the design, enactment and documentation of play in the 
context of participatory performance create the potential for 
transformations of cultural values? 
                                                          
8 Mary Flanagan, ‘Playful Aesthetics: Toward a Ludic Language’, in The Gameful World: 
Approaches, Issues, Applications, ed. by Stefan P. Walz and Sebastian Deterding 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), pp. 249-271 (p. 261). 
9 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: 
Verso Books, 2012), pp. 25-26. 
10 Sophie Nield, ‘The Rise of the Character named Spectator’, Contemporary Theatre Review, 
18:4 (2008), 531-544 (p. 534).  
11 Helen Freshwater, ‘“You Say Something”: Audience Participation and The Author’, 




To clarify the intent of my primary question, I will now unpack its 
constituent parts to formulate three subsidiary questions. Firstly, if the 
culturally transformative potential of play is of primary concern, it is 
necessary to ask who the players are, what their pre-existing cultural values 
might be and what cultural transformations (if any) they might wish to 
pursue. This study investigates the cultural particularity of players as a 
means of designing participatory performance works that invite them to 
actively reflect upon their cultural values, which yields the first of my 
subsidiary research questions: 
How may the cultural particularity of participants inform the design of 
play in participatory performance works? 
Secondly, this research investigates how play in participatory performance is 
documented and how these records might make a secondary, but no less 
significant, contribution to its culturally transformative potential. 
Specifically, I address the importance of documentary records in ongoing 
learning processes and explore how play design methods might be taught to 
enable players to become designers of their own play experiences. This 
pedagogical work combines an exploration of how play experience can be 
recorded with investigation of how such records might be folded back into 
further learning experiences for new players, to address a second subsidiary 
research question: 
How can play documentation and play design pedagogy further the 
culture building potential of play in the context of participatory 
performance? 
Thirdly, if play, as a mechanism of cultural transformation, is under 
investigation, there must be an examination of what play is. Fundamentally, 
the act of play can be viewed as an endeavour to make an impact on the 
material fabric of the world.12 This marks play as an aesthetic process, as 
players attempt to manipulate the world around them and experience the 
                                                          
12 Thomas S. Henricks, Play and the Human Condition. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2015), p. 24. 
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sensory satisfactions of doing so.13 I contend that the essential materials of 
aesthetic experience are space and time14 and this study explores how 
compositions of space and time in play might promote critical reflexivity that 
enhances players’ potential to manipulate and reorder the forms of sensory 
experience that they have encountered, along with the cultural constructions 
that are bound up in them. This yields the third of my subsidiary research 
questions: 
How can the aesthetic compositions of space and time in the play of 
participatory performance promote reflexive agency? 
Having presented my primary research question and elaborated the 
constituent parts of it, the remainder of this introduction provides an 
overview of the methods I have used to carry out this study, the theoretical 
works that have stimulated my enquiries, the structure of this thesis and the 
contributions to knowledge that my findings offer to scholarship and practice 
in participatory performance.  
 
1.2 Sites of Research & Methods of Creative Practice 
The primary and subsidiary questions that I have articulated have 
been addressed through research-led practice in participatory performance. 
This study is situated within performance studies, but my practice applies 
the creative methods of game design, participatory art and live action role-
play in the Nordic tradition. Having trained as a theatre director at the 
London Academy of Music and Dramatic Art, where the methods of theatre 
practitioner Constantin Stanislavski provide the foundation of actor training, 
my approach to making performance is, to a large extent, Stanislavskian. 
This approach centres upon attentiveness to the ‘given circumstances’ of 
dramatic scenarios, which are, essentially, the contextual details of where 
the action happens, when it happens, and the identities of the characters 
                                                          
13 Chris Bateman, ‘The Aesthetic Motives of Play’, in Emotion in Games: Theory and Praxis, 
ed. by Kostas Karpouzis and Georgios N. Yannakakis (Switzerland: Springer International 
Publishing, 2016), pp. 3-20 (p. 15). 
14 Jacques Rancière, ‘From Politics to Aesthetics?’, Paragraph: A Journal of Modern Critical 
Theory, 28:1 (2005), 13-25 (p. 13). 
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involved. This combines with the supposition that characters, like the real-
world humans they typically represent, act in pursuit of objectives and try to 
overcome obstacles to fulfil these desires.15  
Stanislavski’s core concept of the ‘given circumstances’ is not only 
useful with regard to dramatic performance, it also provides fertile parallels, 
I suggest, with processes of system analysis that underpin the work of many 
game designers. In contrast with dramatic structures that typically present 
linear, pre-determined narratives, however, games are premised upon the 
agency of players and an inherent uncertainty of outcome. Consequently, 
given that this study is concerned with the culturally transformative 
possibilities that participatory performances might offer, the application of 
game design methods based on systems analysis is relevant in conferring 
enhanced create agency to participants that enables them to drive emergent 
performance narratives. A system can be simply defined as a set of 
interrelated parts that combine to form a complex whole, which is comprised 
of objects (the active agents within the system), the attributes of those objects 
(their enabling and disabling qualities), their internal relationships and their 
inhabited environment.16 My contention is that dramatic scenarios can be 
seen to function in the same way that game systems operate: there is an 
environmental context containing a range of objects with various attributes 
that interact to generate emergent phenomena (or narratives). Similarly, in 
the same way that the systems of games include rules that limit player 
action and tools with which players can pursue their goals, dramatic 
scenarios contain implicit or explicit social rules that frame permissible and 
transgressive actions, and affordances that enable characters to pursue their 
objectives. These corollaries between dramatic structures and game 
structures are pertinent to this enquiry because if game play is to be 
successfully applied in participatory performance contexts that function as 
drama, identifying commonalities between these creative forms can arguably 
support productive hybridisation.  
                                                          
15 Constantin Stanislavski, An Actor Prepares, trans. by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
16 Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman, Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 50-51. 
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Having briefly discussed the structural commonalities between drama 
and games, it is necessary to offer a distinction between games and the 
primary focus of this study: the practice of play. In his book Man, Play and 
Games, sociologist Roger Caillois builds on the earlier work of Huizinga by 
distinguishing games from play, using the terms ludus and paidia to define 
games as structured, rule-bound activities and play as a more open-ended 
manifestation of playfulness. Caillois foregrounds the idea that games (ludus) 
tend to be strongly characterised by explicit rules and the pursuit of 
concrete goals. Play (paidia), by contrast, tends to have looser, implicit rules 
with more of a focus on intrinsic enjoyment rather than goal-orientated 
action.17 This distinction is important in considering the development of live 
action role-play. Whereas early forms of larp tended to feature detailed rule 
sets (stemming from the heavily rule-based design of the acclaimed fantasy 
role-play game, Dungeons & Dragons), as players began to explore the 
possibility of playing out fantasy narratives in a fully embodied fashion, the 
structures of rules have given way to more paidic forms of play. 
Subsequently, Nordic larp has become characterised by relatively loose 
design structures with an increased emphasis on the creative activity of 
players.  
In setting out my applications of Nordic larp practice in this study, 
three aspects of this emerging art form are particularly important. Firstly, in 
contrast to spectatorial art works which are created by an artist and 
interpreted by an audience, larp is a co-creative activity, combining a 
framework offered by designers and the creativity of participants who play 
the work into actuality and without whom the work could not exist.18 
Secondly, larp typically does not have a conventional audience and, as a 
result, it must be considered as an aesthetic experience rather than an art 
object.19 Thirdly, larp in the Nordic tradition values reflexivity by 
emphasising a conceptual frame, or magic circle (to borrow a term from 
                                                          
17 Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games, trans. by Meyer Barash (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2001), pp. 27-35. 
18 Jaakko Stenros, ‘Nordic Larp: Theatre, Art and Game’, in Nordic Larp, ed. by Markus 
Montola and Jaakko Stenros (Stockholm: Fëa Livia, 2010), pp. 300-315 (p. 303). 
19 Jaakko Stenros, ‘Aesthetics of Action’, Jaakko Stenros: researcher, player, writer (2013) 




Huizinga), that separates the world of play from ordinary reality20 and invites 
players to actively reflect on how the play activity might relate to the world 
outside the magic circle.21 In considering larp as a form of play that might be 
culturally transformative, these principles are important because they 
establish player experience as the locus of aesthetic value and foreground 
the primacy of player agency in creating performance narratives of emergent 
uncertainty. The focus on reflexivity also emphasises the value of critical 
reflection that connects play experiences to wider cultural contexts, with the 
possibility that players might seek to effect some change in these contexts, 
however small, as a result of their play.  
The practical components of this research were undertaken through a 
range of creative activities of varying length and complexity and I will now 
introduce the basic elements of these projects, which are described in detail 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The first project, which serves as the main focus of 
Chapter 4, was conducted with elderly service users of an adult day care 
centre at Haringey Community Hub in the Wood Green area of North 
London. Between June 2017 and March 2018, I worked with service users 
over several phases of activity to gather their stories and apply this research 
in developing a range of play activities with a primary focus on individual 
and collaborative story-making. This was coupled with a similar project, also 
discussed in Chapter 4, with elderly residents of two Sheltered Housing 
schemes in the London Borough of Haringey (at Cranley Dene in Highgate 
and Clements House in Tottenham) which took place over shorter periods 
between November 2017 and March 2018. The project which serves as the 
focus of Chapter 5, entitled Playground, was conducted as a pedagogical 
initiative with a group of interdisciplinary artists at Theatre Delicatessen, a 
creative workspace in central London. Over the course of twelve weekly 
sessions between March and May 2018, I worked with participants on 
explorations of games, larp and interactive performance, leading to the 
development of four original works, designed by participants. Chapter 6 
draws upon a wider range of practical projects. The first of these was a week-
long residency in September 2017 at Trumpington Community Orchard on 
                                                          
20 Huizinga, p.10. 
21 Stenros, ‘Aesthetics of Action’. 
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the outskirts of Cambridge, during which I ran small-scale role-play 
experiments and undertook exploratory walks around the local area with the 
volunteers who managed the orchard as a community space. The second 
project was a three-month residency between June and August 2018 at the 
Peartree Bridge estate in Milton Keynes, organised by Arts for Health, Milton 
Keynes. In this project, I worked with small groups of local residents to 
create role-play activities that responded to the features of their 
environment. The final chapter also describes a second pedagogical project 
that followed the initial Playground, in which four of the original participants 
worked with me to facilitate a second iteration for a new group, which took 
place at Theatre Delicatessen over three weekends in September and October 
2018. The latter part of the chapter offers a case study discussion of 
Migrations of Cool, a street-game about the role of artists in gentrification 
that I created during a residency at the Arebyte Gallery in the Hackney Wick 
area of East London in July 2017, which was played by small groups of 
artists.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Frameworks 
As I have previously indicated, claims for the emancipatory potential of 
participatory art have been challenged by scholars of fine art and 
performance and the philosophy of Jacques Rancière has provided an 
important point of reference for critiques of this kind. His book The 
Emancipated Spectator delivers a sceptical analysis of the ambition to 
empower spectators by shaking them out of their supposedly passive state. 
Instead, Rancière proposes that the spectator does not need to be 
emancipated since she is always actively observing and interpreting the work 
before her.22 Consequently, her autonomous perception and interpretation 
enables her to make her own meaning without being held in thrall to the 
artist’s intention.23 This proposed disjuncture between artistic intent and 
                                                          
22 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso 
Books, 2009), p. 13. 





spectatorial autonomy is described by Rancière as the ‘aesthetic cut’, a 
radical departure from the idea that an artwork expresses artistic intention 
to an observer, towards a vision of interpretive emancipation that cannot be 
controlled by authorial hegemony.24  
The concept of the aesthetic cut forms a core component of Rancière’s 
wider argument that the ‘representational regime’, in which artistic intention 
imposes itself on an audience through communicative signification, should 
be rejected. His alternative proposal is for an ‘aesthetic regime’ that 
preserves the autonomy of both the artwork and the spectator so that 
artistic poiesis (the making of an art work and the intentions that stimulated 
it) does not impinge upon the autonomous freedom of spectatorial aisthesis 
(the process by which audience members interpret the work in question).25 
Rancière’s argument for emancipated spectatorship links with his 
theorisation of the ‘redistribution of the sensible’. This term can be described 
as an interpretive reordering of the forms and concepts that are perceptible 
through the senses. In other words, the sensible, or everything that can be 
perceived through sense, can be redistributed, escaping hierarchical 
distributions enacted by figures of power. By way of example, Rancière 
discusses the writing of the nineteenth century joiner Gabriel Gauny who, 
whilst laying the floor in the house of his higher-class employer, observes the 
scene before him and imagines himself to be the occupier, suspending the 
labour of his arms to enjoy gazing out of his window. According to Rancière, 
this action effects a redistribution of sensible forms since the ‘divorce 
between the labouring arms and the floating gaze introduces the body of a 
worker into a new configuration of the sensible; it overthrows the “right” 
relationship between what a body “can” do and what it cannot’.26 Essentially, 
Rancière’s contention is that Gauny’s gaze reappropriates the sensible forms 
of his immediate environment, enabling him to escape his hierarchical 
designation as a ‘worker’ to claim, albeit temporarily, a social role that does 
not belong to him.    
                                                          
24 Rancière, Emancipated, p. 82. 
25 Rancière, Emancipated, pp. 69-70. 
26 Rancière, Emancipated, p. 71. 
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Rancière’s scepticism towards the artistic impulse to offer 
participatory agency provides an important provocation for this research. In 
contrast to his emphasis on autonomous spectatorship of art, which implies 
a relatively isolated perceptual position for each individual, the 
epistemological framework of this study is social constructionism. This 
system of knowledge posits that our sense of reality is shaped by 
intersubjective exchanges between individual human subjects that lead to 
the emergence of shared cultural values. In other words, the social 
construction of culture involves a reciprocal relationship between individuals 
and the social groupings in which they participate, whereby individuals have 
their personal values and practices shaped by relational exhanges, whilst 
simultaneously impacting the collective cultures of social constellations.27 
Consequently, this thesis offers a consideration of cultural transformation 
that combines the individual and the collective, interrogating how social 
agents sculpt their cultural particulars in relation with one another, 
progressively constructing and reconstructing the shared cultural values of 
social groups as they do so.  
The work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu provides a valuable lens 
through which the social construction of culture can be analysed. Bourdieu’s 
field theory proposes that individuals are equipped with various forms of 
capital which can be applied in fields of social experience, and his key 
concept of habitus, which can be described as the ability of agents to deploy 
their capitals in a specific field, offers a theoretical tool for understanding 
how conditioning factors enable and constrain individuals in the social 
contexts that they occupy.28 Regarding the first of my subsidiary research 
questions, which focuses on how play can be designed in response to the 
cultural particularity of players, I have found Bourdieu’s concept of habitus 
to be extremely useful in considering how the capitals and cultural vantage 
points of individuals might be transformed through play. A key aspect of 
field theory, which stands in opposition to Rancière’s focus on autonomy, is 
                                                          
27 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Penguin, 1991). 
28 Michael Grenfell, ‘Working with habitus and field: The logic of Bourdieu’s practice’, in 
Cultural Analysis and Bourdieu’s Legacy: settling accounts and developing alternatives, ed. 
by Elizabeth Silva and Alan Warde (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 14-27. 
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that it is relational. In other words, although human beings may be born 
with certain genetically innate characteristics, relational exchanges in social 
groups are fundamental in progressively shaping their habitus.29 
Consequently, the notion that relationality might progressively alter the 
habitus suggests that cultural changeability may be enabled by play as 
individuals forge new relational connections and thereby develop new 
capitals.  
There are strong corollaries between field theory and the previously 
articulated system analysis which lies at the heart of many game design 
processes. In the same way that systems in games contain objects with 
attributes and internal relationships within an inhabited environment, a field 
serves as a conceptual context (environment) for agents (objects) with 
capitals (attributes) who engage in relational exchanges (internal 
relationships) that condition how their habitus can be applied to pursue 
goals. A common criticism of Bourdieu’s theory is his apparent tendency to 
affirm social determinism,30 but his work does acknowledge that disruptions 
to habitual patterns can serve as triggers for possible habitus alteration.31 
Again, this is mirrored in systems theory by the concept of resilience, which 
describes the moment when a system, placed under strain, can undergo a 
radical transformation and fundamentally re-order its relational 
composition.32 By combining field theory with systems thinking, therefore, it 
is possible to conceive flexible game frameworks in which disruptions might 
lead to resilience and relational reconfiguration. This, in turn, might 
precipitate an altered process of social construction, prompting changes in 
individual perceptions of social reality that open the potential for the 
transformation of shared cultural values within social groups.  
                                                          
29 Diane Reay, ‘From the theory of practice to the practice of theory: working with Bourdieu 
in research in higher education choice’, in Cultural Analysis and Bourdieu’s Legacy: settling 
accounts and developing alternatives, ed. by Elizabeth Silva and Alan Warde (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 75-86. 
30 Jeffrey C. Alexander, ‘The Reality of Reduction: The Failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu’, 
in Fin de Siècle Social Theory: Relativism, Reduction and the Problem of Reason (London: 
Verso Books, 1995), pp. 128-217 (pp. 146-186). 
31 Reay, pp. 79-80. 
32 Carl Folke, ‘Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems 
analyses’, Global Environmental Change, 16:3 (2006), 253-267. 
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The second of my subsidiary research questions is focused on the 
relationship between documentation and pedagogy and the philosophy of 
Jacques Rancière has offered a useful provocation in approaching this 
question. Rancière’s theories of education make the radical claim that all 
students must be considered to have equal intelligences that are also 
considered equal to that of the pedagogue. This proposition is geared 
towards a vision of emancipated studentship that frees students from 
pedagogical inculcation by a teacher, enabling them to form their own 
interpretations of the world,33 in the same way that the emancipated 
spectator forms her own interpretation of an artwork. This notion of an a 
priori assumption of equality as the basis for emancipated learning can be 
problematised, however, by assessing the work of psychologist Lev Vygotsky, 
whose studies of play in childhood learning suggest that development cannot 
occur in conditions of equality. In his discussion of environmental factors, he 
argues that a child’s learning is necessarily enabled and constrained by the 
relative capacities of other individuals in their vicinity. With regard to 
parental influences, Vygotsky describes the presence of a fully developed 
adult as the ‘ideal form’ from which children acquire knowledge through 
imitative performance. In the absence of this ideal form, the child will simply 
fail to develop, even if they have no impediments to their physical or mental 
faculties.34 In other words, the child will only develop new capabilities by 
imitating other individuals with greater, or diversified, capacities, which 
suggests that an inherent inequality of capital affordances is fundamental to 
learning.  
The imitative nature of learning that Vygotsky articulates foregrounds 
the value of relational sociality in education. Whereas Rancière asserts that 
autonomy prevents the hierarchical ranking of differing levels of 
intelligence,35 Vygotsky’s theories suggest that learning cannot take place 
without social interactions that enable imitative performances. The 
                                                          
33 Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, 
trans. by Kristin Ross (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). 
34 Lev S. Vygotsky, ‘The Problem of the Environment’, in The Vygotsky Reader, ed. by René 
van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner, trans. by Theresa Prout and René van der Veer (London: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1994), pp. 338-354 (p. 349). 
35 Rancière, Emancipated, p. 11. 
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fundamental importance of relational sociality lies at the heart of Vygotsky’s 
influential concept of the zone of proximal development, which offers a model 
for understanding the degree to which an individual can learn independently 
and the degree to which they must have the support of others to develop 
specific capabilities.36 The zone of proximal development has proved 
extremely useful in approaching the practical work linked to my second 
subsidiary question, offering a framework for considering how social play 
provides a context for co-creative learning, as players engage in collaborative 
performances and develop new capacities through relational connectivity. 
Beyond his emphasis on the relational sociality and implicit inequality of 
learning processes, Vygotsky’s work on the function of language has been 
influential in this study. He argues that as children develop, their use of 
language progresses from external use (for verbal communication with 
others) towards internal use,37 as individuals, effectively, talk to themselves. 
The inner voice is significant in the context of play, because it provides a tool 
for individuals to interpret their actions and Vygotsky argues that the 
development of internal language use marks the point at which individuals 
are able to think conceptually, beyond the concrete limitations of their 
immediate surroundings.38 In the context of a study about the culturally 
transformative potential of play, therefore, the internal voice can be 
understood as a vital component of reflexivity, through which players can 
volitionally adapt their individual perspectives and practices to reshape the 
social construction of cultures.  
The third of my subsidiary research questions further interrogates the 
issue of reflexivity, exploring how aesthetic compositions of space and time 
in play might support the reflexive agency of players. This question is, again, 
stimulated by Rancière’s philosophy, specifically his concept of the 
redistribution of the sensible which visualises an aesthetic, and concurrently 
                                                          
36 Lev S. Vygotsky, Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, ed. 
by Michael Cole, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner and Ellen Souberman, trans. by 
Alexander R. Luria, Martin López-Morillas, Michael Cole and James V. Wertsch (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 84-91. 
37 Lev S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language, ed. and trans. by Alex Kozulin (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1986), pp. 86-88. 
38 Lev S. Vygotsky, ‘The Problem of the cultural development of the child’, in The Vygotsky 
Reader, ed. by René van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner, trans. by Theresa Prout and René van 
der Veer (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1994), pp. 57-72 (pp. 58-59). 
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political, reordering of the sensible forms that dismantles hierarchically 
organised power structures. Given that this project investigates how play 
might enable cultural transformation, the notion of pursuing a redistribution 
of the sensible through play is highly attractive, seemingly offering scope for 
profound change through reordering of the sensible forms that make up the 
world. I contend, however, that Rancière’s combined emphasis on equality 
and autonomy undermines his radical, emancipatory intent. The a priori 
assumption of equality expunges the variable capitals that individuals have 
acquired over time. Moreover, the emphasis on autonomy appears to 
undermine the relational social space that is fundamental to learning. 
Consequently, I argue that Rancière’s theory offers an aesthetics of 
immediacy, emphasising the kairos of instantaneous time and an isolated 
space that is limited to what is immediately proximal. This spatio-temporal 
immediacy limits transformative potential by excluding depth perspective on 
time beyond the present and curtailing intersubjective relationality in space.  
In response, I have drawn upon the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza to develop 
an alternative theoretical framework for my enquiries, based on the pursuit 
of rational reflexivity in spatio-temporal perception.  
Spinoza’s theory of affects asserts that the primary endeavour of all 
humans is to persevere in being, leading them to seek out ‘joy’ through 
emancipatory affects that increase their powers of action and avoid the 
‘sadness’ of disabling affects that diminish it.39 Spinoza asserts that 
although we are most strongly affected by events in the spatio-temporal 
present, our power of acting is aided by the rational endeavour to seek out a 
broader plurality of affects. Essentially, the ability of beings to persevere is 
grounded in their power, or potentia, to be affected and to affect others in a 
great many ways.40 The process of giving and receiving a diverse range of 
affects depends, I suggest, on a social relationality that enables affective 
exchange between beings of differential capacities, in clear contrast with 
Rancière’s valorisations of equality and autonomy. Regarding spatiality, 
whereas Rancière’s emphasis on autonomy suggests a relatively isolated 
                                                          
39 Hasana Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2011), p. 31. 
40 Sharp, p. 107. 
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space, Spinoza’s advocacy of maximising the diversity of affects that an 
individual can receive implies an expansion of relational social space. In 
other words, as space becomes increasingly expansive, enabling varied 
affective connections, the potentia of the beings receiving these affects also 
expands. Regarding temporality, Rancière’s focus on equality necessarily 
elides the implicitly unequal cultural particulars that are drawn from past 
experience, which seems to expunge the prior subjectivity of individuals. By 
contrast, Spinoza asserts that the power of rational thought depends on the 
ability of individuals to think beyond the present to combine mental images 
of past and future41 in what I conceive as a depth perspective on time, which 
again provides an increased diversity of affects that strengthens the power of 
action. Taken together, this spatio-temporal analysis contrasts an aesthetics 
of immediacy, in the case of Rancière’s work, with temporal depth and a 
more expansive spatial horizon in the case of Spinoza’s philosophy. 
Spinoza’s ideas have subsequently informed my practical work, prompting 
me to construct activities in which participants can transcend spatio-
temporal immediacy by reflexively imagining past and future, and forging a 
wider array of intersubjective connections to strengthen their reflexive 
agency. My contention is that play is an affect engine, and although there 
are clearly forms of agonistic play that can produce disabling affects, the 
enabling affective exchanges which occur in many types of play can enhance 
the potentia of beings, diversifying their power to affect social others in a 
great many ways and increasing the potential for transformations to occur in 
the shared cultural values and practices of social groups. 
In sum, the theories of Bourdieu, Vygotsky and Spinoza provide the 
conceptual impetus for this study, combining the structural aspects of social 
conditioning that define the habitus, valuable psychological insights on the 
impact of environmental factors in processes of learning, and the more 
corporeally focused notion of affect. By pursuing the insertion of Spinozist 
philosophy within the parameters of Bourdieu’s theories, I start from the 
premise that although conditioning factors of environmental context shape 
                                                          
41 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics: Proved in Geometric Order, ed. by G.H.R. Parkinson, trans. by 




the habitus of individuals, deterministic reproduction of the existing 
structures of social groups is not inevitable. Rather, I contend that the 
affective diversification advocated by Spinoza, which builds new forms of 
relationality and disrupts ossified patterns, can lead beings towards a 
reflexive recognition of their potential to undertake a diverse range of 
affective actions that can transform social constellations and reshape the  
the ongoing construction of human cultures. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Having described the theoretical frameworks that have informed my 
research, this section outlines the structure of this thesis with a brief 
articulation of my main findings. I begin with a chapter reviewing recent 
relevant literature and creative practice in theatre and performance, game 
studies, play anthropology and fine art. Although this study is situated 
within performance studies, I argue that understandings of participatory 
performance can be strengthened by greater awareness of how games are 
designed as systems that combine structural constraints alongside 
affordances that enable player agency and emergent narrative potential. 
Explorations of play anthropology also suggest that an appreciation of play 
as a function of human development can support applications of playful 
activities within participatory performance works, while discussions of 
participatory art promote a reconceptualization of aesthetic value, 
emphasising the experiential qualities of the work, rather than its properties 
as an art object.  
Following my review of literature and creative practice, a chapter on 
methodology sets out my approach to this study as research-led practice in 
participatory performance. This chapter considers recent works on practice 
research in the arts, supplemented with insights from Participatory Action 
Research in the social sciences that provide valuable ideas for working co-
creatively with participants to design, enact and document research 
activities. It is important to stress at the outset that I do not consider my 
work to be a form of PAR, but I have used PAR theories to define my 
approach in contrast to more stratified models of research in which concepts 
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are tested on participants, rather than being developed through collaboration 
with them. This chapter also articulates my use of creative practice as a 
method of research rather than a research outcome. In other words, my 
practical activities are described as methods for stimulating theoretical 
insights that yield a research output which is presented in written form. 
The remainder of the thesis comprises three extended chapters that 
detail specific stages of my research. Chapter 4 discusses my projects with 
elderly service users at Haringey Community Hub and residents of the 
Haringey Sheltered Housing schemes, linking the practical work with 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to consider the possibility of designing play in 
response to the cultural particularity of participants. Chapter 4 also 
considers the potential (and limitations) of field theory and a systems-based 
game design approach in making works that invite players to interrogate 
their existing cultural values. Chapter 5 focuses on the Playground project 
alongside analysis of Vygotsky’s pedagogical theories, prior to a 
consideration of the role of performance documentation in ongoing learning 
processes. My discussion of play documentation problematises the ways in 
which documentations of art (and research) are often instrumentalised by 
the artist/researcher to serve their own agenda instead of enabling 
participants to represent their own experience. I subsequently offer 
alternative propositions for how documentation through memory and 
performative reiteration might promote player agency and further the 
culturally transformative potential of play. Chapter 6 includes descriptions 
of practical work undertaken at Trumpington Community Orchard, Peartree 
Bridge, Hackney Wick and in the second iteration of the Playground project, 
with a specific focus on how aesthetic compositions of space and time in play 
can strengthen the potentia of players. Discussions of these projects focus on 
reflexive agency in play, describing my endeavour to create diverse spaces of 
affective exchange and my explorations of how the spatio-temporal 
aesthetics of play might enhance opportunities for a culturally 





1.5 Contributions to Knowledge 
The primary contribution to knowledge that this study makes is the 
presentation of an alternative to the aesthetics of immersion in participatory 
performance. In contrast to the immediacy of space and time that is 
valorised by some scholars of immersive theatre,42 I argue for an aesthetics 
of spatio-temporal reflexivity. In making this argument, it is not my intention 
to dismiss the immediate pleasures of play, but my research suggests that 
an expanded perspective on space combined with depth perspective on time 
can prompt reflexive thinking that enables individuals to encounter a wider 
affective diversity that strengthens their power of action. My considerations 
of spatio-temporal reflexivity yield a conceptual model for play design that I 
term anchorage-leverage. This model is based on the propostion that 
although the constraints of habitus can anchor individuals within ossified 
patterns of activity, a more reflexive perspective on space and time can 
enhance their affective capacities, enabling them to leverage alterations in 
their cultural values and practices. With regard to play design, this study 
contributes new ideas on how participatory performance might move away 
from linear structures that impose narrative pre-determination. My 
investigations explore system-based approaches that make player agency 
and emergent uncertainty central to the design of games, but rather than 
seeing systems as top-down impositions of a designer, I propose a model of 
participant-led design in which the players themselves bring systems into 
formation from the ground-up. This is a model of play design which, 
ultimately, views the artist as a framework provider within which the content 
and form of play can emerge from player creativity. 
A core focus of this study is designing play in response to the cultural 
particularity of players and this contributes new ideas on how aesthetic 
value in participatory art is perceived. I argue that, in contrast with 
conventional art theories that focus on the properties of art objects, the 
subjective experience of players is the locus of aesthetic value in 
participatory works. Consequently, with regard to the documentation of such 
                                                          
42 Josephine Machon, Immersive Theatres: Intimacy and Immediacy in Contemporary 
Performance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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works, I propose that players can take the lead in self-documentation, since 
their experience of the work is fundamental to its aesthetic value. My focus 
on participatory self-documentation suggests a further contribution to 
knowledge in the relationship between performance documentation and 
pedagogy. In the same way that this study questions the hegemony of the 
singular artist, I question forms of education that privilege the mastery of the 
pedagogue. By arguing for participant agency in the recording or 
remembering of play, I propose a cyclical process of participatory culture 
whereby players can become designers of their own experiences and 
subsequently apply self-documentations of play to teach methods of play 
design to others. In other words, by inviting players to claim agency in 
recording their experience and passing these records on to others, the 
culturally transformative impact of play can expand to create a wider circle 
of players and potential play designers. 
 
1.6 Summary 
In sum, this thesis questions how the play of participatory 
performance play can offer emergent potential for cultural transformation. 
My practical research, informed by existing knowledge in performance 
studies, game studies and fine art, and stimulated by theoretical insights 
from Bourdieu, Vygotsky and Spinoza contributes new ideas for how play 
might be designed in response to the habitus of players, investigating how 
strategies of spatio-temporal reflexivity might enable them to transcend the 
anchorage of established cultural values and leverage transformations in the 
aesthetic and political composition of their world. My discussion of 
documentation assesses how the recording or remembering of play 
experiences might impact upon the ongoing social construction of cultural 
values, while explorations of play pedagogy question how the tools of 
participatory art can be disseminated by players to further the culturally 
transformative potential of play. My epistemological foundation of social 
constructionism asserts the primacy of intersubjective exchanges in shaping 
the cultural values of individuals within social groups. Although such 
exchanges might reaffirm ossified perspectives and practices, I contend that 
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the pursuit of spatio-temporal reflexivity in play can diversify the affective 
potentia of players and support conscious awareness of their resilient 
changeability. By cultivating reflexive perspectives on space and time, I 
propose that the play of participatory performance might enhance the 
potential for reshaping individual perceptions of the world, whilst 
simultaneously strengthening the capacities of individuals to transform the 
cultural values of wider social groups, so that players, as active agents, can 






Chapter 2. Review of Literature and Creative Practice 
 
This study is concerned with the culturally transformative potential of 
play in participatory performance. The current chapter contextualises this 
research within the theatre and performance culture of the United Kingdom, 
which has seen a proliferation, over the last two decades, of various types of 
interactive and immersive theatre that invite audience members to become 
active participants in the work. The emergence of these artistic forms has led 
to increased attention on how participation in performance might confer 
creative agency to audience members. Considerations of games and play are 
often used to describe how interactive performances reconceive audience 
members as players,1 but I suggest that understandings of games and play 
can be productively expanded to inform participatory performance designs 
that enhance the creative agency of participants. In my discussions of works 
by theatre scholars including Gareth White, Adam Alston, Josephine 
Machon and Rose Biggin, alongside the previously cited companies, 
Punchdrunk, Blast Theory and Coney, I suggest that participatory theatre 
practitioners and scholars tend to view audience participation in theatre in 
terms of interaction with fixed performance structures, often retaining a 
focus on linear narrative designs that limit participatory agency. I 
subsequently discuss ideas from game studies and play anthropology to 
supplement these debates. Drawing on the work of game studies theorists 
including Jesper Juul and Mary Flanagan and play scholars Brian Sutton-
Smith and Thomas Henricks, I argue that understandings of player agency 
in games, and the exploratory possibilities of paidic play, can enhance the 
potential of participatory performance to offer culturally transformative 
opportunities.  
In addition to considering games and play, this chapter discusses 
theories of participatory aesthetics that have emerged in fine art discourse 
from writers such as Grant Kester and Falk Heinrich. I argue that insights 
                                                          
1 Alysia Judge, ‘“Playable shows are the future”: what Punchdrunk theatre learned from 
games’, The Guardian (2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/feb/08/playable-shows-are-the-future-what-
punchdrunk-theatre-learned-from-video-games> [accessed 8 February 2019]. 
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from participatory art can shift the attention of participatory performance 
scholarship from the aesthetics of immersion and the aesthetics of the art 
object towards an understanding of aesthetic experience that is sensory, 
agential and reflexive. This focus on reflexivity, alongside participatory 
agency, serves to expand the prevalent emphasis on sensory immersion in 
participatory performance, which can, I suggest, undercut the ability of 
participants to exercise reflexive criticality, and thereby impinge on their 
agential capacities. In sum, this review of literature and creative practice 
sets out an approach to participatory performance that foregrounds the 
insights of games and play scholars in creating works that support 
participatory agency, combined with an experiential aesthetics informed by 
fine art scholarship that promotes the abilities of participants to reflexively 
generate their own sense of meaning as the makers and interpreters of the 
work.   
 
2.1 Play in Theatre and Performance Studies 
The expansion of participatory forms of performance has been 
accompanied by a growing recognition that performance scholars and 
practitioners often disregard the particularity of audience members. Helen 
Freshwater argues that the audience is often viewed, not as a collection of 
individuals, but as a relatively undifferentiated bloc,2 while Matthew Reason 
claims that artistic intentions continue to dominate analyses of performance 
so that ‘despite the development of reader or spectator focused discourses, 
there remains a tendency to value intention over reception in a manner that 
results in an erasure of actual spectators’.3 Gareth White also argues for 
increased attention to the particularities of audience members in 
participatory theatre, recognising that aspects of social conditioning will 
necessarily define the types of participation that audience members can be 
invited to engage in. Referencing Pierre Bourdieu’s theories, he argues that 
individual audience members have a ‘horizon of participation’ that limits the 
                                                          
2 Helen Freshwater, Theatre & Audience (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
3 Matthew Reason, ‘Participations on Participation: Researching the “Active” Theatre 




cultural affordances they bring into the theatre.4 In other words, the habitus 
of any audience member is central in shaping the kind of participation they 
can undertake, with some individuals holding a broad horizon that equips 
them with a wide range of participatory affordances, while others possess a 
more limited horizon that might constrain participation. White is quick to 
resist the accusation that Bourdieu’s ideas imply social determinism, 
however, and makes a compelling argument that it is possible for audience-
participants to apply tactical variations within structural constraints to find 
new kinds of emergent potential. Drawing on the writing of social scientist 
Sharon Hays, he argues that social structures in specific fields, like the field 
of theatre, are in continuous dialogue with the agency of individuals: 
Agency explains the creation, recreation and frustration of social 
structures; agency is made possible by the enabling factors of social 
structures at the same time as it is limited within the bounds of 
structural constraint.5 
White’s proposition is that the structural conditioning that shapes the 
habitus does not preclude agency, it enables it, equipping individuals with a 
range of tools, or capitals, with which they can negotiate variable pathways 
within the limitations of the systems they occupy.  
A prominent feature of White’s argument for agential flexibility within 
structure is his focus on the importance of intersubjective exchange in the 
social experience of theatre. His proposal is that the subjectivity of audience 
members is both the material and the medium of participation as individuals 
express their subjective viewpoints in their relational engagements with 
other individuals.6 White’s emphasis on intersubjective exchange is 
elaborated by discussion of Erika Fischer-Lichte’s concept of autopoiesis 
within the theatre experience. Fischer-Lichte claims that members of an 
audience generate self-perpetuating affects in what she describes as an 
‘autopoietic feedback loop’, whereby individuals are affected by the 
experience and affect others, which in turn produces new affective responses 
                                                          
4 Gareth White, Audience Participation in Theatre: Aesthetics of the Invitation (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 56-59. 
5 Sharon Hays, ‘Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture’, Sociological 
Theory, 12:1 (1994), 57-72 (p. 62), cited in White, Audience Participation, pp. 53-54. 
6 White, Audience Participation, p. 25. 
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in a continuous chain of intersubjective responsiveness.7 White’s application 
of Fischer-Lichte’s ideas is useful, for my purposes, because in contrast to 
Rancière’s insistence on isolated perceptual autonomy for the emancipated 
spectator, he promotes the notion that the theatre is fundamentally social. 
In a recent article, he argues that whereas Rancière primarily values 
singular responses of the spectator to an equally singular ‘pure text’ and 
‘appears to object’ to intersubjective ‘encounters with other intelligences’,8 in 
the social event of theatre, the subjectivity of individuals is shaped ‘in the 
environment and in relation with other people’.9 This focus on the 
importance of intersubjectivity is shared by Nicola Shaughnessy, whose 
discussion of mirror neurons in the audience experience makes a convincing 
case that, within the social space of theatre, individuals receive and generate 
affects in relation with each other.10 Subsequently, this will inevitably create 
some alteration in their habitus and some alteration, however small, in their 
potential to find agential flexibility within the constraints of their horizon of 
experience.  
The notion that structure can coincide with (and indeed support) 
agency in participatory performance is a concept that performance scholars 
often appear to discount. In a recent article about National Theatre Wales’ 
outdoor promenade production For Mountain, Sand & Sea, Kirsty Sedgman 
appears to draw a dichotomy between the freedom for audiences to make 
‘open-ended explorations’ and the constraints of ‘structural limitations’, 
creating an impression that the more structured a participatory work is in 
its design, the less agency an audience participant will have.11 By contrast, 
Sruti Bala offers an account of the balance between structure and agency in 
describing applications of Augusto Boal’s Forum Theatre practices. Citing 
Michel De Certeau, who champions ‘tactics’ as flexible ‘ways of operating’ 
                                                          
7 Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics, trans. by 
Saskya Iris Jain (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 38-39, cited in White, Audience 
Participation, pp. 161-162. 
8 Gareth White, ‘Theatre in the “Forest of Things and Signs”’, Journal of Contemporary 
Drama in English, 4:1 (2016), 21-33 (p. 27). 
9 White, ‘Theatre in the “Forest of Things and Signs”’, p. 23.  
10 Nicola Shaughnessy, Applying Performance: Live art, socially engaged theatre and affective 
performance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 13. 
11 Kirsty Sedgman, ‘“Ladies and Gentlemen Follow Me, Please Put on Your Beards”: Risk, 
Rules and Audience Engagement in National Theatre Wales’, Contemporary Theatre Review, 
27:2 (2017), 158-176 (pp. 159-160). 
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within the constraints of governmental ‘strategies’,12 Bala argues that binary 
oppositions between ‘bad’ top-down organisation and ‘good’ bottom-up 
participation are overly simplistic, claiming that it is possible for agential 
flexibility to be found in spite of structural constraints.13 
In considering how participatory performance might support the 
agency of participants, Boal’s methods are important since they have served 
as an inspiration for many practitioners, including myself, to pursue a 
participatory approach. His book, Theatre of the Oppressed, is premised on a 
robust critique of the Poetics of Aristotle, setting out an argument that his 
theatrical theories rhetorically reinforce dominant ideologies through 
emotionally manipulative strategies that guide the perceptions of 
spectators.14 Boal’s response to this rhetorical coercion was the creation of 
Forum Theatre, which invited spectators to become spect-actors in the 
drama by stepping into scenes of oppression and attempting to change them. 
Although there is much to applaud, I suggest, in this emancipatory intent, I 
see a limitation in Boal’s Forum Theatre approach (which remains among 
the most widely used of his techniques) because it is focused on changing 
outcomes in the narrative of a protagonist,15 utilising a somewhat reductive 
problem/solution binary.16 This focus on the protagonist’s journey as they 
seek to overcome a problem is limiting as it elides the complexity of social 
systems in which multiple agents (all of whom are their own protagonist) 
pursue a wider multiplicity of desires.17 Consequently, despite the fact that it 
can produce variable outcomes, Forum Theatre remains fixed in a linearity, 
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rather than allowing for a more dispersed series of performance actions 
driven by a broader plurality of players.   
In a similar vein to the constricting linearity of Forum Theatre, I 
suggest that many contemporary theatre makers who invite audiences to 
become players encounter similar limitations in their design approach, with 
a tendency to remain fixed in linear narrative structures. Gareth White, for 
example, proposes that participatory theatre makers can be understood as 
‘procedural authors’ who construct a sequence of interactive episodes, then 
invite audience members to engage in a performative ‘process’ that sets the 
authored procedure into action.18 Procedural authorship can be understood 
as a series of pre-authored units of performance within which there are gaps 
that invite various forms of audience interaction. White’s clearest 
articulation of procedural authorship is drawn from a detailed description of 
his own work as a facilitator of a theatre workshop about bullying in schools 
with the London-based theatre in education company Armadillo Theatre.19 
His account of this workshop sets out the combination of pre-scripted 
scenes, performed by professional actors, alongside interactive sections in 
which the students are invited to take on the basic role of children in the 
playground. As the ‘procedure’ is enacted as ‘process’, it becomes clear that 
the participatory action of the students is carefully orchestrated to lead 
towards a pre-determined conclusion in the narrative, which suggests that 
standing up to bullies with physical aggression never solves the problem. 
What is striking about this account of procedural authorship is the fact that 
White is open about its rhetorical intentions, and although it could be 
argued that dissuading children from responding to bullying with violence is 
laudable, the clearly rhetorical structure of a procedural authorship that 
uses audience participation to reach a pre-determined ending seems 
analogous to the rhetorical strategies of Aristotle, as described by Boal. 
Effectively, what is at stake here is the fundamental question of participatory 
agency. White’s discussion of this topic is problematic, in my view, as he 
suggests that agency in participatory theatre is about the feeling of being 
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able to pursue an intention or goal.20 In other worlds, according to White, if 
participants, like the children in the fictional playground scenario, have the 
impression that they can achieve something within the framework of the 
drama, they have agency, even if the design structure of procedural 
authorship precludes this. There appears to be a disjuncture, therefore, 
between White’s arguments for agential variability in his discussion of 
Bourdieu’s field theory, alongside Fischer-Lichte’s concept of autopoietic 
feedback loops, and his own theory of procedural authorship, which offers 
only qualitative variability and the appearance of agency within a linear 
narrative design that is quantitatively pre-determined.  
The tension between the semblance of agency and the actual 
preclusion of it is common, I argue, in contemporary interactive theatre 
practices. In a recent article describing their acclaimed piece, Hotel Medea, 
Persis Jade Maravala and Jorge Lopes Ramos describe forms of ‘interactive 
gameplay’ that participants are invited to engage in, such as hide and seek, 
which is played by audience members whilst pretending to be Medea’s 
children. Although this play might be extremely enjoyable, it is questionable 
as to whether it can be agential play, since the outcomes of the game cannot 
change anything within the fixed linearity of the Greek myth. Irrespective of 
how well the children hide, they cannot escape death, because fate has pre-
determined it. Consequently, it is apt that Maravala and Ramos share 
White’s argument that agency is a matter of perception. They state that they 
are seeking to provide audiences with ‘the experience of agency as opposed to 
actual agency…the real sensation of empowerment, even if they don’t 
actually shape the narrative’,21 which again presents a vision of agency in 
participatory performance that is limited. 
If Gareth White’s procedural authorship suggests a rhetorical 
affirmation of the cultural values of the author(s) through the enactment of a 
pre-determined procedure by members of an audience, Adam Alston 
suggests that a relatively subtle rhetorical affirmation of dominant values is 
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produced by immersive theatre practices. He argues that immersive works in 
the United Kingdom often implicitly affirm neoliberal ideology by inviting 
audience members to become productive consumers through their 
participation in the event.22 Alston offers the example of Punchdrunk, who 
have, in his view, become exemplary creative entrepreneurs through a range 
of private collaborations.23 He also claims that this entrepreneurial spirit has 
fed into the company’s artistic output, as audience-participants are invited 
to be productive and consume the vast array of delights within their 
immersive worlds through entrepreneurial exploration.24 The overlap of 
performance and commerce is also neatly articulated in a recent article by 
Meghan O’Hara which suggests, in discussing the work of Punchdrunk, that 
the productive consumption of audiences extends beyond the performance 
itself. O’Hara argues that the invitation to purchase artefacts from concluded 
productions perpetuates the experience of the work and also serves to 
advertise the company that created it as audience members display 
purchased artefacts as mementos.25 O’Hara’s argument that audience 
members are co-opted into the commercial operations of Punchdrunk 
resonates with Alston’s suggestion that the company’s work can be seen to 
exploit the affective labour of its audiences. He argues that the scenography 
of Punchdrunk productions provides richly affective landscapes, but goes on 
to claim that the affects which are produced by audience participants are, 
effectively, appropriated as aesthetic material, becoming part of the 
scenography to be consumed by other immersants.26 A striking example of 
affect appropriation can be found in The Black Diamond, Punchdrunk’s 
collaboration with Stella Artois Black, in which audience-participants were 
invited to playfully explore an immersive party world whilst consuming the 
branded beverage, effectively turning the audience of productive consumers, 
in Alston’s view, into unpaid brand ambassadors.27  
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An even more stark example of potentially exploitative practices can be 
found in the immersive performance work of Secret Cinema, a London-based 
company, formed in 2006 by Fabian Riggell, who stage highly popular 
screenings of films within interactive performance environments. In an 
article on Secret Cinema’s immersive screening of Moulin Rouge, media 
studies scholar Helen Kennedy describes how audience members in 
possession of a lower cost ticket, described as ‘creatures of the underworld’, 
were required to perform certain actions within the event. Kennedy states 
that the ‘creatures’ were instructed prior to the screening that ‘they must be 
compliant with the instructions and must not break any of the rules of 
engagement and participation’ and that if they failed to comply, they would 
be asked to leave, which effectively turns their participation into unpaid 
performance labour.28 Alston’s interest in affect appropriation has also led 
him to analyse the work of Secret Cinema. In his recent article, ‘Tell No One’ 
(which is the central marketing slogan of the Secret Cinema brand), he 
argues that the culture of secrecy is commodified and spectacularised, 
creating a sense of exclusivity (which is reflected in the ticket price). Alston 
subsequently suggests that audience members are implicitly invited to 
perform their exclusivity by sharing the secret (the title of the film in 
question) which immediately co-opts them into the marketing strategy of the 
company.29  
Despite the fact many immersive works seem to appropriate the 
affective labour of their audiences, Alston maintains, drawing on the ideas of 
Jacques Rancière, that audience-participants can preserve their 
emancipated autonomy by engaging in an introspective manner with the 
affects that occur in their bodies and embodied brains.30 Similarly, Keren 
Zaiontz, in her consideration of narcissistic participation in the work of 
Punchdrunk, suggests that even if participants are aware that they might be 
exploited by the design of the work, they are willing to acquiesce provided 
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that they are able to pursue individuated one-of-a-kind experiences.31 The 
autonomous introspection and narcissistic self-absorption that Alston and 
Zaiontz describe contrast sharply with the highly social descriptions of 
intersubjective exchange articulated by Gareth White. Whereas White 
discusses the potential of participants to take affective action towards each 
other, Alston’s discussion of affect focuses much more on the affects that 
autonomous individuals receive and appears to omit recognition of the social 
and intersubjective aspects of participatory performance, which are vital, for 
my purposes, in considering how alterations of the habitus might occur.  
The valorisation of autonomous experience in immersive theatre is 
further evidenced by Daniel Schulze’s analysis of the form. He argues that in 
a world that appears to be increasingly superficial, immersive theatre 
audiences seek out what appear to be ‘authentic’ experiences. Whilst 
recognising that immersive experiences are often highly orchestrated and 
frequently impose stringent controls on participant agency, Schulze claims 
that this creative form is ‘the “absolute fake” that is able to deliver “the real 
thing”’,32 arguing that the feeling of apparent authenticity can be arrived at 
through the individual experience of sensory affects,33 much like Alston’s 
emphasis on introspective experience. The point that I wish to make here is 
less a matter of what is ‘real’ and what is ‘fake’ but rather the tendency of 
Alston and Schulze to prioritise singularised subjectivity. As I have argued in 
relation to Spinoza’s philosophy, potentia is strengthened by affective 
diversification through intersubjective exchange. Consequently, although it 
might seem appealing to seek individual emancipation or ‘authentic’ 
experiences through autonomous engagement with immersive works, 
ultimately, in my view, an autonomous break can only weaken participant 
agency. 
In contrast to the arguments for autonomous, subjective experience 
that are noted above, Jospehine Machon argues that immersive theatre is a 
                                                          
31 Keren Zaiontz, ‘Narcissistic Spectatorship in Immersive and One-on-One Performance’, 
Theatre Journal, 66:3 (2014), 405-425 (p. 425). 
32 Umberto Eco, Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyperreality (London: Vintage, 1998), p. 31, cited 
in Daniel Schulze, Authenticity in Contemporary Theatre and Performance: Make it Real 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 140. 
33 Schulze, p. 176. 
32 
 
highly communitarian art form that offers democratic agency to its 
participants.34 Machon claims that immersive theatre has become popular in 
contemporary arts culture because of the alienating impact of all-pervasive 
technology in our lives. In response to this alienation, she suggests that 
immersive theatre promotes intimacy and immediacy, offering the affective 
richness of haptic tactility. Drawing upon the work of Nicolas Bourriaud, 
who proposed ‘relational aesthetics’ in the late 1990s as a term to describe 
art works of social conviviality that escape technological alienation, Machon 
argues that immersive works create an ‘interstice’, separated from the 
dehumanising effects of the everyday world.35 However, the use of the term 
interstice implies the creation of a space of alterity with a different set of 
rules, which assumes a clear framing, so that individuals who enter the 
interstice are aware that they are entering a separate, alternative 
environment. Machon, though, is keen to emphasise that works of immersive 
theatre frequently blur the boundaries between fictional construction and 
reality, referencing Allan Kaprow’s argument that ‘the line between art and 
life should be kept as fluid, and perhaps as indistinct as possible’.36 In my 
view, this indistinctness in the boundary between an immersive world and 
the ‘real world’ runs counter to the notion of an interstice, since it impedes 
the ability of participants to distinguish between ‘real world’ rules and the 
alternative rules in the interstitial space. Consequently, I suggest that this 
can have a disabling impact, creating uncertainty about what the 
participatory affordances are and where the limits of participation might lie.  
Within the interstice of immersive theatre, Machon claims that there is 
profound potential for political transformation as individuals enter a form of 
communitas,37 a term most closely associated with Victor Turner’s 
description of the transition of individuals into an unstructured collective 
                                                          
34 Josephine Machon, Immersive Theatres: Intimacy and Immediacy in Contemporary 
Performance. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p 144. 
35 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. by Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods 
with the participation of Mathieu Copeland (Dijon: Les Presses du Reel, 2002), pp. 16-17, 
cited in Machon, pp. 121-122. 
36 Allan Kaprow, ‘Excerpts from “Assemblages, Environments & Happenings”’, in 
Happenings and Other Acts, ed. by Mariellen R. Sandford (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 
235-254 (p. 235), cited in Machon, p. 31. 
37 Machon, p. 150. 
33 
 
through ritual performance.38  Machon uses communitas to describe what 
she sees as a democratic communitarianism in immersive theatre. In 
discussing Machon’s work, however, Schulze states that ‘she remains vague 
as to what kind of communitas she means and in what way this communitas 
is established’.39 He goes on to question the value of communitas, arguing 
that the uniform collectivity of masked audience members in Punchdrunk 
works is redolent of a ‘herd of zebras, suddenly turning in one direction’.40 
The claim that the collectivism of immersive work equates to democratic 
practice is also contested by Anna Wilson’s discussion of Punchdrunk’s 
work. She identifies a paradox between the apparent freedom of individual 
spatial navigation and the collective homogeneity imposed by the company’s 
use of masks,41 resonating with Schulze’s claim that masked audience 
members ‘are no longer subjects who are free to voice their thoughts…they 
are a silent, scenery-like, exploring mass’.42   
The apparent loss of individuated subjectivity in the ‘exploring masses’ 
that function as audience-participants in many immersive theatre works can 
be further explicated by Elias Canetti’s writing on the dangers of crowd 
activity. Canetti uses the term discharge to describe the moment when 
individuals are subsumed into the crowd, casting off their individual 
subjectivity to become part of the mass.43 This loss of subjectivity may be 
desirable in certain contexts, particularly in ritual processes, as described by 
Turner, but I contend that communitas, with its requirement for de-
individuation of participants and its emphasis on the immediacy of action in 
the present moment,44 impedes the potential for reflexivity. For Machon, 
immediacy, both in temporal and spatial terms is central to the aesthetic 
appeal of immersive theatre, and she references the total theatre strategies of 
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Antonin Artaud45 to valorise the sensation of ‘praesence’ in intimate 
proximity to the performance and with a sense of instantaneous engagement 
with the action.46 Schulze points out, however, that ‘in this state of “deep 
involvement” traditional mechanisms of distance or even critical reflection 
begin to diminish or may even become obsolete’.47 Consequently, the 
aesthetics of immediacy in immersive theatre, as described by Machon, limit 
the ability of participants to critically reflect on the action they are engaged 
in through subjective, recursive consideration of what has gone before, what 
is happening now and what they may wish to do in future.  
Having thought through several aspects of immersive theatre practice, 
the remainder of this section considers the argument that immersive works 
offer participant agency and politically transformative potential through their 
similarities with games. In her discussion of productions by Punchdrunk, 
Machon claims that: 
Audience-participant-performer interactions, although carefully staged 
and in many ways pre-determined, allow diverse decisions to be taken 
and thus invite an exciting variation of interpretations to be made. As 
this suggests, affiliations between gaming practice and immersive 
theatre can clearly be drawn in Punchdrunk’s work.48   
It is difficult to make a correlation between the immersive theatre of 
Punchdrunk and gaming practice, however, because whereas games are 
built upon the notion of quantitative uncertainty of outcomes,49 Punchdrunk 
performances are not susceptible to structural change led by participant 
actions, so there can be no uncertainty of outcome. In a 2014 interview with 
the Guardian newspaper, Punchdrunk director Felix Barrett gave a neat 
summary of the extent of agency that is afforded by the company’s works. In 
describing his production, The Drowned Man, Barrett commented that 
‘rather than an audience member creating their own narrative, they are 
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peeling back layers of story archeologically’,50 which illustrates that although 
audiences are free to explore and uncover pre-prepared narratives that are 
architecturally embedded in the space, there is no affordance for them to 
influence the dramatic action that unfolds.  
There are other companies that Machon includes under the immersive 
theatre banner who do, arguably, offer greater creative volition to 
participants through game-like practices, such as Coney and Blast Theory, 
but my experience of recent works by these companies has suggested that 
the story worlds they present tend to remain fixed, with little susceptibility to 
structural change through participant actions. In Blast Theory’s Operation 
Black Antler, for example, participants are invited to assume the role of 
undercover police operatives, finding out information about the activities of a 
far-right political group, but although there is huge qualitative variability in 
the interactions that can occur, these interactions cannot change anything. 
The only concrete, constitutive action that players can take at the end of the 
event is to decide, through a group vote, whether to place the group under 
permanent surveillance. Recent work by Coney offers a somewhat different 
example, with works such as Remote, which employs a digitally mediated 
‘Twine’ narrative structure in the mode of a Choose Your Own Adventure 
story. Although the design of this work does allow for quantitative variability 
in outcomes, the provision of agency is limited to binary choices, again 
through group voting, in a bifurcating narrative tree which remains linear 
and fixed. 
Aside from Machon’s work, several other theatre scholars have 
suggested that there are links between immersive theatre and gaming 
practice because immersive works, like some video games, require players to 
‘hunt clues’ that reveal the ‘hidden story’.51 In describing her game-like 
experience of Punchdrunk’s Masque of the Red Death, Rosemary Klich 
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describes her experience of clue hunting as a form of ‘epistemic immersion’, 
a term coined by game studies scholar Marie Laure Ryan, which refers to the 
sense of being immersed in a mystery story and caught up in ‘the desire to 
know’.52 Similarly, Lindsay Brandon Hunter cites game studies scholar Janet 
Murray’s description of narrative immersion in games and links this to the 
immersive audience experience of ‘looking for clues that will alert them to 
puzzles, which, when solved, yield information which can be assembled to 
form the game narrative’.53 The common theme of these examples is the idea 
that immersive works can be described as games because they are similar to 
puzzles in which latent content is excavated and revealed. This approach is 
rooted firmly in a textual paradigm, however, in the sense that there is a 
latent text to be decoded, in contrast to games in which agential play is 
generative of emergent game states.  
In considering the question of agency in game-like participatory 
performance, the distinguishing features of games that game studies 
scholars have sought to identify are instructive. Greg Costikyan describes 
games as ‘state machines’ in which the system of interrelated parts that 
makes up the game responds to player action to generate new game states. 
He contrasts state machines with puzzles, such as crosswords, arguing that 
although the play activity of tackling problems and making choices about 
which problem to solve first will have experiential variability, the 
fundamental structure of the puzzle does not change: 
The solution to a logic puzzle is contingent on the clues provided. The 
only uncertainty involved is in the solver’s ability to sort through the 
contingencies; or to put it another way, a puzzle is static. It is not a 
state machine. It does not respond to input. It is not uncertain and it 
is not interactive.54  
This assessment of the agential limitations of puzzles could equally be 
applied to the participatory performance works described above. In Operation 
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Black Antler, the only uncertainty is in the participant's ability to follow the 
trail of clues that the actors provide, uncovering the latent story in the same 
way that the concealed words of a crossword are uncovered. Similarly, the 
bifurcating narrative trees employed by Coney are based on the release of 
pre-existing narrative content as players deliver collective votes, in contrast 
to the emergent generation of new game states through player action. Viewed 
in these terms, to paraphrase Costikyan, these works are not state 
machines. They do not respond to input. They are not uncertain, and they 
are not interactive. Essentially, the design structures that these pieces 
employ are not responsive in the manner of game systems and, therefore, 
they are best described as puzzles to be explored and unravelled rather than 
games of emergent possibility.55 
The limited agency conferred by many immersive theatre works is 
highlighted by the work of Rose Biggin, who questions the assumption that 
participatory performance, in general, is necessarily empowering. She 
suggests that ‘empowerment’ through participation can function as an 
‘orthodoxy’ that is often ‘applied reductively and uncritically’56 and goes on 
to suggest that immersive works often ignore the particularities of 
individuals, citing Chris Goode’s claim that this type of work can exclude 
‘those with less confidence or less mobility or who simply aren’t accustomed 
to a sense of access-all-areas entitlement’.57 With regard to the experience of 
immersion itself, Biggin, like Schulze, notes that being subsumed within a 
fully immersive world can impede critical reflexivity, acknowledging that 
‘immersion…is characterised by a diminishing of the spectator’s ability to (or 
their desire to attempt to) form a distanced, critical perspective…in favour of 
a more immediate, emotional, visceral reaction to the work’. As a result of 
the occlusion of reflexive potential caused by immersion, she claims that 
there is a ‘tension between this effect and the idea of audience 
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empowerment’.58 Biggin develops her arguments on the effects of immersion 
by suggesting that immersive environments can create a sense of the 
sublime, as audiences are overwhelmed by the scale of total sensory 
experience.59 This idea is affirmed by Schulze who suggests that an 
immersive world ‘in its seemingly endless dimensions is subjectively 
experienced as sublime, thus creating both pleasure and fear’.60 Essentially, 
the impression that both writers create is that the immersive sublime is 
geared towards leaving the spectator awestruck, with a ‘reverend gaze’ that, 
in Biggin’s view, implies ‘coercion or control rather than empowerment’.61  
In the context of the arguable disempowerment of participants in 
immersive works, Biggin gives a thorough account of how games function 
through the application of game mechanics that afford player agency and 
generate responses from the game itself. She argues that ‘a more interactive 
game isn’t necessarily the one with the flashier graphics, but the game that 
responds the most to the player. What matters is how the player can affect 
the outcome’.62 Subsequently, she offers a delineation between responsive 
games and ‘static puzzles’,63 (affirming my previous argument that puzzles 
should be seen as distinct from games) and suggests that because 
Punchdrunk’s immersive works often deploy puzzle-like structures they are 
‘not particularly “interactive” at all’ since ‘audience members are not invited 
to influence, change or complete anything’.64 Despite going to great lengths 
to offer a wide-ranging and clear articulation of ideas generated by game 
studies scholars, Biggin concludes that the lack of interactivity offered by 
many immersive works is less important than the experience of immersion: 
When considering immersive theatre production, what matters is less 
how interactive a production actually is at any given moment, and 
more the question of how it manipulates various modes of interactivity 
to allow for the experience(s) of its audience.65  
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She goes on to present arguments against the application of game methods 
in immersive theatre, arriving at the suggestion that the use of ‘gaming 
mechanics’ in immersive environments ‘may overpower any sense of 
narrative discourse, rather than allowing a participant to find narrative 
elements embedded within them’.66 This leads her to suggest, with regard to 
one of Punchdrunk’s recent projects, that ‘immersion in narrative is 
ultimately the most powerful or long-standing effect of the project, story 
being foregrounded rather than the ludological aspects of gameplay being 
the ends in itself.’67 Ultimately, therefore, Biggin’s conclusions reaffirm the 
textual paradigm that conceives immersive theatre experiences, not as 
interactive games, but as exploratory uncoverings of pre-authored narrative. 
Although Biggin’s work has many admirable components, therefore, raising 
awareness of games in theatre and performance studies to a high level, her 
work omits a consideration of games as systems that hold emergent 
narrative potential. 
In sum, this review of participatory performance within Theatre 
Studies suggests that understandings of how to design for participant 
agency can be expanded. Many of the authors cited identify the rich sensory 
experiences that participation in theatre contexts can offer and also note the 
importance of considering the particularities of audience-participants, but 
there is scope for further investigation of how the design of participatory 
performance might serve participant volition and invite transformative 
action. Gareth White provides a compelling argument that agential flexibility 
within conditioning factors of structural constraint can be found through 
intersubjective processes that build relational connections and offer new 
tactical possibilities. His proposition of procedural authorship appears to 
maintain authorial hegemony, however, setting out a deterministic design 
structure that affords only qualitative variability within a quantitatively fixed 
structure. Adam Alston’s analysis of the implicit neoliberal rhetoric at play in 
the experience economy of immersive theatre is equally compelling, but his 
tendency to affirm introspection, linking with Rancière’s ideas of 
                                                          
66 Biggin, p. 165. 
67 Biggin, p. 168. 
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autonomous perception and interpretation, seems to limit participatory 
agency to individualised self-transformation.  
In contrast with Alston’s emphasis on autonomous introspection, 
Josephine Machon’s discussion of communitas in immersive theatre 
presents a positive vision of democratic communitarianism, but I argue that 
being subsumed by the aesthetics of immersive immediacy undercuts 
individuated subjectivity and critical reflexivity with the result that 
participant agency is restricted. Most significantly, for my purposes, 
Machon’s discussion of game-like features in immersive theatre suggests 
quite a narrow understanding how games are designed and how they afford 
agency to players. Rose Biggin’s work makes a significant contribution 
towards remedying this limitation, but her argument that narrative 
immersion matters more than interactivity sets up an oversimplified 
dichotomy between narrative experience and player agency in participatory 
performance. This ultimately leads to a return to the textual paradigm that 
treats immersive theatre works as narrative puzzles filled with latent content 
that is to be archeologically uncovered, rather than emergent systems of 
narrative possibility that foreground the generative agency of players. There 
is fertile scope, therefore, to offer new ideas on how ludic strategies might be 
applied in participatory performance to promote agency and the potential for 
cultural transformation. Consequently, the following section considers 
insights from game studies and play anthropology to propose an approach to 
participatory performance design that foregrounds the creative agency of 
participants in games and the potential of play to expand the capacities of its 
players.
 
2.2 Play in Game Studies and Anthropology 
Game Studies is a relatively new subject of academic enquiry, having 
emerged as a discrete field at the turn of the twenty-first century,1 but 
theorists in this new area of study have sought to build upon the work of 
                                                          
1 Espen Aarseth, ‘Computer Game Studies, Year One’, Game Studies: The International 
Journal of Computer Game Research, 1:1 (2001) 
<http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/editorial.html> [accessed 4 May 2019]. 
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earlier scholars of games, including the previously cited Johan Huizinga and 
Roger Caillois. Caillois’ work has been particularly influential, since he, 
unlike Huizinga, attempted to delineate games and play, using the term 
ludus to describe games as organised, rule-bound structures and paidia to 
describe more unstructured, playful activities. This distinction between 
games and play has been a major concern for game studies theorists, with 
much debate between ludologists, who argue that this new field should focus 
on the designed structures of games, and narratologists, who prefer to place 
attention on narratives of play experience.2 The early development of game 
studies was marked by the approach of narratology, through which scholars 
attempted to analyse games as texts. Janet Murray’s Hamlet on the Holodeck 
analysed interactive narrative exploration in the new internet age, whereby 
computer users could navigate flexible narrative pathways with the selective 
click of a mouse.3 Similarly, Espen Aarseth’s Cybertext conceptualised 
games as ‘ergodic’ literature in which players take ‘non-trivial action’ in 
defining their journey through a hypertext narrative.4 Marie Laure Ryan’s 
Narrative as Virtual Reality also argued for the centrality of narrative in 
creating immersive experiences,5 leading towards the formulation of the 
previously cited concept of ‘epistemic immersion’ through which readers of 
interactive narratives become engrossed in the fictional world by pursuing 
and uncovering latent narrative content.6 The early years of the new 
millennium saw sustained challenges to this textual paradigm in game 
studies, however. Ludologists such as Gonzalo Frasca argued for games as 
simulations that could model social scenarios and allow experimentation 
within them, rather than as a form for storytelling,7 while Katie Salen and 
                                                          
2 Espen Aarseth, ‘A Narrative Theory of Games’, in Proceedings of the Foundations of Digital 
Games Conference (2012), pp. 129-133. 
<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Espen_Aarseth/publication/254006015_A_narrativ
e_theory_of_games/links/57fb37a708ae280dd0bf9983/A-narrative-theory-of-games.pdf> 
[accessed 9 May 2019]. 
3 Janet Murray, Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narrative in Cyberspace (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
4 Espen Aarseth, Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 1. 
5 Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature 
and Electronic Media (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
6 Marie-Laure Ryan, ‘From Narrative Games to Playable Stories: Towards a Poetics of 
Interactive Narrative’, Storyworlds: A Journal of Narrative Studies, 1 (2009), 43-59. 
7 Gonzalo Frasca, ‘Rethinking agency and immersion: video games as a means of 
consciousness raising’, Digital Creativity, 12:3 (2001), 167-174 (p. 174). 
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Eric Zimmerman’s comprehensive book on game design, Rules of Play, 
offered a detailed account of how games function as complex systems.8 
Building on the work of these writers, Jesper Juul, a prominent 
proponent of the ludological approach, draws a valuable distinction between 
two types of games: games of progression and games of emergence. Juul 
argues that games of progression are composed of sequences of play 
challenges which lead through a pre-authored, or embedded, narrative 
sequence towards the completion of the game. Games of emergence, by 
contrast, are based on a set of rules which combine in response to player 
actions to generate new game states and emergent variability in how the 
narrative of the game will unfold.9 The comparison of games of progression 
and games of emergence is useful in considering applications of game play in 
participatory performance because it offers two radically different 
approaches to narrative design. Arguably, since performance makers often 
wish to craft a story experience for audiences, they tend to create games of 
progression which leads from one challenge to the next, in a linear fashion, 
towards some narrative denouement, but this linearity of progression has 
clear connections to the Aristotelian pre-determination that I have previously 
problematised.  
Although Juul’s distinction between progression and emergence is set 
in opposition to narratological analyses of games, a ludological, systems-
based approach is not incompatible with flexible narrative development. 
Gonzalo Frasca makes precisely this point when he argues that although the 
rules that compose the structure of a game are fundamental, games can 
indeed create valuable narratives.10 Similarly, C. Thi Nguyen suggests that 
although games are not narratives in themselves, they can produce 
narratives, stating that whereas ‘the audience of a narrative is told and 
interprets the story…the player of a game enacts and creates a story’.11  
                                                          
8 Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman, Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 152-168. 
9 Jesper Juul, Half-Real: Video Games Between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 5. 
10 Gonzalo Frasca, ‘Ludologists love stories too: notes from a debate that never took place’, 
Proceedings of the 2003 DiGRA Conference (2003) 
<https://www.ludology.org/articles/frasca_levelUP2003.pdf> [accessed 4 May 2019]. 
11 C. Thi Nguyen, ‘Philosophy of Games’, Philosophy Compass, 12:8 (2017), 1-18 (p. 4). 
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Consequently, my consideration of games investigates how game design can 
invite players to create emergent narratives and I argue that emergence in 
this context arises from the variability that is inherent in complex systems. 
As I have argued previously, in my consideration of the similarities between 
Bourdieu’s field theory and systems thinking, the constraints that systemic 
structures impose on agents need not be viewed as inevitably repressive. 
Rather, the active agents in a system, with their various attributes, or 
capitals, can form variable relational connections that confer new capitals 
that offer emergent potential for transformative action.  
Despite my positive appraisal of the possibilities of applying systems 
thinking in the design of participatory performance, much recent work in 
game studies has pointed out that systematised play runs the risk of 
enforcing instrumentalised activity that rhetorically reinforces the ideas of 
the designers. In his analysis of ‘persuasive games’, Ian Bogost argues that 
designers often create forms of ‘procedural rhetoric’ that lead the player 
through pre-determined steps towards desired conclusions.12 This rhetorical 
approach to games has become an increasing concern for many authors who 
note the increasing ‘gamification’ of culture. Phil Wilkinson’s ‘A Brief History 
of Serious Games’ charts the progression of instrumentalised play from 
ancient Greece, citing Plato’s argument that ‘one should regulate children’s 
play. Let them always play the same games, with the same rules…that way 
you’ll find that adult behaviour and society itself will be stable’.13 Wilkinson 
subsequently discusses the emergence of games as educational tools, as 
described by Clark Abt’s book, Serious Games,14 leading towards more 
commercially focused applications of game strategies.15 Jamie Woodcock and 
Mark Johnson focus more squarely on contemporary gamification of work as 
a ‘new mode of governmentality’, making the argument that ‘if agents can be 
encouraged towards increased production for their own sake (as they 
                                                          
12 Ian Bogost, Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2007), pp. 2-46. 
13 Armand D’Angour, ‘Plato and play: taking education seriously in ancient Greece’, 
American Journal of Play, 5:3 (2013), 293-307 (p. 299), cited in Phil Wilkinson, ‘A Brief 
History of Serious Games’, in Entertainment, Computing and Serious Games, ed. by Ralf 
Dörner; Stefan Göbel, Michael Kickmeier-Rust, Maic Masuch and Katharina Zweig (Cham: 
Springer Press, 2016), pp. 17-41 (p. 24). 
14 Clark Abt, Serious Games (New York: Viking Press, 1970). 
15 Wilkinson, p. 34. 
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perceive it), then the needs of management (production) can be met’.16 Given 
the potentially instrumental nature of system-based play in both serious 
games for educational purposes and commercial applications of gamification, 
many scholars have chosen to turn away from a ludological approach 
towards more unstructured forms of paidic play. Sebastian Deterding, for 
example, contrasts games that function as highly structured simulation 
models with play activities that are ‘dressed up’ to resemble a fictional world. 
This notion of ‘dressing up’ is suggestive of an imaginative, emotional and 
qualitative form of play experience that foregoes any attempt to create 
quantitative rules17 and I will now explore this kind of activity through 
discussions of play by anthropologist Brian Sutton-Smith and sociologist 
Thomas Henricks.  
Sutton-Smith’s highly influential book The Ambiguity of Play is focused 
on the ways that play is culturally appropriated to serve various rhetorical 
narratives that seek to instrumentalise it for ideological purposes.  His 
project is to illustrate how acts of play often rebel and resist rhetorical 
appropriation, however, with specific emphasis on the ‘hidden scripts’ of 
secret childhood play that are often perverse, cruel and phantasmagorical.18 
In contrast to previous studies of such play which, in his account, claim that 
children re-enact troubling aspects of their lived experience as a way of 
coping and adapting to their circumstances, Sutton-Smith suggests that 
phantasmagorical play goes beyond mimetic representation or simulation to 
allow players to explore more exaggerated emotional states: 
Children give their play a structure, which is based on experiencing, in 
a safe way, the intense and even potentially disturbing emotional 
relationships of actuality or fantasy. This play is not based primarily 
on a representation of everyday events – as many prior investigations 
have supposed – so much as it based on a fantasy of emotional 
events.19   
                                                          
16 Jamie Woodcock and Mark R. Johnson, ‘Gamification: what it is, and how to fight it’, The 
Sociological Review, 66:3 (2018), 542-558 (p. 546). 
17 Sebastian Deterding, ‘Make Believe in Gameful and Playful Design’, in Digital Make-
Believe, ed. by Phil Turner and J. Tuomas Harviainen (Switzerland: Springer International 
Publishing, 2016), pp. 101-124 (p. 110). 
18 Brian Sutton-Smith, The Ambiguity of Play (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997), pp. 160-172. 
19 Sutton-Smith, Ambiguity, p. 158. 
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This notion that play is about creating an emotionally exaggerated version of 
reality in a safe space of experimentation is neatly exemplified by Sutton-
Smith’s article ‘The Kissing Games of Adolescents in Ohio’ in which he 
argues that a traditional kissing game (like ‘Spin the Bottle’): 
…allows for the expression of given impulses but at the same time 
safeguards players by putting limits on the way in which these 
impulses can be expressed. That is, the game allows the player to grow 
along the lines that he desires, but it safeguards him against the 
danger of risking too much. The game is essentially an adventure of a 
non hazardous kind.20 
The ‘growth’ that can be occasioned by play in non-hazardous contexts can 
be linked to Sutton-Smith’s analysis of dreams as a form of play. Drawing on 
the work of neurobiologist Antonio Damasio, he claims that dreams serve to 
keep the brain ‘labile’, building neural connections during sleep that take 
human beings beyond the limited horizon of their lived experience, 
preventing the mind from becoming ossified by simple repetition of a 
relatively narrow range of existing knowledge.21  
Sutton-Smith extends his idea of dream play as a means of generating 
cognitive flexibility by arguing that children’s fantasy play (during their 
waking hours) is geared towards finding labile flexibility through an 
exploration, and exaggerated extension, of their lived experience that 
dismantles the constituent parts of the world as they know it and 
reassembles these parts in myriad reconfigurations: 
It takes the world apart in a way that suits their own emotional 
responses to it. As such, their play is a deconstruction of the world in 
which they live. If the world is a text, the play is a reader’s response to 
that text. There are endless possible reader responses to the orthodox 
text of growing up in childhood. There is an endless play of signifiers of 
which children and all other players are capable. All players unravel in 
some way the accepted orthodoxies of the world in which they live.22 
The argument that play promotes a labile and flexible exploration of 
potentialities is at the heart of Sutton-Smith’s overall theory of play which he 
                                                          
20 Brian Sutton-Smith, ‘The Kissing Games of Adolescents in Ohio’, Midwest Folklore, 9:4 
(1959), 189-211 (p. 208). 
21 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (New York: Grosset-Putnam, 1994), cited in Sutton-
Smith, Ambiguity, pp. 61-62. 
22 Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, sign and play in the discourse of the human sciences’, in The 
Structuralist Controversy, ed. by Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), cited in Sutton-Smith, Ambiguity, p. 166. 
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terms adaptive variability. This theory posits that play occurs as a form of 
enactive subjunctivity, which refers to action that optimistically projects 
desired future results,23 allowing humans (and other animals) to reconfigure 
existing knowledge of the world in flexible new ways in order to adapt, not to 
the present realities of their environment, but rather in preparation for 
possible futures that may transpire in a limitlessly uncertain world.24  
Sutton-Smith’s theory of play as adaptive variability is a vital concept 
for my investigation of play as a culturally transformative practice because it 
offers, I contend, a strong link between the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu and 
Baruch Spinoza which form the primary theoretical foundations of this 
study. Just as Bourdieu’s habitus describes the capitals possessed by 
individuals and the ability of individuals to deploy them, play is composed of 
knowledge gained through sense perception and the capabilities that players 
have developed through lived experience. Rather than seeing habitus and a 
limited range of existing play affordances as deterministic restrictions, 
however, the theory of adaptive variability suggests that play can enable 
players to reconfigure elements of the world as they know it in new forms of 
affective relationality, expanding their potentia to affect and be affected in a 
great many ways and enhancing their capacities to persevere as they proceed 
into uncertain futures. A useful example of the play of adaptive variability 
can be found in Sutton-Smith’s discussion of ritual performances which 
involve both reiteration of existing cultural practices and innovative 
developments that reconfigure cultural norms to imaginatively project how a 
community might function in potential futures. He argues that innovation 
within rituals enables deviation from, and reversal of, traditional roles, ‘so 
that each person can become the joker in the pack, the card who can be all 
the cards’.25 In other words, drawing on the terminology of Bourdieu and 
Spinoza, I suggest that the habitus can be provisionally reconfigured 
through play to expand the affective potentia of individuals and their ability 
to reconstitute their culture and their world. 
                                                          
23 Sutton-Smith, Ambiguity, p. 198. 
24 Sutton-Smith, Ambiguity, pp. 221-224. 
25 Victor Turner, ‘Comments and Conclusions’, in The Reversible World: Symbolic Inversion 
in Art and Society, ed. by Barbara A. Babcock (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 
p. 287-288, cited in Sutton-Smith, Ambiguity, p. 210. 
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Thomas Henricks builds upon the work of Sutton-Smith by providing 
further insight into the psychological motivations of play. Henricks proposes 
that players seek to impose their will upon the world, attempting to 
transform it in some way, with a ‘consummatory’ attitude that values the 
intrinsic enjoyment of action in the present moment,26 and he claims that 
this activity creates ascending meaning by opening up new possibilities for 
experience and understanding.27 Alongside the creation of ascending 
meaning, however, he proposes that play-like activities can be applied within 
non-play contexts to solidify, rather than expand, the cultural 
understandings of the society in question, in a process that he terms 
descending meaning.28 For example, Henricks claims, in contrast to Sutton-
Smith, that ritual is the opposite of play, arguing that such activity, though 
it may appear to be playful, is geared towards the reinforcement of existing 
cultural values.29 This view is affirmed by Deterding’s discussion of the 
Amish ritual of rumspringa, in which young men spend a year in the world 
outside their community, with the implicit aim of reaffirming their conviction 
that the Amish way of life is better than the lifestyles of the modern world.30 
Henricks also argues, with regard to the communitas of festival gatherings, 
that ascending meaning is curtailed by assimilation into the crowd,31 while 
work is also described as an activity of descending meaning, despite the 
apparently playful nature of many enjoyable work activities, since it is 
focused on the instrumentalised use-value of the products of labour.32  
Henricks’ discussion of play as work is particularly pertinent to 
deployments of play-like activities in participatory performance. For example, 
if we consider a footballer, messing around with a ball in a playground, for 
no other reason than the desire to impose their will on the world by 
controlling the ball and enjoying the consummatory experience of expanding 
                                                          
26 Thomas S. Henricks, Play and the Human Condition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2015), pp. 43-44. 
27 Henricks, Human Condition, p. 50. 
28 Henricks, Human Condition, p. 76. 
29 Henricks, Human Condition, p. 55. 
30 Sebastian Deterding, ‘The Ambiguity of Games: Histories and Discourses of a Gameful 
World’, in The Gameful World: Approaches Issues, Applications, ed. by Stefan P. Walz and 
Sebastian Deterding (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), pp. 23-64 (p. 25). 
31 Henricks, Human Condition, pp. 59-60. 
32 Henricks, Human Condition, p. 53. 
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their capacities, who is suddenly transported into the context of a 
professional match in a packed stadium, the activity arguably changes from 
play into Performance work.33 Subsequently, in this new setting, extrinsic 
rewards, like public adulation or financial gain may surpass the intrinsic 
rewards of manipulating the ball. Similarly, a participant in an interactive 
theatre piece cannot play for the sake of their own intrinsic enjoyment if they 
are required to Perform, or work, for the extrinsic reward of spectatorial 
approbation, or to assist in facilitating the success of the production in 
question. A clear example of the transition from play to Performance can be 
found in the recent rise of professional esports, in which video game players 
complete for substantial cash prizes whilst being watched by large numbers 
of spectators, both live and online. Tom Brock discusses this gaming 
phenomenon in relation to Caillois’ argument that play must be a free 
activity that is entered into voluntarily,34 arguing that the professionalisation 
of digital gaming can create non-voluntary play in which players are required 
to spend vast quantities of time repetitively practicing play actions in order 
to Perform successfully and win prize money.35  
Henricks’ model of ascending/descending meaning can be linked with 
a distinction between two different motivational states that may be 
experienced in play: telic and paratelic. Jaakko Stenros states that telic 
motivation pursues the fulfilment of extrinsic rewards which can include 
financial reward or spectatorial adulation, while paratelic motivation 
pursues the intrinsic rewards that are inherent in the play activity itself.36 
This delineation of telic and paratelic motivation has an important bearing 
on Sutton-Smith’s theory of adaptive variability and the possibility that play 
                                                          
33 I apply a capitalisation of Performance to indicate a distinction between performance (with 
a small p) that is focused on the intrinsic experience of the activity in question and 
Performance (with a capital P) that is focused on extrinsic rewards. In other words, whereas 
play that is undertaken for its own sake can be described as performance, play that is 
geared towards some extrinsic objective, beyond the activity itself, can be described as 
Performance with a capital P. 
34 Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), p. 159, 
cited in Tom Brock, ‘Roger Caillois and E-Sports: On the Problems of Treating Play as Work’, 
Games and Culture, 12:4 (2017), 321-339 (p. 322). 
35 Brock, pp. 327-328. 
36 Jaakko Stenros, ‘Behind Games: Playful mindsets and transformative practices’, in The 
Gameful World: Approaches, Issues, Applications, ed. by Stefan P. Walz and Sebastian 
Deterding (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014), pp. 201-222 (p. 203). 
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in participatory performance might facilitate it. I contend that in instances 
when a participant is subjected to the observation and judgement of external 
spectators in a theatrical context they may become more of a Performance 
worker, rather than a player, and if a Performance worker is required to 
pursue the telic motivation of extrinsic reward in the form of spectatorial 
approval, they are more likely to display their relative mastery of pre-existing 
skills and knowledge. This conflicts with the exploratory play of ascending 
meaning, which is more likely to occur, I suggest, in instances of paratelic 
play that are motivated by intrinsic rewards. 
The distinction between paratelic and telic motivation raises an 
important issue about the extent to which game play should be seen to exist 
autonomously, in a separate sphere to everyday life. Theorists such as 
Huizinga and Caillois are insistent that play must be autonomously focused 
on the intrinsic rewards of the activity, with Huizinga’s ‘magic circle’ serving 
as the conceptual barrier that ensures this separation from external 
considerations.37 It is important to stress, however, that although I have 
argued that play in pursuit of intrinsic rewards is more likely to yield 
experimental discoveries, this need not imply that play must retain total 
autonomous separation from the outside world. Stenros argues that players 
continually shift between paratelic and telic motivational states38 and he 
makes a compelling case that the magic circle should be seen as permeable 
so that it can function both as an interstice of playful experimentation, but 
also as a space that feeds the results of such experimentation back into the 
everyday reality.39 The connection between the inside and the outside of the 
play space is important in linking the expansion of potential that might 
occur in play with ‘real world’ action. Consequently, rather than seeing the 
magic circle of play as a fully liminal space, I suggest that it is more 
                                                          
37 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A study of the play element in culture, trans. by R.F.C. 
Hull (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1949), p. 10. 
38 Michael J. Apter, ‘A Structural-Phenomenology of Play’, in Adult Play: A Reversal Theory 
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productive to view it as a ‘liminoid’ interstice40 so that the play that occurs 
can be understood to take place simultaneously in the real world and in the 
imaginary world of the game. Conceiving the play space as a liminoid 
interstice recognises that it is a strictly temporary space of alterity in which 
new possibilities may be tested then potentially carried back to the ‘real 
world’.   
Thomas Henricks affirms a balanced perspective between the inside 
and outside of play, arguing that unstructured play that is focused on 
intrinsic motivations tends to become structured so that it can become 
accessible to others who are initially outside the magic circle.41 In other 
words, paidic play that occurs autonomously does not need to remain in an 
isolated bubble of intrinsic, paratelic motivation. According to Henricks, play 
is given a structure so that the magic circle can open out to incorporate a 
wider heteronomy and, in considering the culturally transformative potential 
of play, the question of the relative autonomy or heteronomy of play is of 
essential concern. Although the experimental potential of play is heightened, 
I contend, when players pursue paratelic motivation without consideration of 
telic rewards of the external world, if these experimental discoveries are to be 
shared with the external world, it must be possible for the magic circle to 
open its borders to a wider heteronomy.  
Elaborating on the divergence between autonomous and 
heteronomous play, Henricks links his discussion of intrinsically motivated 
play with Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of ‘flow’, a state of being which 
occurs when an individual is engaged in an activity that is challenging 
enough to generate arousal and interest but not so challenging that they 
experience anxiety or frustration.42 In this state, according to 
Csikszentmihalyi, the task at hand is enjoyable to undertake and becomes 
engrossing, to the point where ‘goals lose their substance and reveal 
themselves as mere tokens that justify the activity’. Essentially, ‘the doing is 
                                                          
40 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York: PAJ 
Publishing, 1982), pp. 44-45.  
41 Thomas S. Henricks, ‘Reason and Rationalisation: A Theory of Modern Play’, American 
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the thing’ and, through the intrinsic enjoyment of doing, ‘there is little 
distinction between self, environment, between stimulus and response, or 
between past, present and future’.43 These descriptions of the intrinsic 
motivations of flow activity are strongly suggestive of autonomous action, but 
in the same way that I have argued that play cannot exist solely in an 
autonomous bubble, I suggest that flow need not be seen as antithetical to 
telic motivations. For Csikszentmihalyi, the experience of flow is most likely 
to be found in activities that ‘are part of a structured life’s purpose’.44 This 
creates the sense that there is ‘good’ flow in productive, healthy activities, as 
opposed to ‘bad’ flow in activities that are seen as a waste of time, like 
playing video games.45 This clearly suggests that telic motivations of a 
‘structured life’s purpose’ cannot be dispensed with, which implies that a 
flow state cannot be considered as entirely autonomous and based solely on 
intrinsic motivation.  
Beyond the question of whether fully autonomous, intrinsic motivation 
in flow is possible, the fact that flow invites a loss of self-awareness and loss 
of one’s sense of time, prompts me to problematise it in the same way that I 
have questioned communitas and the immediacy of ‘praesence’ in Josephine 
Machon’s account of immersive theatre. My contention is that a flow state, 
despite being highly gratifying, appears to preclude the possibility of critical 
reflexivity, which I argue is a key aspect of the culturally transformative 
potential of play. Instead, I find greater value in Greg Costikyan’s proposal of 
‘interrupted flow’ as an objective of play design, which can combine the 
intrinsic rewards of a flow state with the critical value of reflexivity: 
Many games benefit precisely from jarring the player out of any sense 
of flow. Puzzle games are one example. Upon completing one puzzle 
and encountering the next, a player of this sort of game is not likely to 
feel ‘I am in the zone, I am master of this. I react and do the next thing 
with preternatural ease’ – rather, he is likely to think ‘Holy crap, what 
                                                          
43 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, ‘A Theoretical Model for Enjoyment’, in The Improvisation 
Studies Reader: Spontaneous Acts, ed. by Rebecca Caines and Ajay Heble (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015), pp. 150-162 (p. 151). 
44 John Hamon Salisbury and Penda Tomlinson, ‘Reconciling Csikszentmihalyi’s Broader 
Flow Theory with Meaning and Value in Digital Games’, Transactions of the Digital Games 
Research Association, 2:2 (2016), 55-77 (p.69). 
<http://todigra.org/index.php/todigra/article/view/34> [accessed 9 May 2019]. 
45 Robert Kubey and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, ‘Television Addiction is no mere metaphor’, 
Scientific American, 286:2 (2002), 74-80, cited in Salisbury and Tomlinson, pp. 64-65. 
52 
 
do I do now?’ That is, he is immediately jarred out of anything like a 
flow state and forced to grapple with new problems, to think about 
what he must do next.46  
In other words, in contrast to valorisations of flow as a state of being that 
sets an individual in an autonomous bubble of intrinsic motivation with little 
reflexive consideration of the outside world, I contend that interruptions to 
flow can be conducive to useful critical thinking, prompting reflexive 
consideration of how the actions within the magic circle of play might relate 
to wider social circumstances.  
Like Costikyan, game studies theorist Mary Flanagan affirms the value 
of reflexivity, calling for a radical game design that promotes critical, reflexive 
consideration of the world through play. For the purposes of this study, 
Flanagan’s references to applications of play in art are of particular interest. 
She cites the work of the Dadaists and Surrealists, describing their use of 
chance procedures to dismantle the hegemony of the artist and invite the 
audience to share in meaning making47 and her account of the Situationist 
dérive also articulates the endeavour to promote playful transgressions that 
challenge conventional ways of navigating urban space.48 Similarly, her 
descriptions of works of the Fluxus movement, such as Fluxus kits, which 
offered unperformable sets of instructions for the use of apparently random 
selections of objects, are suggestive of forms of play that ‘open everyday life 
to more careful examination, rendering social movements as acts of 
exchange, or opportunities to critique larger situations’.49  
Flanagan links her advocacy of reflexive criticality in playful art with 
contemporary digital games, referencing Darfur is Dying, a serious game 
designed by students at the University of Southern California about refugees 
in Sudan attempting to survive by foraging food and water whilst 
simultaneously trying to avoid the Janjaweed militia. She comments that 
whereas mainstream commercial games attempt to create a flow state of 
challenge and satisfaction as players find the balance between their play 
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skills and the tasks within the game, Darfur is Dying ‘sobers feelings of 
accomplishment, and allows players to feel the distance between a game and 
the real-world situation’.50 Flanagan’s approach to the aesthetics of 
reflexivity is strongly apparent in a recent article comparing digital and non-
digital iterations of a collaborative two-player game about public health 
strategies for disease control. The results of the study in question showed 
that, in the digital game, players’ focused immersion within the digital 
interface led them to play the game faster, with less conversation between 
collaborators on the implications of their next move. Flanagan’s assertion is 
that the aesthetic framing of the non-digital version of game, in which 
players had to manipulate pieces on a physical game board, resulted in 
slower play which fostered a greater degree of reflexivity through dialogue.51 
A similar point is made in Evan Torner’s analysis of table-top role-play 
games. Torner argues that this form of collaborative storytelling promotes 
reflexivity because the design format transparently shows its mechanisms in 
contrast to more immersive forms of play: 
A self-reflexive TTRPG is one that, in the written text or play-as-text, 
renders conscious and unfamiliar these performances and the 
mechanisms that produce them. They expose the machinery, whilst 
keeping it running.52    
In other words, in much the same way that Bertolt Brecht exposed the 
machinery of theatre to audiences as a means of generating defamiliarization 
and critical reflexivity,53 a non-immersive approach in play that interrupts 
flow can be conducive to reflexive thought. 
My argument for reflexivity in play is strongly influenced by a belief in 
asymmetry as a factor of design that promotes emergent instability and the 
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critical thinking of players. For example, in his critique of Hex, a strategy 
board game that is played on a hexagonal grid, Costikyan states: 
In a perfectly symmetrical game like Hex, all players strive for identical 
goals, with identical starting capabilities, and it is therefore typically 
straightforward to determine the degree to which an action benefits 
yourself and/or injures other players. The symmetrical nature of the 
game means that, all things being equal, players’ analytic paths tend 
to follow the same line. The moment a degree of asymmetry is 
introduced, players come to value the actions available to them 
differently, and analysing play requires them to try to understand 
what and why other players are doing what they are doing.54 
Costikyan’s argument, building on his proposal of interrupted flow, is that 
asymmetrical design promotes a stronger recognition of difference, which 
heightens the affective sensitivity of players and leads to a reflexive 
consideration of divergent avenues of potential action.55 Vittorio Marone also 
applies the concept of asymmetry in his description of play contexts that are 
open to a plurality of participants, arguing that ‘dynamic asymmetry…can 
lead to a spontaneous evolution of roles, from peripheral to central, from 
reader to author and from player to designer’.56 Similarly, Thomas 
Markussen and Eva Knutz claim that ‘participation in art as in ordinary life 
is never symmetrical or equal; it will always rely on an asymmetrical 
distribution of control’.57 Markussen and Knutz do not frame this inequality 
as negative, however. Instead, they point to the capacity for asymmetrical 
social play ‘to increase resilience in the players by reconfiguring the social 
relationship between them’58 so that they can ‘play imaginatively with 
alternative identities, forbidden identities and even identity switching’.59  
As I have previously suggested in my discussion of Bourdieu’s field 
theory and complex systems, variability of potentialities (and a reflexive 
awareness of this variability) can be generated by the development of new 
relational connections. Similar arguments are made by Nick Crossley who 
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references George Herbert Mead’s work on role-play to concretise his ideas 
on how people develop reflexive awareness of their potential to develop new 
capacities. According to Mead, in Crossley’s articulation, individuals become 
aware of their own ‘self’ by ‘adopting the role of another in relation towards 
their “self”’.60 Subsequently, the ongoing absorption of the perspectives of 
others enables them to reflexively alter their habitual dispositions: 
Perspectives are constantly coming into contact, affording agents a 
new viewpoint upon their self and generating new synthetic and hybrid 
cultural forms which can never achieve taken-for-grantedness. We are 
creatures of habit, for Mead, but we are equally conversational agents 
and our conversational tendencies, whilst rooted in habit, tend to 
disturb at least some of our sedimented repertoires of action, bringing 
them into view for us. Tradition and culture lose some of their grip 
upon us by virtue of our experientially-rooted awareness of their 
relativity.61 
Mary Flanagan makes similar arguments to those offered by Crossley, calling 
for works of critical play as interstitial sites of relational affectivity. For 
example, she describes Ariana Souzis’ Cell Phone Free Temporary 
Autonomous Zone, inspired by the Temporary Autonomous Zones advocated 
by anarchist writer Hakim Bey,62 in which participants create a space of 
sociality that is free from mobile phones to create an interstice that deviates 
from the normative behaviour of constant engagement with digital devices. 
According to Flanagan, this type of interstitial space, which is clearly framed 
as (partially) separate from the ‘real world’, can create emergent possibility 
through asymmetry, enabling participants to form new types of relational 
connection that destabilise their subjectivity.63 Following Flanagan’s 
arguments, I suggest that game-based interstices have the potential to 
expand the affective potentia of players who play within them as new 
relational connections confer new capitals. Reflexive awareness of this 
expanded affective power can, in turn, be generated through interrupted flow 
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that combines the intrinsic enjoyment of play with critical reflection on 
possible connections between the space of play and the outside world.  
Having discussed a number of perspectives in theatre studies on how 
play can enhance the creative and political agency of audiences in 
participatory performance, this review of game studies and play 
anthropology provides useful insights into processes of game and play design 
that might enhance potential for cultural transformation. Jesper Juul’s 
analyses of games of progression and games of emergence highlights the 
importance of understanding systems thinking in game design, looking 
beyond the limitations of linear progression in favour of emergent variability. 
Highly structural ludological approaches tend to focus less on the social and 
emotional aspects of play, however, and I have discussed anthropological 
accounts of play activities to address this shortcoming, focusing on Brian 
Sutton-Smith’s theory of adaptive variability, which suggests that play 
functions as a method of reconfiguring emotional experiences of the world to 
prepare more diverse capacities for uncertain futures.  
Thomas Henricks builds on Sutton-Smith’s work by illustrating how 
the motivational states of players shape the play actions that emerge, with 
telic motivations that pursue extrinsic rewards tending towards the 
descending meaning of cultural consolidation, as opposed to intrinsically 
motivated play that tends towards ascending meaning and culturally 
transformative potential. In discussing intrinsic motivation in play, I have 
problematised Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow, given that it suggests a 
diminishment of subjective self-awareness and the ability to exercise 
reflexivity. The arguments of Mary Flanagan and Greg Costikyan provide 
useful alternatives to flow, however, proposing the design of interstitial play 
spaces characterised by asymmetry, which offer potential for destabilising 
the subjectivity of players, interrupting flow and prompting reflexive 
considerations of how the play activity might relate to a wider world. 
Although these analyses of games and play offer useful insights into game 
design, the psychological motivations of play and the politically iconoclastic 
potential that play might hold, they lack a thorough consideration of the 
aesthetics of play experience. Consequently, the final section of this chapter 
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discusses applications of play in participatory art with the aim of setting out 
arguments for an experiential aesthetics of playful participatory 
performance.
2.3 Play in Fine Art 
Alongside the rapid expansion, in recent decades, of participatory 
forms of theatre and performance, in fine art contexts, participatory works 
have gained increasing prominence since the 1990s, following Nicolas 
Bourriaud’s proposal of relational aesthetics as a conceptual approach to 
practices that foreground social relations between participants as the 
substance of the artwork. In linking Bourriaud’s ideas with play, Mary 
Flanagan claims that ‘rather than encountering a work of art that may have 
been formerly perceived as a visual experience, Bourriaud’s art consumer 
contributes his whole body, complete with its history and behaviour and is 
no longer an abstract physical presence’. This leads her to propose that in 
playful art practices, ‘the dynamic relationships between actors…form their 
own unique aesthetic that is performative and social’.1 The notion that the 
sociality of participatory art constitutes a new aesthetic has been challenged, 
however, by Claire Bishop, who suggests that the pursuit of a collaborative 
‘social bond’ creates a damaging focus on social ‘equality’ rather than 
aesthetic ‘quality’: 
Instead of supplying the market with commodities, participatory art is 
perceived to channel art’s symbolic capital towards constructive social 
change…but the urgency of this social task has led to a situation in 
which socially collaborative practices are all perceived to be equally 
important artistic gestures of resistance: there can be no failed, 
unsuccessful, unresolved or boring works of participatory art, because 
all are equally essential to the task of repairing the social bond.2 
In other words, Bishop argues that social and political efficacy are the 
criteria upon which participatory works are judged, at the expense of 
aesthetic evaluation, a point which resonates with Miwon Kwon’s critical 
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view that it is necessary to ‘break through the halo-like armature of do-
goodism’ that shields community-based artists from ‘incisive analysis and 
criticism’.3 Bishop also claims that participatory strategies have been 
appropriated by neoliberal movements, affirming Adam Alston’s correlation 
of neoliberalism and productive participation in immersive theatre. She 
suggests that under the public arts funding policies of the New Labour 
government in the United Kingdom, public participation in the arts has been 
valorised as a means of remedying ‘social exclusion’, but she argues that, far 
from seeking to genuinely help people from deprived backgrounds, this is 
geared towards fostering self-sufficiency amongst communities who had 
previously relied on the state.4 Essentially, then, Bishop views participatory 
art either a means of creating enforced neoliberal self-sufficiency or enforced 
communitarianism, both of which impose a false consensus that constrains 
the interpretive freedom of participants and ignores questions of artistic 
quality.  
Bishop’s ideas are strongly influenced by Jacques Rancière’s views on 
the autonomy of art and she argues that art should express the singular 
autonomy of the artist, rather than focusing primarily on socially 
ameliorative aims.5 She claims that the tendency of ‘socially engaged’ 
participatory art to pursue consensus makes participants so sensitive to 
anything potentially discordant that they self-censor disruptive impulses, 
leading to bland homogenisation.6 Her response to this is to advocate a 
‘fidelity to singularised desire’ in the work of artists, arguing that: 
Instead of obeying a super-egoic injunction to make ameliorative art, 
the most striking, moving and memorable forms of participation are 
produced when artists act upon a gnawing social curiosity without the 
incapacitating restrictions of guilt.7 
Bishop’s contention is that guilt-free artistic practice enables artists to 
create provocative works that, instead of seeking ameliorative consensus, 
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generate an antagonism which she sees as holding greater potential for the 
radical redistribution of the sensible that Rancière envisages.  
In setting out her arguments for antagonism, Bishop praises the work 
of artists whose work directly displays an antagonistic quality, suggesting 
that this functions as provocation for lively political debate. A prominent 
example can be found in Santiago Sierra’s 250 cm Line Tattooed on 6 Paid 
People, in which the artist tattooed a two and half metre line on the backs of 
a group of young unemployed Cuban men.8 In considering this work and 
Bishop’s positive appraisal of it, Jason Miller comments that ‘aesthetically 
rendered exploitation is presumed to be not only qualitatively distinct from 
exploitation as such, but ethically privileged, insofar as it is in the bigger 
business of raising awareness via artistic production’.9 Miller expresses 
scepticism towards the idea that this type of work raises any increased 
awareness of exploitation, but he goes further to challenge some of the 
theoretical presuppositions of Bishop’s approach. In addition to the work of 
Rancière, Bishop has been strongly influenced by Chantal Mouffe’s political 
philosophy of agonistics,10 which proposes that radical democracy must 
stage contests between differing ideologies rather than seeking a consensus 
that neutralises political discord.11 As quoted by Miller, however, Mouffe is 
careful to point out that agonism should not be equated with a destructive 
antagonism that presumes to be politically revelatory: 
This perspective, while claiming to be very radical, remains trapped 
within a very deterministic framework according to which the negative 
gesture is, in itself, enough to bring about the emergence of a new 
form of subjectivity; as if this subjectivity was already latent, ready to 
emerge as soon as the weight of the dominant ideology would have 
been lifted. Such a conception is, in my view, completely anti-
political.12 
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Similarly, although Bishop sees her approach to art criticism as being 
closely aligned to Rancière’s philosophy, Stephen Corcoran argues, in 
contrast to Bishop’s proposal of antagonism between rival positions, that 
Rancière’s approach ‘has nothing to do with the forms of struggle associated 
with the supposed divide between friend and enemy’.13 Tony Fisher also 
queries Bishop’s position and points out that agonistic confrontation may, in 
fact, tend towards conservative reaffirmation of dominant values, rather than 
offering radical political potential: 
The catharsis induced by the trial of tragic drama, as intended by 
Aristotle, is grasped precisely as an agonic trial: one must experience 
‘the conflict of opposites’, one must learn that to ‘cure an evil’ one 
must empty ‘evil’ for only in this way can the spectator learn to 
mitigate its effects, and be led to a sense of ‘due proportion’.14 
Consequently, despite the fact that her theories are intended to align with 
the radical redistribution of the sensible that is called for by Jacques 
Rancière’s philosophy, the antagonistic confrontation that Bishop calls for 
may be more likely to reinforce dominant ideologies, as agonistic contests 
expel dangerous extremes to create the ‘mean’ of ‘due proportion’, in line 
with Aristotelian virtue.15  
By focusing on the guilt-free autonomy of the artist who follows their 
singularised desire in producing antagonistic works, Bishop creates a vision 
of participatory art in which the agency of participants is of limited 
importance compared with the agency of the artist. She proposes that 
participants in art function as a kind of ‘living currency’, suggesting that 
human bodies and their affective labour may be used as material by the 
artist.16 Bishop claims that it is justifiable for artists to use participants’ 
bodies and cultural identities as material because this naturally coincides 
with the practices of ‘a service industry that increasingly relies upon the 
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marketing of certain qualities in human beings’.17 Leaving aside, once again, 
the ethical disquiet that this might cause, I contend that Bishop’s tendency 
to view participants in art as material components in the artist’s composition 
is symptomatic of a persistent reluctance to move beyond the aesthetic 
concept of the art object. Bishop’s focus on the primacy of the art object is 
made clear through the numerous examples she provides of works in which 
participants Perform and are observed by spectators, such as La Familia 
Obrera by Argentinian artist Oscar Bony, who hired a working-class family 
and displayed them on a plinth in an art gallery.18 In my view, such work 
ought not to be described as participatory art at all, since it is concerned 
with spectatorship of performative objects, with no consideration of what the 
work might mean to the participants involved. Essentially, Bishop does not 
examine the important aesthetic distinction between Performance that is 
displayed for the extrinsic reward of spectatorial approval and participatory 
play that is geared solely towards the experience of participants. Notions of 
experiential aesthetics are gaining increased recognition, however, as 
neuroscientific advances highlight the fundamentally aesthetic nature of 
human perception. For example, in a recent article on the cognitive 
neuroscience of aesthetic experience, Ellen Dissanayake and Stephen Brown 
critique the tendency of traditional art criticism to focus solely on the 
aesthetic affects generated by art objects, arguing that: 
It is important to emphasise that the efficacy of the arts in terms of 
human behaviour is dependent upon the production and perception of 
ALL TYPES of emotions and not just object-based emotions. We 
suggest that one of the most significant (and understudied) emotions 
that drives the arts is social affiliation, an emotion of strong reward 
value.19 
Bishop does discuss a small number of participatory works that do not 
function as performative objects to be viewed by spectators, but there is less 
emphasis on the value of ‘social affiliation’, which appears to disregard the 
aesthetic affects that such social exchanges might produce. For example, she 
                                                          
17 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by Gregory Elliott 
(London: Verso Books, 2007), p. 444, cited in Bishop, Artificial, p. 231. 
18 Bishop, Artificial, p. 113. 
19 Ellen Dissanayake and Stephen Brown, ‘The arts are more than aesthetics: 
Neuroaesthetics as narrow aesthetics’, in Neuroaesthetics, ed. by Martin Skov and Oshin 
Vartanian (New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 43-56 (p. 52). 
62 
 
criticises Sanctuary, a piece about members of a community suffering from 
housing inequality by The Blackie, a community arts group in Liverpool, 
because of its polemical political agenda and because she finds it to be 
artistically chaotic, with several improvised performance actions occurring 
simultaneously.20 What Bishop does not focus on, however, is the possibility 
that, in the absence of spectators, aesthetic value in this piece might come 
from the affective experience of participants, through an autopoietic 
feedback loop of intersubjective exchange, without any concern for how the 
performance action might be viewed by external audiences.  
In contrast to her criticism of the highly social work of The Blackie, 
Bishop reserves her most positive critique for works that allow participants 
to go their own way, in keeping with Rancière’s arguments for the singular 
autonomy of the emancipated spectator. In her discussion of artists working 
in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, she 
compellingly argues that forced collectivisation prompted many artists to 
turn towards more introspective and personal work. Her account of the 
Collective Actions Group in Moscow is particularly vivid, describing works 
like Ten Appearances, which invited ten people, each holding an unravelling 
spool of white thread, to walk away from each other across a snowy field. 
The creator of this work, Andrei Monastyrsky, describes it as an ‘empty 
action’ and, according to Bishop, he appears resolutely opposed to ascribing 
meaning to the work.21 In the apparent emptiness of the experience, it is left 
for participants to create their own meaning, which would seem to provide 
an exemplary case study of Rancière’s emancipated spectatorship, with an 
‘aesthetic cut’ that precludes the imposition of authorial intention, inviting 
autonomous perception and interpretation. I would like to call attention, 
however, to what I see as a paradox in Rancière’s vision of singular 
autonomy in aesthetic perception. In discussing the work of The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster, Rancière argues for the autonomous freedom of students, like 
the participants in Ten Appearances, to explore the world and form their own 
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opinions. He also valorises the refusal of the schoolmaster, like Monastyrsky, 
to impose his own viewpoint, so that: 
Instead of attempting to teach them his knowledge, he orders them to 
venture into the forest of things and signs, to say what they have seen 
and what they think of what they have seen. To verify and have it 
verified.22 
The apparent contradiction that emerges from this, however, is that 
although the students are autonomous in their explorations, they need to 
verify the perceptions of others and have their own perceptions verified, 
which implies intersubjective exchange, not emancipation through 
autonomy. Similarly, despite the seemingly isolated participatory experience 
in Ten Appearances, Bishop acknowledges that this work inspired numerous 
written hermeneutic analyses by participants which were meticulously 
collected together in book form and distributed to the ten people who 
enacted the work.23 Consequently, although the subjective interpretations of 
participants will have been widely divergent, the fact that the artwork 
included a gathering together of these interpretations implies a form of 
reflexive dialogue on the substance of the experience which should, in my 
view, be considered as a major feature of its experiential aesthetic value.  
In contrast to the arguments for artistic autonomy offered by Bishop, 
Grant Kester presents a vision of participatory art that is founded upon 
dialogue and intersubjective exchange. Rather than viewing participatory 
action as material to be manipulated and objectified by the artist, as Bishop 
claims, Kester argues that the artist of participatory work should be seen as 
a ‘context provider’,24 framing interstitial spaces of collaborative action, 
designed in response to the cultural particularity of those who play within 
them. The notion that the artist can create contexts for creativity, as 
opposed to fashioning art objects, has grown in popularity since the 
emergence in the 1990s of ‘new genre public art’, a term originated by 
American artist Suzanne Lacy to describe socially engaged art projects that 
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were designed in opposition to the creation of public art sculptures in social 
spaces.25 This trend runs in parallel with relational aesthetics, as described 
by Nicolas Bourriaud, but Kester’s work is set in opposition to Bourriaud’s 
approach, proposing ‘dialogical art’ as an alternative term.26  
Kester argues that although many works described under the banner 
of relational aesthetics pursue the laudable aim of creating social conviviality 
to overcome what Bourriaud describes as ‘the general mechanisation of 
functions’ caused by technology that ‘gradually reduces the relational 
space’,27 they often appear to disregard the specificity of social sites and the 
people who occupy them. For example, Kester references Rikrit Tiravanija’s 
relational work Tomorrow is Another Day which involved the reconstruction 
of the kitchen of the artist’s New York apartment in a gallery space, which 
was subsequently made available to participants for cooking, eating and 
conversing. Following its initial iteration in the United States, this piece was 
transposed to a gallery in Cologne at a time when the local police were in the 
process of driving out a settlement of homeless people near the gallery. In 
Kester’s account, the enactment of this work at this time, and in this 
particular context, drew strong criticism from local artists, one of whom 
claimed that: 
They act as if they are being so generous in making this room available 
when really they are doing nothing at all. It is a meaningless 
statement. At the same time they are making this grand gesture, fifty 
homeless people are being ordered to clear out of the camp and go. It 
fits perfectly with the rhetoric of globalism, with its empty platitudes 
and its commitment to image over real change.28  
Kester is quick to point out that Tiravanija cannot be blamed for the eviction 
of the homeless community near the art gallery but he argues, nonetheless, 
that this project ‘suggests the difficulties faced by artists who claim a 
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dedication to dialogue but ignore the (political, social and cultural) context in 
which dialogue is situated’.29  
Whereas works of relational aesthetics seem to provide participatory 
encounters of instantaneous immediacy, with less consideration of context, 
the dialogic works that Kester promotes emerge from ‘extended dialogue and 
personal interaction with the groups and individuals involved’.30 For 
example, he identitifies Concerning Our Present Way of Living by Stephen 
Willats as a piece that was based on a deep investigation of the social, 
educational and political contexts of participants living on a housing estate 
in Whitechapel, East London. Kester claims that this contextual engagement 
gave the artist an important insight into the habitus of the people involved 
and suggests that Willats’ approach ‘shifts the focus of art from the 
phenomenological experience of the creator fabricating an exemplary 
physical object to the phenomenological experience of his co-participants in 
the space and routines of their daily lives’.31  
Although Kester’s vision of dialogical art is firmly grounded in a 
context responsive approach, he also recognises the value of artistic projects 
that create interstitial spaces of alterity, in a similar vein to Mary Flanagan’s 
positive appraisal of interstitial play. This is evident in his description of the 
untitled boat trips created by the Austrian art collective, WochenKlausur, in 
which politicians, journalists, political activists and sex workers from the 
city of Zurich went on a series of excursions on Lake Zurich to talk about the 
problem of drug addiction in relation to prostitution. For Kester, these boat 
trips created a temporary environment that allowed figures of political power 
to ‘communicate outside the rhetorical demands of their official status’.32 
Consequently, this art event can be understood as an interstice, functioning 
as ‘an open space where individuals can break free from pre-existing roles 
and obligations, reacting and interacting in new and unforeseeable ways’.33 
The emphasis on interstitial separation in the temporary environment of the 
boat does not imply autonomous dislocation of artistic practice from 
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everyday life, however. The interstice created by the boat trips enabled 
participants to partially leave behind the constraints of their habitus, and 
temporarily occupy alternative social positions in an alternative social space, 
but the content of the dialogical exchanges that occurred retained a clear 
connection to the lived experience of those involved.  
The notion of a link between a partially separate artistic space with the 
heteronomy of everyday life connects with my previous arguments that play 
spaces are framed by a permeable magic circle. This point is affirmed by 
Sruti Bala'’s discussion of the physical and conceptual spaces of 
participatory art, in which she asserts that: 
They are not located outside social reality, in a safely cordoned area 
marked as an aesthetic space, wherein they may reflect or represent 
the world outside, undisturbed or untouched by it; rather, these two 
dimensions are porous, connected by a vector shuttling between them, 
not merely transposing ideas from one dimension to the other, but 
affecting and translating each of them in the process.34 
Consequently, although Kester proposes, with regard to WochenKlauser’s 
work, that the ‘ritual and isolation of the boat trip’ was integral to ‘the 
demand for self-reflexive attention’,35 I suggest, following on from Bala’s 
arguments, that the transitional movements into and out of the liminoid 
interstice are key to its potential for promoting reflexivity. Entering the 
interstice offers scope for the formation of new relational connections that 
can enable individuals to transcend the limitations of their habitus, but I 
suggest that, ultimately, the potential for cultural transformation depends 
on reflexive consideration of how the activity within the interstice might 
relate to the ‘real world’. Essentially, therefore, I argue for the construction of 
participatory art spaces that afford a degree of separation from everyday life, 
in line with Ellen Dissanayake’s argument that the ‘making special’ of art is 
key to its efficacy,36 whilst retaining a connection to the wider context in 
which the work is situated.  
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Kester’s model of dialogical aesthetics solidifies the idea that aesthetic 
value in participatory art can be based, not on the art object, but on the 
intersubjective exchange of participants and the transformative 
opportunities that this might present. In the context of research that focuses 
on play, however, it is necessary to expand participatory aesthetics beyond a 
relatively narrow focus on discursive interaction and consider a broader 
range of activities through which individuals are affected and affect others. 
Christina Albu, for example, provides compelling arguments for the 
substantial affective exchanges that occur between audience-participants 
through the simple act of looking together. Albu argues that ‘empathetic 
relations prompted by visual encounters can be as important in triggering 
intersubjective exchanges between people as invitations to perform similar 
activities, such as dancing or eating together’.37 Albu develops her ideas by 
discussing mirror neurons, offering the suggestion, in a similar vein to 
Nicola Shaughnessy’s work in a theatre context, that ‘viewers contemplate 
the potential for interaction or for empathetic connection with co-
participants who are simultaneously engaged in acts of affective, perceptual 
and behavioural mirroring’, leading to a kind of relational reflexivity that she 
terms ‘affective attunements’.38 
Albu’s linkage between affect and reflexive thought shares similarities 
with Falk Heinrich’s account of the aesthetics of participatory art, which 
affirms Kester’s belief that aesthetic value need not be considered as a 
characteristic of an art object. Heinrich argues for an understanding of 
beautiful experiences, setting out a tripartite theory of ‘performative beauty’ 
that unites sensory affects, agency and reflexivity in three, separate, but 
linked, actions: to do, to act and to perform.39 To do refers to the sensory 
experience of taking physical actions and the affective satisfaction that such 
actions can produce. To act refers to actions that are taken to express 
agency in some transformation of objects in the world. To perform refers to 
the reflexive understanding of what these actions might mean in broader 
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contexts. Taken together, Heinrich argues that in participatory art contexts, 
to do / to act / to perform can yield the sentiment of performative beauty as 
‘an experienced unity in action that combines reflection, sense perception 
and agency’.40  
Heinrich’s tripartite theory of participatory aesthetics is strongly 
influenced by the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey, who argues that 
aesthetics is a combination of phenomenological experience, evaluation and 
semantic meaning making.41 This link to Dewey’s ideas sets Heinrich’s 
aesthetics firmly against the notion that art should exist in autonomous 
separation from everyday life and he affirms this view by stating that 
‘aesthetic judgements cannot be executed in a vacuum external to systems 
of personal and societal values’.42 Heinrich’s combination of sensory 
experience, agential action and reflexive meaning making also challenges 
Rancière’s concept of an ‘aesthetic cut’ between poeisis (as making) and 
aisthesis (as interpretive evaluation).43 In participatory art, according to 
Heinrich, because the participant is both the maker and evaluator of their 
aesthetic experience, they simultaneously combine poeisis and aesthesis in 
their actions and reflections.44  
The inclusion of reflexivity as a vital component of Heinrich’s concept 
of ‘performative beauty’ is extremely valuable in considering the design of 
play that has culturally transformative potential. I have questioned the 
tendency of immersive theatre to undercut critical thinking through the 
application of a powerful sensory affects and Heinrich offers a similar 
critique, delineating Renaissance art, which sought to draw a sharp 
distinction between reality and fiction, and Baroque art which aimed to 
overwhelm critical reflection. He argues that ‘the baroque theatre was a place 
of spectacle where the creation of sensory affects by means of the stage 
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machinery and constantly shifting set designs triggered the spectator’s 
senses’45 and claims that ‘the baroque arts aimed at overwhelming the 
audience on sensory levels’ so that ‘reason was displaced by the senses’.46 
Heinrich carries this analysis of Baroque art forward to challenge immersion 
as an aesthetic value in participatory art because it de-individuates its 
participants, undercutting their capacity for subjective reflection as they are 
overwhelmed by sensory stimuli. He references Oliver Grau’s discussions of 
the immersive environment of the Dionysian Revel Room in which all walls 
are painted with images of revelry, not as representations, but as sheer 
presence. Grau argues that ‘the core of the Bacchic rites’ consisted of 
‘physical and psychological immersion of the individual in the god to attain 
fulfilment’ and suggests that such strategies trigger ‘a regression of 
consciousness’.47 Heinrich subsequently compares Dionysian immersion 
with the total theatre strategies of Antonin Artaud, whose work is, as I have 
previously mentioned, valorised by Josephine Machon in her discussion of 
immersive theatre: 
Immersion is associated with Dionysian formlessness and elimination 
of the reflective subject…Nietzsche tells us that the god of wine and 
ecstasy devours his devotees by wresting their reflective subjectivity 
from them. In the same vein, the theatre visionary Antonin Artaud 
conjured the devastating will of powerful presence (sheer action) on 
stage by destroying the semiotic veil of appearance.48  
Heinrich’s aversion to these immersive strategies is shared by Albu. In her 
account of participatory artworks that include mirrors and reflective surfaces 
she suggests that the literal pursuit of reflexivity is geared towards 
subverting ‘the desire for complete immersion in visual spectacle’ in favour of 
‘self-scrutiny and collective attunement’ as individuals watch themselves 
watching others. The productive consequence of such ‘self-scrutiny’, for 
Albu, is that audience-participants are challenged to ‘explore the potential 
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for self-transformation and acquire critical distance from the social or 
political systems in which they are entangled’.49   
These critical analyses of immersive strategies make a powerful case 
against sensory immersion as an aesthetic value in participatory art and an 
equally strong case for the value of reflexivity. Although Albu downplays the 
importance of language in the participatory works that she considers, for 
Heinrich the semiotic aspect of reflexive meaning making that occurs in ‘to 
perform’ is extremely important, resonating with my earlier discussion of Lev 
Vygotsky’s idea that internal language use is a vital aspect of higher 
psychological processes. Heinrich argues that ‘no work of art can do without 
a semiotic layer that allows for meaning affirmation by establishing a 
relation (and a difference) between the artwork and the surrounding world of 
which it is part’50 and although this is a rather sweeping statement that 
should not be accepted uncritically, I see value in Heinrich’s emphasis on 
the semiotic layer of meaning making. Essentially, the poiesis of 
participatory action generates simultaneous aisthesis through the 
application of representational signs in the form of internal language and I 
suggest, drawing on Vygotsky’s theories, that this ability to think with words 
is integral to the development of abstract concepts that enable participants 
to connect their embodied experience with the abstract elsewhere that is the 
surrounding world.  
In the same way that Vygotsky asserts that abstract thought is 
essential for creative imagination, Heinrich emphasises ‘agential imagination’ 
as the mechanism that ‘condenses sense perceptions into possible 
representations, thus opening up a range of possible actions and their 
anticipated results’.51 In considering this revelation of potentiality within a 
participatory artwork, Heinrich draws on Martin Heidegger’s concept of the 
clearing, which involves an unconcealment of truth or meaning.52 For 
Heinrich, the unconcealment of a clearing in digitally mediated participatory 
art involves agential action within responsive systems that provide feedback 
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to the participant on the results of their actions, unfolding an awareness of 
further potentialities.53 This unconcealment also involves a movement 
beyond the immediacy of perceiving what is being represented by the system 
towards a perception of the ‘hypermediacy’ of how the system operates.54 In 
other words, a shift from the immediacy of perception and action in the here 
and now to the hypermediacy of perceiving how the system functions 
generates the unconcealment of meaning and a conscious awareness of 
future potentialities.  
The shift from immediacy to hypermediacy directly connects with my 
arguments for a shift from an aesthetics of immersion towards an aesthetics 
of reflexivity. In contrast to immersive practices which seek to create a 
sensation of the sublime that leaves spectators awestruck by the magnitude 
of sensory overload, hypermediacy enables participants to effectively see 
through the sublime in the same way that Brecht sought to expose the 
mechanisms of theatrical illusion so that audiences could penetrate and 
fathom the complex social systems being represented.55 Consequently, I 
contend that Heinrich’s insistence on reflexive criticality, in addition to the 
sensory immediacy of ‘to do’ and ‘to act’, reaffirms my argument for 
interrupted flow that intermittently punctuates the intrinsic enjoyment of 
play with reflexive considerations of meaning that are related to the wider 
world in which play is situated. 
Building on the accounts of participatory aesthetics offered by 
Heinrich and Kester, I argue that live action role-play exemplifies an 
approach to participatory art that foregrounds the creative agency of 
participants and productively situates the locus of aesthetic value in their 
reflexive considerations of subjective experiences. In his treatise on the 
aesthetics of action in Nordic larp, Jaakko Stenros argues larps are rule-
bound and emergent,56 and although the constraints of rules might seem to 
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limit player agency and emergent possibility, my discussion of Bourdieu’s 
field theory in relation to system design in games shows that structural 
constraints, far from precluding emergence, are, in fact, the contextual 
substance of it. In other words, the rules that frame live action role-play 
designs produce an emergent variability of outcomes as players are 
prompted to adapt to the explicit or implicit rules of the fictional context and 
apply their agency to create unpredictable narratives that build upon 
structural constraints. 
In the same way that Kester’s discussion of dialogical art focuses on 
the experiential value of intersubjective exchange, larp is a fundamentally 
co-creative activity that necessarily draws upon the subjectivities of players, 
and thereby their habitus, in enacting the work.57 Preparatory workshops 
are common in larp practice, for example, enabling players to express their 
subjective agency in developing the culture of play in advance of the play 
activity itself.58 Above all, the intersubjective process of playing larps is done 
for the intrinsic reward of aesthetic experience, without the presence of an 
audience. Consequently, according to Stenros, larp ought not to be viewed as 
a commodifiable art object composed of players’ affective labour.59 Stenros 
also suggests that the practices of Nordic Larp place a strong emphasis on 
reflexivity. Although early manifestos of larp valorised total immersion so 
that players could become one with their character,60 more recent thinking 
has expressed the need to maintain reflexive awareness of the ‘steering’ that 
players exercise during play by holding onto an ongoing sense of their 
subjectivity as players, together with an awareness of how they apply their 
subjectively in manipulating the character being played.61 Similarly, the 
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evaluative process of the runda in which facilitators conduct structured 
debriefs once players have made the liminal transition out of the magic circle 
is clearly conducive to reflexivity, inviting players to critically reflect on their 
play experiences and how they might relate to the wider world.62 
In sum, understandings of larp as a rule-bound, emergent activity can 
enable participatory performance makers to apply the methods of game 
design to create flexible, non-linear narrative structures, while the co-
creative qualities of larp can help practitioners to move beyond the aesthetic 
logic of the autonomous art object and embrace the experiential aesthetic of 
intersubjective play. Additionally, in contrast to the valorisation of sensory 
immersion, larp illustrates that clear framing of the activity as an interstitial 
construction promotes a reflexivity that enables players to critically evaluate 
their play experience in a wider context.63  Consequently, I contend that 
there is fertile scope for applying the insights of Nordic larp, which can be 
seen as a form of creative practice that is simultaneously theatre, art and 




In this review of literature and creative practice, I have argued that the 
theory and practice of participatory performance can benefit greatly from 
deeper understandings of playful participation drawn from game studies, 
play anthropology and fine art. Although many theatre makers have sought 
to employ participatory methods in their work to depart from the coercive 
determinism of Aristotelian linear narrative, interactive performance 
structures often give an appearance of narrative variability and agency that 
is not delivered in actuality. My analysis of game studies has suggested that 
there are fruitful understandings to be drawn from distinguishing between 
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games of progression, which reaffirm procedural determinism, and games of 
emergence that apply systems thinking to open broader spaces of possibility 
in play. By applying a fuller understanding of how games function as 
responsive systems, I contend that participatory performance makers can 
enhance the creative volition that is offered to participants as co-authors of 
emergent play narratives. 
Beyond the issues of narrative design and participant agency, 
contemporary participatory performance in the United Kingdom has focused 
strongly on the creation of immersive environments. As I have argued in my 
analysis of Josephine Machon’s work, however, the pursuit of immersion can 
undermine reflexivity through its focus on strategies of sensory affect that 
generate the immediacy of presence in the now-moment, rather than a 
recursive and reflexive awareness of action over time. As Heinrich, Kester, 
Flanagan and Albu suggest, reflexivity is important in enabling participants 
in an artwork to engage in meaning making and, for my purposes, given my 
primary aim of investigating the culturally transformative potential of play, 
reflexivity is essential. It is important to state that my promotion of reflexivity 
does not imply a rejection of the immediate pleasures of play. Rather, my 
interest is in combining the immediacy of action with intermittent 
punctuations of reflexive thinking that enable participants to connect their 
play with the wider world in which it is situated. 
Perhaps the most contentious issue raised in this chapter is the 
tendency to view participatory art works through the critical paradigm of the 
art object. Claire Bishop’s discussion of participation in art focuses strongly 
on how the activity might be viewed and aesthetically evaluated by a 
secondary audience, while Adam Alston’s argument that the affective labour 
of audience-participants is appropriated as aesthetic material to be 
consumed by other audience members suggests a vision of immersive 
theatre as a landscape of living art objects. In order to move beyond the 
normative primacy of the art object, I contend that a deeper understanding 
of play, with specific attention to the aesthetics of play, is required. As 
Thomas Henricks has suggested, play as ascending meaning tends to be 
concerned with the intrinsic enjoyment of the activity, while play activities 
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that pursue telic rewards of extrinsic motivation often become more like 
work. In other words, participatory play that serves the work of producing an 
art object is, arguably, no longer play and I have argued that the loss of 
intrinsic motivation in favour of extrinsic goals is likely to result in a display 
of existing capacities, diminishing the play of adaptive variability through 
which players repurpose their knowledge of the world in preparation for 
uncertain futures. In contrast to Bishop’s focus on the art object, Kester’s 
work reifies the notion of aesthetic experience and his emphasis on 
intersubjective exchange as a source of aesthetic value provides a strong 
response to Rancière’s notion that an emancipatory redistribution of the 
sensible is to be found through autonomous perception and interpretation. 
Rather, in Kester’s view, culturally transformative potential lies in the 
creation of interstitial works that respond to the habitus of participants, but 
also enable them to partially relinquish the constraints of habitus, to 
reshape their subjectivities by forming new relational connections with 
others.        
To conclude, by drawing on the insights of game studies to design 
participatory performances as responsive systems, I contend that 
participatory agency and emergent narrative potential can be enhanced, and 
by reconceiving participatory performance as an aesthetic experience, rather 
than an art object, I suggest that players are more likely to engage in the 
exploratory play of adaptive variability that enables the development of new 
capacities. Fundamental to the culturally transformative potential of play, I 
suggest, is the ability of players to exercise reflexivity, and I argue that this 
is supported by adopting a critical perspective towards the aesthetics of 
immersion. Following the theory of ‘performative beauty’ offered by Falk 
Heinrich, I suggest that combination of sensory affects in the embodied play 
of to do with the agency of to act in a system of emergent possibility, together 
with the reflexivity of to perform, allows players to experience the intrinsic 
enjoyment of play, but also interrupt their flow and critically reflect on their 
activity, supporting their awareness of the adaptive variability that their play 




Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
This study is an investigation of the culturally transformative potential 
of play, conducted through research-led practice, in which engagement with 
theoretical material stimulates practical work that informs a retheorisation 
of ludic possibilities in participatory performance. In this chapter, I provide 
an overview of the practical methods that I have used in the various stages of 
this research, outlining my creative applications of games, larp and 
interactive performance. In addition to analysing methods of artistic 
research, this chapter considers the insights of social scientists on forms of 
Participatory Action Research which foreground the possibilities of 
collaborative enquiry between academics and public participants. Given that 
my practice is inherently participatory, certain ideas from PAR have been 
useful in formulating a methodology that seeks to promote the agency of 
participants and the culturally transformative potential of play.  I also 
discuss the issue of how arts practice might be documented, as a foundation 
for my argument for participant-led self-documentation of play activities. 
Although my research is based in creative practice, artistic outputs do not 
serve as the research outcome of this enquiry. Instead, my practical work 
has informed the theorised engagement with participatory performance that 
is presented here. This chapter considers recent scholarship on the 
relationship between theory and practice in planning, conducting and 
evidencing arts-based practice research in order to contextualise my 
methodological approach. 
 
3.1 Practical Methods of Participatory Research 
In this section, I offer an introduction to the creative methods used in 
the various practical research activities undertaken in this study. It is 
important to stress that this retrospective articulation should not create the 
impression that there were fully fixed plans at the outset of each practical 
project. All projects placed me in unfamiliar situations, to greater or lesser 
extents, and despite my prior artistic experience, in all cases I was 
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challenged to develop new methods to meet the variable capacities and 
interests of participants. Effectively, my practical methods have evolved in 
collaboration with the people involved, prompting me to adapt pre-existing 
skills to formulate context-appropriate strategies. In pursuing a collaborative 
approach, theories of Participatory Action Research have been useful, since 
PAR explicitly aspires to challenge hierarchies of knowledge production, 
which distinguish the transcendent researcher from the participants who are 
treated as objects to be studied. In contrast, PAR is founded on the belief 
‘that human beings are dynamic agents capable of reflexivity and self-
change, and an epistemology that accommodates the reflexive capacities of 
human beings within the research process’.1 In their critique of ‘research as 
usual’,2 Sarah Kindon and colleagues argue that researchers typically begin 
a project by identifying a problem or theme that meets their personal 
interests. Subsequently, they seek out communities of participants upon 
whom research can be conducted to address the questions they wish to 
investigate.3 Aside from the hierarchical nature of this approach, the 
identification of communities of interest seems to presume a degree of 
homogeneity, with all individuals in the study being viewed through the lens 
of the research theme in question. From a PAR standpoint, this presumption 
of relative homogeneity in communities is problematic because ‘if we 
understand community and commons to be processes and social relations 
rather than bounded and discrete entities, our participatory research would 
not so much search for these discrete entities but facilitate processes 
constitutive of community and commons’.4  
The ideas noted above, despite being unrelated to artistic research, 
have informed my thinking in designing, playing and analysing play 
activities. Rather than seeking to create playful participatory performance 
works that express my own interests, my work has sought to develop a 
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dialogical engagement with participants that informs play designs, so that 
the enactment of play and its evaluation can enable players to critically 
reflect on issues of concern in their own lives. It is important to be explicit 
that the sites in which I have carried out practical work have not been 
sought out deliberately to interrogate any specific thematic interests. I have 
simply taken up opportunities that appeared to offer scope for useful 
research, irrespective of potential thematic content. In other words, rather 
than pursuing pre-planned thematic priorities that required the targeting of 
specific sites or social groups, I have responded to the issues that 
participants wished to address and adapted my methods to provide context 
appropriate play activities that could most effectively support their creative 
explorations.  
A centrally important aspect of my practical work has been a continual 
attentiveness to the physical and emotional safety of research participants. 
My project received ethical approval from the Faculty of Humanities and 
Social Sciences Ethics Committee at Newcastle University in March 2017, 
but in addition to formal ethical procedures, such as the use of participant 
consent forms, I have solicited the consent of participants on an ongoing 
basis. The Nordic larp practices that have informed my practical approach 
place strong emphasis on player safety, foregrounding the importance of 
transparency in telling players what the activity will entail so that they can 
give informed consent when opting-in to the event. Despite having given 
initial consent, however, ongoing consent is not assumed. Instead, players 
are given mechanisms through which they can opt-out of the activity or even 
halt it entirely.5 Borrowing from the safety techniques of Nordic larp, in all 
the exercises, role-plays and games that are described in this thesis, players 
were told, at the outset, what the activity would involve and that they could 
opt-out of it at any time, for whatever reason, with no questions asked. 
Additionally, players were told that if, at any point, they were uncomfortable 
with the content of the play activities they could call a halt to them 
immediately. Given the fact that many of the exercises undertaken included 
                                                          
5 Simo Järvelä, ‘The Golden Rule of Larp’, in The Foundation Stone of Nordic Larp, ed. by 




personal stories from the lived experience of participants, it is important to 
emphasise that their consent was continually requested so that they could 
withdraw from, and stop, any activities that created physical or emotional 
discomfort. 
 
3.1.1 Haringey Projects 
In the Haringey projects, which are the focus of my discussions in 
Chapter 4, the physical and mental infirmity of participants and the limited 
English language affordances of some individuals meant that the range of 
practical activities that I could attempt was quite limited. My first priority 
was to investigate the habitus of participants with the aim of using this 
contextual research as a precursor to designing system-based games 
modelling their fields of social experience. My approach in exploring the 
habitus of participants was to apply Constantin Stanislavki’s methods of 
‘given circumstances’ analysis,6 focusing on three key questions in 
establishing the contextual circumstances of scenarios from participants’ 
lived experiences: WHERE? WHEN? WHO? In practical terms, this involved 
asking participants about meaningful places, times and people in their lives, 
in a process that I have termed ‘habitus mining’. Essentially, habitus mining 
can be understood as an endeavour to excavate the cultural particularities of 
individuals by gathering stories of their experiences to progressively build a 
picture of how their capital affordances have shaped their life trajectory. In 
critically reflecting on ‘habitus mining’ as a method, I have recognised that a 
person’s habitus cannot be seen merely as a body of latent content that can 
be extracted by the researcher. Instead, I have found it more productive to 
view this process as a dialogic construction, or forging, of insights into the 
habitus of individuals. Nonetheless, habitus mining through dialogue has 
remained a useful concept in considering how play can be designed in 
response to the cultural particularities of participants. 
                                                          
6 Constantin Stanislavksi, An Actor Prepares, trans. by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 43-44. 
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Following the habitus mining, I attempted to use the material 
generated in a process of system analysis as the basis for game design. A 
system analytic game design approach seeks to identify the active objects in 
a system, their internal relationships and their attributes as the basis for 
creating goals and game mechanics that drive play action, together with 
rules that constrain it. Progressing from habitus mining to system design 
proved to be difficult, however, because the life experiences of the 
participants were incredibly divergent, making it difficult to create games 
that could meaningfully model the wide diversity of experiences that they 
had told me about. Consequently, my play design approach changed to focus 
on more open-ended paidic activities, influenced by methods of larp. Larp in 
the Nordic tradition includes a broad plurality of approaches, but it 
frequently seeks to create loose frameworks whereby designers offer prompts 
for player creativity rather than orchestrating fully realised systems of play. 
Larps will often include preparatory workshops that lead players through a 
sequence of actions that establish general understandings of what the 
activity will entail, prior to more detailed co-creation of aspects like 
scenography, character roles and relations to cumulatively meet the 
‘hierarchy of needs’ that enable players to take part in collaborative story-
making.7 Play theorist Marjukka Lampo describes the co-creative 
development of larp as an ‘ecological’ approach whereby players receive a 
series of stimuli within the conceptual frame of the scenario and generate 
responses that co-construct the fabric of play. Lampo describes this co-
creation process as a kind of ‘meshwork’ that is emergent rather than 
prescribed by the designer.8  
In practical terms, my play workshops have asked participants to 
create fictional scenarios by imagining places and characters through 
drawing, storytelling or the arrangement of objects, in much the same way 
                                                          
7 Abraham Maslow, ‘A theory of human motivation’, Psychological Review, 50:4 (1943), 370-
396, cited in Maryia Karachun, Yauheni Karachun, Olga Rudak and Nastassia Sinitsyna, 
‘The Workshop Pyramid’, in Once Upon a Nordic Larp…Twenty Years of Playing Stories, ed. 
by Linn Carin Andreassen, Simon Brind, Elin Nilsen, Grethe Sofie Strand and Martine 
Svanevik (Oslo: Knutepunkt, 2017), pp. 105-108. 
8 Tim Ingold, Lines: A Brief History (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 80-82, cited in Marjukka 
Lampo, ‘Ecological Approach to the Performance of Larping’, International Journal of Role-
Playing, 5 (2016), 35-46 (pp. 36-37). 
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that larp workshops invite players to build their scenarios of play. I then 
offered sequences of prompts to invite participants to enact an 
intersubjective ‘interweaving’ of their contributions to create emergent 
stories, in line with Lampo’s description of the ‘meshwork’ concept.9 For 
example, following the early habitus mining, which focused primarily on 
places that were meaningful for participants, I created collaborative story-
making exercises in which players responded to locations that others had 
described, creating fictional characters in these contexts and narrating their 
actions.10 One participant, Yamini,11 discussed the rural environment of her 
upbringing in Tanzania and described the mango plantations near where she 
lived. Subsequently, I sourced a picture of a mango field in Tanzania and 
invited another player, Ravi, to invent a character in this location. He then 
imagined a farmer and built upon a detail in the picture (the presence of 
water pipes) to describe his hopes for rain and the fear that the crop would 
fail if the land became too dry. Yamini then completed the story by narrating 
a journey to the market with a relatively meagre crop. Effectively, play 
processes of this kind provided a series of stimuli that invited players to 
create the contexts for their play, translating the ‘given circumstances’ from 
players’ lived experience into new sets of fictional circumstances for 
imaginative story-making. 
 
3.1.2 Playground Projects 
Unlike the Haringey projects, the Playgrounds, which are described in 
Chapters 5 and 6, did not involve in depth ‘habitus mining’ of participants’ 
life experiences. Instead, the projects sought to interrogate the artistic 
habitus of those involved by considering the creative forms that they had 
previously employed (from interactive theatre to art installations) and 
inviting them to experimentally adapt their methods through exposure to 
techniques of game design, larp and interactive performance. The workshops 
                                                          
9 Lampo, p. 43. 
10 See Appendix B.5 for the structure of the Journey Dialogue play exercise. 
11 Throughout this thesis, I use pseudonyms for participants to maintain confidentiality. 
The pseudonyms have been selected to give an indication of participants’ cultural 
backgrounds. Names included in footnotes are written in inverted commas to maintain the 
reader’s awareness that the name given is a pseudonym.   
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were typically split into two halves, with the first half featuring the playing of 
an activity that I had designed, followed by the setting of a design task in the 
second. The work on game design focused on system analysis, challenging 
participants to interrogate real-world systems and convert the contents of 
their analyses into simple, rule-based games. Conversely, experiments with 
larp design asked them to loosen their artistic grip by designing stimuli for 
player action rather than orchestrating it. Lastly, work with interactive 
performance tasked the groups with creating simple dramatic scenarios in 
which audience-participants were endowed with generic roles that fulfilled a 
function in a pre-prepared performance.  
In developing interactive performance works in the Playground project, 
I set participants the task of creating fictional scenarios in which social 
groups, faced with some kind of dilemma, invited ‘visitors’ (to be played by 
the audience members) to engage with the group and play some role in 
helping them to resolve the issue.12 For example, one group created an 
interactive performance that focused on a living ‘fatberg’ (a congealed mass 
of fat found in sewer systems) and its baby, who were faced with eviction by 
the local council from their subterranean home. Audience members were 
given the role of members of the public, who were invited by council officials 
to engage in a consultation exercise which involved visiting the fatbergs in 
their sewer and making decisions about their fate. Clearly, this role was 
highly generic and served primarily as a stimulus for the performance of 
internal conflicts between the council staff (played by the designers of the 
piece) on what to do with the fatbergs. In approaching this type of interactive 
performance design, I was transparent with participants about my personal 
preference for creative forms offering greater degrees of participant agency, 
but many participants came from interactive theatre backgrounds (and 
wished to develop their skills in this area), so I felt that it was important to 
explore a variety of approaches beyond my own preferences. In response to 
the range of performance methods that the Playgrounds investigated, 
towards the end of each project, participants were invited to compare and 
contrast the various forms they had encountered and select those that they 
                                                          
12 See Appendix B.22 for the structure of the ‘Visitors’ play design exercise. 
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were most interested in employing to create original pieces of participatory 
performance work. 
 
3.1.3 Trumpington, Peartree Bridge & Hackney Wick Projects 
The Trumpington and Peartree Bridge projects, which are discussed in 
Chapter 6, were both focused on exploring the subjective attitudes of 
participants towards their local areas. As such, I wanted to investigate the 
habitus of those involved, but rather than conducting in-depth interviews in 
preparation for play designs, I sought to conduct ‘habitus mining’ through 
play itself. Drawing again on methods of larp workshop design, I invited 
participants to describe places and people in their actual environment and 
use these descriptions as stimuli for inventing fictional scenarios. In one 
exercise in the Peartree Bridge project, participants were invited to imagine 
the most important places in the neighbourhood and build abstract 
representations of them by placing objects on blankets to symbolise 
locations like the bus stop or convenience store. Each player then imagined 
a character in a location that someone else had created. Subsequently, the 
role-play involved character rotation so that each participant played all the 
roles within the fiction, offering the opportunity to occupy multiple 
viewpoints on issues of concern in the area.13 In reflecting on the exercise, 
which featured a quite optimistic story of creating a community garden 
collective, one participant, Lysbeth, commented on the value of adopting 
alternative viewpoints in relation to her negative views on the area: 
This town never brought me any happiness, but it was interesting 
because different people can have different feelings about the same 
subject. I find this place is a depressing place, but you might not think 
it’s depressing. You might think it’s an interesting place…Its interesting, 
it really is. It gets our imagination going…I’m always moaning that 
nothing ever happens, but here we’ve done it.14 
This example is illustrative of my approach to creating role-play activities in 
which players could actively reflect on their feelings about the 
neighbourhood within fictional frames that enabled them to express their 
                                                          
13 See Appendix B.10 for the structure of the Overcoding play exercise. 
14 ‘Lysbeth’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Peartree Bridge, Milton Keynes (4 July 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘PeartreeBridge4’. 
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views a little more freely than they might ordinarily have felt able to. In the 
same way that the Haringey projects used sequences of prompts to generate 
intersubjective story invention, a key focus in the design of the activities in 
Peartree Bridge was the collaborative overlap of participant subjectivities. 
Essentially, this challenged participants, many of whom did not know each 
other, to take the creative material originated by their partners and build 
upon it to create palimpsest story formations that encouraged them to 
engage with alternative perspectives that might defamiliarize their outlook. 
The final section of Chapter 6 includes discussion of Migrations of 
Cool, a street-game that I designed during a residency at the Arebyte Gallery 
in the Hackney Wick area of East London.15 Unlike the other projects in this 
study, this work was not founded on extended engagement with participants 
in a particular site. Instead, I explored Hackney Wick by walking and 
conducting online research to design a system-based game about the role of 
artists in processes of gentrification, linking with Hackney Wick’s status as a 
regeneration hotspot. The game was played twice by small groups of artists 
and engaged their artistic habitus by inviting them to create fictional artist 
collectives as part of a pre-game workshop process. In addition to creating 
these artistic character roles, they were asked to create fictional property 
development companies. Subsequently, the game play challenged them to 
periodically switch between their artist and property developer roles with the 
aim of stimulating a reflexive oscillation between different perspectives on 
the urban space. Despite the fact that my endeavour to apply system-based 
game design in the Haringey Community Hub project proved to be 
problematic, my discussion of Migrations of Cool maintains the value of 
systemic thinking in play. The creation of a system-based game that 
simulated the interconnections of property development, artistic activity and 
residential housing estates challenged participants to experiment with 
various strategies for how artists might interact with their environments, 
either by collaborating with local groups, participating in the community 
engagement initiatives of property developers or by seeking to create 
independent zones of autonomous artistic activity.  
                                                          
15 See Appendix B.7 for the rule set of Migrations of Cool. 
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To summarise this section, my methods in this study have built on my 
existing knowledge of theatre, game design and larp, but my creative 
techniques have had to give way, to greater or lesser extents, to the 
requirements of particular sites of research and the people within them. I see 
great value, however, in an instability of methods, or ‘methodological 
bricolage’, whereby the researcher responds to new contexts and devises new 
methods as and when they are needed.16 Rather than maintaining a rigid 
adherence to existing artistic forms, therefore, this study has sought to 
develop new methods that are generative of unpredictable practical outcomes 
and equally unpredictable ideas.  
 
3.2 Politics & Aesthetics of Performance Documentation 
The question of how practice might be documented is a core concern of 
practice research methodologies in the arts. In this section, I outline 
arguments for and against different forms of performance documentation, 
prior to setting out my argument that if the aesthetic value of participatory 
performance lies in participants’ experience, participatory arts researchers 
might usefully promote participant-led self-documentation, so that the 
people at the heart of the work can play a central role in documenting it. A 
common refrain of performance scholars is that documentation of 
performance is a betrayal of its ephemeral liveness and given that the live 
experience of play is central to my practical work, I have also taken a 
cautious approach to documenting my practice. The challenge of creating 
‘recordable’ knowledge in the context of postgraduate practice research in 
performance is highlighted by Angela Piccini and Caroline Rye who suggest 
that ‘unless praxis can be directly experienced, assessment is typically made 
by way of documentation that always inevitably (re)constructs the practice 
such that the thing itself remains elusive’.17 Aside from the difficulty of 
                                                          
16 Matt Rogers, ‘Contextualising Theories and Practices of Bricolage Research’, The 
Qualitative Report, 17:48 (2012), 1-17 (p. 6). 
17  Angela Piccini and Caroline Rye, ‘Of Fevered Archives and the Quest for Total 
Documentation’, in Practice-as-Research in performance and screen, ed. by Ludivine Allegue, 
Simon Jones, Baz Kershaw and Angela Piccini (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 34-
49, cited in Robin Nelson, ed., Practice as Research in the Arts: Principles, Protocols, 
Pedagogies, Resistances (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 5. 
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effectively capturing and archiving the ephemeral event of live performance, 
there is a troubling tendency to revere archives as bastions of authoritative 
knowledge. Matthew Reason suggests that performance archives can be 
constructed and excavated by researchers in ways that reaffirm imbalances 
of power. He references Helen Freshwater’s suggestion that ‘the temptation 
of making a claim to the academic authority conferred by undertaking 
“proper research” may prove irresistible for the researcher utilising archival 
material’, and argues that ‘allure of archive’ might cause researchers to 
disregard the power dynamics that lead to the inclusion of certain archival 
documents (and the voices they contain) to the exclusion of others.18 For 
example, the potential power imbalance of the archive is readily apparent in 
the documentary practices of artist Marina Abramović, as discussed in a 
recent article by Adriana Disman. Disman describes how, in her 
performance work The Artist is Present, Abramović made it mandatory for 
each audience member to be photographed when visiting the performance 
installation, which effectively ‘conscripted’ them into the artist’s archive, 
leaving each person ‘objectified’ as a ‘performing product’.19  
Despite the political issues at stake in archival construction and 
despite the fact that documentation can never hope to perfectly replicate a 
performance, I do not advocate an outright avoidance of documentary 
recording of performance, because without some trace of the live event, 
performance disappears and becomes unknowable. The issue of 
documentation of participatory art has been highlighted by Claire Bishop 
who complains that a secondary audience has no way of understanding a 
work that they were not directly involved in if there is no photographic 
evidence to view.20 I argue, however, that it is important to question the use 
of photographic documentation of play in participatory performance, not 
only because there is a substantial difference between the experience of play 
                                                          
18 Helen Freshwater, ‘The Allure of the Archive’, Poetics Today: International Journal for 
Theory and Analysis of Literature and Communication, 24:4 (2003), 729-758 (pp. 731-735), 
cited in Matthew Reason, Documentation, Disappearance and the Representation of Live 
Performance. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 42-47. 
19 Adriana Disman, ‘Performance Art, Pornography and the Mis-spectator: The Ethics of 
Documenting Participatory Performance’, Canadian Theatre Review, 162 (2015), 46-51 (p. 
50). 
20 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: 
Verso Books, 2012), pp. 5-6. 
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and its pictorial depiction but also because of the political partiality of those 
who control the camera. Theorists of image-based qualitative research have 
highlighted how the producers of photographs and films can manipulate 
perception through the strategic orchestration of what is included, and 
omitted, from an image. A clear example can be found in Robert Flaherty’s 
Man of Aran documentary, which shows a family of crofters ‘laboriously 
transforming a rocky field into soil using seaweed’.21 What the film-maker 
does not show, however, according to a subsequent film, How the Myth Was 
Made: A Study of Robert Flaherty’s Man of Aran, is that next to the rocky 
field are perfectly good portions of farm land which ‘belonged to absentee 
owners, a complication with which Flaherty simply did not wish to deal’.22 
Essentially, the myth-making of the hardy, indomitable Man of Aran is the 
result of highly selective filming practices that intentionally omit the full 
picture.  
In the context of participatory arts research, the partiality of a 
researcher using a camera to document the activity is problematic because it 
is likely that they will seek out images that meet their specific interests and, 
potentially, the ideas that they wish to affirm. This hierarchical loading of 
documentary agency in the photographic tools of the researcher has been 
challenged by proponents of PAR who have sought out alternative examples 
of participant-led documentation. For example, Donald Snowden’s Fogo 
Island Project, a pioneering participatory video initiative conducted with the 
inhabitants of Fogo Island, Newfoundland in 1967, is described by Geoffrey 
Hume-Cook and colleagues, who argue that: 
By putting community researchers behind as well as in front of the 
camera and by facilitating a process of community feedback on the 
films produced, research participants became ‘meaning makers’ who 
explored and worked to change their own ‘realities’ through the 
production and analysis of video products.23    
                                                          
21 Brian Winston, ‘“The Camera Never Lies”: The Partiality of Photographic Evidence’, in 
Image-based Research: A Sourcebook for Qualitative Researchers, ed. by Jon Prosser 
(London: RoutledgeFalmer, 1998), pp. 60-68 (p. 63). 
22 Winston, p. 63. 
23 Geoffrey Hume-Cook, Thomas Curtis, Kirsty Woods, Joyce Potaka, Adrian Tangaroa 
Wagner and Sarah Kindon, ‘Uniting people with place using participatory video in Aotearoa 
/ New Zealand: a Ngªti Hauiti journey’, in Participatory Action Research: Connecting People, 
Participation and Place, ed. by Sarah Kindon, Rachel Pain and Mike Kesby (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2007), pp. 160-169 (p. 161). 
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Reason notes, however, that the presence of cameras in a performance 
context materially affects the artwork being performed, suggesting that ‘the 
camera tends to exert a sort of authority that shapes a situation it is 
intended to simply reveal or fix’.24  
In discussing the attractions of video as a documentation tool, Reason 
suggests that it is relatively accessible, cheap and portable, offering the 
promise of immediacy, ‘with the production process being close, direct and 
instant, which in turn favours an aesthetics, an ideology of immediacy’.25 
This point is affirmed by Jonah Westerman who argues that mediatized 
capture of performance is ironically now a pre-condition for its ‘liveness’ and 
immediacy. In other words, performance and document are now seen as the 
same thing, with the result that ‘the moment of creation lasts forever, 
projected into the future, secured by the form of the document’.26 I argue 
that in video and photographs, immediacy refers not only to the ‘nowness’ of 
the image but also the clarity of the information it holds. Viewed in these 
terms, the aesthetics of immediacy promise direct access to the now-moment 
of the performance action being represented and a direct depiction of the 
material substance of this action, which is described by Roland Barthes as 
the ‘studium’ of the image.27 This kind of immediacy threatens to undermine 
a principle which is extremely important, I contend, in any research enquiry: 
reflexivity. Immediacy in time holds the viewer of an image in a perpetual 
now-moment which can limit a reflexive comparison between the ‘now’ and 
that which has preceded it or the future that may follow on from it. 
Similarly, the immediacy of space that exists in the mimetic image limits 
reflexivity since the studium offers immediate, uncomplicated discernibility. 
Robin Nelson claims that the incompleteness of the photographic image as a 
depiction of a performance event ‘effectively draws attention to the device of 
                                                          
24 Douglas Rosenberg, Video Space: A Site for Choreography, Dziga Vertov Performance 
Group (2002) <www.dvpg.net/docs/videospace.pdf> [accessed October 2005], cited in 
Reason, Documentation, p. 82. 
25 Reason, Documentation, p. 77. 
26 Jonah Westerman, ‘Practical Histories: How We Do Things with Performance’, in Histories 
of Performance Documentation: Museum, Artistic and Scholarly Practices, ed. by Gabriella 
Giannachi and Jonah Westerman (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 1-12 (p. 
9). 
27 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. by Richard Howard 
(London: Cape, 1981), pp. 25-28. 
89 
 
construction rather than presuming immediacy’.28 I argue, however, that the 
constructedness of a documentary image can only be foregrounded if the 
producer of the image intentionally avoids creating the immediacy of the now 
moment and the immediacy of readily discernible content. Consequently, I 
have opted not to use video or photographic cameras to document my 
practical work, not because the camera lies, but because it appears to tell 
the immediately discernible truth.  
In contrast with the apparent lucidity of photographic documentation 
outlined above, Reason makes what I see as an extremely productive 
proposition in theorising performance documentation with his idea of an 
archive composed of detritus.29 Whereas the immediacy of the photographic 
image purports to display authoritative depictions of performance, detritus 
creates a fragmentary picture that invites the viewer to look beyond the 
immediacy of discernible objects, enabling greater reflexivity and a space of 
possibility for emergent meaning to be generated: 
The idea of detritus as archive is also not so far from the state of all 
archives: but the archive as detritus turns around the presumptions of 
neutral detachment, objectivity, fidelity, consistency and authenticity: 
instead claiming partiality, fluidity, randomness and memory.30  
In considering the idea of an archive of detritus, I see strong parallels with 
the literary and theatrical theories of defamiliarization, or estrangement, 
propounded by, respectively, Viktor Shklovsky31 and Bertolt Brecht,32 which 
suggest that the familiar should be made strange to prolong perception and 
require a greater level of perceptive and imaginative effort from the viewer or 
reader. A positive valuation of documentary detritus that exceeds immediate 
discernibility can be found in Yvon Bonenfant’s discussion of ‘plethora’ in 
documentation. Bonenfant suggests that such excess, ‘is impossible to distil, 
refine, or simplify…without cheating it of its complexity – not just in artistic 
                                                          
28 Nelson, p. 86. 
29 Reason, Documentation, p. 53. 
30 Reason, Documentation, p. 54. 
31 Viktor Skhlovsky, ‘Art as Device’, in Viktor Shklovsky: A Reader, ed. and trans. by 
Alexandra Berlina. (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), pp. 73-96 (p. 80). 
32 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. by John 
Willett (London: Methuen, 1978), pp. 143-145. 
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but also in research terms’.33 She goes on to claim that plethoric excess can 
be extremely valuable as ‘layers and layers of contrasting types of data can 
be plundered, juxtaposed, rearranged, viewed at new angles, listened to, 
touched and otherwise sensed and cognitively processed in order to suggest 
new sets of assertions and observations’.34  
In addition to assemblages of defamiliarized material items that invite 
imaginative constructions of meaning, memory is an important aspect of the 
flotsam and jetsam of detritus. Reason acknowledges the fallibility of 
testimony, citing Denise Varney and Rachel Fensham who argue that ‘surely 
the very ephemerality of individual memories should make it suspect as a 
reliable record of a performance truth’.35 He subsequently retorts, however, 
that ‘if we value performance in terms of its time-based transience, its 
disappearance, then memory must be a more appropriate site for any trace 
or afterlife than the frozen and unchanging archive’.36 It is important to add 
that the archive of detritus can also contain embodied memory. Diana 
Taylor’s concept of ‘the repertoire’ which refers to ‘a treasury, or inventory’ of 
embodied knowledge that can be transmitted through ‘performances, 
gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing – in short, all those acts usually 
thought of as ephemeral, non-reproducible knowledge’37 suggests that 
archives need not be seen solely as collections of documentary items. Rather, 
the ‘repertoire’ archive is something that is performed (or played) into 
(re)existence. This notion that performance itself can serve as documentation 
of prior performances can be linked to the PAR concept of ‘participatory 
snowballing’.38 This effectively involves the reperformance, in new contexts, 
                                                          
33 Yvon Bonenfant, ‘PAR produces plethora, extended voices are plethoric, and why plethora 
matters’, in Performance as Research: Knowledge, Methods, Impact, ed. by Annette Arlander, 
Bruce Barton, Melanie Dreyer-Lude and Ben Spatz (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 
2017), pp. 224-248 (p. 224). 
34 Bonenfant, p. 242. 
35 Denise Varney and Rachel Fensham, ‘More-and-Less-Than: Liveness, Video Recording 
and the Future of Performance’, New Theatre Quarterly, 16:1 (2000), 88-96 (p. 91), cited in 
Reason, Documentation, p. 50. 
36 Reason, Documentation, p. 51. 
37 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 20. 
38 Maria Stuttaford and Chris Coe, ‘Participatory learning: opportunities and challenges’, in 
Participatory Action Research: Connecting People, Participation and Place, ed. by Sarah 




of behaviours that were enacted during the original research, and I argue in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis that the reperformance of the Playground project, in 
which four of the original participants returned as co-facilitators of 
Playground 2, offers an example of ‘participatory snowballing’ as a form of 
embodied documentation of prior performances.  
In the context of participatory art, I contend that the documentation of 
performance through the embodied memory of participants productively 
shifts the balance of power in documentation from artistic hegemony 
towards greater participant agency and also reconfigures the locus of 
aesthetic value in the work. My practice in participatory performance 
conceives aesthetic value as being located in the subjective experience of 
participants and, in this study, I have attended to participant experience by 
inviting players to verbally reflect on their play activities, making audio 
recordings of these conversations. Central to my approach, however, is the 
promotion of participant agency and I have investigated how participants 
might document their own experience as subject agents, rather than solely 
being documented from the viewpoint of the artist-researcher. Participant-
led self-documentation has taken the form of embodied memory, but it has 
also included other forms of detritus like written notes, drawings and 
diagrams that have helped participants record or remember their experience 
in ways that meet their interests. Making this argument for a fragmentary 
archive of participant-led self documentations raises questions, however, 
regarding the possibilities and limitations of using participatory arts 
documentation to evidence a research enquiry. Consequently, the last 
section of this chapter questions whether practice and its documentation 
should necessarily be expected to serve as evidence, within a broader 
consideration of the relationship between theory and methods in planning 
and conducting arts-based practice research.  
 
3.3 Reconceiving Theory, Methods & Evidence in Practice Research 
In this section, I set out an approach to research-led practice which 
views theoretical investigation as a stimulus for exploratory methods that 
generate new ideas, which can then be presented in written form. My 
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arguments respond to Robin Nelson’s tripartite theory of artistic practice 
research which comprises ‘know-that’ (existing knowledge that can form a 
conceptual framework for research), ‘know-how’ (the practical skills of the 
artist-researcher) and ‘know-what’ which refers to the insights drawn from 
praxis.39 Within Nelson’s proposed triumvirate of knowing is the premise 
that if practice is to be considered as research, it must be underpinned by a 
‘conceptual framework’ of know-that, which defines the research questions 
that the practice seeks to answer.40 The value of theoretical concepts as 
stimuli for practical research is also articulated in Hazel Smith and Roger 
Dean’s advocacy of ‘research-led practice’: 
Our experience of postgraduate supervision…convinced us that 
practitioners who were uncomfortable with research (particularly 
theory) often benefitted from exposure to it early on in their degrees 
and that, in some areas, this was more likely to create a paradigm 
shift in their thinking when working outwards from creative practice.41  
This description of a ‘paradigm shift’ in the thinking of the postgraduate 
artist-researcher accurately maps onto my own experience. In my case, 
theoretical explorations have significantly expanded my imaginative sense of 
what my practice could be, so although my work is based in practice I see 
my practical work as research-led practice, with theory influencing an 
emergent exploration of play in participatory performance that draws on my 
previous creative ‘know-how’ but also departs into unknown artistic 
territory.  
The foregrounding of scholarly research as a primer for creative work 
that is offered by Smith and Dean might seem to align with Nelson’s 
combination of conceptual frameworks with the artistic activity of know-how. 
I argue, however, that there is a significant difference between theory that 
stimulates practical exploration and know-that which frames (and thereby, 
potentially, constrains) the know-how of the artist-researcher. Nelson argues 
that although the know-how of artist-researchers should be flexible, it is 
important for them to retain a clear sense of why they are applying their 
                                                          
39 Nelson, pp. 40-47. 
40 Nelson, p. 65. 
41 Hazel Smith and Roger T. Dean, eds., Practice-led Research, Research-led Practice in the 
Creative Arts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 9. 
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creativity. In other words, the theoretical framework (know-that) which is 
used to establish the ‘problem solving’ task of the research, should maintain 
a consistent position in the mind of the artist-researcher as they consider 
the practice in which they are engaged.42 This emphasis on consistent 
awareness of theoretical frameworks in practice research is problematised by 
Simon Grennan who argues that ‘the “creative production” researcher is 
motivated by the desire for practical activity per se, rather than by the desire 
to frame and solve problems to an adjudicated template’.43 Similarly, Baz 
Kershaw argues that ‘the more rigorously consistent the research design, the 
greater may be the chances of missing out on producing reflexive results’.44  
In challenging consistency as a value in artistic research, I am not 
advocating the abandonment of clearly defined questions as the core of the 
enquiry. My concern is that although Nelson gives a positive of appraisal of 
variability within the know-how of method, this variability appears to remain 
bounded and restricted by an overly consistent know-that of established 
theoretical knowledge. By contrast, my theoretical investigations have 
provoked an exploration of new practical methods that can be described as 
‘not-know-how’. In conducting my research, I have found myself in settings 
for which I have been unprepared (having never previously worked with 
elderly people, for example) and I have been required to devise new and 
untested methods to meet the requirements of unfamiliar contexts. 
Consequently, it has not been possible to maintain consistency in the 
application of these methods or a consistent linkage with the theoretical 
frameworks that prompted their creation. Essentially, my proposition of 
exploratory ‘not-know-how’ is an argument for the value of abductive 
enquiry, as opposed to a deductive model of research. In his discussion of 
practice documentation, Nelson uses a mathematical equation as a 
metaphor, arguing that ‘presentation of process as evidence….is similar to 
                                                          
42 Donald Schön, The Reflective Practitioner (New York: Basic Books/Perseus, 1983), p. 69, 
cited in Nelson, p. 65. 
43 Stephen Scrivener, ‘Reflection in and on action and practice in creative-production 
doctoral projects in art and design’, Working Papers in Art and Design, 1 (2000), cited in 
Simon Grennan, ‘Arts Practice and Research: Locating Alterity and Expertise’, The 
International Journal of Art and Design Education, 34:2 (2015), 249-259 (p. 252).   
44 Baz Kershaw, ‘Practice as Research through Performance’, in Practice-led Research, 
Research-led Practice in the Creative Arts, ed. by Hazel Smith and Roger T. Dean (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 104-124 (p. 117). 
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showing the workings, rather than simply the conclusion of a mathematical 
calculation’. Nelson acknowledges that ‘the difference, perhaps, is that the 
mathematical problem also has an answer while an arts practice is not 
analytic in this way’45 but this analogy does suggest a somewhat positivistic 
impulse to view practical know-how as a means of deductively solving a 
problem or proving a theoretical hypothesis. By contrast, artist and scholar 
Graeme Sullivan highlights the limitations of deductive enquiry in creative 
practice: 
Recent studies in cognitive neuroscience offer tantalising evidence that 
‘insight’ is a consequence of precisely the opposite approach to the 
thinking advocated by the clinical model of inquiry that promotes 
progressive focusing, the elimination of confounding variables and 
distractions and exercising control. It is this attention to detail that is 
framed by prior knowledge that can limit creative links that may lead 
to insightful outcomes.46  
This emphasis on the restrictions imposed by ‘prior knowledge’ is 
particularly useful, for my purposes, in proposing research-led practice that 
is based in not-know-how. I argue that although theoretical investigation 
prompts artistic action, this need not form a rigid frame of prior knowledge 
that limits the unpredictable creative possibilities inherent in not-know-how. 
Instead, my theoretical investigations have provided a springboard into an 
exploration of practical methods that are informed, but not constrained, by 
prior knowledge.  
Having described an approach to research-led practice in which 
exploratory practical activities are stimulated by theoretical investigation, I 
will now consider the role of practice within the overall research enquiry, 
setting out an argument for practice as a method that yields insights which 
can be presented in a theoretical research outcome. Nelson argues that 
although artist-researchers may see practical outputs as central to their 
research, the research enquiry is something broader, incorporating 
documentation of practice and complimentary writings.47 This separation of 
                                                          
45 Nelson, p. 63. 
46 Graeme Sullivan, ‘Making Space: The Purpose and Place of Practice-led Research’, in 
Practice-led Research, Research-led Practice in the Creative Arts, ed. by Hazel Smith and 
Roger T. Dean (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 41-64 (p. 48). 
47 Nelson, pp. 34-37. 
95 
 
a research enquiry from an artistic output resonates with the work of Ben 
Spatz who argues for a delineation between research practice and artistic 
outcomes that have a public performance dimension. In discussing his work 
with actors in training who complained about their studio-based scene study 
because ‘no one would see it’, he exclaims: 
No one would see it. As if seeing were the only way to be transformed 
by technique. As if the enactment of technique in one’s own body 
could not be just as transformative as seeing it practiced by someone 
else – or even more so.48 
The central point of Spatz’s argument is that the persistent focus on the 
production of performative outcomes that are presented to audiences 
neglects the transformative potential of practice (without an audience) as an 
ongoing means of creating knowledge. I am attracted to the proposal that the 
outcome of practice research in the arts need not focus predominantly on an 
artistic output. In my practice, the locus of aesthetic value lies in the 
subjective experiences of participants rather than in a performative art 
object that is to be scrutinised by external observers. It follows from this that 
if my practice were to be considered a research outcome, the impact of this 
outcome would be limited to a relatively small number of participants and 
even if documentations of their experiences were widely disseminated, the 
particular thematic content of these experiences might have little relevance 
for secondary audiences. Consequently, my documentation of practical 
research activities has been limited to making audio recordings of 
participant reflections on play experiences with no attempt to create lucid 
renderings of the play itself. These audio recordings should not, I suggest, be 
seen as documentary representations of play. Rather, they stand as traces of 
my research enquiry which are connected to (but distinct from) the play 
experiences that have been recorded or remembered by players in ways that 
meet their own purposes. Essentially, in this study, the participants and the 
researcher were engaged in two interrelated (but distinct) activities: the 
participants engaged in play and self-documented their experience in 
whatever ways they saw fit, while I, as the researcher, created records of the 
                                                          
48 Ben Spatz, What a Body Can Do: Technique as Knowledge, Practice as Research 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p. 7. 
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practical explorations of my enquiry, not as authoritative representations of 
performative outputs, but as traces of the evolution of my research.  
The distinction between methods of practical exploration and 
performance outputs is considered in the latter chapters of Nelson’s book by 
several contributors who provide alternative views on the place of practice 
within a research enquiry and I have found it beneficial to consider a 
question for artist-researchers on this issue, posed by Annette Arlander: 
It could be useful to try to choose whether you use your artistic 
practice as data (as in qualitative research), as method (as in some 
types of practice-led research) or as research outcome (as in most 
practice as research).49 
My response to this range of options has been to reconceive my practice as a 
method which yields participatory experiences that stimulate the 
development of new theories of participatory performance and play design 
that can be articulated in the research outcome of a written thesis. Given 
that my practice is a method of research rather than a research outcome, I 
now want to question the notion that arts practice and its documentation 
must serve to evidence the research enquiry. As I have previously 
articulated, Nelson advocates a hybrid approach that combines the 
conceptual frameworks of know-that with the variability of practical know-
how, leading to know-what which combines the previous two aspects of his 
tripartite theory. According to Nelson, this approach: 
While fully recognising the importance of close-up, tacit, haptic, know-
how seeks a means to establish as fully as possible an articulation of 
‘liquid knowing’…into the know-what of shared and corroborated 
knowledge, in turn resonating with the harder know-that of 
established conceptual frameworks.50 
Nelson’s reference to ‘resonance’ forms a key aspect of his theorisation of 
practice research with the aim of lifting praxis out of the instability of ‘liquid 
knowing’ so that the tacit can become more explicit by establishing 
resonances between know-what and know-that. I contend, however, that 
despite his claims to the contrary, Nelson’s emphasis on resonance leans 
                                                          
49 Annette Arlander, ‘Artistic Research in a Nordic Context’, in Practice as Research in the 
Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, Resistances, ed. by Robin Nelson (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), pp. 152-162 (p. 162). 
50 Nelson, p. 60. 
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towards a positivistic pursuit of knowledge whereby theoretical propositions 
are tested in practice and confirmed or disconfirmed, leading to 
documentation data that are used as proofs in theorising the know-what. 
Essentially, the aspiration to produce resonance suggests a cycle of practice 
research that aims to go full circle in the manner of a mathematical QED. 
Indeed, the very concept of using ‘data’ to prove a hypothesis is contestable. 
Svend Brinkmann, for example, problematises the assumption that data are 
‘givens’ that the researcher collects to solve a problem linked to pre-existing 
theory. Rather, he argues, drawing on John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy, 
that knowing is always a relational construction that follows from a 
‘breakdown’ of understandings based on familiar routines.51 This leads 
Brinkmann to challenge deductive thinking in favour of abductive enquiry in 
which we ‘stumble upon’ new ideas rather than harvesting data to confirm or 
challenge existing concepts.52 Similarly, Pil Hansen contests the givenness of 
data arguing that: 
Phenomena are believed neither to exist ontologically in and of 
themselves nor to be accessible through objective methods of 
observation; they emerge relationally, through active and embodied 
engagement which is also how they are accessed.53 
Hansen subsequently argues for a ‘methodological mutability’ that is 
prepared to make ‘a radical dismissal of documentation, analysis, synthesis, 
or other forms of knowledge extraction’ and challenges the model of research 
in which data are used as proofs of theoretical propositions by suggesting 
that ‘if hypotheses are used, they are abductive jumps or kick-starters of a 
process, not theories to be proven right or wrong’.54  
Brinkmann and Hansen’s ideas are valuable, for my purposes, 
because they affirm my desire to avoid the collection of documentation data 
to prove pre-existing concepts. In my practical work, the know-that of 
                                                          
51 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960 [1929]), cited in 
Svend Brinkmann, ‘Doing Without Data’, Qualitative Inquiry, 20:6 (2014), 720-725 (pp. 721-
722). 
52 Brinkmann, p. 723. 
53 Pil Hansen, ‘Research-Based Practice: Facilitating Transfer across Artistic, Scholarly and 
Scientific Inquiries’, in Performance as Research: Knowledge, Methods, Impact, ed. by 
Annette Arlander, Bruce Barton, Melanie Dreyer-Lude and Ben Spatz (Abingdon and New 
York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 32-49 (p. 33). 
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existing conceptual frameworks has not retained a clear and consistent 
linkage with know-how as is the case in Nelson’s theory. The paradigm 
shifting theoretical works that I have encountered have served, as Hansen 
suggests, as ‘kick-starters’ to enter the unstable territory of not-know-how 
that merges my prior creative expertise with new forms of practice, but the 
theories that have provoked my experimental methods have not functioned 
as rigid conceptual frames. Instead, I have operated in the mode of the 
‘abductive tool-user, the bricoleur’55 and, given the creative instability that I 
have encountered in the process of devising new methods, it has not been 
possible (or desirable) try to sustain conscious, consistent links with the 
know-that which instigated my practical explorations. Furthermore, rather 
than using documentation data to generate know-what that resonates with 
the pre-existing know-that, the accumulated documentary traces that my 
practical projects have produced have served to catalyse wholly new ideas. In 
other words, ‘data’ created through practice does not need to prove the 
coherence of pre-existing theoretical propositions or even serve as evidence 
to support answers. Instead, it is the ideas, gained through the practical 




To conclude, my methodology has drawn on theoretical sources to 
generate experimental methods that provide the impetus for a theoretical 
research outcome. The insights I have drawn from Participatory Action 
Research have provided useful stimuli for my practical approach, prompting 
me to pursue flexibility in my applications of games, larp and interactive 
performance in order to respond to the capacities and interests of 
participants. Similarly, the emphasis in PAR on enabling participants to 
represent their own experience to claim a stake in knowledge production and 
meaning making has informed my approach to practice documentation, 
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foregrounding the agency of participants in remembering and recording their 
activities in ways that suit their own purposes. 
Although my research is based in practice, I have approached my 
practical work as a method of generating a retheorisation of play in 
participatory performance, rather than as a research output. Subsequently, I 
have not sought to create authoritative representations of play performances 
that function as evidential proofs. Instead, the documentation that I have 
gathered has functioned as a form of stimulus (like the practice itself) for the 
generation of new ideas that can be articulated in a research outcome that is 
presented in writing. In sum, my methodology has used theoretical concepts 
as a springboard for an exploratory practice that yields new theoretical 
propositions for how the play of participatory performance might support 




Chapter 4. Habitus & Systems:  
Play Design & Cultural Particularity
 
This study is concerned with the question of how the design of play 
can afford agency to players so that they might explore possible 
transformations in their cultural values and practices. If the culturally 
transformative potential of play is under investigation, I suggest that there 
must be a consideration of the specific cultures that might be transformed. 
Similarly, since play involves, at the most fundamental level, a wilful attempt 
on the part of the player to exercise their powers in imparting some influence 
on the world1 and will, necessarily, be conditioned by the variable nature of 
the powers they possess, it is important to assess the relative powers with 
which players might enact such transformation. These considerations of the 
variable powers of players and the cultural contexts that their play might 
alter lead to the first of my subsidiary research questions, which concerns 
how play can be designed with specific reference to the capacities of players 
and the social contexts that they occupy: 
How may the cultural particularity of participants inform the design of 
play in participatory performance works?   
 
In addressing this question, I draw upon Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory 
which can be summarised as an analytical approach to describing the 
relative powers of agents in specific domains of activity. At the heart of field 
theory is the concept of habitus which can be understood as the combined 
capitals that agents possess in a field, their dispositions, and their practices 
within it.2 Bourdieu’s theories have stimulated a process that I have termed 
‘habitus mining’, through which I have investigated the cultural particularity 
of participants as the basis for the design of play activities. The methods I 
                                                          
1 Thomas S. Henricks, Play and the Human Condition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2015), p. 24. 
2 Karl Maton, ‘Habitus’, in Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, ed. by Michael Grenfell 
(Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), pp. 49-65. 
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have employed in habitus mining have been inspired by Constantin 
Stanislavski’s process of ‘given circumstances’ analysis which excavates 
dramatic texts for contextual details of place, time and character identity.3 It 
must be acknowledged that people’s lives cannot be viewed as texts like the 
plays that Stanislavsky analysed, but by asking participants about places 
that they have experienced, times they have lived through and biographical 
details about themselves, I have developed a picture of their positioning in 
social fields, the temporal progression of their lives, and the capitals and 
practices that have formed and reformed their habitus.  
In the same way that given circumstances analysis yields insights into 
the habitus, I have secondarily applied the process of system analysis 
(drawn from my knowledge of game design) to seek insights on the fields that 
participants have operated within. System analysis resonates closely with a 
field analytical approach because it focuses on the active objects in the 
system (the subject agents), their internal relationships (relational 
connections) and their attributes (capitals) to create a broader picture of how 
the system (like the field) functions. In this chapter, I discuss my 
applications of given circumstances analysis and system analysis in a 
project with elderly service users of an adult day care centre at Haringey 
Community Hub and two additional projects of shorter durations with 
residents of Sheltered Housing schemes in Haringey. Through my 
description of these projects, I argue that given circumstances analysis is an 
effective method for investigating the cultural particularity of participants, 
reaffirming the value of habitus as a theoretical and practical tool. I also 
suggest, however, that system analysis and the field theoretical approach 
have limited applicability as models for play design when working with 
diverse participant groups because they tend to impose reductive simplicity 
on varied experiential phenomena.  
In my critique of field theory, I discuss recent work that problematises 
Bourdieu’s tendency to describe fields as autonomous entities that exist in 
                                                          
3 Constantin Stanislavksi, An Actor Prepares, trans. by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 43-44. 
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relative isolation from a wider heteronomy of influences.4 I also draw upon 
the work of game studies scholar Ian Bogost, who makes similar criticisms of 
the totalizing nature of systems theory which, in his view, conceives systems 
as closed structures governed by immutable rules. In contrast to visions of 
autonomous systems, Bogost proposes an alternative model of analysis, unit 
operations, which focuses on how systems (both digital and otherwise) can 
be understood as the cumulative outcomes of relational connections between 
discrete entities at a local level, rather than macro-configurations that are 
organised in a top-down fashion.5 The theory of unit operations is useful in 
thinking about play design and cultural particularity, offering a model for 
considering the habitus as being founded on small-scale relational 
connections which progressively build the wider social systems within 
individuals’ horizons of experience. Building upon Bogost’s ideas, my 
approach has been to invite play with the objects within the experiential 
horizon of players so that they might reconfigure the units of their 
experience to enable potential transformations of cultural values.  
In describing my practical work, I argue that intersubjective 
heteronomy is an important aspect of the transformative potential of play, 
fostering potential habitus alteration as different subjectivities overlap and 
influence each other. Whereas Jacques Rancière insists on autonomy for the 
emancipated spectator,6 I suggest that autonomous isolation promotes 
cultural ossification by cutting individuals off from the relational 
connections that might enable them to develop new capacities. By contrast, 
through reference to the works of Gareth White, Grant Kester and Shannon 
Jackson, all of whom argue against autonomous separation of art (and 
artists) from the everyday life of audiences, I argue in favour of work that 
foregrounds heteronomous exchanges between artists and participants and 
within participants groups themselves. My contention is that heteronomy in 
participatory art can be conducive to cultural transformation as individuals 
                                                          
4 Eric Mangez and Georges Lienard, ‘The field of power and the relative autonomy of social 
fields: the case of Belgium’, in Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications, 
ed. by Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 181-198. 
5 Ian Bogost, Unit Operations: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 2008), pp. 3-4. 
6 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso 
Books, 2009), pp. 14-16. 
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are brought into relation with things that are unfamiliar, opening potential 
for the cultural particularities of the habitus to be transformed. 
Despite taking a critical stance towards Bourdieu’s field theory and 
systems thinking, in the latter part of the chapter, I set out an alternative 
approach to fields and systems that views them, not as autonomous entities 
that present static and closed visions of the world from top-down 
perspectives, but as flexible assemblages that emerge from the ground-up. In 
making this argument, I draw on the work of theorists who reconceive fields 
as heteronomous networks that invariably overlap and thereby open the 
possibility for new relational connections that can enable their agents to 
adapt and change. With regard to systems, I discuss the works of Niklas 
Luhmann and Gregory Bateson to argue that systemic thinking in play and 
art is an integral part of the human ability to exercise reflexivity and think in 
abstract terms to visualise new possibilities beyond the concrete materiality 
of immediate surroundings. In sum, this chapter sets out an argument for 
designing play in response to cultural particularity that foregrounds habitus 
as a conceptual tool for engaging with participant subjectivities. 
Subsequently, by setting the habitus of individuals in relation with the 
cultural particularity of others, new systems of play can emerge as ground-
up assemblages, in contrast to top-down models of system design. My 
argument proposes that a combined focus on habitus as the source material 
for play and reflexivity as a core component of aesthetic value in the play 
experience itself can support the development of play designs that offer 
potential for habitus alteration and cultural transformation. 
 
4.1 Habitus Mining & Play Design 
In this section, I offer examples of how the process of habitus mining, 
based on a reappropriation of given circumstances analysis, served as a 
method for investigating the cultural particularity of participants as a 
precursor to the design of play activities in my practical work. Stanislavski’s 
concept of the given circumstances is, fundamentally, a form of literary 
analysis whereby the reader can examine the contextual details that are 
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‘given’ by the author. In the opening stage direction of Anton Chekhov’s, The 
Cherry Orchard, for example, we gain a huge amount of information: 
 A room which is still known as the nursery.7 
This sentence tells us something of where we are: in a room, which used to 
be a nursery, but is no longer used for this purpose. It also gives information 
on time: there was once a child (or children), but they are no longer here; 
and it suggests that the people of this place perhaps enjoyed a relatively high 
degree of privilege since they had the luxury of a nursery as their living 
space. As this example shows, small amounts of material can yield 
substantial insights on where events have happened, when they have 
happened, and the identities of the people involved. 
In my conversations with participants at Haringey Community Hub, 
small anecdotes were often extremely revealing. The most fundamental 
aspect of given circumstances analysis, as is illustrated by the stage 
direction above, is place and, in approaching the habitus mining process, 
investigations of place were my starting point. By issuing the simple 
invitation: ‘Tell me about a place that really matters to you’, I was able to 
glean significant insights into the cultural particularity of participants. Mr 
Ganguly told me about the English-speaking boarding school that he 
attended in Mussorie, in the Himalayan foothills of Northern India, and 
recalled the pleasure of travelling by train to his home in Delhi through the 
snowy mountains, while Ravi described the field of grass at the edge of the 
sugar cane plantation in Mauritius where, as a boy, he cut fodder for the 
cows on his small family farm. These simple descriptions of place 
immediately open a vista on the differing capital affordances of these two 
individuals and foreground a consideration of the times in their lives that 
particularly mattered to them. Yamini described the beach in Tanzania 
where she and her school friends used to go for short holidays, travelling on 
a lorry and singing Bollywood songs along the way, and described attending 
Pitman’s College, a school for secretarial skills in central London. In linking 
these two spaces together, the educational capital conferred by the latter 
                                                          
7 Anton Chekhov, The Cherry Orchard, trans. by Michael Frayn (London: Bloomsbury 
Methuen Drama, 1978), Act One, p. 1. 
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indicates a trajectory in which she was able to migrate from Tanzania to the 
United Kingdom as a matter of choice: 
London for further education. Education here and go back home, but 
then I stayed here. Political situation was not good at all. Not at all. And 
my mum wrote to me not to come back. And I stayed here…I didn’t want 
to go back home because of the coloured people you know? I don’t like 
coloured people.8 
By contrast, Mrs Jadeja, a very elderly woman with whom I communicated 
via the translations of Indu, one of the Community Hub staff, gave more 
partial descriptions of places that nonetheless illuminated a trajectory 
influenced by weaker capital affordances. In responding to an invitation to 
describe something she liked about where she grew up, she said: 
 (Mrs Jadeja speaks) 
Indu: She grew up in a village in India. She enjoyed farming and the 
cows. She didn’t go to school. 
Subsequently, in describing her journey when coming to the UK for the first 
time, she said: 
 (Mrs Jadeja speaks) 
Indu: She came from Kampala by plane and she left everything behind 
there.9 
This statement was then elaborated upon by Yamini who said: ‘She came 
exodus. Prime Minister Idi Amin. They chuck out all Indians without British 
passport you know?’ giving a strong indication that Mrs Jadeja’s emigration 
was, unlike her own journey (which was volitionally shaped by her 
educational capital), not voluntary, a result, perhaps, of weaker capitals that 
offered less volitional choice.  
As the above examples illustrate, descriptions of places revealed 
substantial detail about the capitals of individuals and how these capitals 
shaped their trajectories through space and time. Consequently, as Cristina 
Costa and Mark Murphy argue, habitus is not only a theoretical concept, it 
can also serve as a method of research, enabling the researcher to devise 
                                                          
8 ‘Yamini’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community, London (21 August 2017). 
See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub25’. 
9 ‘Mrs Jadeja’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community Hub, London (24 July 
2017). See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub11’. 
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‘mechanisms through which social agents’ dispositional schemas can be 
identified within the fields in which they originate or transform’.10  The 
question that follows, however, is how play can be designed in response to 
the knowledge gleaned from this process and the following section describes 
my attempt to design a game (as the final play activity of the Haringey 
Community Hub project) through a system analysis of the information 
drawn from habitus mining.  
 
4.2 Limitations of Field Theory & System-Based Game Design 
As I have suggested in the introduction to this chapter, there are 
strong commonalities between field theory and a system analytic approach to 
game design. In the same way that fields are composed of the relational 
connections between subject agents whose habitus influences their ability to 
take actions within a specific domain of activity, system analysis in game 
design focuses on the active objects in systems, their internal relationships 
and their attributes. These details are subsequently translated into game 
mechanics (the levers with which players can influence the system in pursuit 
of goals) and rules to constrain the play action. In this section, I argue that 
field theory is useful in considering cultural transformation because it is 
fundamentally relational, in the sense that the attributes of objects in the 
field are determined by their relational connections with other objects. It 
follows that if agents in a field are able to establish new relational 
connections, they may also acquire new capitals that enable transformative 
opportunities. I also critique field theory, however, since it tends to visualise 
fields as autonomous spheres of activity which can impose a reductive 
simplicity on the phenomena that are represented. Similarly, with regard to 
my game design work, I suggest that my attempts to apply field theory as a 
game design approach proved problematic for my endeavour to create play in 
response to cultural particularity by eliding the complexities of participants’ 
lived experiences.     
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Field theory is founded on the notion that the relations between 
objects determine their properties. In contrast to Aristotelian substantialism, 
which holds that the qualities of objects ‘do not depend on the object’s 
relation to the environment’ but rather ‘inherently belong to the object, 
regardless of its setting, at all times’,11 Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez 
argue that the concept of a field foregrounds the idea that it is the relational 
connections between objects that illuminate their qualities and behaviour: 
Only a set of relationships on which a system is based, and which is to 
be found in each particular configuration, truly gives access to the 
object. From this standpoint, it is not so much the properties of an 
object or a configuration, as the network of (cor)relations that is woven 
between them and other neighbouring formations that is the object of 
analysis.12 
Phenomenological thinkers subsequently adopted the concept of the field as 
part of ‘gestalt’ theory which proposes that sensory percepts should be 
understood as relational configurations of stimuli. In the description of John 
Levi Martin and Forest Gregg, gestalt theorists argued that: 
The way to understand our actual empirical, phenomenological 
experience would be to investigate how we captured such whole forms 
(‘Gestalts’) as unified objects of experience (and not as aggregates or 
syntheses)…for the objects we perceive – or at least their character as 
quality bearing objects – are themselves structures, and structures are 
sets of relations.13 
Drawing on the insights of gestalt theorists, Bourdieu’s conception of the 
field is fundamentally relational. Rather than viewing the habitus as a set of 
innate characteristics held by an individual, it is a structure of relations 
which emerges as agents are endowed with capitals through their 
connections with other agents in the field. 
For Bourdieu, an agent’s capital endowment is expressed as a position 
in the field, typically conceived as a stratified distribution of positions based 
                                                          
11 Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez, ‘Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social 
fields’, in Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications, ed. by Mathieu 
Hilgers and Eric Mangez (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 1-35. (p. 3). 
12 Hilgers and Mangez, ‘Introduction’, p. 3. 
13 John Levi Martin and Forest Gregg, ‘Was Bourdieu a field theorist?’, in Bourdieu’s Theory 
of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications, ed. by Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 39-61 (pp. 41-42).  
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on hierarchies of capital.14 In addition to field position, he argues that 
movement in the field can be effected through the agent’s disposition (the 
desire to alter or conserve field position) and position-takings (the actions 
that agents take to alter or conserve field position). Consequently, ‘rather 
than seeing social agents as particles, mechanistically pushed and pulled by 
external forces’15 Hilgers and Mangez argue, citing the collaborative work of 
Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, that: 
They [social agents] are…bearers of capital, and, depending on their 
trajectory and on the position they occupy in the field by virtue of their 
endowment (volume and structure) of capital, they have the propensity 
to orient themselves actively either towards the conservation of the 
distribution of capital or towards the subversion of that distribution.16 
A key aspect in determining whether an agent can subvert the distribution of 
capital in a specific field is the degree of correspondence between field 
position, disposition and position-takings. If there is a high level of 
correspondence, whereby the agent is disposed to maintain their position, 
the distribution of capital will not change. If there are gaps between position, 
disposition and position-takings, however, whereby the agent is disposed to 
take up an alternative position and takes actions to do so, there is the 
potential for transformation of capital distributions in the field.17 In the 
context of a study about the culturally transformative potential of play, the 
notion of correspondence between position, disposition and position-taking 
is significant, suggesting that the cultivation of gaps in correspondence 
might open a space of possibility for emergent changeability. Similarly, in 
system-based games, emergent potential can be explored by players as they 
actively orient themselves, according to their disposition, towards new 
relational connections, or position-takings, in pursuit of goals, continually 
reordering the game state in the same way that field positions may change. 
                                                          
14 Tony Bennett, ‘Culture, Power, Knowledge: Between Foucault and Bourdieu’, in Cultural 
Analysis and Bourdieu’s Legacy: settling accounts and developing alternatives, ed. by 
Elizabeth Silva and Alan Warde (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 102-116. 
15 Hilgers and Mangez, ‘Introduction’, p. 4. 
16 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 108-109, cited in Hilgers and Mangez, ‘Introduction’, 
p. 4. 
17 Louis Pinto, ‘The Field: a Leibnizian perspective in sociology’, in Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Social Fields: Concepts and Applications, ed. by Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015), pp. 102-118 (p.110). 
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As I will now suggest, however, a field theoretical approach to play design 
can have the undesirable effect of reductively compressing the complexity of 
cultural particularities into a simplified system, which might limit, rather 
than promote, the potential for culturally transformative play. 
In the early stages of the Haringey Community Hub project, it quickly 
became apparent that it would be difficult to employ a field analytical or 
system-based approach to game design, owing to the radically disparate life 
trajectories of the participants. Even though all participants were of 
southern Asian heritage and might be perceived from an external perspective 
as being a relatively homogenous group, the actuality was markedly 
different, with strong religious differences emerging between Muslims and 
Hindus in response to the London Bridge terror attack in June 2017, for 
example. In my considerations of how the participant group could be 
conceived as a ‘community’ the predominant thought that occurred to me 
was that they were all immigrants, having arrived in the United Kingdom 
from various countries that had been part of the British Empire. When I 
posed the question of what the participants had in common with each other, 
however, none of them identified immigrant status as a commonality. The 
most concrete proposition in response to this question came from Mr 
Ganguly who said: ‘We’re all disabled. We all have some things that we can’t 
handle properly. That’s the obstacle with us’.18 Following Mr Ganguly’s 
suggestion, it would have been possible to analyse the day care centre in its 
function as a facility for elderly people. This would have forced me to define 
participants according to their disabilities, however, focusing my attention 
on issues that the participants were relatively uninterested in discussing (old 
age and disability), foregoing consideration of the many things that they were 
enthusiastic about discussing from other points in their life trajectory. 
As I have indicated in my brief description of some of the outputs from 
the habitus mining process, the participants had moved through a wide 
variety of social fields over time. Given the enormous diversity of field effects 
within the lived experience of individuals, it was extremely difficult to design 
                                                          
18 ‘Mr Ganguly’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community Hub, London (14 
August 2017). See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub22’. 
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a game system based on a field analytic approach that could meaningfully 
engage the diverse cultural particularities of all participants. I did, however, 
design a board game, which I called Islands, as the final play activity of the 
overall project, which attempted to offer a play system that might be 
meaningful for all participants.19 The system of the game was strongly 
influenced by the stories of Ravi, undoubtedly the most conversant of the 
participants, who had discussed in detail his childhood experiences of 
growing up in Mauritius, working on his small family farm, going to school, 
getting qualifications as a mechanic then emigrating to England to work in 
the Vauxhall car plant, before starting his own auto repair business. The 
core themes of Ravi’s stories (education, work, social life, and coming to the 
UK) were broadly shared by all participants, so basing the game on these 
components seemed to offer some prospect that players’ engagement with 
the game might connect with aspects of their own habitus. 
The game centred on three children growing up in a village on a small 
island. One child had a big family farm, one child had a small family farm 
and the third child had no farm. Correspondingly, the child with the big farm 
had a high level of economic capital, while the child with no farm had lower 
economic capital. These levels of economic capital also corresponded with 
levels of educational capital, since the richer children could afford to skip 
work on the farm to go to school. Counterbalancing economic capital was 
cultural capital in the form of ‘friendship’ tokens which initially ranked the 
poorest child as the most popular in the village and the richest child as the 
least popular. Each round of play consisted of a three-way choice that the 
players could make on behalf of their character avatar. They could choose to 
go to school which increased their educational capital, they could choose to 
play at the seaside to increase their popularity (which brought the benefit of 
being able to call in ‘favours’ from friends), or they could choose to work, 
which boosted economic capital, with the added twist that the poor child 
could only work on the farms of his neighbours, earning money for them 
alongside earning their own money. This basic structure was repeated as the 
children progressed to adulthood and, depending on their capital 
                                                          
19 See Appendix B.4 for the rule set of Islands. 
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affordances, moved to the town to pursue further education or higher-waged 
occupations, or emigrated to the ‘big island’ in search of the same things on 
a larger scale. 
As a representation of field theory in the form of a game, I suggest that 
Islands was a successful piece of design, presenting a trio of agents with 
basic relational connections (based on monetary exchange and the 
popularity stakes of friendship) and an initial set of positions that could be 
altered according to players’ dispositions and the redeployment of the 
capitals that their characters held. The game also created the development of 
a relatively clear doxa (Bourdieu’s term for the dominant ideology of a 
field),20 based on the notion that increased educational capital enables 
advanced employment and increasing economic capital which, in turn, 
enables more leisure time that can increase popularity and happiness. In 
critically reflecting on the game, however, I suggest that the synergies 
between the system design employed and field theory might be seen as 
limitations, at least in this instance. The most obvious criticism that can be 
levelled at field theory is that its hierarchical approach to capitals seems 
reductively axiomatic. This can be seen in Bourdieu’s models of artistic fields 
in which high economic capital (combined with low cultural capital in the 
case of artists who ‘sell out’) sits at one pole, with high cultural capital 
(combined with low economic capital in the case of experimental artistic 
innovators) at the other.21 This polarity seems to mirror my own axioms of 
the rich but unpopular child contrasting with the poor but popular one. The 
issue with such axiomatic frameworks is that they treat position and 
position-taking in quantitative terms, and although quantitative action is a 
core feature of many games, in the context of a study about play and 
culture, the elision of qualitative factors of the habitus seems unfortunate. 
This qualitative limitation was reflected in a comment made by Ravi after he 
had played the game, when he described it as a relatively simplistic 
‘parabole’, with general play actions that were ‘comme ci, comme ca’ in 
                                                          
20 Frédéric Lebaron, ‘Bourdieu in a multi-dimensional perspective’, in Cultural Analysis and 
Bourdieu’s Legacy: settling accounts and developing alternatives, ed. by Elizabeth Silva and 
Alan Warde (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 142-150. 
21 Hilgers and Mangez, ‘Introduction’, pp. 11-12. 
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contrast to the qualitative specificity of actions in real-life ‘that put the dot on 
the i’.22  
The sentiments noted above resonate with the work of Bernard Lahire 
who criticises Bourdieu’s analysis of the literary field because it treats the 
production of literary works in computational terms, with little reference to 
the qualities of the work itself: 
What is the specificity of aesthetic products? The answer that consists 
in saying that ‘literature’ is what literary institutions consider as such, 
that ‘art’ is whatever is put in an art gallery, that ‘science’ is whatever 
is published in a scientific journal, is clearly inadequate. While this 
tautology is useful in underlining the instrumentalization by the social 
world of the meaning of acts or of the products of these acts, it does 
not answer the question of what characterises these different symbolic 
constructions of the real.23 
In other words, Bourdieu’s theory operates in reductively quantitative terms, 
whereby any work of art in an art gallery equates to a +1 output of artistic 
production. According to Lahire, Bourdieu gives scant consideration to the 
qualitative variability of how the work might be received, leading him to 
argue that ‘this way of conceiving the consumers prevents one from grasping 
the plural appropriations of the same works’24 since the field theoretical 
model treats all reception of art work in an art gallery as a computational +1 
output, disregarding the divergent views that different people may have had 
of it. In a similar vein, Georgina Born argues that ‘Bourdieu insistently 
refuses to address the art object and its aesthetic properties’ claiming that 
‘any concern with the substantive meaning and power of particular aesthetic 
traditions is evacuated in favour of a synchronic focus on the agonistics of 
position-taking’.25  
Aside from criticisms of the reductively axiomatic and quantitative 
nature of field theory, for my purposes, the most significant critique of 
Bourdieu’s work is his tendency to view fields as autonomous objects of 
                                                          
22 ‘Ravi’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community Hub, London (19 March 2018). 
See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub42’. 
23 Bernard Lahire, ‘The Limits of the Field: Elements for a theory of the social differentiation 
of activities’, in Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications, ed. by Mathieu 
Hilgers and Eric Mangez (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 62-101 (p. 88). 
24 Lahire, p. 93. 
25 Georgina Born, ‘The social and the aesthetic: For a post-Bourdieuian theory of cultural 
production’, Cultural Sociology, 4:2 (2010), 171-208 (p. 179). 
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analysis that are neatly bounded from external influences. Lahire discusses 
Bourdieu’s argument that the French literary field gained autonomy through 
figures such as Flaubert, whose work was only influenced by other members 
of the literary field, without being subject to forces from outside it. He points 
out, though, that Flaubert was only able to exercise the autonomy of the 
total writer, and thereby help establish the autonomy of the literary field, 
because he was independently wealthy with no family ties, allowing him to 
devote himself to writing with no distractions. By contrast, the vast majority 
of writers who populate the literary field do not enjoy such privileges and are 
required to take other jobs to earn a living. Consequently, the literary world 
cannot be seen as autonomous when large numbers of its agents are 
influenced by economic forces from outside the field.26 The salient point that 
emerges from this analysis of struggling writers is that field theory, in its 
endeavour to define fields of activity as autonomous entities, fails to account 
for the broad plurality of influences from outside a field that impact the 
habitus of agents and the capitals that they can deploy within it. Lahire 
comments that it is ‘impossible to proceed as if journalists, footballers, 
philosophers or jurists could be reduced to their being-as-member-of-a-
field’27 and yet, as Hilgers and Mangez suggest, Bourdieu, through the 
development of a field theoretical approach that privileges autonomy, ‘gives 
the impression of having studied relatively isolated societies, circumscribed 
in one territory’ in which agents are defined by their function in the activity 
that the field seeks to represent.28  
A focus on the autonomization of fields is problematic, in my view, 
because as fields become more autonomous and less susceptible to outside 
influences, the doxa of the field becomes stronger, which in turn prompts 
subject agents to more fully embrace the illusio, or ‘commitment to the 
stakes of the game’29 being played within it. Consequently, as agents in 
increasingly exclusive and isolated fields commit to the doxa, it is arguably 
                                                          
26 Lahire, pp. 79-80. 
27 Lahire, p. 74. 
28 Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez, ‘Afterword: theory of fields in the postcolonial age’, in 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications, ed. by Mathieu Hilgers and 
Eric Mangez (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 257-273 (p. 268). 
29 Pinto, p. 112. 
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more likely that existing capital distributions, governed by the dominant 
ideology, will be consolidated. This subsequently reduces the potential for 
gaps between field position, disposition and position-taking and thereby 
reduces the possibility for agents to actively reorient themselves to challenge 
or subvert the distribution of capitals and effect alterations to their habitus. 
This idea is discussed by John Postill who criticises Bourdieu’s focus on the 
internal stabilisation of fields. In Postill’s account, Bourdieu downplays the 
possibility of change by suggesting that discrete fields are usually only 
altered by disruptions from outside that create a ‘hysteresis effect’, whereby 
individuals are forced to adapt their practices in the midst of a disorientating 
set of new conditions.30 Yang Yang shares Postill’s critical view of field 
autonomy, arguing that Bourdieu’s focus on change through external 
disruption disregards the possibilities of internal transformation within fields 
through proactive agency and reflexivity. Yang argues that Bourdieu appears 
to see reflexivity as the sole preserve of the sociologist rather than ‘lay 
agents’ and claims that his focus on change through hysteresis is excessively 
pessimistic since it emphasises disorientation as the primary effect of 
disruptions, with the probable effect of exacerbating the difficulty that agents 
face in achieving transformations within the field.31 In short, Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on the tendency of fields to seek increased autonomization points 
towards cultural ossification and deterministic reproduction of the doxa. 
Consequently, despite my positive valuation of habitus as a conceptual tool 
for designing play in response to cultural particularity, applying Bourdieu’s 
wider field theory in relation to game design has proved problematic in my 




                                                          
30 John Postill, ‘Fields: Dynamic configurations of Practices, Games and Socialities’, in 
Thinking Through Sociality: An Anthropological Interrogation of Key Concepts, ed. by Vered 
Amit (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), pp. 47-68.  
31 Yang Yang, ‘Bourdieu, practice and change: Beyond the criticism of determinism’, 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 46:14 (2014), 1522-1540 (pp. 1530-1531). 
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4.3 Unit Operations: An Alternative to Totalizing Systems 
Having problematised my own field theoretical approach in creating a 
system-based game design in response to the habitus mining process at 
Haringey Community Hub, this section addresses criticisms levelled at 
systems theory for emphasising the closured nature of system operations, 
presenting an alternative approach that draws Ian Bogost’s concept of unit 
operations. Bogost’s theory serves as a useful framework for considering play 
design in response to cultural particularity, emphasising how systems can 
emerge from the ground-up, through local relational connections that create 
flexible assemblages. In contrast to the ossified rigidity of autonomous fields, 
therefore, I propose that a unit operational approach offers a theoretical 
basis for play design in which players can apply their cultural particulars in 
relationally assembling the structures of their play.  
In contrast to systems theoretical approaches, which Bogost describes 
as closed, static and totalizing,32 unit operations, in his definition, are ‘an 
arrangement of discrete, interlocking units of meaning’.33 This offers a clear 
distinction between system operations that ‘reductively affirm the principle 
of an organising system’ and unit operations that ‘articulate connections 
between nodes in networks’ and ‘build relations’.34 The contrast between 
unit operations and system operations is given concrete expression in 
Bogost’s discussion of the human genome project which he criticises as 
being illustrative of the limitations of a totalizing, systematized view of 
human life: 
As scientists learn more about the human genome, they increasingly 
realise that no skeleton keys exist for human pathology…biology has 
entered a post-genomic phase, recognising that knowledge about the 
individual genes themselves is not very useful. Instead, scientists seek 
to understand the functions between individual genes and how the 
complex configurations of genetic functionality underlie complex 
behaviour.35 
                                                          
32 Ian Bogost, Unit Operations: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 2008), p. 6. 
33 Bogost, Unit Operations, p. ix. 
34 Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 8. 
35 Bogost, Unit Operations, pp. 3-4. 
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Essentially, Bogost’s proposition is that understanding the relational 
connections between individual genes is more fruitful than seeking to 
construct a universal system view, and he goes on to argue that ‘the human 
genome project attempts to account for humanity as a holistic system 
operation rather than as a complex, discursive set of unit relations’. As such, 
‘it serves as an example of a unit operational model interpreted or forced into 
the format of a system’.36 Moving beyond genetic biology, Bogost investigates 
cultural instances of unit operations and finds value in the figure of the 
flâneur, whose wandering of the city contains innumerable points of decision 
that function as discrete units: 
The decision points faced by the flâneur far exceed mere cartographic 
decision; he chooses not only which streets, alleys, and arcades to 
traverse, but also which tobacconist to visit, which passers-by to 
watch or ignore, which carriage to take, which puddle to step in or 
avoid. The work of the flâneur is constituted of these individual unit 
operations, some of which he considers as he traverses the city, some 
of which critique themselves for him based on the emergent effect of 
actions taken by all the other individuals in the vicinity.37 
In considering the unit operations of genes alongside the cultural units of 
the flâneur’s city wandering, Bogost arrives at the concept of the meme as an 
elementary unit of culture that can be understood in parallel with the 
biological units of genes:  
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, 
ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate 
themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperm 
and eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the memepool by leaping 
from brain to brain.38 
Subsequently, as memes spread and grow into wider cultural networks, they 
form the ‘memeplex’, which can be understood as a ‘kind of cultural unit 
cluster in which memes encapsulate themselves into the social systems we 
perceive and participate in’.39  
                                                          
36 Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 44. 
37 Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 75. 
38 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 192, cited 
in Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 45. 
39 Richard Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion, and the Appetite for Wonder 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), p. 306, cited in Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 45. 
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The notion of memes as units of cultural expression that contribute to 
the memeplex of cultural networks provides a framework for thinking about 
the ways I have worked with participants in the habitus mining process. 
Each question or creative invitation from me provided a decision point for 
participants to express units of cultural meaning and the relational 
connections between these fragmentary units have cumulatively formed 
pictures of the memeplex, or cultural networks, that the participants have 
moved within. Bogost is careful to point out, though, that these networks 
need not be seen as systems that are impermeable to change. He references 
Martin Heidegger’s concept of ‘enframing’, which can be understood as the 
way that human actions become constrained by rigidified patterns, to argue 
that unit operations, by contrast, are not deterministically fixed, but rather 
resist enframement through ongoing reconfigurations.40  
The idea of unit operational reconfiguration can be exemplified by the 
play activities that I designed in the second phase of my project at Haringey 
Community Hub. Having gathered many stories from participants in the 
habitus mining process, I invited them to create fictional re-orderings of 
units of their lived experience.41 Working with Mr Ganguly, for example, I 
began by showing him photographic images of places that he had told me 
about and he selected an image of the Himalayan foothills of Mussorie, the 
place where he had attended boarding school as a boy. I then invited him to 
imagine a fictional character and offered a sequence of prompts as stimuli 
for further units of the story: 
JH: So, the school in Mussorie. Now, I’d like you to imagine an invented 
character that goes to the school. 
Mr Ganguly: Things have changed over there – it’s all changed now. I 
don’t know what’s going on there. I was there – English Standard 
school. I was there in the 50s. 
(He laughs) 
 JH: Maybe just start with the name? The name of a person. 
 Mr Ganguly: Alan. 
                                                          
40 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper, 1977), p. 32, cited in Bogost, Unit 
Operations, pp. 6-8. 
41 See Appendix B.14 for structure of the Pathways exercise. 
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JH: Okay, so now I’d like you to imagine taking Alan to a completely 
new place. It could be a beach, a village or the city? 
Mr Ganguly: No beaches over there. There are villages. No cities. Down 
there in the plains – there is a religious place on the plains. If he goes 
from my place – the school – he has to go down – like – those days, my 
time – you go down the hill. Ways of going down – there’s a shortcut you 
take. You take the shortcut and you go down to the bus station. From 
there – then go all the way to Deradun. Station called Deradun. From 
there take a train – then go to Hardwa. Rishikesh. Historical place. Go 
on tour there to the temple or go for shopping. 
JH: And now I’d like you to imagine another person who he meets there. 
It could be a friend, a relative of someone that he works with? 
Mr Ganguly: John – friend of his. They study together. Came on the 
same train. He lives in Hardwa. He shows him round the lakes and the 
religious places in Hardwa then he takes him up the hill. There’s a rope 
bridge where you can go. 
JH: And what happens next? Is there a decision that Alan makes or a 
request that he makes of John? 
Mr Ganguly: He goes there – stays in a hotel. There’s a café over there – 
he can have his meal. He can’t request from John…I wouldn’t do that 
myself. It’s hard to go to someone’s house. If you’re not shy – if you’re 
really not afraid to stay in someone’s place you can. But I wouldn’t do 
that.42 
In this story-making exercise, Mr Ganguly was invited to recalibrate his 
memeplex through fictional invention, but as is apparent from the excerpt 
above, he strongly projected his cultural particularity (which I would 
characterise as modest, impeccably polite, with a keen sense of decorum) 
onto the character of Alan.  
In reflecting on his play experience, I asked Mr Ganguly what it was 
like to create an imagined story and whether he preferred to invent things 
that were close to his experience or different from it. In reply, he said: ‘Not 
difficult to imagine. I can make it up also – I gave you another name, but I’ve 
got a friend who lives there. It’s one of the things I know. I can explain for 
myself about the school – that’s my experience I had’. This clearly indicates 
that Mr Ganguly preferred not to take up the unpredictable pathway of the 
flâneur in his story and instead chose to navigate familiar pathways. This 
example, which might be read as an instance of ‘enframement’, in the sense 
                                                          
42 ‘Mr Ganguly’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community Hub, London (4 
December 2017). See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub34’. 
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that Mr Ganguly remained within a familiar pattern, exemplifies the 
challenge of designing play that might be culturally transformative for 
persons like Mr Ganguly, who was, in my estimation, a man of highly fixed 
habits. In considering this challenge, Bogost’s interest in bricolage, a term 
borrowed from anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, offers a valuable concept 
for designing play that escapes the enframement of adherence to habitual 
patterns of activity by suggesting a process in which a scattered plurality of 
memes might be combined to create innovative new assemblages: 
The bricoleur is a skilful handy-man, a jack-of-all-trades who uses 
convenient implements and ad hoc strategies to achieve his ends. 
Unlike the engineer, the scientific thinker who strives to construct 
holistic, totalizing systems from the top-down, the bricoleur performs 
his tasks from spare parts, from odds and ends. The scientist strives 
to create events by means of structures, whereas the bricoleur seeks 
to create structures through events.43 
If Mr Ganguly stands for the engineer in the work at Haringey Community 
Hub, I would suggest that Ravi might stand for the bricoleur. In the same 
way that bricolage involves deviating from normative patterns of production 
to create new structures, the stories that Ravi shared during the habitus 
mining process suggested a similar flexibility that enabled him to apply his 
capitals in surprising and often transgressive ways. In describing his 
experience of cutting grass for the cows on his small family farm, Ravi 
mentioned that the took the opportunity to do a bit of ‘fiddling’ by stealing 
sugar cane from the plantations owned by the ‘barons’.44 He also played the 
same story-making exercise through which Mr Ganguly had narrated the 
journey to Hardwa, inventing a story in which two friends, Tom and Rosé, 
arranged a group expedition to hunt crabs then decided to steal the catch 
from the others and split it between themselves despite the bad reputation it 
would earn them, yielding the moral lesson that ‘people are cheeky! You have 
to get rid of them’.45 Similarly, in his description of Empire Day, his school 
sports day festival, he talked about winning the wheelbarrow race by picking 
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his partner off the ground and running with him because he was moving too 
slowly. Mr Ganguly was listening to the wheelbarrow race anecdote and 
called out ‘That’s cheating! Should have been disqualified!’ but the bricoleur 
replied: ‘I done something special!’46 This momentary overlap of Ravi and Mr 
Ganguly says much about their respective cultural particularities, with Mr 
Ganguly’s fidelity to rules contrasting with Ravi’s apparent relish for 
innovative rule-breaking. Rather than characterising their interrelation as an 
antagonistic clash between two divergent subjectivities (the engineer and the 
bricoleur) I will move on, shortly, to give an account of some of their 
intersubjective exchanges during play, exploring the possibilities for adaptive 
reconfiguration of subjectivities that these exchanges provided. 
In considering the potential of reconfiguring subjectivities, Bogost’s 
discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of rhizomatic nomadism is 
instructive. The rhizome, in Bogost’s account, is based on a ‘plant growth 
model, according to which growth spreads by non-hierarchical tubers 
instead of hierarchical roots’.47 In Deleuze and Guattari’s use of this term, 
bodies move according to free-form attractions along a rhizomatic structure 
between different plateaus, or territories, in a process that they term 
‘deterritorialization’: 
Deterritorialization is the up-rooting of a thing along the vector of a 
rhizome that decodes it, or changes the circumstances and actions 
affecting it. Deterritorialization leads to a reterritorialization in which 
the thing is reimplanted and reincoded in a new circumstance. This 
recoding is called an ‘overcoding’; it creates a new insertion of the 
object into a different level or assemblage, from which it can again 
uproot and reconstitute itself.48 
The concepts of deterritorialization and overcoding are useful in the context 
of intersubjective play as they offer a theoretical framework for considering 
the possible reconfiguration of subjectivities in response to the influence of 
another body. This can be seen as the creation of a palimpsest, whereby an 
                                                          
46 ‘Mr Ganguly’ and ‘Ravi’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community Hub, London 
(14 August 2017) See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub22’. 
47 Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 140. 
48 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. by Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987), cited in Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 141. 
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initial textual imprint is deterritorialized and overcoded by another imprint 
that forms a new assemblage. 
In practical terms, I argue that deterritorialization and palimpsestic 
overcoding are common features of the intersubjective exchanges that occur 
in role-play activities and I will now offer an example stemming from my 
work with Ravi and Mr Ganguly.49 To begin the activity, I showed the two 
participants four images relating to stories that the other person had told 
and invited each of them to pick the image that they found the most 
interesting. Mr Ganguly picked a picture of a plane on a runway at the 
airport in Mauritius,  relating to Ravi’s stories of leaving his country and 
moving to the UK to work in the Vauxhall car plant as a mechanic, while 
Ravi picked an image of King’s Cross station, where Mr Ganguly had worked 
as a platform manager for twenty-five years. I asked both players to restate 
the circumstances of their stories then invited them to imagine a 
fictionalised version of the other person’s story. Working with Mr Ganguly’s 
story, Ravi invented a character called Michael and, following my prompts, 
described his hopes and fears as follows: 
He supervisor of the platform. He hope for everything goes safe, safely. 
He watches the train coming in – stop in the right place then give the 
order. He fears accident – somebody may fall in the line. When the train 
coming. 
Ravi subsequently carried on the story, developing it based on the premise 
that a woman had, in fact, fallen onto the train tracks: 
He will pull anyone in danger and report it to the office…He may think 
about this event – think about it all day. An accident like this can get to 
your head…If I am Michael, I would explain to people whatever 
happened. What I see. I see the woman fall on the line – because some 
old women when they walk – they get giddy and miss their step…I don’t 
think Michael alone could pull her out. So, I don’t believe – he won’t be 
able to save her. 
At this point, Mr Ganguly interjected by saying: ‘Michael can’t go on the 
lines’, but Ravi continued and concluded the story, speaking in Michael’s 
voice: 
                                                          
49 See Appendix B.1 for the structure of the Deterritorialization play exercise. 
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I don’t think I can carry on that job. The woman badly bruised or maybe 
dead. Maybe if I lift she fall again and then the woman get hit many 
time – badly bruised or broken bones. Maybe dead. 
When Ravi was finished, Mr Ganguly commented: 
Good story but, the main thing is – let me finish – that Michael can’t go 
on the lines. He’s not allowed to go on the lines. He has to get the trains 
stopped and there’ll be people. Someone else has to get on the lines and 
take over. He’s not responsible for it. 
Mr Ganguly’s response is symptomatic of a tendency to reaffirm codified 
rules and norms of behaviour (which are clearly necessary for the safe 
functioning of busy railway stations). Despite the fact that he attempted to 
pull Ravi’s dramatic story back towards more normative ways of operating, 
however, within the social contract of the role-play activity he allowed Ravi to 
modify his story and deterritorialize the central character (implicitly a 
version of Mr Ganguly himself) enabling Ravi to enact a (provisional) 
overcoding of his subjectivity as a result.  
Following on from the King’s Cross play exercise, My Ganguly enacted 
an overcoding on Ravi’s story, which, in the original version, involved moving 
to the UK, working in the Vauxhall car plant, making friends, borrowing 
money from them and spending it in the attempt to generate a social life in a 
new country. In reworking this story, however, Mr Ganguly invented a 
character called Philip (implicitly a version of Ravi) whom he steered on a 
much more careful path: 
His future hope is a graduate degree – he wants to be an engineer – to 
proceed on after. But he needs experience by training. He’s scared of 
women. He doesn’t like them. He doesn’t want to spend money in that 
respect. He wants to build himself up and later settle down. 
Essentially, both these examples of intersubjective role-play invited the 
players to deterritorialize the subjectivity of their role-play partner, creating 
palimpsest characters that merged the subjectivity of the original person 
with the subjectivity of the player who constructed the fictional version. 
When I asked Ravi and Mr Ganguly what it was like to create these 
imaginative reconstructions of true stories, they said: 
Mr Ganguly: It’s quite nice. Very interesting. Honestly speaking, I enjoy 
it. I like talking – making some stories out of facts. 
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Ravi: I would say the same. Whatever we have invented – I invented it 
because I invented on facts of life.50  
Though they may have been enjoyable, it cannot be claimed that these 
overcodings were culturally transformative, but I would suggest that the 
willingness and enthusiasm shown by these players to have the cultural 
memes of their life experience reconfigured by another subjectivity is 
indicative of a potential for habitus alteration. 
Having developed the method of palimpsest character hybrids in the 
Haringey Community Hub workshops, I made further explorations of this 
process in the Haringey Sheltered Housing scheme workshops and one 
particular exercise stood out as a clear example of overcoding, yielding some 
interesting reflections from the participants.51 The exercise began with an 
invitation to tell a story about an adventure from their own experience (an 
invitation which I also offered to myself, on this occasion). My story was of a 
solo hiking trip in the west of Ireland during which I got stuck on the top of a 
mountain on a dark and misty day. Once everyone had told their story, the 
stories were passed on to another person who was invited to change some 
aspect of the contextual circumstances and then progress the narrative. One 
participant, Beryl, built on my initial story by inventing a new circumstance 
concerning a silent stranger who rescued the hiker and brought him to a 
derelict barn to shelter for the night. In the morning, though, the man was 
gone. At this point, the stories were passed on again and another 
participant, Tony, added the new circumstance that when the hiker found 
his way to the road, he discovered that his car was gone, and that the road 
was reduced to a dirt track. It subsequently transpired, in a short role-play 
between Tony (playing the role of an old man on the road) and myself, that 
the hiker had somehow been transported to the year 1794.  
In reflecting on the story-making exercise outlined above, Beryl 
expressed a number of ideas on the creative tensions (but also opportunities) 
of having her story reconfigured by others: 
                                                          
50 ‘Mr Ganguly’ and ‘Ravi’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community Hub, London 
(27 November 2017). See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub30’. 
51 See Appendix B.12 for the structure of the Palimpsest Storymaking exercise. 
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I don’t know – it makes me realise that your imagination can really 
work. Start with a part that’s absolutely true then building it up on 
imagination. Everyone has imagination. Children use it. As we get older 
– this doesn’t happen – but we do have it. 
Subsequently, when I asked her what it was like to manipulate someone 
else’s story and have her own version of it manipulated in turn, she said: 
It was exciting – again your imagination comes into it. I’d already got 
this stranger, then Tony brought the kibosh. Tony brought it. It was 
because it threw a spanner into it – and now my mind’s ticking round – 
how can I bring Tony’s story into you? 1794! Many versions of the same 
story. Could’ve had a dream – fallen and knocked your head – and now 
you think you’re in Tony’s place in 1794.52  
Finally, I asked her if she would like to bring the story back to her version 
and she said: ‘I would like to bring it back – but I’m curious with where he’s 
gonna come to’. In reflecting on this exercise, I suggest that it shows a 
similar engineer/bricoleur tension as was evident in the play between Mr 
Ganguly and Ravi. Beryl renovated my story but seemed to experience some 
shock at Tony’s overcoding of her version. Ultimately, though, she appeared 
to view Tony’s ‘spanner’ as a productive intervention in stimulating further 
imaginative challenge and potential. 
Following on from these descriptions of the practical work in the 
Haringey projects, I conclude this section by summarising the value I have 
drawn from Bogost’s theory of unit operations in approaching play design in 
response to cultural particularity. Bogost’s central proposition, in contrast to 
systematized approaches, is to view unit operational structures as flexible 
networks that emerge from local relational connections between distinct 
units of meaning. Relating these ideas to my practical work, I see clear value 
in conceiving habitus mining, not as a simple extraction of latent content by 
the researcher, but as a unit operational approach in which participants are 
invited to express cultural memes that construct a picture of their memeplex 
which can inform play designs that are responsive to cultural particularity. 
Central to Bogost’s project is the notion that the networks formed by unit 
operations are flexible configurations that can be reconfigured, and his 
applications of bricolage and deterritorialization offer conceptual tools for 
                                                          
52 ‘Beryl’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Cranley Dene Sheltered Housing Scheme, London 
(17 January 2018). See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCranleyDene2’. 
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thinking about how intersubjective play strategies might enable participants 
to enact overcoding on each other’s subjectivities, reconfiguring their habitus 
and playing with the possibility of cultural transformation. 
 
4.4 Artistic Heteronomy & Aesthetic Strategies of Play Design 
The concept of unit operations sets out a heteronomous approach to 
system formation in the field of game studies, in contrast to the autonomy of 
closed systems, but debates between autonomy and heteronomy are even 
more prominent in performance studies and fine art. In this section, I argue 
for the value of heteronomy in participatory art as a means of bringing 
participants into contact with the unfamiliar, enabling them to adapt their 
subjectivities by widening the horizons of their cultural particularity. 
Conventional aesthetic theories separate the creations of the autonomous 
artist from the disinterested reception of the autonomous viewer,53 based on 
the view that ‘art is art because it is somehow detached from the world’.54 My 
analysis of autonomous fields suggests, however, that the exclusion of 
outside influences strengthens the doxa of dominant ideology. Consequently, 
I contend that the autonomous production and reception of art is likely to 
consolidate the pre-existing habitus of the artist and spectator and promote 
cultural ossification, since neither can be altered in the isolated cocoon of 
their singular, autonomous experience. By contrast, the pragmatist 
philosophy of John Dewey offers a clear rejection of artistic autonomy and 
suggests the transformative potential of integrating art with the experience of 
everyday life. In his discussion of Dewey’s theory, Gareth White argues that 
‘far from needing to defend the autonomy of art, Dewey’s “esthetics” places 
art at the centre of human life, and its possibilities for fulfilment and 
change’.55 This affirms my belief that even apparently inconsequential 
creative activities (like playing games) can be considered as ‘consummations’ 
                                                          
53 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. by J. H. Bernard (New York: Dover 
Philosophical Classics, 2005 [1914]), cited in Gareth White, Applied Theatre: Aesthetics 
(London: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 2015), pp. 30-31. 
54 White, Applied Theatre, p. 34. 
55 White, Applied Theatre, p. 44. 
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of aesthetic experience.56 For example, on one occasion during the Haringey 
Community Hub project, Ravi observed me practicing a type of cricket 
delivery called a ‘carrom’ ball, which involves flicking the ball out the hand 
with the knuckle of the middle finger. This led him to describe the traditional 
Indian game of Carrom, which involves flicking circular discs in the 
endeavour to cannon them into holes on the game board. It subsequently 
transpired that the Community Hub had a Carrom board, creating a kind of 
performance event as Ravi taught me how to play. In addition to playing, 
however, the event stimulated further conversation on the games (such as 
marbles) that participants had played during childhood and I suggest that 
this episode can be seen as a valuable ‘consummation’ of aesthetic 
experience for those involved. 
Grant Kester, like White, is critical of the notion of autonomy in art 
and he sets out a robust critique of artistic autonomy as ‘the isolation of the 
artistic personality in a sequestered zone of autonomous self-reflection’.57 In 
contrast to visions of artistic autonomy, Kester describes a range of artistic 
practices that foreground heteronomous engagement with the conditions of 
lived experience in specific sites and the cultural particularity of people 
within them. For example, he describes the AA Project of Argentinian art 
collective Ala Plástica, who worked with communities in the Rio de la Plata 
region of the country to ‘recover local knowledge of the region’s topography, 
habitats and cultural and agricultural traditions’.58 Kester subsequently 
describes the outcomes of this work as forms of situated knowledge which he 
terms ‘métis’: 
Métis is differentiated from episteme – knowledge that is generic, 
repeatable, and codifiable – a techne or technical know-how. It has the 
implication, instead of a form of knowing rooted in the specific 
conditions of a given site and the aggregated wisdom of the 
inhabitants of that site over time.59 
                                                          
56 John Dewey, Art as Experience (London: Pedigree, 1980 [1935]), cited in White, Applied 
Theatre, p. 9. 
57 Grant Kester, The One and The Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 20. 
58 Kester, The One, p. 142. 
59 Kester, The One, p. 143. 
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The concept of ‘métis’, as described by Kester, decisively foregrounds a 
heteronomous production of ‘knowing’ through a ground-up process of 
intersubjective exchange between participants. Although the work of Ala 
Plástica is deeply embedded in the cultural particulars of a specific site, 
however, Kester also emphasises the value of setting the work ‘sufficiently 
apart from quotidian social interaction to encourage a degree of self-
reflection, and calling attention to the exchange itself as creative praxis’,60 
which highlights the importance of a degree of differentiation between the 
project and normal life, in order to facilitate critical thinking. The notion that 
heteronomous participatory art might usefully offer a degree of separateness 
from normal life is, again, redolent of the ideas of Dewey, who argues that 
although art should be integrated into everyday experience, it must also 
function as ‘an experience’ in order to register an impact with those who 
participate in it. In other words, art experiences must be experienced as 
somewhat special in contrast to quotidian normalcy.61  
An example of ‘an experience’ in the Haringey Community Hub project 
can be found in an activity I designed called Journey to the Centre of the 
Earth.62 This was a simple game that involved a game board composed of 
pictures related to the stories that participants had told me. Each player had 
to move their counter around the board to collect mini-images of objects that 
related to larger images of locations that they had talked about. Effectively, 
each player had to match the relevant object image with the relevant location 
image. Once they had collected the object and moved it to the right location, 
they were invited to tell their story to the other players. This performance 
action functioned as ‘an experience’ by offering opportunities for 
participants’ experiences to be recognised by the group, rather than simply 
being told to me as an individual. In reflecting on the game, Yamini, who was 
frequently marginalised due to her mental infirmity which often resulted in 
quite volatile behaviour, seemed to appreciate taking part in an activity that 
brought her into relation with others. When I asked her to describe her play 
experience, she said: ‘yes, very interesting. Various places. Various 
                                                          
60 Kester, The One, p. 28. 
61 John Dewey, Art as Experience (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1934), pp. 35-40. 
62 See Appendix B.6 for the rule set of Journey to the Centre of the Earth. 
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ornaments. Various countries. From one country to the next. Fruit, light, 
everything included’.63 The insight that can be gleaned from this example is 
that, in contrast to her usual isolation within the group, the sense of 
occasion that the game created seemed to function as ‘an experience’, which 
invited Yamini to engage with others and be recognised by them in ways that 
were not ordinarily available to her.   
The balance between heteronomy in art that embraces embeddedness 
in the everyday, alongside a degree of separation from quotidian normalcy, is 
further interrogated by Shannon Jackson, who challenges ideas of artistic 
autonomy by referencing artworks that consciously call attention to the 
wider support structures that enable their very existence. She offers a 
detailed account of the practice of American artist Mierle Laderman Ukeles 
whose ‘maintenance works’ focus on everyday practices of household labour 
and public sanitation to highlight the fact that no artwork can stand alone 
from the materiality of everyday life. Such work, in Jackson’s view, is 
politically radical because it sets out a vision of human freedom that rests, 
not on individual autonomy, but on a recognition of heteronomous 
interdependence so that ‘to avow the supporting acts that sustain and are 
sustained by social actors is to avow the relational systems on which any 
conception of freedom rests’.64 Jackson’s most vivid account of Ukeles’ work, 
in my view, is of her performances of domestic labour, including acts of 
childcare and household chores which were an integral part of the artist’s 
family life and, subsequently, became the focus of her art. Aside from the 
political aspect of this heteronomous overlap of art and everyday life, 
Jackson identifies important aesthetic implications of making domestic 
labour into performance art. She references the Situationist practice of 
détournement, in which familiar objects are repositioned in unfamiliar 
contexts, suggesting that this aesthetic estrangement can be applied in order 
‘to make you aware that the objects and institutions you thought to be 
                                                          
63 Yamini’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community, London (4 September 2017). 
See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub29’. 
64 Shannon Jackson, Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics (New York: Routledge, 
2011), p. 36. 
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natural were really only historical: the result of change’.65 Building on these 
ideas, Jackson claims that, in Ukeles’ work, the heteronomous overlap of 
domestic labour with art gallery contexts generated a similar type of 
estrangement, arguing that ‘the transcontextualized move from the field of 
the household to the field of art sought to defamiliarize and thereby counter 
everyday assumptions of personal independence’.66 Jackson’s arguments 
present heteronomous art as being aesthetically significant because the 
collision of people and practices from diverse contexts enacts a 
defamiliarization that offers scope for linking ordinary sensory experience 
with critical reflection on wider social structures. This has the consequence, 
I suggest, of enhancing the potential of art to generate cultural 
transformation as audiences or participants reconsider what had been 
viewed as simply natural and instead view it as contingent and changeable. 
The aesthetic potential of defamiliarization (set in contrast with the 
aesthetics of immersion) has been an important part of my investigations of 
how to design play in response to cultural particularity and I will now 
articulate the aesthetic strategies that I have explored in my work at 
Haringey Community Hub and the Haringey Sheltered Housing schemes. In 
the first phase of the Community Hub project, when I was gathering stories 
in the habitus mining process, I decided to explore methods that employed 
different sensory affects. To do this, I sourced photographic images that 
related to places that participants had told me about and found audio clips 
to create soundscapes to match the pictures.67 I then invited participants to 
look at the picture whilst listening to the soundscape and offered them the 
option to talk and elaborate on their stories. Working with Mr Ganguly, I 
showed him a picture of a train passing through a snowy landscape in the 
mountains of northern India, along with a soundscape of a train clanking 
along the tracks, which mapped onto the stories he had told about travelling 
home from boarding school in the winter. As he looked at the picture and 
listened to the sounds, this is what he said: 
                                                          
65 Frederic Jameson, The Prison-House of Language (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1974), p. 58, cited in Jackson, p. 82. 
66 Jackson, p. 93. 
67 See Appendix B.19 for structure of the Sound and Image exercise. 
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Looks like – reminds me of the snow – the snow all over. I love it – on the 
train. It reminds me of my school days… I’m delighted. I’m happy…you 
can make a trip on the train. Through the hillsides. And have a good 
holiday.68   
From my perspective, it seemed clear that Mr Ganguly had been quite moved 
by this experience, but although he had apparently found it very gratifying, 
in my reflections on the activity I realised that I had unwittingly applied 
immersive strategies, providing rich sensory affects that had the effect of 
offering passive satisfaction rather than prompting active, generative 
imagination.  
In contrast with my accidental application of immersive aesthetics, I 
tested a radically different approach by bringing a variety of random (but 
recognisable) objects for participants to play with. My invitation was for them 
to pick out three objects that they liked or felt some connection with and 
then tell me whatever they were imagining.69 What was notable about this 
activity was that the relative abstraction of space, with an inchoate jumble of 
objects, seemed to leave a greater space of possibility (in contrast to the 
immersive completeness of the sound and image combination) for 
participants to creatively express their cultural particularity. This was 
particularly evident with individuals who found it difficult to engage in 
imaginative play activities. In working with Yamini, for example, she often 
struggled to create imaginative narratives. In one activity, I invited her to 
imagine a journey to Zanzibar (a place which was close to where she grew up 
but which she had never visited),70 but she said ‘I can’t imagine. It’s very 
difficult. How can you visualise? You can’t visualise without seeing - unless 
you live in a world of fantasy. You can’t fantasise like that’.71 By contrast, in 
the object play, having selected a ball of string and a plant pot she seemed 
more able to make imaginative constructions: 
Yamini: The pot is for the plants….in the spring time, put the seeds in 
the garden and grow like this. All those plants. With the space. All that 
space. 
                                                          
68 ‘Mr Ganguly’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community Hub, London (14 
August 2017). See Apppendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub23’. 
69 See Appendix B.16 for structure of the Random Objects exercise. 
70 See Appendix B.14 for structure of the Pathways exercise. 
71 Yamini’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community, London (4 December 2017). 
See Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub35’. 
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JH: What plants will you grow? 
Yamini: Flowers. Roses. 
JH: And what’s the string for? 
Yamini: The string is for crochet.  
JH: Ah, you crochet? 
Yamini: I used to. 
JH: What will you do first? 
Yamini: The planting of seeds. 
JH: Okay. So, you plant the seeds. And then you wait? 
Yamini: Then crochet. Crochet is something like luxury time. To fill your 
time, like a luxury. Time passes. The day goes quick. 
JH: What’s it like if we come back into the garden a month later? 
Yamini: Nice grass.  
JH: How are the flowers? 
Yamini: The flowers are blooming as well. 
JH: And what are you making with the crochet? 
Yamini: Dressing table set. Round.72 
The imaginative potential of abstract object play was also evident with 
individuals with the lowest discursive capitals. For example, the fact that 
Mrs Jadeja could not speak English meant that her conversational 
affordances (when working with me) were quite limited, but in the object 
play, she was able to participate more fully. She began by selecting an 
adaptor plug, followed by a ball of string and seeding pot and proceeded to 
describe (via Indu’s translation) a relatively elaborate scenario of returning 
home from shopping and beginning her household tasks, using the adaptor 
plug as a story-telling fulcrum for a range of household appliances: 
 Indu: She say – this one we plug it in and use the iron. 
 (Mrs Jadeja speaks) 
Indu: Iron, television, kettle and she can plug the fridge to keep the 
things cold. 
 JH: What will you plug in first? 
                                                          
72 Yamini’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Haringey Community, London (24 July 2017). See 
Appendix A: ‘HaringeyCommunityHub13’. 
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 (Indu translates, Mrs Jadeja speaks) 
 Indu: Iron first to iron her clothes. 
 JH: What next? 
 (Indu translates, Mrs Jadeja speaks) 
  Indu: TV 
 JH: Turn the TV on? What’s on? 
 (Indu translates, Mrs Jadeja speaks) 
 Indu: She watch the programmes, whatever comes. 
 (Mrs Jadeja speaks) 
Indu: The water gets boiled. For tea. Fridge to put vegetables and milk, 
yoghurt. 
 JH: And what about the pot and the string? 
 (Indu translates, Mrs Jadeja speaks) 
Indu: You put mud and then seeds to grow in the pot. Flowers. And to 
the string, she can hang it for the clothes.73 
It could be argued that this story does not represent a huge imaginative 
departure, since it focuses on the enactment of household chores, 
correlating closely with Mrs Jadeja’s working role as a housewife. In light of 
her elderly frailty, however, this episode was, for me, a striking moment of 
imaginative play and encouraged my idea that the use of familiar objects in 
an abstracted context could serve as a useful springboard for imaginative 
reconfiguration of cultural memes. Moreover, in the same way that Ukeles’ 
work with typically invisible household labour is highlighted and 
defamiliarized by its transposition to an art gallery, the fact that Mrs Jadeja 
presented her story in a creative setting, beyond the quotidian normalcy of 
housework, arguably made her performance ‘an experience’, to borrow 
Dewey’s phrase, marking it out as being special and meaningful.  
My interest in pursuing the defamiliarization of spatial abstraction (as 
opposed to sensory immersion in space) resonates with Bogost’s critical 
appraisal of immersive aesthetics in video games. He claims that the video 
games industry has a ‘continuing obsession with verisimilitude’ and links 
this to his wider agenda of avoiding totalizing systematization, arguing that 
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the verisimilitude that virtual reality pursues is another example of an 
attempt to impose organisational order and control on the systems of play.74 
By contrast, in his discussion of The Sims, in which characters speak in a 
form of gibberish, abstraction is described as beneficial. For Bogost, this 
‘“weakness” is also a strength because it increases the game’s possibility 
space’ since the partiality of the simulation enables players to focus on the 
things that interest them rather than being subsumed by full immersion.75 
Bogost subsequently links non-immersive aesthetics with his wider theory of 
unit operations by discussing montage in the work of film-maker Sergei 
Eisenstein76 arguing that its dislocated assemblage of cultural memes has 
much in common with the scattered assemblage process of bricolage.77 
Consequently, in the same way that the bricoleur makes connections 
between units of bric-a-brac, in the case of montage, the viewer or reader is 
required to construct an assemblage from the discrete units provided, rather 
than consuming images that provide fully coherent renderings of space that 
require no effort of imagination to grasp.  
In my workshops in the Haringey Sheltered Housing schemes, I 
followed up on my initial experiments with the abstracted use of objects and 
developed this aesthetic strategy to create montage play structures, framed 
by a sequence of object selections, that might provoke imaginative bricolage. 
In one session, I worked with Daniel, a Congolese man, inviting him to create 
a story that could make a journey from an imagined past to an imagined 
future, using objects as stimuli.78 Firstly, I asked him to pick an object that 
connected with his past and he selected a spanner, saying: 
It reminds me when I was younger to repair or fix the bike. And then 
when I went to the city capital – I was helping a friend – fixing his car.  
Next, he was invited to pick an object related to the future and he selected a 
small orange: 
This one is not only for the future – but also from my infancy to the 
future. Because my father was not only a tailor – he was also in 
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77 Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 113. 
78 See Appendix B.9 for the structure of the Object Montage exercise. 
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agriculture. And we had a plantation with all kind of fruits, and this 
was one of them. And for me it represents when the earth will produce 
enough food for everyone. It’s a bright future. 
Having discussed the past and the future, I asked him to pick an object that 
represented a place, and he picked up a flashlight, saying: 
I’m now preparing to go somewhere in the bush where there are no 
lights and it’s dark. I will need it to see my way where I am going and 
identify objects around me. 
Next, I asked him to choose an object that represented a character in this 
place, and he picked a balloon: 
Yes – because a balloon can be flexible, and you can put the air inside 
and it becomes big – this young man or woman – very young, he will 
grow up and become an adult. 
At this point, I asked him to describe the hopes of his character and he said 
‘he’s trying to find something very precious for them. A treasure that they can 
discover.’ Next, I asked him to pick another object that represented a new 
place, or a new opportunity and he picked up a toy aeroplane: 
He found his treasure in that bush. He comes back and boards a plane. 
Now he wants to go to trade it in New York. And there he will land in 
the JFK and then find somewhere he can trade his treasure. 
Finally, I asked him to pick an object that represented a challenge and he 
selected a padlock, saying: 
This can represent somewhere where the doors are locked. And he 
needs to unlock so that he can either hide his treasure or the price that 
he received – he doesn’t know where to put it and protect it. But it is a 
challenge. I see on the padlock – there are numbers – codes. He needs to 
know what code to unlock, hide his treasure and lock it. Keep and not 
forget the code. Because then there is no way to come back.79 
In reflecting on this play experience, I found it noteworthy that a very simple 
montage of object selections could serve as the springboard for an imaginary 
construction of a relatively complex story which made a significant departure 
from Daniel’s lived experience growing up in Africa, towards a broader 
horizon of possibility in America (a place that he had never visited). It should 
be acknowledged that Daniel had, in my estimation, relatively high 
educational capital, so the imaginative and discursive range of his responses 
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is perhaps not surprising, but when facilitating a similar exercise with 
images, I found that the montage approach also provided fertile imaginative 
ground for participants whose affordances were arguably weaker. 
Following up on the immersive sound and image combinations that I 
had used at Haringey Community Hub, I decided to experiment with a 
spatial collision between images of familiar and unfamiliar places to explore 
what the interruption of immersion in the familiar might offer in terms of 
stimulating an imaginative departure.80 In making this experiment, I worked 
with Brenda, an elderly lady who had previously told me a story about 
suffering an epileptic fit as a young girl during an excursion to a pond in 
Epping Forest, just outside London, which had almost caused her to drown. 
To begin, I laid out a range of photographic images relating to stories that 
members of the group had told me and asked each of them to pick the image 
that interested them the most. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they all chose the 
image that represented the story that they had previously told. I invited 
Brenda to look at her image, which depicted a young girl splashing (and 
possibly struggling) in a small lake whilst also playing a soundscape of 
splashing water. During this experience Brenda commented: 
Going in the water – I was unconscious – didn’t know anything in that 
respect. Sounds very much like me bath when I pull the plug out. I’m 
just thanking God someone was there and I survived. Grateful. This is 
what that must have sounded like to my friend.  
Subsequently, I asked Brenda to imagine another character in her scenario, 
either a real person or a fictitious one, to which she replied: 
Yes, my friend’s older sister who was supposed to be looking after us. I 
can imagine she wishes she was away in the forest or at the sea and go 
away – because it frightened her very much – because of what 
happened. Mavis was her name. 
Next, I asked Brenda to pick a second image, choosing one of the pictures 
relating to the stories that other people had told, and she chose a 
photograph of a small aeroplane flying over water, which related to Daniel’s 
story of seeing a plane for the first time when he was a child. I then invited 
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her to listen to the soundscape of the aeroplane whilst imagining a 
destination that her character wanted to go to, to which she replied: 
Possibly France – run away from Tottenham – if she thought we was 
gonna say something to mine or possibly her own parents. She’s 
frightened – so she runs away…She’d want to go somewhere nice – 
Paris. Have a good time – knowing Mavis. Drink – and all the things that 
young women and girls would do – especially where there’s no father to 
put her in her place. Possibly a weekend – maybe just a day and then 
she would come back. 
In reflecting on the exercise, Brenda commented on the divergence between 
the true aspects of the story and the fiction she had invented: 
There was a lot of memories because it was a true story. That’s only 
imagination that she would want to get away, but I can imagine her 
doing it – she was that kind of person. 
I then asked her to comment on how familiar the two images (the girl in the 
lake and the plane over water) seemed to her and she replied that the first 
was familiar but the second was unfamiliar: 
I’ve never flown – I don’t even have a passport. I’ve never been abroad. 
I’ve been to France, but on the ferry. That was on a one-day pass.81  
In my reflections on this exercise, I formed the idea that the spatial collision 
between the familiar image and the unfamiliar image, alongside the 
deterritorialization of taking up a new subjective vantage point in the 
character of Mavis, opened the possibility for Brenda to make an imaginative 
leap from the known quantities of a familiar situation to the unknown 
quantities of experiences outside of her experiential horizon. Essentially, I 
suggest that the defamiliarization produced through a montage of 
recognisable and alien spaces provided an imaginative gap for bricolage, in 
which she could assemble original cultural memes, moving beyond the 
limitations of her habitus. 
My emphasis on the juxtaposition of the familiar and the strange 
resonates with the defamiliarization strategies of Bertolt Brecht who argues 
that estrangement shifts perception from passive acceptance of the 
apparently natural state of the world and prompts a recognition that the 
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existing order of things is changeable.82 My contention is that the 
defamiliarization of a montage of the familiar and the unfamiliar provokes a 
reflexively productive oscillation between closeness and distance, here and 
there, now and then, in contrast with the pursuit of immersive immediacy of 
space and time. I contend that such reflexivity, activated through aesthetic 
reconfigurations of space and time might enable a movement beyond the 
existing habitus towards a diversified memeplex, offering potential for 
cultural transformation. 
 
4.5 Heteronomous Field Networks and Permeable Systems 
In the previous section, I argued that heteronomous artistic practices 
can enable culturally transformative potential by promoting an interplay 
between the familiar and the unfamiliar, in contrast to the valorisation of 
autonomy which, in my view, promotes cultural ossification in isolation from 
external influences. Similarly, in this section, I discuss a heteronomous 
conception of fields as networks that are open to change, as field agents seek 
out external influences from other spheres of activity to diversify their capital 
affordances. I subsequently link this discussion of field heteronomy to game 
design by returning to the work of Ian Bogost, who argues that although 
systems can be conceived as static and closed, they remain permeable to 
outside influences through the unpredictable subjectivities of players.  
Recent considerations of Bourdieu’s work have been critical of his 
belief that fields tend to pursue increased autonomization, presenting 
alternative example of heteronomous fields that are boundary spanning. In 
discussing the work of ‘think-tanks’, for instance, Thomas Medvetz argues 
that these organisations gain resilience by acquiring diverse capitals from a 
range of fields: 
In an institutionalized context already marked by advanced 
specialization, think-tanks excel by gathering and assembling multiple 
forms of capital as a way of claiming for themselves a kind of 
mediating role in the social structure. In this way, it is their function 
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with respect to the relationships among fields – and thus their 
positioning and reach – that becomes the basis of their power.83 
Field heteronomy is also celebrated in a less institutionalised setting by 
David Landy, who discusses the influence on the Jewish political field in the 
United Kingdom of contacts with political activists in Palestine. Landy argues 
that by ‘bringing the outside in’ through encounters with Palestinian groups, 
anti-Zionist Jewish organisations have cultivated methods of ‘accumulating 
external forms of cultural capital which they translate to local fields’ and 
thereby alter the dominant ideology within them.84  
Just as fields can be reconceived as heteronomous networks, as 
opposed to autonomous spheres of activity, Bogost, having critiqued the 
totalising thrust of systems theory, argues that systems are permeable to 
external influences through the insertion of contingent player subjectivities. 
Bogost uses the term ‘simulation fever’ to describe the moment when the 
player can apply their subjectivity in the gaps between system operations.85 
As a result, Bogost enacts a kind of rehabilitation on systems, suggesting 
that if there is scope for subjective reflection to permeate users’ engagement 
with a system, it ceases to be closed and static. Bogost reifies his concept of 
simulation fever through discussion of Grand Theft Auto III. This game is, 
arguably, extremely rhetorical, in the sense that players are only able to 
progress if they enact acts of violent crime. Jesper Juul argues that although 
it appears to offer almost limitless freedom and emergent potential, as 
players explore a vast urban landscape, it is, in fact, a game of progression 
in which players can only proceed along a linear narrative pathway as they 
unlock a series of ‘levels’ through successful criminal enterprise that open 
up new spaces in the game.86 This structural determinism does not curtail 
the possibility for player subjectivity to permeate the system, though, and 
Bogost argues that, as the player avatar traverses the city, much like the 
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flâneur, the gaps between the unit operational points of decision offer space 
for the subjective reflexivity of simulation fever: 
GTA crafts the game experience in terms of a set of relations between 
possible actions and their consequences; in the gap between these 
decisions, simulation fever reigns. This is where the player must frame 
his next action in relation to a web of motivations, fears and 
preconceptions, both within and without the game.87 
This argument for simulation fever (in the context of Grand Theft Auto III) is 
not entirely convincing, because although Bogost cites examples of players 
resisting the game’s rhetoric by stealing ambulances to bring the injured to 
hospital or donning a priest’s habit and praying for the victims of crime,88 
the design of the game clearly necessitates the performance of violent crime 
as the means of progression. Nonetheless, simulation fever is a useful 
concept in reflecting on my system-based game design work because it 
emphasises the heteronomous interplay between the functions of the 
supposedly closed system and the subjective reflections of players that 
appear to exist outside it.  
With regard to Islands, the piece that I designed for participants at 
Haringey Community Hub, Bogost’s concept of simulation fever provides a 
new way to view the game and the players’ responses to it. In debriefing their 
play experience, participants commented on the synergies and tensions 
between the play action and their own subjectivities. Ravi’s character, 
Antoine, had progressed from being the poorest child in the village to finish 
the game on the ‘big island’ with a high level of educational capital, a small 
amount of money and a very low level of popularity. In reflecting on this 
outcome, Ravi claimed that he had won the game (even though there were no 
specific victory conditions) saying, ‘I been in the big island and I got some 
money and I got education – so I’m happy’, but as he further elaborated on 
his feelings it became unclear whether he was talking about the life of his 
character or his own life: 
It was a good game. We played success. We played also for education, 
money and happiness – I’m pleased. I got lot of education. Making 
money. My life – I got my money. I got education and I got happiness – 
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little happiness. I got money and education. I done all the transactions 
to reach that point. 
I then asked him what it was like to leave his friends behind and see that Mr 
Ganguly’s character, who had devoted more of his time to the cultural 
capital of friendship, had met someone special, to which he responded: 
I’m not interested in friends – the past is past. And then I go to this 
position – what I see – regalement – fulfilled. I don’t need the others – 
friends or what has passed. What is past is past. What I have here is 
happiness – I’m happier here.89 
In analysing the playing of this game, it seemed that Ravi’s comments 
represented a retrospective form of simulation fever in which he had the 
opportunity to express his subjectivity and cultural particularity by drawing 
a relation between the structure of the game and his own life experiences. 
Despite his initial claim that the ‘past is past’, at the end of the play session 
he changed his position, saying that if he was to play the game again, he 
would work to acquire even more wealth so that he could return to the small 
island (implicitly based on his home country of Mauritius) to buy the big 
farm that his family had lacked when he was a child.  Subsequently, it 
occurred to me that if I had offered more space and time for players to 
articulate similar reflections on the connections or contrasts between play 
action and their own subjective viewpoints throughout the game (in the gaps 
between its unit operational functions), the meaning making impact of play 
and its culturally transformative potential might have been enhanced. 
Although my analysis has responded favourably to Bogost’s unit 
operational approach, which argues for the assemblage of networks from the 
ground-up, it is important, I suggest, for players to combine the experience 
of the localised affects of play with a more distanciated, critically reflexive 
perspective. As I have previously argued in my Literature Review, through 
my discussion of Falk Heinrich’s tripartite theory of performative beauty 
which combines the sensory, the agential and the reflexive in his 
formulation: to do / to act / to perform,90 reflexive consideration of the 
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structures of participation is fundamental in transforming the immediate 
satisfactions of play into something with greater culturally transformative 
potential. Essentially, my pursuit of reflexivity is geared towards creating 
aesthetic experiences that unconceal a clearing,91 to borrow the terminology 
of Heidegger, in order to escape ossified enframement. Consequently, the 
final section of this chapter considers how thinking systemically can 
facilitate an oscillating movement between the immediacy of sensory 
experience towards reflexive meaning making, combining the satisfactions of 
immediate action alongside greater scope for culturally transformative 
reconfigurations of the habitus. 
 
4.6 Reflexive Communication in System Formation  
In contrast with Bogost’s critical appraisal of totalizing systems, in this 
section I offer a more positive account of systems theory by drawing on the 
work of Niklas Luhmann. At first glance, Luhmann’s view that systems are 
characterised by ‘operative closure’92 seems to correspond with Bogost’s 
position, but I argue that despite the apparent autonomy of systems in 
Luhmann’s thinking, he remains open to the possibility that they are 
permeable to what lies outside their form. Alongside the highly abstract 
theory that Luhmann presents, I offer more concrete applications of his 
ideas in the context of participatory art by referencing the writing of Tim 
Stott, who highlights the possibility that participants can reshape the form 
of the systems they play within by making decisions that bring things that 
are external to the system into its form. I will subsequently link these ideas 
to my practical work to argue that instead of creating play structures in a 
top-down fashion, the majority of the play activities that I facilitated at 
Haringey Community Hub and the Haringey Sheltered Housing schemes 
invited participants to create the systems of their play from the ground-up, 
through sequences of decisions that brought the play form into resolution. 
The final part of this section considers the work of Gregory Bateson who 
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compellingly argues that the act of play is integral to higher level 
communication as players define the form of their play and ‘meta-
communicate’ to each other that this form is distinct from ordinary reality.93 
Subsequently, I argue that this ‘meta-communication’, through which 
players reflexively recognise the distinction between what is inside the play 
system and what lies outside it, is a vital tool for abstract thinking that 
enables the limitations of immediate surroundings to be transcended. I 
suggest that this allows players to imagine possibilities that lie beyond 
immediate experience and thereby visualise potential transformations of 
existing cultural practices and the values associated with them. 
In setting out his understanding of systems, Luhmann argues that 
they are fundamentally characterised by distinctions, whereby a boundary is 
drawn between a form and that which lies outside it.94 In other words, a 
form can only be defined by a distinction that creates a boundary between 
the intended object that is ‘marked’ and the ‘unmarked’ external 
environment,95 in much the same way that phenomenologists see visual 
perception as being essentially based on a distinction between figure and 
ground.96 Stott’s application of Luhmann’s ideas suggests, however, that the 
insistence on a strict boundary between form and its outside does not mean 
that systems are impermeable to change. He argues that although the form 
is closed ‘it also remains open on its unmarked side’.97 This fundamental 
linkage between form and its unmarked exterior is redolent of Shannon 
Jackson’s juxtaposition of the heteronomy of everyday life with the 
autonomous art object which she describes as ‘the exteriority that interiority 
can’t do without, the co-operator’.98 In other words, the openness of the 
‘unmarked side’ of the form implies the possibility that further distinctions 
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can redefine the form and bring new objects from the exterior within its 
boundary.  
The notion that forms and systems are created through distinctions 
that establish a boundary with the ‘unmarked’ outside is relevant to my play 
design approach because it suggests a model through which systems of play 
establish their form through sequences of distinctions made by players. For 
example, in the object play of Mrs Jadeja, her selection of the adaptor plug 
defined the initial form of her activity, establishing a system based on the 
operational functions of the plug. She subsequently made further 
distinctions that drew upon the ‘unmarked exterior’ of external objects by 
selecting a ball of string and a seeding-pot which enabled her to expand the 
system of her play to create an imaginary domestic environment with a 
broader plurality of system operations, including watching TV, ironing 
clothes, putting food in the fridge, planting flowers and hanging washing on 
the line. None of these systemic features were given by the authored play 
design, they emerged in a bottom-up bricolage process that brought the play 
form into resolution through an initial distinction made by the player and a 
sequence of formal redefinitions that were made through further 
distinctions. 
Central to Luhmann’s concept of distinctions as the basis of formal 
definition is the idea that they are made through observations. An 
observation should not be seen as the sole preserve of a living agent who 
perceives and selects an object of intention (an observation can also be made 
by a system itself, such as a thermostat system, in its observations of hot 
and cold).99 For my purposes, however, a human-oriented view of 
observations is most useful. In discussing observations, Luhmann makes a 
key distinction between first-order observation, which is the primary action 
of distinction that separates form from that which lies outside its boundary, 
and second-order observations which are, effectively, observations of the 
initial observation.100 Stott usefully reifies the concept of second-order 
observations by discussing the activity of a child in play who not only makes 
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distinctions as part of her play activity but is also consciously aware of 
having made these distinctions: 
She now observes how she takes part, and, once she is aware of the 
distinction and how she relates to it, she can begin to consider what 
she and other players might do next. She can begin to reflect upon 
and evaluate the play of which she is part.101     
As this quotation suggests, second-order observations are fundamentally 
reflexive, and this reflexivity is significant because it enables the observer to 
recognise that they have made a distinction and that they have the 
possibility of making further distinctions that open a wider realm of 
possibility. As Luhmann notes, ‘the world of possibility is an invention of the 
second-order observer which, for the first order observer, remains 
necessarily latent’102 and he goes on to suggest that ‘second-order 
observation affects the modality of whatever appears to be given and endows 
it with the form of contingency, the possibility for being different’.103 In other 
words, the act of second-level observation is, in effect, the reflexive 
consideration of possibilities for further distinctions that can redefine the 
form of the system at play, opening potential for contingent changeability 
that is unavailable through first-order observations in which ‘the world is 
observed directly on the basis of the belief that it is as it appears’.104  
An awareness of contingent changeability was evident in the 
previously discussed play exercise at one of the Haringey Sheltered Housing 
schemes which involved transposing my hiking story to the year 1794. In 
this activity, the players not only made distinctions that expanded the form 
of the story beyond its factual origins, they also made second-order 
observations of their distinctions. In reflecting on her play experience, Beryl 
commented that: 
What’s interesting is that when we started, the first parts of the story 
were absolutely true…but then you asked Tony to take up your story – 
and it made me realise that when somebody else comes into it they’ve 
got a completely different outlook on the story and it puts a bombshell 
into it…it’s that Tony – not rudely – he put his spokes in and the whole 
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story’s gone totally out of proportion, but it just shows you – life is like 
that. This is what happens.105 
 What this example illustrates is that the players in the exercise recognised 
the contingency of meaning that could emerge from their story-making as a 
result of reflexively acknowledging their capacity to radically change the form 
of the play activity, rather than being bound by the givenness of the factual 
details upon which the exercise was based. 
Luhmann’s arguments regarding second-order observations share 
commonalities with the ideas of Gregory Bateson who argues that the 
evolution of communication is marked by a progressive abstraction so that: 
The organism gradually ceases to respond quite ‘automatically’ to the 
mood-signs of another and becomes able to recognise the sign as a 
signal, that is, to recognise that the other individual’s and its own 
signals are only signals, which can be trusted, falsified, denied, 
amplified, corrected and so forth.106 
Essentially, what Bateson is describing is a movement from a first-order 
observation to a second-order observation, whereby an organism not only 
makes signals as ‘automatic’ reactions to external stimuli, but also 
consciously recognises that signals are signals of contingent meaning. 
Bateson’s arguments are concretised by his classic example (in the field of 
game studies) of play-fighting monkeys at San Francisco zoo. He argues that 
in order for the monkeys to engage in play that does not threaten injury, 
they must enact a form of meta-communication that alerts them to the fact 
that ‘this is play’ rather than actual violence.107 In other words, in entering 
their play-fight, the monkeys draw a distinction between what is real and the 
‘not real’ space of play, enacting a second-order observation which meta-
communicates that a boundary, or frame, between the real and play has 
been drawn.  
Bateson extrapolates his reflections on the monkeys’ play to suggest 
that play may be an important feature in the development of complex 
communication (a theme which I will return to in the next chapter) by 
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creating frames, much like the formal boundaries of play systems, which 
enable second-order observations that facilitate reflexive meaning making. 
He claims that ‘a frame is meta-communicative. Any message, which either 
explicitly or implicitly defines a frame, ipso facto gives the receiver 
instructions or aids in his attempt to understand the messages within the 
frame’.108 In a similar vein to my arguments regarding Luhmann’s notion of 
second-order observations, Bateson’s concept of meta-communicative frames 
suggests that systemic thinking that consciously recognises both what is 
inside and outside the frame (or system) enables thinking at a level of 
abstraction that permits a movement beyond automatic responses to stimuli 
and promotes an awareness of contingent possibility. Consequently, despite 
the problematisations of systems theory that I have offered through 
discussion of Bogost’s work, ultimately, thinking systemically about play 
(and in play) is an important feature of play’s culturally transformative 
potential. Rather than simply responding to ‘mood signs’, players meta-
communicate second-level observations of their activity, offering scope for 
abstract thinking beyond the concrete limitations of the present, which 
opens possibilities for emergent expansion of play systems and emergent 
transformation of the environments that exist outside them.      
 
4.7 Summary 
To conclude, in this chapter on designing play in response to the 
cultural particularity of players, I have argued that a ground-up approach to 
the social construction of human culture is fundamental to designing play 
structures that offer scope for the expression and potential alteration of 
cultural particulars. My practical work has illustrated that Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus is useful in conceiving cultural particularity and that 
given circumstances analysis is an effective tool for exploring how the capital 
affordances of participants have been shaped over their life trajectory. 
Habitus is a fundamental component of Bourdieu’s broader field theory, but 
I have problematised a field analytical approach to play design, due to the 
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tendency of Bourdieu’s theory to emphasise a field autonomy that reaffirms 
the doxa of dominant ideologies. As an alternative to the totalizing 
tendencies of field theory, Bogost’s concept of unit operations suggests a 
model of analysis that privileges discrete relational connections that 
assemble more flexible networks. His argument for the reconfigurability of 
unit assemblages has proved valuable for my focus on the culturally 
transformative potential of play, stimulating ideas on the possibilities of 
bricolage play as a method of deterritorialization and overcoding that offers 
scope for habitus alteration. 
In a similar vein to Bogost’s arguments for bricolage as the formation 
of flexible assemblages, the performance and fine art scholars that I have 
cited emphasise the value of heteronomy in opposition to the inviolable 
autonomy of the art object. The arguments for artistic heteronomy that I 
have presented are both political and aesthetic, promoting an overlap of art 
and life as a means of promoting participatory agency but also as a way of 
creating aesthetic defamiliarization that merges what is known with wider 
array of unfamiliar influences that might enable cultural change. 
Consequently, my aesthetic investigations of defamiliarization techniques, 
set in opposition to the aesthetics of immersion, have suggested that such 
strategies can offer potential for players to escape un-reflexive perception 
and action and make new imaginative leaps that might be culturally 
transformative. Despite my problematisation of Bourdieu’s field theory, I 
have drawn on recent critiques of his work which offer what I see as more 
productive visions of fields as heteronomous networks that are open to 
mutual influence. Similarly, despite Bogost’s criticism of totalizing systems, 
his concept of simulation fever suggests that apparently closed systems can 
be permeable to contingent player subjectivity. This permeation of 
heteronomous influences suggests that systems, like fields, can be 
reconceived as emergent structures that offer scope for expressing and 
reshaping the cultural particulars of those who play within them. The 
potential for systems to support contingent changeability is affirmed by the 
work of Niklas Luhmann and Gregory Bateson. Both theorists argue, albeit 
with variations in language and approach, that systemic thinking is 
consonant with the reflexivity of second-order observations and meta-
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communication, both of which enable abstract thinking to transcend the 
limitations of immediate perception and open a wider realm of the possible.  
Crucial to my arguments in this chapter is the notion that systems, 
whether they be social structures or structures of play, can be understood 
and designed in a manner that proceeds from the ground-up. This means 
that play systems need not be seen as top-down impositions of a designer 
that corral the actions of participants, but rather as assemblages that 
players can form for themselves. Consequently, the emergent formation of 
flexible play systems, led by the distinctions of players, can engage their 
cultural particularities and enable the reconfiguration of the habitus as 
intersubjective exchanges evolve the form that the play activity takes, 
inviting reflexive reconsideration, and possible transformation, of cultural 




Chapter 5. Pedagogy & Documentation:  
Curatorial Learning in Play
 
In the previous chapter, I investigated how the design of participatory 
performance might engage with the cultural particularity of players and 
enable transformative experiences, but in considering the impact of play in 
the broadest possible sense, a focus on the act of play alone cannot be 
sufficient. The experiences of players are recorded in myriad ways and, since 
memory and documentation are central to our knowledge of the world, a 
study of the culturally transformative potential of play must include an 
exploration of how play is remembered and documented. The importance of 
memories and documents is heightened further by their use in the 
transmission and creation of knowledge in processes of learning which are 
fundamental to the foundation, reaffirmation and potential transformation of 
cultural values. This essential linkage between the experience of play, the 
remembering and documentation of play and learning about play (or through 
play), yields the second of my subsidiary research questions: 
How can play documentation and play design pedagogy further the 
culture building potential of play in the context of participatory 
performance? 
 
In responding to this question, I discuss the works of Paulo Freire, 
Jacques Rancière and Lev Vygotsky, all of whom seek to construct 
pedagogical theories through which learners might move beyond apparently 
fixed identities or ossified cultural values. Freire sets out an oppositional 
approach towards ‘banking education’ in which the knowledge of the 
masterful pedagogue is simply transmitted to the mind of the passive 
student and calls for an emancipatory pedagogy that creates equality.1 By 
contrast, Rancière’s a priori assumption of equality between students holds 
                                                          
1 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. by Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: 
Continuum, 2005), pp. 72-86. 
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that learners, like emancipated spectators of art, are always already 
emancipated and free to break out of the conventional distribution of the 
sensible. This view of learning is described by Tyson Lewis as being highly 
theatrical because it invites students to enact disruptive performances as if 
they were someone other than the person whom power brokers, or the ‘police 
order’, as Rancière describes it, have assigned them to be.2 This chapter 
problematises Rancière’s ideas, however, through reference to the work of 
Lev Vygotsky, whose pedagogical studies suggest that learning depends on 
imitation of others with stronger, or more diverse, capacities. Similarly, 
whereas Rancière asserts the necessity of autonomy for the emancipated 
student, human development through play is a highly social activity in 
which groups construct the sites, substances and narratives of their learning 
through intersubjective exchange. In making these arguments, I draw upon 
the concept of ‘the curatorial’ which has become increasingly influential in 
fine art contexts as a way of conceiving artistic projects as frameworks for 
co-creation. Artistic curation can be understood as the presentation of 
knowledge, with the curator acting as a mediator between the masterful 
artist and the nominally passive spectator. By contrast, the curatorial in 
participatory art focuses on creating contexts for a form of meaning making 
that is relationally constructed by participants.3   
In the same way that pedagogy often appears to be policed by a 
masterful pedagogue who stands as a transcendent figure of power, the 
issue of documentation is laden with concerns over the canonical hegemony 
of the archive. In considering alternatives to conventional archival 
approaches, I discuss Diana Taylor’s proposal that cultural practices which 
might be excluded from the archive continue to exist in the ‘repertoire’ of 
embodied memory that is passed down through the generations,4 alongside 
Rebecca Schneider’s arguments that performative acts can, in fact, be 
                                                          
2 Tyson E. Lewis, The Aesthetics of Education: Theatre, Curiosity and Politics in the work of 
Jacques Rancière and Paulo Freire (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), pp. 40-41. 
3 Jean-Paul Martinon, ed., The Curatorial: The Philosophy of Curating (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013). 
4 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
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understood as documents of the past.5  This notion that embodied memory 
contains the remains of a performative repertoire is also useful in 
considering how players might promulgate the culturally transformative 
impact of their play experiences through ongoing play performances that 
function pedagogically.  
In practical terms, my creative work has interrogated links between 
play pedagogy and play documentation through a creative learning project in 
which I worked with a group of arts practitioners to explore methods of game 
design, interactive performance and live action role-play. Over the course of 
twelve weekly sessions between March and May 2018 at Theatre 
Delicatessen in London, this project, entitled Playground, invited 
participants to construct a group learning environment, test out methods of 
play design and work towards the creation of several original participatory 
works which were play-tested by invited guests. Throughout this project, 
participants were invited to document their experiences through writing, 
drawing or discursive reflection. These documentations were subsequently 
applied by four members of the group who took on the role of facilitators in a 
second Playground project in September and October 2018 (which will be 
discussed in Chapter 6). As a whole, this process has offered scope for an 
active consideration of how knowledge of play design can be created in a 
group learning environment, how pedagogical experiences can be 
documented or remembered and how these records might stimulate ongoing 
pedagogical work. The chapter concludes with the suggestion that 
participatory documentations might be understood to function, not as 
commodities of use for an artist or archival curator, but as gifts that issue a 
call to other (potential) participants to recognise the play that has taken 
place and respond to it in some fashion. Drawing on recent anthropological 
and museological works by Roger Sansi and Roger Simon, respectively, I 
propose that such gifts are not free offers that confirm a utopian 
egalitarianism, but a form of debt through which play documentation calls 
                                                          
5 Rebecca Schneider, Performing Remains: Art and war in times of theatrical reenactment 
(New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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for a response from those who receive it, inviting ongoing creative learning 
that perpetuates the culturally transformative potential of play. 
 
5.1 Theatrical Imitation & Inequality in Learning 
In this section, I consider Tyson Lewis’ comparative analysis of the 
pedagogical theories of Paulo Freire and Jacques Rancière which both assess 
the issue of educational emancipation. Lewis describes Rancière’s vision of 
emancipated learning as the performance of the ‘theatrical will’ through 
which individuals can dismantle hierarchies and free themselves of assigned 
roles by performing alternative identities.6 Although this theatrical liberation 
from fixed subject positions may seem compelling, I question Rancière’s 
assumption of equality amongst learners and offer a different pedagogical 
perspective, through reference to the work of psychologist Lev Vygotsky, 
whose theories of childhood play suggest that human development implicitly 
relies on inequality, as learners attempt to appropriate the abilities of other 
individuals with stronger, or more diversified, capacities. 
In his discussion of Friere’s pedagogy, Lewis suggests that an 
apparently emancipatory approach may actually be the opposite in cases 
where intellectual emancipation depends on a ‘master explicator’. He makes 
the compelling argument that although Freire’s approach is geared towards 
the liberation of oppressed students, the necessity of pedagogical expertise in 
‘unveiling’ the forces of oppression that have subjugated them reinforces the 
very inequality that it aims to overcome: 
To empower students to see themselves as agents of cultural change 
they must first identify themselves as unequal partners in the 
pedagogical act of pointing and looking – an act that holds them in the 
very position of dependency which the pedagogy of the oppressed is 
attempting to counteract.7 
In contrast with Freire’s notion that emancipation and equality are to be 
achieved by the student with the support of the pedagogue’s expertise, 
Rancière advocates an approach to pedagogy that ‘breaks with intellectual 
                                                          
6 Lewis, p. 48. 
7 Lewis, pp. 140-141. 
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dependency by asserting the abilities of all to think, speak and act differently 
on their own accord’.8 Building on Rancière’s theories, Lewis’ concept of 
theatrical will suggests that students can break out of the hierarchy of roles 
assigned by the police order, by performing ‘as if’ they were someone other 
than who they are supposed to be: 
The aesthetics of politics are situated in terms of the theatrical ‘as if…’ 
of sensual disruption and disjunction, where the subject is a subject 
in excess of prescribed names, and thus an actor that wears the mask, 
performs the gestures, suffers from pains and pleasures which are the 
exclusive property of others…Behind the mask is not a fixed individual 
but rather a singular will to become other than. It is this theatricality 
of the will that enables political actors to take up words that they are 
not meant to speak, or sights they were not supposed to see, or 
pleasures they were not supposed to feel. The theatrical will is a 
creator of material fictions – fictions of the senses that challenge the 
order of things.9  
In other words, the theatricality that Lewis proposes, invites students to 
dismantle hierarchy and assert equality by relinquishing pre-ordained 
subject positions and enacting a redistribution of the sensible by adopting 
roles that do not belong to them. In the context of a study about the 
culturally transformative potential of play (with a specific focus on role-
playing with alternative identities), this theatrical ‘as if’ is a highly attractive 
proposition, but I will now suggest that the concept of theatrical will, and the 
Rancièrean theories on which it is based, are problematic, since they 
disregard the implicit inequality of theatrical imitation.  
Lev Vygotsky’s theories of learning through childhood play are 
strongly, if indirectly, theatrical because they are focused on processes of 
imitative mimicry which are central to notions of theatrical performance. 
This playful imitation is not merely a mimetic reproduction of observed 
behaviour, it is a transformative act, ‘allowing the child to perform as if a 
head taller’10 so that they incrementally become other than what they are. 
Lois Holzman highlights the idea that imitation is a selective and generative 
activity stating that: 
                                                          
8 Lewis, p. 12. 
9 Lewis, pp. 47-48. 
10 Lev S. Vygotsky, ‘Play and its role in the mental development of the child’, trans. by 
Catherine Mulholland, Soviet Psychology, 5:3 (1967), 6-18. (p.16). 
154 
 
Children do not imitate anything and everything as a parrot does, but 
rather what is ‘beyond them’ developmentally speaking and yet present 
in their environment and relationships. In other words, imitating is 
fundamentally creative.11   
The idea that creative imitation is an endeavour to perform beyond the 
developmental level of the playful learner foregrounds the importance of 
unequalness in childhood learning, suggesting that children extend their 
capacities by enacting versions of actions that they are not (yet) capable of 
performing. Implicit inequality is central to Vygotsky’s theory of the zone of 
proximal development, which conceives the learning process as an 
inherently social endeavour in which development occurs ‘under guidance or 
in collaboration with more capable peers’,12 and Holzman elaborates on the 
necessary inequality within the ZPD by arguing that: 
Vygotsky showed that children learn collectively and through their 
active relationships with others at varying levels of skill, knowledge, 
expertise, ability and personality…They learn by doing with others 
what they do not know how to do because the group (usually the 
family) supports such active, creative risk taking and performs with 
them.13 
The emphasis in this excerpt on ‘varying levels of skill, knowledge, expertise, 
ability and personality’ is salient, highlighting that learners develop by 
imitating that which is beyond, or other than, their capacity, which clearly 
implies the necessity of differentiation and unequalness, in contrast to 
Rancière’s emphasis on equality.  
The importance of inequality in learning is affirmed by Elena Bodrova 
and Deborah Leong’s study of early childhood play. They assert that ‘in 
today’s early-childhood settings, children are almost always segregated by 
age and have to interact with play partners who are as inexperienced as they 
are’.14 The result, according to Bodrova and Leong, is that the developmental 
                                                          
11 Lois Holzman, ‘Without Creating ZPDs There Is No Creativity’, in Vygotsky and Creativity: 
A Cultural-historical Approach to Play, Meaning Making and the Arts, ed. by M. Cathrene 
Connery, Vera John-Steiner and Ana Marjanovic-Shane (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 
27-40 (p. 32). 
12 Lev S. Vygotsky, Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, ed. 
by Michael Cole, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner & Ellen Souberman, trans. by 
Alexander R. Luria, Martin López-Morillas, Michael Cole & James V. Wertsch (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 86. 
13 Lois Holzman, Vygotsky At Work and Play (Hove: Routledge, 2009), p. 37. 
14 Elena Bodrova and Deborah J. Leong, ‘Vygotskian and Post-Vygotskian Views on 
Children’s Play, American Journal of Play, 7:3 (2015), 371-388. (p. 386). 
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complexity of contemporary children’s play is markedly lower than children 
of the 1950s who would, typically, benefit from playing with children of a 
more a diverse range of capacities in their home or neighbourhood.15 This 
strongly suggests that effective learning requires ‘intellectual asymmetry’ so 
that children can ‘appropriate knowledge and skills from more expert 
members of their society’.16 Consequently, the zone of proximal development 
can be seen as a relational social space in which encounters with, and 
imitations of, the differentiated and unequal behaviours of other members of 
the group are central to learning. 
Although the examples cited above relate to childhood learning 
through play, Holzman argues that that playful zones of proximal 
development can be created by people at all stages of life, suggesting that 
‘this performing kind of play and these spaces for performance are essential 
to development and learning – not only in early childhood but for all of us at 
all ages’.17 In line with Holzman’s positive assessment of the potential of 
adult play, the Playground project illustrated the developmental benefits of 
playful imitation for a group of (adult) artists before we had even engaged in 
any role-play games. The first exercise at the start of the opening session 
was a very simple play activity called Totem Build,18 in which participants 
were invited to collectively build a monument, or totem, out of a pile of 
assorted junk, without speaking or negotiating how they might do it. In 
reflecting on this exercise, one participant, Zara, admitted being inhibited by 
the apparent weirdness of the task, even though, as an actor, she was used 
to unusual workshop activities. Her nervousness in this case was overcome 
by simply imitating other people, enabling her to become something (a 
confident workshop participant) that she was not, initially: 
It’s like ‘okay, we’re gonna just pick up some things from around the 
room and make a structure’ – and I’m like ‘what do you mean?!’ – but 
that was great because – because I had no idea what was going on, but 
                                                          
15 Bodrova and Leong, pp. 385-386. 
16 Juan Manuel Fernández-Cárdenas, Rupert Wegerif, Neil Mercer and Sylvia Rojas-
Drummond, ‘Re-conceptualising “scaffolding” and the zone of proximal development in the 
context of symmetrical collaborative learning’, Journal of Classroom Interaction, 36:2 (2002), 
40-54 (pp. 40-41). 
17 Lois Holzman, Vygotsky, p. 19. 
18 See Appendix B.21 for the structure of the Totem Build exercise. 
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some people did – there was this thing of sort of – ‘Well, they seem to 
know what they’re doing – so okay – I’ll pick up this ball!’19  
Another participant, Josh, who described himself as an introvert, also 
reflected positively on the opportunity to imitatively follow others in 
unilaterally sculpting the totem, which enabled him to move beyond his 
usual shyness and deference towards others: 
I really liked the statue thing – it’s nice to go along with everyone doing 
their own thing and just say ‘I feel like doing this. I wanna put that dog 
– there…because it’s not something I do very often in my life. I spend a 
lot of time questioning my decisions and doing things that other people 
want…This might be really personal, but I really like being selfish in 
these games, just going ‘I think that should go there’.20 
The theatrical imitation practiced by Josh and Zara in this instance was, in 
contrast to Rancière’s insistence on equality, borne of an inequality in the 
sense that both felt uncertain or less well equipped to engage in the activity 
than their apparently more confident peers. Their solution was to learn by 
imitating, following the actions of differentiated and unequal others, in 
keeping with Vygotsky’s notions of how learners develop by performing ‘a 
head taller’ than themselves. 
 
5.2 Relational Sociality in Learning 
The ability of participants to perform beyond their initial capacities 
that is illustrated by the examples noted above is fundamentally dependent 
on the social relationality that makes theatrical imitation possible, as 
individuals perceive and copy the behaviour of those around them. The 
highly intersubjective and relational nature of group learning through play, 
as articulated by Vygotsky, stands in sharp contrast with Rancière’s 
valorisation of the autonomy of emancipated students. In this section, I 
question his emphasis on autonomy, arguing that relational sociality is 
fundamental to playful learning through theatrical imitation.  
                                                          
19 ‘Zara’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Theatre Delicatessen, London (23 July 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘Playground18’. 




For Rancière, preserving the autonomy of emancipated students is 
essential in disrupting the hierarchical distribution of social roles of the 
police order. For example, the Ignorant Schoolmaster of Rancière’s 
philosophy is not a pedagogical guide, but simply someone who invites the 
always already emancipated and equal students to ‘follow [their] path’21 and 
autonomously pursue the will that is served by their intelligence.22 
Undermining singular autonomy, in his view, risks a perpetuation of 
stratification, as the viewpoint of one individual is compared and ranked in 
relation to others, thus reaffirming hierarchies that determine whose voice is 
worth listening to and whose is merely noise.23 The hierarchy of the police 
order is described by Rancière as the orthodox ‘count’ of assigned identities 
and, in reaction to this, he calls for a ‘rupture’ or ‘breach’ in the stratified 
distribution of the sensible through actions that cast aside preassigned 
roles.24 This relinquishment of prior identities is described by Lewis as a ‘dis-
identification’ that moves autonomous individuals beyond hierarchically 
ordered social space into the ‘atopic space of the stranger’. Lewis suggests 
that this atopia is characterised by the ‘inoperative communication 
necessary for an uncertain community to remain open to the possibility of 
politics’.25 Essentially, what is envisioned here is a form of political action in 
which an individual divests pre-existing identity through the performance of 
the theatrical will, claiming an unassigned role which cannot be recognised 
because it has no pre-ordained name. This process also appears to eschew 
intersubjective exchange because it occurs in a space of ‘inoperative 
communication’ in which all are strangers. Although these theoretical 
propositions are geared towards preserving intellectual emancipation, I 
argue that isolated autonomy could actually threaten the end of learning. In 
contrast to Vygotsky’s highly intersubjective model of the zone of proximal 
development, which relies on relational connectivity for creative imitation to 
stimulate development, according to Rancière’s theory, the autonomous 
student makes their discoveries independently. I contend, however, that if 
                                                          
21 Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, 
trans. by Kristin Ross (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 57. 
22 Rancière, Ignorant Schoolmaster, p. 54. 
23 Lewis, p. 61. 
24 Lewis, p. 70. 
25 Lewis, pp. 71-72. 
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students lack a differentiated social group to creatively imitate as a means of 
discovering capitals that are (initially) beyond them and also lack peers with 
whom they can communicate to compare their discoveries, it is unclear how 
learning can occur. 
In considering the Playground project as a possible manifestation of 
the zone of proximal development, the composition of the group as a diverse 
social entity with varying skills and levels of knowledge was of central 
importance. One participant, Jack, who runs a theatre company for young 
audiences, commented on the value of relational exchange within a 
creatively diverse group, arguing that this made it possible for participants 
to produce things that exceeded their capacities as individuals: 
What’s nice for me is that – although I do work very collaboratively in 
the company I have, I’m always the writer and the director of 
everything…But the range of approaches and the range of backgrounds 
that we had – and experiences – really made the process of creating 
things feel very new. It was very rich for producing stuff – and 
producing stuff that no-one individually could have made – but 
somehow between them they could.26 
Beyond the relational connectivity of group function, a centrally important 
aspect of the project was the creation of relational connections within the 
play experiences themselves. One participant, Navdeep, commented on 
several occasions about an exercise in which groups of participants built a 
landscape, characters, and relations by ‘tapping in and tapping out’ so that 
each person, in turn, would add a layer to the emerging story world then 
step back to observe the next layer added by the next person.27 For Navdeep, 
the important feature of this process was that all knowledge was publicly 
shared as the exercise unfolded, enabling participants to make their 
contributions in relation to the offerings that others had made: 
The tapping in, tapping out thing – and kind of rotating of the characters 
– that for me was like a brilliant gift…because you have to plug into the 
shared thing – how you relate it to the whole…and one of the things I 
realised afterwards – cos I reflect on it a lot – but one of the things about 
that is that everybody’s seeing what’s happening, everybody’s 
observing…so the tapping in tapping out made a landscape, someone 
said it’s a base on the moon then there were the characters – like Zara 
                                                          
26 ‘Jack’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, London (28 June 2018). See Appendix A: 
‘Playground16’. 
27 See Appendix B.2 for the structure of the Gestalt World Building exercise. 
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said ‘you treat me differently cos I’m a woman’, so then I’m like ‘I’m not 
like that’ – and everything was feeding into like a collective thing.  
Navdeep went on to describe a piece that he designed later (about secrecy 
and paranoia in a squatters’ commune) in which social sharing was 
relatively absent, using this experience to reflect on the value of relational 
connectivity in play: 
When I did my piece – I’m not flagellating myself – but I did much less, I 
just went ‘you’re there, you’re there’ and what I realised I did was that I 
split people into silos. I didn’t want them to – cos one of the themes was 
mystery and I was thinking ‘don’t tell them’ – and what I realised was 
that I put a barrier between a shared experience…and the tapping in 
tapping out – why I mention it is – everyone’s watching, so everyone’s 
writing – there’s that sense of a whole.28 
As these examples suggest, social relationality is extremely important in 
offering learners a differentiated range of behavioural material that they can 
creatively imitate to expand their capitals. Conversely, Navdeep’s 
observations about splitting people ‘into silos’ illustrates the pedagogical 
risks of autonomy that precludes the formation of zones of proximal 
development by limiting relational connectivity. 
 
5.3 Language and Reflexivity 
In the same way that relational connections are essential for 
generating learning through play, Vygotsky argues that the discovery and 
use of language as a means of ‘completing’ instances of knowledge creation 
in social interactions is of central concern. He claims that ‘speech does not 
merely serve as the expression of a developed thought…thought is 
restructured as it is translated into speech. It is not expressed but completed 
in the word’.29 Holzman builds on these ideas to suggest that ‘the human 
ability to create with language – to complete and be completed by others – is, 
for adults as well as very young children, a continuous process of creating 
who we are becoming’.30 In addition to using language in social 
                                                          
28 ‘Navdeep’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, London (12 July 2018). See Appendix A: 
‘Playground17’. 
29 Lev S. Vygotsky, The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky, Volume 1 (New York: Plenum, 
1987), p. 251, cited in Holzman, Vygotsky, p. 39. 
30 Holzman, Vygotsky, p. 40. 
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communication, Vygotsky’s theories also emphasise the importance of inner 
speech in developing imaginative thinking and this section considers the 
value of both external and internal speech in supporting reflexivity in play.  
In the Playground project, the continuous process of attempting to 
create meaning through discursive reflection was extremely important. It is 
traditional in Nordic Larp communities to conclude the play activity with the 
ritual of the runda, or storytelling circle, in which each player is invited to 
verbally reflect on what they have encountered, and it became a regular 
practice to conclude sessions in this way. A notable example of discursive 
reflection came when one participant, Meg, was thinking about a play 
experience she had had when role-playing with me, which had affected her, 
but without her being able to immediately understand why. The discussions 
that followed illustrate the value of shared verbal reflection as a means of 
intersubjectively forging new understandings of what has taken place. The 
experience being discussed was a role-play, designed by members of the 
group, which involved a small band of revolutionaries (two of whom were 
secretly in love with each other) being hunted by the police. In the first stage 
of the role-play, the group made plans to flee from a shopping centre in 
Cardiff, rejecting the option of escaping by car and embarking on a journey 
to Bristol by stealing a small boat. In the final scenario, the revolutionaries 
found themselves floating on the Severn estuary, following the failure of the 
boat’s motor, which prompted the characters to engage in some 
philosophical meditations about the possibility of death and what they would 
like to do with their lives if they survived. The design of the play activity 
invited players to deliver these meditations through the device of character 
inner monologues which allowed them to verbalise things that their 
characters were thinking, but could not say.31 In reflecting on this scenario, 
Meg focused on a moment when the tone of play changed and became, for 
her, more emotionally charged, and she attempted to work out why this 
change had occurred: 
The moment when our play shifted was when you as a player gave like 
a monologue and there was something about there being introspective 
character roles (the ability for players to articulate the inner feelings of 
                                                          
31 See Appendix B.17 for the structure of the Retreating Army play design exercise. 
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their character as a meta-theatrical gesture) that shifted the way I was 
playing – like I could think about how I was feeling and I got to be like – 
‘I’m feeling really frightened right now’ – and then I could pretend like I 
wasn’t really frightened and I could deal with everything – but it 
allowed me to bring two layers to the way I was playing and I found 
that really useful.32 
Meg’s comment that there were ‘two layers’ to her play as a result of the 
types of communication that she was able to use is strongly redolent of 
Gregory Bateson’s notion of ‘meta-communication’ which was discussed in 
the previous chapter. In this instance, communication self-consciously 
referred to itself as Meg and I used language within the role-play and also as 
meta-communication about the role-play through the device of character 
inner monologues.  
The notion that communication can function on ‘two layers’ connects 
to a key component of Vygotsky’s theory: the link between using language for 
external and internal speech. Norris Minick offers a neat articulation of 
Vygotsky’s idea that although speech emerges first as social communication 
about tangible objects in a child’s immediate vicinity, secondarily, as the 
child begins to develop complex play, it becomes a tool for internalised 
thought that enables a higher level of imagination that transcends the 
limitations of immediate surroundings: 
Vygotsky argued that word meanings are…bound to their objects for 
the very young child, with word and thing fused in the child’s 
consciousness…it is through the development of the child’s play 
activity that thought and meanings are liberated from their origins in 
the perceptual field, providing the foundation for the further 
development of speech and its role in advanced forms of thinking and 
imagination.33  
Several months after playing the scenario in the Severn, when we were 
debriefing the project as a whole, Meg again remembered the episode and 
continued to develop her understandings of it through dialogue with me and 
through a consideration of her own internal dialogue: 
                                                          
32 ‘Meg’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Theatre Delicatessen, London (17 April 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘Playground8’. 
33 Norris Minick, ‘The Development of Vygotsky’s thought: an introduction to Thinking and 
Speech’, in Introduction to Vygotsky, ed. by Harry Daniels (Hove: Routledge, 2017), pp. 32-
56. (p. 46). 
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I really remember our conversation in the boat from Wales. I remember 
being really affected and I think, of my playing experiences, it was the 
most significant…And I remember that I had a whole narrative in my 
head about our relationship that I didn’t say – and then I was playing, 
and I was like – ‘why didn’t I verbally share that at the start of this? 
Because I’m clearly playing it’. Thinking about it now as we’re 
speaking, a big part of it was that when we were on that boat, I felt like 
there was nothing – I had no idea what was going to happen, and we 
were just on a boat – and that was important. That as a circumstance 
really facilitated a particular type of conversation.34 
In setting out this reflection on Meg’s play experience, several salient points 
about communication emerge. Firstly, her verbal speech was clearly not an 
articulation of pre-existing thoughts. The fact that she was ‘thinking about it 
now as we’re speaking’ illustrates that her thoughts were shaped by the act 
of speaking itself. Secondly, she identified that her inner speech about the 
(potentially romantic) nature of the relationship between her character and 
my character was an important aspect of what had made the experience 
valuable, aside from what was actually said within the role-play, which 
shows the reflexive value of the internal conversation in play. Thirdly, she 
emphasised the unknown quantity of what was going to happen to the 
drifting boat on the Severn and suggested that this facilitated a ‘certain type 
of conversation’. I suggest this ‘certain type’ was an open-ended dialogue 
about abstract imaginings of the future (relating to possible sinking or 
survival) rather than a conversation about immediate realities. This 
highlights the vital relation between internal language use (which was clearly 
a major feature of this role-play) and abstract, imaginative thinking that is 
oriented towards the future and, in the following section, I offer further 
consideration of the relationship between imagination and time in play.  
 
5.4 Temporal Immediacy & Imaginative Time 
A comparison of the theories of Vygotsky and Rancière shows a 
marked contrast in notions of pedagogical space, with Rancière’s 
emancipated student arriving through the breach of the theatrical will in an 
atopia in which their autonomy is preserved at the expense of relational 
                                                          




communication, set against Vygotsky’s vision of learning in a strongly 
relational space that thrives on communicative connection. In a similar vein, 
the two theorists have differing approaches to pedagogical time and I will 
now discuss Rancière’s interest in the temporal immediacy of curiosity, as 
articulated by Lewis, to throw into relief Vygotsky’s alternative view of 
imagination which relies on both recursion and projection in time.  
In his analysis of Paulo Freire’s pedagogy, Lewis argues that Freire 
sees a temporal progression between scientific learning about the world and 
aesthetic imagination. According to Lewis’ articulation of Freire’s ideas, ‘the 
aesthetic event of vision is the imaginative supplement to scientific 
unveiling’.35 In other words, the pedagogue must first help the oppressed 
student to unmask the material conditions of their oppression as a 
necessary precursor to any imaginative projection by the student of how the 
world could be changed in future. The problem, according to Lewis, with a 
temporal separation between scientific unveiling and imagination is that it 
reaffirms a hierarchical subordination of ignorant students who must have 
the objective scientific reality of the world unveiled to them by the expertise 
of the pedagogue before they can exercise creative imagination. By contrast, 
Rancière focuses on the immediacy of curiosity rather than imagination. In 
Lewis’ description, Rancière sees curiosity as ‘a failing in our understanding’ 
that occurs in ‘a location where the eye “does not know in advance what it 
sees, and thought does not know what to make of it”’.36 The benefit of 
curiosity, for Lewis, is that it forgoes any temporal division between scientific 
understanding (mediated by the masterful pedagogue) and imagination, and 
he claims that ‘overcoming this division reorients education from a utopian 
horizon to the active aesthetic performance of the theatrical will in the here 
and now’.37  
The assumption of equality lies at the heart of Rancière’s emphasis on 
the immediacy of curiosity. In his pedagogical theory, prior identities 
assigned by the police order can be cast aside in the moment of equal 
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perceptual capacity, but without a projection into the future that might 
become tied into a hierarchically ordered prescription of what a utopian 
future should look like.38 I contend, however, that Rancière’s ideas on 
temporal immediacy appear to undermine the possibility of accomplishing 
the type of radical political reordering of the world that he envisages. For 
example, Çiğdem Çidam argues, in an article assessing Rancière’s political 
philosophy, that his focus on temporal immediacy ‘overlooks the question of 
how to hang onto gains attained by a political movement’ creating a vision of 
democratic action that is limited to the ‘here and now’.39 Aside from the 
political limitations of temporal immediacy, I argue that Rancière’s emphasis 
on the instantaneity of curiosity in the here and now might actually preclude 
any performance of the theatrical will. Central to Vygotsky’s theories of 
learning through play is the idea that it is fundamentally imitative, 
functioning as a creative mimicry of behaviours and events that the child 
has previously experienced. In Rancière’s philosophy, however, the temporal 
immediacy of curiosity elides recursion of past experiences, while the 
assertion of equality strips away the particularities that individuals have 
developed over their life trajectory. I suggest that the consequence of this 
equalisation and expungement of particularities that have emerged over time 
is the removal of the experiential material that must necessarily be the 
substance of any theatrical performance. In other words, if all students are 
equal and perform the theatrical will in the immediacy of now, they can have 
no recursion of past experiences or deploy the particularities of their 
repertoire in their theatrical performances.  
In the context of a study of the culturally transformative potential of 
play, the valorisation of temporal immediacy is problematic because it 
reduces the scope for reflexivity whereby an individual can recursively draw 
on their experiences of the past to prompt action in the present. For 
Vygotsky, however, the reconfiguration of past experiences is fundamental in 
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fuelling imagination. In describing his imaginings of the Saharan desert, for 
example, he argues that: 
These productions of the imagination…consist of transformed and 
reworked elements of reality and a large store of experience is required 
to create these images out of these elements. If I did not have a 
concept of a lack of water, sand, enormous spaces, animals that live in 
deserts, and so forth, I, of course, could not generate the concept of 
this desert.40 
The imagination that reconfigures aspects of past experience (either things 
that have been directly encountered or indirectly discovered through verbal 
communication or written literature, for example) is not limited to basic 
mimetic reiteration of these experiences. Rather, Vygotsky suggests that the 
function of imagination is to selectively gather elements of past knowledge 
and creatively reconfigure them in anticipation of the future: 
When, in my imagination, I draw myself a mental picture of, let us say, 
the future life of humanity under socialism or a picture of life in the 
prehistoric past and the struggle of prehistoric man, in both cases I 
am doing more than reproducing the impressions I once happened to 
experience…The brain is not only the organ that stores and retrieves 
our previous experience, it is also the organ that combines and 
creatively networks elements of this past experience and uses them to 
generate new propositions and new behaviour…It is precisely human 
creative activity that makes the human being a creature oriented 
toward the future, creating the future and thus altering his own 
present.41 
As Vygotsky’s arguments suggest, imagination is predicated upon the 
repurposing of prior experience, a point that is elaborated by Anna 
Stetsenko’s reading of his work which highlights the fundamentally time-
bound nature of emergent experience as a composite of prior knowledge and 
future-oriented imagination:  
Reality has to be understood in its unfolding and open-ended, dynamic 
historicity where the present is a continuously emergent process tied 
not only to previous conditions but also, most critically, to future 
conditions as these are envisioned.42 
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Consequently, the performance of the theatrical will, as described in Lewis’ 
articulation of Rancière’s theory, must necessarily be limited in its 
transformative scope by the temporal immediacy of curiosity, since the 
curious subject must remain in relative ignorance and therefore possess a 
relatively limited range of material to supply their performative repertoire. By 
contrast, the depth perspective of imaginative time that combines experience 
of the past with visions of potential futures offers a more fertile ground for 
performing the theatrical will, for the simple reason that there is a greater 
store of prior knowledge to fuel this performance. Furthermore, as Vygotsky 
carefully points out, imagination is not simply a reproduction of the old, or a 
reaffirmation of existing norms, it is a creative repurposing of the past, 
projected into an uncertain future, that simultaneously reshapes the present 
moment. 
In the Playground project, instances of imagination connecting past 
present and future are innumerable, but one workshop was particularly 
focused on using memory as the basis for imaginative play. The session 
started off with an introductory exercise in which I asked participants to 
respond to the question: ‘Where have you come from today?’ The replies that 
they gave detailed the ordinary activities of everyday life and might, 
therefore, be seen as relatively inconsequential, but I suggest that this 
simple invitation encouraged participants to put themselves in the mindset 
of remembering, in preparation for engaging in creative activities with their 
memories. Subsequently, I conducted another memory exercise which asked 
participants to draw a place that really mattered to them from their past 
experience. Working in small groups, they then passed the image on to 
another player who was invited to draw characters into the picture, leading 
to small role-plays in which group members acted out a scenario featuring 
the characters in the pictures.43 In reflecting on this exercise, several 
participants commented on the imaginative potential of reconfiguring 
personal memories in play: 
Zara: I really enjoyed the mixture of building from people’s memory 
versus them taking it into an imaginative place and it was kind of – very 
satisfying from when you described something – the next player kind of 
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listening to that and adding to your picture – influenced by what you’d 
said. 
Meg: Similarly, I found it starting in a place that was quite like – it was 
a memory…and then the development out of that – there were 
characters that were discussed that then formulated and that was 
really lovely to see – to see someone who had existed in a kind of off-
hand comment then taking full form – and actually like a massive back 
story as the game went on. 
Xanthe: I guess something similar – with the auxiliary character that 
has a relationship with someone from the like – first world. I liked that 
as a spark to an entirely different environment, or time. I guess you 
would think of it as going into the past – but then there was a different 
temporality…in my case it was quite resonant because it’s a place – the 
story is of a woman who starts to lure tourists into the sea to kill them – 
and this is from a place that was very dear to me that has been 
absolutely ruined by tourism and that’s actually like a fantastic 
fantasy! So, I’m like – ‘Wow! Good idea! Lure them into the ocean!’44 
As Xanthe’s comments suggest, the reconfiguration of memory in the play 
activity provided a fertile ground for future-oriented fantasy. Although her 
idea of killing tourists was clearly not a serious proposition, it does share 
similarities, I suggest, with Vygotsky’s understanding of imagination, which 
draws on past experiences as a means of constructing future projections. 
Just as Vygotsky draws on his experience of the past to construct the 
utopian vision of the future life of humanity under socialism, Xanthe’s play 
imaginatively reconfigured memories of her home in Greece to create a 
vision, fantastical though it might seem, of productive change (from her 
perspective) in a place that was extremely important for her.    
 
5.5 Not-Knowing & the Search for Method 
A fundamental aspect of imagination is the notion that the future is 
uncertain and, in the same way that uncertainty in play is a large part of 
what makes it compelling, in this section, I argue for the pedagogical value of 
not-knowing. In discussing Vygotsky’s ideas on childhood language 
acquisition, Lois Holzman states that ‘developmental activity does not 
require knowing how’.45 She argues that ‘when babies begin to babble, they 
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are speaking before they know how to speak or that they speak, by virtue of 
the speakers around them accepting them into the community of speakers 
and creating conversation with them’.46 Vygotsky’s positive assessment of 
not-knowing can also be linked with the pedagogical ideas of his American 
contemporary John Dewey who argues that ‘suggestion…runs beyond what 
is actually…present. It relates, therefore, to what is possible rather than to 
what is actual. It proceeds by anticipation, supposition, conjecture, 
imagination’.47 In other words, development comes from imaginative leaps as 
speculative instances of hypothetical suggestion that do not need to be 
rooted in scientific knowledge and analysis of actuality. 
In Playground, the speculative, suppositional nature of not-knowing 
was a marked feature of the project. In the same way that babbling babies 
begin to speak before they know how to speak, the participants were 
challenged to design and facilitate live action role-plays before they really 
knew how. Rather than seeing this as a negative, however, participants 
reflected positively on not-knowing, as is illustrated by Xanthe’s comments 
following a play-test session of her group’s final piece: 
My reflection – holy shit – you just do it. And something comes out of it 
and you learn something. I didn’t want to play-test, I was like ‘We’re not 
ready. I don’t have my concepts!’ (everyone laughs) ‘I don’t know if this 
needs to be here or here, so like – we’ll do it next time’ And then – you 
think it’s gonna be rubbish but then – it was helpful. I mean, we’re not 
gonna show it – quite now – but yeah. It was really helpful for us – you 
just do it even if you haven’t got all the laces and flourishes and its 
really basic. But it’s great – cos I’m really an overthinker. 
Xanthe’s comments were subsequently echoed by Josh, who also identified 
the value of moving away from a highly thought out creative process: 
I’m astonished by how quickly you can build something. Like – when 
did we start doing this – last week? That is wild that we’ve got 
functioning things in such a short space of time. I’m used to spending a 
year building an hour-long show…this is the literal opposite – where you 
can just come up with a concept – build it – and you just let it run – and 
it is wild to me that I feel pretty comfortable with what we’ve got in two 
weeks.48  
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As these examples indicate, know-how was not a requirement for designing 
role-play games. Rather, the willing embrace of speculative not-knowing was 
key in enabling participants to seek out new ways of working based on quick 
iterations of their designs, in contrast to more ordered forms of creativity 
framed by careful planning.  
The relationship between knowing and not-knowing was further 
elaborated by Meg in her reflections on our scenario of the boat in the Severn 
estuary. Her enjoyment of having ‘no idea what was gonna happen’ in this 
role-play subsequently led into a consideration of facilitating the unknown in 
her own projects. She described being strongly attracted by complexity, but 
said that she often undermined the experience of her audience-participants 
by over-explaining things to them and creating a deficit of not-knowing: 
JH: With this thing of complexity – feels like there’s maybe something 
similar to what you described about being in the boat – where you don’t 
know… 
Meg: Yeah. 
JH: There’s a kind of layer of unknown. 
Meg: Yeah. Yeah! And I think – often what I’m trying to facilitate is 
getting people to that point of unknown – but what I think I often do is – 
I explain the complexities and then they’re not at a point of unknown. 
At this point, Meg picked up a menu card (which was shaped like a 
triangular cylinder) from the table to illustrate her facilitation of complexity: 
Meg: It’s like – this is the complexity (the menu) and I want them here 
(outside the structure) – but instead I put them here (inside the 
structure). So, I put them in the midst of the complexity rather than like 
– sitting on top of it or sitting outside of it so that they’re able to kind of 
lean on it and consider it. 
JH: So – if you’ve put me into it – you’ve already told me what the 
properties of this thing are – too much perhaps? 
Meg: Yeah, cos then you can’t get down. You’re just in it. You’re in it so 
much that you can’t remove yourself from it.49 
This notion of wanting to be able to remove oneself from the close, proximal 
immediacy of knowledge in order to stand outside it and discern it is 
strongly suggestive of the role of reflexivity in learning. The reflexivity 
                                                          




involved in standing outside complexity does not imply a valorisation of 
perpetual not-knowing, however. Instead, my proposal is that not-knowing is 
a productive foundation for the search for new knowledge.  
In Vygotsky’s theories, the search for method is a key aspect of 
learning whereby members of a group do not simply acquire tools to find 
solutions, the search for method is itself the source of development. This can 
be exemplified most clearly by childhood language development in which the 
discovery of words and speech provides tools for communication but also 
results in development through the process of searching for these tools. 
Holzman describes this as a ‘tool and result’ approach to learning as 
opposed to the ‘tool for result’ approach of banking education in which 
teachers instruct students on how to use a tool in order to achieve a desired 
result. For Holzman, ‘the method is simultaneously prerequisite and 
product, the tool and the result of the study’ and the method itself is ‘not a 
tool to be applied, but an activity (a search) that generates both tool and 
result at the same time and as continuous process’.50 
The search for method in the Playground project was indeed a 
continuous process for both participants and me as the facilitator. I was 
mindful to avoid the temptation of simply supplying the group with a range 
of tools with which they could produce the ‘result’ of new works, favouring a 
more experimental (and risky) approach of trying to do things that I did not 
know how to do as part of my own search for method. A consequence of this 
emphasis on not-knowing and searching for new tools was that there was a 
considerable amount of what might be seen as failure, particularly in the 
early part of the project. Nonetheless, I would argue that a culture of not-
knowing placed participants in a position that enabled them not just to 
acquire tools but to discover that they could create their own tools as well. 
For example, Navdeep commented on the widely used Nordic larp practice of 
applying workshop activities, like using post-it notes to propose ideas for the 
fictional settings in which a role-play might be played, as a preparatory first 
stage of the play experience: 
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Because I’m such a workshop whore (referring to his frequent 
attendance of arts workshops) I realised early on that part of larp must 
be the workshop…If we’re doing a preliminary thing, we’re larping…If 
we’re doing this thing with the post-it notes – as a process of idea 
generation – this isn’t just – this is actually part of the larp.51 
The salient point that can be drawn from this reflection is that Navdeep 
became aware that the workshop was not a separate precursor to the larp 
itself, or a tool that would produce the result of role-play drama. Rather, the 
workshop process of sticking post-it notes on the wall to generate ideas was 
both tool and result: not just a preparatory warm-up, but a fundamental 
part of the larp itself. Moreover, this realisation meant that that he had not 
only acquired a tool (using post-it notes for world building), he had also 
gained a self-reflexive, second-order awareness of his acquisition and his 
ability to make such an acquisition, which can be understood as a form of 
learning development that is independent of the tool’s utilitarian function.  
 
5.6 Pedagogical Scaffolding & the Curatorial 
As I have suggested in my previous discussion of the balance between 
knowing and not-knowing in my facilitation of Playground, a substantial part 
of the pedagogue’s work lies in deciding the extent to which they will present 
pre-existing methods or concepts or invite students to experimentally 
originate their own. Educational psychologist Jerome Bruner, who is, 
arguably, a leading proponent of Vygotsky’s theories, gained notoriety for 
developing the concept of ‘scaffolding’ as the means by which the pedagogue 
creates frameworks for learning, with a balance of independence for the 
student alongside teaching guidance.52 In the latter part of his career, as 
Vygotsky’s influence on him grew, Bruner recognised that his scaffolding 
concept placed too much emphasis on the expertise of the pedagogue and 
moved towards a position of valuing the intersubjective nature of learning, 
seeing the individual learner ‘not as the pure and enduring nucleus but…the 
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sum and swarm of all participations’.53 Nonetheless, for my purposes, 
scaffolding remains a useful term for considering how a facilitator can frame 
a learning process. In the same way that Rancière’s Ignorant Schoolmaster 
frames learning by ‘pointing’ towards objects that might be unfamiliar or 
‘placing’ before the student another such object,54 scaffolding can be seen as 
a process of curatorial pointing through which the facilitator points out 
things that may be of interest for the students to explore further. To develop 
the idea of pedagogical scaffolding as curatorial pointing, I will now discuss 
the concept of the ‘curatorial’ as it has emerged in recent fine art discourse. 
 In considering the distinction between curation and the curatorial, 
Jean-Paul Martinon defines the former as the practice of presenting existing 
knowledge contained in art objects, in opposition to the latter which seeks to 
be more disruptive of received knowledge. He states that curating: 
Is an attempt a) to take the measure of a world (art, artists, 
generation, geography etc.), b) to figure the measure (translate it in a 
common language: art history, ethnography, history, sociology etc.), c) 
to give it an ideological character (to slant the translation with a set of 
common principles or political beliefs), and finally, d) to hide from the 
viewer the method that led to this measurement, figuration, 
translation and ideology.55 
Martinon clearly suggests that traditional curating is highly instrumental, 
with a clear intent to sculpt the perceptions of audiences. This approach has 
a strongly biopolitical character, setting out a vision of the curator as a 
caretaker who selects objects of attention that are desirable and excludes 
undesirable elements from a specific body of work.56 Stefan Nowotny goes 
further to suggest that the actions of the curator as caretaker can be seen as 
narcissistic, referencing the myth of the goddess Cura (the etymological root 
of the word ‘curator’) who sculpts the first human from clay as an image of 
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herself in the same way that curators might been seen to sculpt the 
perceptions of audience in line with their own visions.57 
In contrast with an approach to curation that seeks to gather an 
understanding of the world and present it to the viewer, which might be seen 
as analogous to the principles of ‘banking’ education, the curatorial, 
according to Martinon is ‘simply an effort to let go of knowledge…an effort to 
sustain the disruption of knowledge’58 that is ‘paradoxically, but necessarily, 
the birth of knowledge’.59 This call for curatorial disruption of knowledge 
seems to connect directly to Rancière’s pedagogical theory of curiosity, but 
other contributors in Martinon’s book suggest a model of curatorial practice 
that is less disruptive and more constructive. Irit Rogoff argues that the 
curatorial creates contexts for ‘the event of knowledge’,60 by setting a 
plurality of viewpoints in relation, in the same way that a plurality of diverse 
learners construct the zone of proximal development, a point which is 
affirmed by curator Ine Gevers: 
Curating is a practice that permits the creation of different interpretive 
contexts, embracing different political, social and psychological 
positions, theories and ideologies, at the same time as making cultural 
connections between them. To put it more simply, it is about opening 
up ‘spaces’ within which different discourses can be brought into 
relationship with one another, ‘spaces of transformation’ in which both 
critical and self-critical engagement are put into work as the chief 
transforming agents. Such ‘spaces’ would bring personal strategies 
into the public domain in a way that encourages an arena of inter-
subjectivity.61  
Building on the ideas presented by Gevers, I argue that the Playground 
project functioned as an ‘arena of inter-subjectivity’ in which practitioners 
from a range of disciplines were brought into creative relation with each 
other. In reflecting on his experience of the project, one participant, Andy, 
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who came from a fine art background, commented on the interdisciplinarity 
in the group, saying: 
I felt like the course was kind of a broad spectrum of different variants 
of larp and interactive theatre and games but lots of people came from 
an interactive theatre background and that kind of – kind of pushed a 
lot of decisions in our piece into that setting. Which was fine…I mean – I 
think we made some decisions that were more – more trusting the 
players – but some decisions pushed more into the kind of interactive 
performance area.62 
Andy’s comments highlight the fact that intersubjective exchange is not 
necessarily a harmonious process of adapting to alternative viewpoints and, 
as he suggests, the prior inclinations of some participants led them to hold 
onto favoured artistic forms in which an audience would interact with a 
performance rather than creating the performance themselves. On one hand, 
this could be seen in a negative light, with the implication that the project 
did not enable interactive performance makers to adapt their methods and 
encounter the culturally transformative experience of using alternative 
creative forms. I suggest, however, that within the methodology of scaffolding 
as curatorial pointing, cultural transformation should not be seen as 
something that is necessarily desirable or required. Rather, as Andy’s 
comment shows, the Playground participants were able to choose or 
disregard the various things that were ‘pointed to’ at their own discretion, 
rather than being required by the pedagogue to receive prescribed forms of 
knowledge or practical methods. In other words, they were invited to pursue 
cultural transformation in their repertoire of creative methods to the extent 
that it was desirable for them to do so.  
 
5.7 Curatorial Aesthetics 
Aside from the question of the content offered by the pedagogue, the 
formal aspects of curatorial pedagogy relating to the framing of events in 
space and time were important areas of interest in my facilitation of 
Playground. In the same way that I have challenged valorisations of temporal 
                                                          




immediacy for reducing the scope for critical reflexivity, this section 
considers the spatial composition of pedagogical contexts. Drawing on Roger 
Simon’s analysis of museological practice, I argue that, in contrast to the 
aesthetics of sensory immersion, spatial compositions in playful learning 
environments that employ defamiliarization and a minimalistic economy of 
means can be conducive to critical reflexivity and imaginative thinking that 
fosters culturally transformative potential. 
Simon’s discussions of curatorial practice offer detailed descriptions of 
exhibitions of lynching photographs from the United States, focusing closely 
on the aesthetics of their curation. He proposes that despite their horrific 
content, the lynching photographs might be seen as a gift (an idea that I 
return to later in this chapter) that calls for a response from the viewer.63 To 
achieve this response, however, Simon argues that the curation of the 
photographic exhibit must seek to generate a movement from affect to 
thought that might stimulate action: 
At the heart of the matter regarding questions of difficult knowledge is 
the provocation of affect, and most importantly, affect’s relation to the 
instigation and possibilities of thought…this notion of affect is not 
dichotomously opposed to or forestalling thought, but felt as a force 
that incites and compels thought as to the range of emotions one is 
feeling…and, consequently, in what ways this encounter might become 
significant to one’s framework of acting in the world.64 
In considering how the link between affect and thought might be brought 
about, Simon applies the concept of the dispositif, which he describes as ‘a 
specific complex of discourses, material practices…that orient, enable, but 
also constrain and limit particular ways of rendering a sensate world 
comprehensible’.65 Simon develops his conception of the dispositif by 
analysing the ways in which sensory stimuli are used in curatorial strategies 
to generate affective impacts. In a particularly striking example, he discusses 
an 1893 street exhibit of lynching photographs in Seattle, which used 
soundscapes of baying crowds to supplement the affective force of the 
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images, which can be seen as an immersive strategy that strives for complete 
sensory envelopment of the viewer in the events depicted: 
The sounds integral to this event attempted to draw the viewer nearer 
to what the photographs alone would not show. This attempt 
approaches Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of ‘super-representation’, a 
regime of rendition in which what is aspired towards is the exposure of 
a world without fissure, without withdrawn invisibility, that can be 
placed right before one’s eye.66 
In Simon’s analysis, this immersive ‘super-representation’ creates an 
affective intensity that precludes critical reflexivity whereby ‘the image 
actively gives out an affective force that exhausts itself either in spectacle of 
the image and/or of the trauma of its blur, with the consequence that there 
is little provocation to thought’.67 Simon contrasts this example with a more 
contemporary exhibition of lynching photographs, entitled Without 
Sanctuary, at the Andy Warhol Museum in Pittsburgh, which intentionally 
created an incompleteness by placing the images on their own without 
explanatory text or additional sensory supplements. According to Simon, 
this dispositif created a ‘hollowness’ in the images that ‘resulted in an 
occlusion of what happened that was at the same time an acknowledgement 
of an unimaginable horror and an opening to thought’.68 In other words, in 
contrast with the immersive completeness of the ‘world without fissure’ 
presented in the Seattle exhibit, the partial occlusion of ‘hollowed’ images 
created an incompleteness that required viewers to actively think about what 
was represented. 
Linking the curatorial ideas from the museum exhibitions cited by 
Simon to my curatorial pedagogy in Playground might seem surprising given 
that the project did not work with photographs and did not handle any 
subject matter that approached the complexity and severity of lynching. I 
suggest, however, that the aesthetic implications of sensory occlusion (as 
opposed to sensory completeness) in exhibition practices connect closely 
with my concerns about strategies of immersion that valorise sensory 
immediacy in both space and time, to the detriment, in my view, of reflexive 
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thought. In the Playground project, the spatial framing of the work, in terms 
of its physical context and the materials used, has been revealing regarding 
the aesthetics of pedagogy. In discussing the space where the workshops 
took place, which was an extremely nondescript former office building, Andy 
commented that: 
Because it was so bland and benign – it does sort of stimulate your 
imagination in a way that like – cos it was so plain it sort of pushed 
your imagination even further. You had to imagine you weren’t there – 
which is the basis of most larps (he laughs). So yeah – it did its job.69 
Although the workshop space was extremely bland, in my facilitation I 
sought variety in the spatial composition by avoiding the temptation to 
arrange the space before the start of each session. In other words, when I 
arrived in the room, I responded to whatever configuration I found it in, a 
strategy which was noted by Jack who commented on the possibility of 
finding dynamism in the use of the space, despite its dullness: 
When I make stuff, I’m always responding to the space so much. 
Whereas like – when we first started, I was like – ‘it’s gonna be so 
boring if it’s in an office every time!’ (he laughs)…but it felt like it 
worked. I think the fact that we never – there was never like a set way 
that we used the space. It was never like we were always in a circle 
and it felt like we used different bits of the space – like – ‘let’s have this 
conversation here’ or the room would get pulled apart – and it meant 
that the room was dynamic. Sometimes working on the floor – 
sometimes on the table. The fact we it was dynamic in the way we used 
it meant that it worked.70 
Beyond the composition of the room itself, Zara commented on the use of 
random objects within the neutrality of the space and the impact this had on 
her theatrical imagination: 
Zara: I guess the flexibility of using them (the objects) in lots of different 
ways – you start to see – (she puts on a mysterious voice) ‘see beyond 
the object’. That sounds very wanky, but because – you begin either 
thinking about things in a very literal way – or you start to do that thing 
of – ‘or it could be this!’ – but then you just start going with it, without 
trying to be clever. 
JH: What does it mean to ‘see beyond the object’? Cos I don’t think 
that’s wanky at all. 
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Zara: It’s just like – the thing – isn’t it?  It just becomes like a tool – and 
that’s quite different to my experience of theatre. And later working with 
Josh – he was like ‘oh, do we need like costumes and set?’ – and almost 
– like the idea of that just seemed absolutely insane to me…cos it was 
just like – ‘this is just the room isn’t it? So, let’s just pretend’ (she 
laughs) – and that’s absolutely fine – so that was something that I let go 
of as a result of the space, over time.71 
In the same way that seeing ‘beyond the object’ allowed Zara to let go of the 
immersive conventions of theatrical naturalism and embrace the imaginative 
attitude of ‘let’s just pretend’, Meg also made some intriguing comments 
about how distance in space could help in finding a flexible perspective on 
her ideas. When I asked her about the space, her first comment was that one 
side of our workshop room was a floor to ceiling plate glass window which 
allowed us to see out into a long foyer area, and she mentioned that she had 
seen someone doing taekwondo at the other end of the space. I asked her 
what impact this had, and she replied: 
Meg: The thing about taekwondo is that it has specific roles and it’s 
very – it’s got like a uniform and a very set space and a very clear 
perception that it adheres to and we were doing quite a lot of throwing 
away of those things….And it (the large window) made us feel like we 
had more space cos it kind of let some things go…it gave you the space 
to throw things out to. For some reason – it made it easier in retrospect 
to let go of stuff and feel a little bit looser…I’ve been thinking quite a lot 
about creating distance in my life more broadly – being able to take a 
step back. Its where the sense of time comes from – being at ease. And 
it creates an ease in playing when you’re able to create distance. Big 
bodies of water do it sometimes. You look at the sea – and I think it can 
allow you to create some distance from what you’re doing right then. 
And perhaps even in that larp that we played (the boat on the Severn), 
even though the water wasn’t there – again it was the mass of this thing 
that we’re floating on – in my brain.72 
This example suggests that the ability to create distance in space promotes 
reflexivity by taking ‘a step back’ from spatial immediacy in the same way 
that thinking beyond temporal immediacy offers reflexivity through 
recursive/projective imagination.  
The aesthetic considerations drawn from the examples noted above 
have moved my conception of curatorial pedagogy beyond the question of 
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content towards a more formal consideration of how the dispositifs of 
curatorial scaffolding can offer an expansiveness in space and time that 
supports the potential for cultural transformation through play. In contrast 
to Rancière’s views of space and time that prioritise autonomy in space and 
immediacy in time, Vygotsky’s sense of space is fundamentally relational, 
with social connections at the heart of the zone of proximal development, 
while his emphasis on imagination relies on reflexive recursion and 
projection in time. My emphasis on reflexivity is not a call for perpetual 
distance as remoteness and strangeness. Rather it is a call to step into a 
relational play space and then have the capacity to step back in order to ‘see 
beyond the object’ and consider its possible reconfiguration. Similarly, 
reflexivity in time is not divorced from immediate action in the now, it is a 
call for learners to repurpose the experiential material accumulated through 
their past existence and imaginatively project a reconfiguration of this 
material into an uncertain future through action in the present. 
 
5.8 Documentation & Memory 
Central to the culturally transformative potential of play is the 
question of how knowledge of the world that is created through play can be 
remembered or documented. Essentially, if the knowledge gained through 
play is to be disseminated and shared with others to promote further 
learning and the ongoing social construction of culture, this knowledge must 
be narrativized or recorded in some way. The archive stands as the 
conventional institution for housing valued knowledge but, as I have 
previously noted, the canonical hegemony exerted by the archive and its 
curators appears to assert the police order that Rancière describes as the 
hierarchical distribution of the sensible. In opposition to the authority of the 
archive, many performance studies scholars have valorised the ephemerality 
of performance, arguing that attempts to capture it through documents like 
photographs or film are a betrayal of the inherent liveness of the 
performative act.73 In this section, however, I draw on the work of Rebecca 
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Schneider and Diana Taylor to suggest that the play of participatory 
performance can be effectively documented by the embodied memory of 
players and the retrospective narratives that they discursively construct.  
In contrast to arguments for the innate ephemerality of performance, 
Schneider argues that performance always remains, for the simple reason 
that all present performances are necessarily composed of elements of 
previous performances, meaning that traces of the past remain through their 
reiteration in the now: 
Performance becomes itself through messy and eruptive re-
appearance. It challenges, via the performative trace, any neat 
antinomy between appearance and disappearance, or presence and 
absence, through the basic repetitions that mark performance as 
indivisible, non-original, relentlessly citational and remaining.74 
What is striking, from my perspective, about Schneider’s argument that past 
performances remain through their citation in subsequent performances is 
the strong commonality that it shares with Vygotsky’s understandings of 
play. In the same way that play is an imitative reconfiguration of past 
experience, performance remains because it is repeated or theatrically 
imitated in future iterations. This idea is compounded by Richard 
Schechner’s theories of performance which have been strongly influenced by 
repetition in ritual play. Schechner claims that players in rituals ‘get in 
touch with, recover, remember…strips of behaviour and then rebehave 
according to these strips’ and he goes on to argue that due to the recycled 
nature of these behaviours, ‘performance means: never for the first time. It 
means: for the second to nth time. Performance is “twice-behaved 
behaviour”’.75  
In a similar vein to the ideas of Schneider, Diana Taylor’s concept of 
the repertoire, which refers to ‘a treasury, an inventory’ of embodied 
knowledge, suggests that times of the past are recorded in the body and 
transmitted through social interactions. Rather than viewing the repertoire 
simply as an embodied archive that passes knowledge on to others through 
mimetic repetition, however, Taylor argues that ‘the actions that are the 
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repertoire do not remain the same. The repertoire both keeps and transforms 
choreographies of meaning’76 and she goes on to discuss the concept of the 
meme, suggesting that the reproduction of cultural topes is a selective 
process whereby certain memes ‘catch on’.77 By way of example, Taylor 
discusses the ‘madres’ of Argentina, mothers of people who disappeared 
under the dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s, who developed the practice 
of carrying identification photographs of their loved ones during protest 
marches, a cultural trope that has subsequently been adopted by other 
protest groups elsewhere.78 
The concept of the meme that is reproduced and becomes more 
influential as it is reperformed is, as I have indicated through discussion of 
Ian Bogost’s consideration of memes in the previous chapter, very useful in 
my overall project of considering how individuals and groups develop 
cultural tropes that can be adapted and reconfigured. In the Playground 
project there were certain memes that appeared to ‘catch on’ such as the co-
creative world building process that Navdeep described as ‘tapping in, 
tapping out’, in which players shared all the roles so that everyone could 
contribute to the development of all aspects of the story world. This model of 
gestalt co-creation became something of a meme within the repertoire of the 
group, with several variations of this method emerging. In reflecting on 
aspects of the project that were memorable, Jack commented that: 
The investigation of like – sharing characters or swapping characters 
was really – you can almost create more empathy and I found it really 
engaging…like – in terms of collaboratively telling a story it was really 
interesting. I can make a decision about this character that in five 
minutes you’re gonna have to deal with – but it did – there was a less 
selfish perspective maybe on the things we were playing because the 
self changed so many times – it was more about creating the whole 
thing.79 
Similarly, several other members of the group adopted the meme of gestalt 
characterisation in developing their final piece, a scenario set in a hospital 
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with three characters who were to be shared by three players. Following the 
final playtest with invited guests, one player wrote a blog post about this larp 
which gives an insight into the gestalt character experience: 
This was a three player larp, with roles of the patient, the doctor and 
the visitor. During three scenes, the players rotated around these 
roles, so you played all three. Reality was kind of vague. So it was 
never stated what was wrong with the patient, except that they were 
blindfolded and had to be led around by the doctor. The doctor asked 
the patient a bunch of questions, while elsewhere the visitor filled in a 
questionnaire. Then the visitor was admitted and there was a touching 
sick bed scene. But then we rotated characters and played out the 
same sequence again – except this time the visitor’s answers from the 
first situation formed the basis of the doctor’s examination. And it 
became somewhat blurred as to whether the sickness was in the 
patient’s and visitor’s relationship rather than in the patient 
themselves. And then we rotated again, and reality now was pretty 
thoroughly abstracted, we were all caught up together in a network of 
sickness, possible recovery, grudges, possible forgiveness and a sense 
of the Hospital as Purgatory. All in all, a powerful and expressive 
experience, built from small and simple ingredients.80 
Aside from the subjective experience of the participant who played this larp, 
I argue that this manifestation of the meme of gestalt characterisation serves 
as an example (even though you are reading about it through a written 
account) of a live performance act that stands as a document of previous live 
acts. The participant played the three gestalt characters in the Hospital larp 
and thereby (unknowingly) documented the previous embodied experiences 
of the designers who had also performed gestalt characters in preceding 
workshop sessions.  
Live performance documentation of live performance from the past is 
described by Schneider as a kind of ‘syncopated time’ and she reifies this 
term through discussion of Hamlet, arguing that the protagonist constructs 
a live performance (through the dumb show of the players) as a 
documentation of the past events surrounding his father’s death, as 
narrated by Old Hamlet’s ghost: 
The character Hamlet is making a ‘live’ performance to function as 
record – troubled as that record may be – for a prior event (his father’s 
murder) otherwise recorded only by the testimony of a phantom…The 
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problem of the real in relation to the live here slips away from tidy 
distinction.81 
In other words, according to Schneider, the play within the play serves as a 
live record of a past event, syncopating time by creating a simultaneity of 
past and present. The idea that theatrical performance can serve to 
document the past in a syncopated time that is both past and present 
combined stands in sharp contrast with the long-standing distrust of 
theatricality that thinkers from Plato to Rousseau have expressed.82 
Schneider summarises this anxiety by arguing that ‘the threat of 
theatricality is still the threat of the imposter status of the copy, the double, 
the mimetic, the second, the surrogate, the femme or the queer’.83 In other 
words, theatricality is seen as a fake version of an authentic original that 
should be eschewed because of its artificiality. Notions or originality are 
regularly problematised by performance scholarship, however, a point that is 
illustrated by Gabriella Giannachi’s discussion of performative re-
enactments. She cites the example of the performance art persona Roberta 
Breitmore, a fictional character created and performed in a variety of real-
world settings over a four-year period by artist Lynn Hershmann. Breitmore’s 
life was documented through fragmentary accounts from the ‘original’ 
performer and then reperformed by a number of successors who assembled 
further collections of documentary fragments. In discussing this sequence of 
reiterative performances, Giannachi troubles the notion of the original by 
refencing Rosalind Krauss who suggests that ‘originality should be 
considered as “a working assumption that itself emerges from a ground of 
repetition and recurrence”’.84  
Beyond performance in artistic contexts, when considering the 
performance of play, as it has been analysed by Vygotsky, theatrical 
imitation is fundamental, and Gregory Bateson’s seminal studies of play 
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activities amongst animals further demonstrate the intrinsic theatricality of 
play. In describing the play fighting of the monkeys in San Francisco zoo, 
Bateson identifies that the animals signal to each other that the contest is 
not real. Nonetheless, his famous phrase ‘it’s not a bite, but it is a nip’ 
makes the point that although the play fight is not real it is also not not 
real.85 This doubleness of play that is concurrently not real and not not real 
seems to resonate with the twice-behavedness of performance as described 
by Schechner, problematising the assumption that there is an authentic 
original that is simply copied. Instead, all performance play is composed in 
theatrical imitation of previous performances that were themselves 
imitations. The temporal register of this not real / not not real performance 
play can consequently be understood, not as a linear progression from 
knowledge of the world that is then mimetically repeated, but rather as a 
‘not-in-between’ time in which knowing is an event that occurs in theatrical 
imitation, syncopating past performance concurrently with its present 
reconfiguration.86  
Schneider’s understanding of the hybridity of not real / not not real is 
clearly illustrated in her descriptions of American Civil War re-enactments. 
She argues that when the bugler plays Taps he is not merely copying Taps 
as a representation of it, he is really playing Taps, while the soldier eating 
salt pork is not simply representing Civil War era food culture, he is really 
eating salt pork: 
Both are true – real and faux – action and representation – and this 
both/and is the beloved and often discussed conundrum of 
theatricality in which the represented bumps uncomfortably (and 
ultimately undecidedly) against the affective, bodily instrument of the 
real.87 
In other words, performance play can be seen as a live document of the past 
that is not just a secondary copy of a previous event (with an ‘in-between’ 
time that separates the two) but an event of knowledge that simultaneously 
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combines the not real and the not not real through theatrical imitation in a 
syncopated, ‘not-in-between’ time that is concurrently now and also then.  
 
5.9 Documentary Gifts as Social Debt 
Although performance play can serve as a document, this does not 
necessarily devalue more conventional forms of documentation. For my 
purposes, in the context of a study focused on the culturally transformative 
potential of play and the subjective aesthetic experience of play, the question 
of documentary agency is, ultimately, a more pressing concern than 
documentary form. Consequently, I have investigated how participants can 
produce their own self-documentations, either through ongoing performance 
play, embodied repertoire memory or other more traditional archival 
documents like written notes. This section describes participant-led 
documentation in the Playground project and sets out the argument that 
exchanging documentary records of play can be understood as a form of 
gifting that calls for a reciprocal response from those who receive these gifts. 
Tied into the question of agency in the creation and curation of 
archives is the notion of documents as commodities. In discussing the 
commodification of artistic documentation, for example, anthropologist 
Roger Sansi describes contemporary artist Francis Alÿs’ work When Faith 
Moves Mountains which is presented as a video work, depicting a group of 
500 volunteer students moving a sand dune in front of a shantytown on the 
outskirts of Lima in Peru, over a distance of 100 metres: 
The work…is clearly separated in two phases: first, the subsumption 
in everyday life through ‘events’; and second, the ‘redemption’ of these 
events for the world in the form of documents that toured through 
different art venues…in fact, this documentation has become the very 
work of art, the commodity that is sold in the art market, an 
objectification of the ephemeral event…At the turn of the twenty-first 
century, the ‘document’…has become…the new form of commodity 
fetishism in art.88  
Sansi’s description of this kind of documentation as commodity fetishism is 
salient because the video document in this instance is an objectified 
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distillation of the labour of the students moving the sand dune and stands 
as a clear example of ‘the reduction of action to object that constitutes the 
basis of commodity fetishism for Marx’.89  
In practices of larp, examples of commodity fetishism that reduce 
performative labour to commodity objects are common. For example, in the 
highly popular larp Fairweather Manor, (a regular production, since its first 
run in 2015, of the Danish/Polish company Dziobak Studios) which is based 
on the well-known television programme Downton Abbey, the production of 
glossy photographs and video documentations of play elides the very real 
labour that players contribute to making the larp function. As a fully 
immersive experience, Fairweather Manor requires staff to work below stairs 
as cooks and cleaners and the players who take on these roles within the 
fiction pay substantially lower participation fees than the aristocrats in 
recognition of the labour that they provide. Nonetheless, this labour is 
integral to the provision of lavish banquets which are subsequently 
photographed and filmed, rendering the performative labour of all involved 
(both masters and servants) as commodity objects that are used to market 
subsequent runs of the larp.90 In all the practical projects undertaken in this 
study, I have avoided such forms of documentation, using only audio devices 
to record verbal reflections from participants on their subjective experiences 
of play. In the Playground project, however, I also invited participants to 
consider how they might choose to self-document their experiences to record 
or remember aspects of the project that might be of value to them, rather 
than foregrounding the creation of my own documents as artistic 
commodities of use-value for myself. In responding to this invitation, several 
participants commented that they would remember the project simply by 
applying their experience in the creation of subsequent works, in keeping 
with Schneider’s notion that performance remains through subsequent 
reiterative performances. Others suggested that they would (or already had) 
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written notes about the work undertaken while others spoke about drawing 
diagrams or images to illustrate various ideas for themselves.  
In contrast to the idea that artistic documents become commodity 
objects, I propose that the forms of self-documentation outlined above can 
be understood as gifts whenever they come into relation with others. 
Whereas Sansi leans in the direction of viewing gifting as free-flowing 
munificence, however, I find greater value in understanding the gift as a 
form of social debt that calls for what Simon terms ‘response-ability’91 (or 
empathetic responsiveness), from others. Sansi’s analysis responds to the 
work of sociologist Marcel Mauss whose studies of gift-giving practices were 
intended to ‘question the notion of the “natural” economy, based on the 
market and commodity exchange between individuals guided by the 
principle of utility’.92 The primary example used by Mauss is the potlatch, a 
ritual of excessive gift-giving practiced by indigenous communities on the 
Pacific coast of North America in which individuals seek notoriety and social 
stature by giving away their possessions. The example of the potlatch 
illustrates that ‘not all forms of exchange in world history are market 
exchange: in many societies, the first and foremost form of exchange is the 
gift’. Sansi is at pains to point out, however, that the objective of gaining 
notoriety that is inherent in the potlatch shows that gifting practices are not 
necessarily symptomatic of ‘utopias where everyone gives and takes freely’. 
Rather, the social relations entailed by giving, receiving and returning gifts 
are often ‘hierarchical and bound to strict social obligations’.93 
Central to Sansi’s analysis of gift giving is the notion that the gift 
embodies the ‘distributed person’,94 a term borrowed from anthropologist 
Alfred Gell. Gell suggests that the objects that people possess function as 
prosthetics that serve as extensions of their agency. Using the example of a 
soldier, he suggests that ‘the soldier’s weapons are parts of him which make 
him what he is…agents thus, “are” and do not merely “use” the artefacts that 
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connect them to social others’.95 In other words, agency is not solely bound 
up in the intentions of the soldier, it is also expressed in the objects that are 
‘parts of him’. Subsequently, when an individual offers objects as gifts, their 
agency is made manifest in the effects that the objects generate as they 
connect with the people to whom they are given. Essentially, ‘through gifts, 
people give themselves to other people’,96 and this idea can be exemplified by 
another gifting ritual, the kula of Melanesia, in which individuals from one 
island offer gifts, not to be kept by those who receive them, but to be passed 
on along the chain of islands. Sansi sees the kula in similar terms to the 
potlatch as an expansion of a person’s notoriety, describing ‘the transmission 
of kula valuables as an expansion of the person in space and time, an 
expansion of her name, her fame’.97  
The apparently egotistical and hierarchical nature of gift-giving may 
seem unappealing, but I find value in the idea that a gift implies a spatio-
temporal expansion of the gift giver that calls for recognition and response 
from others. Regarding the Playground project, I argue that certain forms of 
documentation functioned as gifts that issued such a call, inviting other 
participants to make a creative response. Towards the end of the project, 
Josh, who was well known for being organised and diligent, wrote up 
detailed notes on the piece that he was developing with his partners. This 
gift documented the creative process that he and his group were engaged in 
(making a larp about a cult group recovering from the death of their 
charismatic leader) and called on his colleagues to respond. Clearly, the 
other participants in Josh’s group could have chosen to ignore the gift that 
they had received but, in this case, they accepted and responded to it, as is 
illustrated by Zara’s comments: 
Towards the end – Josh is like the master of note taking – and he sent 
so many notes over to us and then we like – watched things and sent 
things to each other and stuff. Like the phenomenon of Bhagwan – Wild 
Wild Country? It’s a nine-parter on Netflix – and it’s about cults – so I 
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watched all of that and made notes that I sent. Josh watched something 
else and Meg sent something else and we sort of engaged as a three.98  
In this example, I argue that the giving of gifts functioned as a form of social 
debt through which individuals felt the need, or desire, to reciprocally 
respond to each other, and although the word ‘debt’ has many negative 
connotations in contemporary economics, it can also be seen, more 
positively, as being constitutive of social relationality. For example, 
anthropologist David Graeber articulates the fact that social debt 
substantially predates the formation of modern market economies based on 
commodity exchange and money and he argues that debt plays an important 
role in developing bonds of trust within communities.99 Similarly, Gustav 
Peebles makes compelling arguments that credit/debt relations build 
connections between people over time, claiming that ‘credit/debt refers 
backward to specific actions in the past when an obligation was established. 
In so doing, contracting parties conjoin their respective futures and pasts, 
materialising their temporal bond, as it were’.100 Peebles goes on to argue 
that in addition to creating temporal bonds between people, credit/debt 
consolidates sites of social relationality, arguing that it plays a central role in 
‘place-making’ by building ‘consistent transactional pathways and networks’ 
of exchange.101 Consequently, I contend that, in the context of participatory 
art, the notion of gift as debt is conducive to intersubjective response-ability. 
Earlier in this chapter, I referenced Simon’s suggestion that the 
exhibition of lynching photographs could function as a gift that calls on the 
viewer to respond and he goes on to argue that the reception of documentary 
gifts functions as a form of ‘inheritance’ which is not merely passive 
reception of information but an invitation to link affect to thought and 
subsequent action: 
This is a temporal bond rooted in a felt sense of obligation to inherit 
what one has seen and heard so that it becomes a locus of difference 
in the way one lives one’s life. To inherit is never a passive condition, 
never simply a transfer of skills or some material goods of symbolic 
                                                          
98 ‘Zara’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Theatre Delicatessen, London (23 July 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘Playground18’. 
99 David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years (New York: Melville House, 2013). 
100 Gustav Peebles, ‘The anthropology of credit and debt’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 39 
(2010), 225-240 (p. 227). 
101 Peebles, p. 233. 
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knowledge, never just a felt sense that the violence of the past weighs 
on one’s psyche. Rather ‘to inherit’ is to engage in a particular form of 
work that intertwines thought and affect. Following Derrida, one’s 
inheritance is never simply that which is given, ‘it is always a task’. 
When considering what it is that exhibitions might actually do, one 
response is to view exhibitions as initiating the task of inheritance. In 
this sense, exhibitions may be understood as a form or gift, one that 
interpolates its intended receivers in a manner that demands a 
thoughtful response (even if that response is ultimately to ignore the 
bequest).102 
Simon’s referencing of Jacques Derrida’s work is pertinent here, linking with 
his argument that ‘the question of the archive is not…a question of the past, 
it is a question of the future, the question of a response, or a promise of and 
a responsibility for tomorrow’.103 Schneider shares Simon’s future-oriented 
view of the archive, suggesting that ‘documents that had seemed to indicate 
only the past, are now pitched toward the possibility of a future reenactment 
as much as toward the event they apparently recorded’.104 This idea is 
affirmed by Paul Clarke’s discussion of the temporal extension of 
performance through the distribution, or gifting, of its archival traces: 
A performance takes place through the dissemination of its 
performative documents, our time-based encounters with them in 
archives or beholding them in displays; the work continues through 
oral accounts, rumours, hearsay, reviews and reinterpretations in 
print. Practical modes and motives are passed on experientially, in-
and-through performance practice and spectating, reappearing 
transformed in new generations of works.105  
This vision of performance continuation through the distribution of its 
archival traces can be readily exemplified by documentation outputs from 
the Playground project. For example, having played my larp 
Neighbourhood106 (in which players construct a neighbourhood, invent 
characters and play out a year of good news or bad news in the life of the 
community), Jack went on to run another version of it at the National 
Student Drama Festival with a group of teenagers. This reiterative 
                                                          
102 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the 
New International (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 54, cited in Simon, p. 215. 
103 Jacques Derrida, ‘Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression’, trans. by Eric Prenowitz, 
Diacritics, 25:2 (1995), 9-63 (p. 27). 
104 Schneider, p. 28. 
105 Paul Clarke, ‘Performing the Archive: The Future of the Past’, in Performing 
Archives/Archives of Performance, ed. by Gunhild Borggreen and Runa Gade (Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press, 2013), pp. 363-385 (p. 378). 
106 See Appendix B.8 for the play script of Neighbourhood. 
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performance combined the documentary gift of my larp script, which serves 
as a ‘score’ or instruction sequence as a framework for play, alongside his 
own embodied memory of having played the larp previously, which enabled 
him to offer the documentary gift of facilitating it for the students: 
It was really interesting because, on your notes you gave kind of step by 
step instructions on how to run it… and I think the main observation 
was how much fucking crazier they were. They were real musical 
theatre kids – full of energy and things like – houses would burn down. 
One person was addicted to smack and wanted to murder someone for 
their money – and then there were people having sex – loudly…I was 
worried during it that they were just pissing about and not really 
thinking about it and then – actually – the second half – they came back 
from the break and had a good chat about it for about 45 minutes and 
they were really, really engaged with like – how that can be – like is it 
theatrical? Who are the performers and who are the audience? And we 
talked about it as a piece of theatre and then talked about larp – and 
they found that really interesting and they were engaged – sort of – 
intellectually with it.107 
As an instance of distributed personhood, this example includes the 
distribution of my person as the larp designer and Jack’s person as the 
facilitator through the documentary gifts of my larp script and Jack’s 
embodied memory. The inheritance of these gifts enacts a substantial 
temporal extension, whereby larp, as a gift in itself, is projected forward in 
time to a group of young people who had evidently never heard of this 
creative form. Subsequently, the teenage participants might further the 
distribution of the gift through future play performances, embodied memory, 
telling the story of their experience or perhaps even seeking out further 
opportunities to larp again.  
 
5.10 Gifting as Bricolage 
In addition to the projection of knowledge into future time that results 
from the inheritance of documentary gifts, I argue that gifting also effects an 
expansion of knowledge in space, in line with the notion of gifts as 
embodiments of the ‘distributed person’. Roger Sansi links his discussion of 
gifts as manifestations of the distributed person with the concept of bricolage 
                                                          




through which subjectivities are formed and re-formed as individuals pass 
through space and time, forging relational connections with other objects 
and other subject agents. He argues that ‘the gift is not just an act of 
participation and collaboration of pre-existing subjects that remain 
separated, but an event, a situation through which the people and things 
assembled become something else in relation to each other’.108 Similarly, I 
argue in this section that the Playground project as a whole, including its 
offshoots into other creative contexts, represents an assemblage of gift 
exchange that offered the potential for adaptation of subjectivities and, by 
extension, cultural transformation, by creating new forms of relational 
connection. 
In the same way that documentary gifts project the distributed person 
forward in time, Zara described how she held the memory of playing the 
Totem Build exercise from the first session and subsequently applied this 
embodied documentation by using the exercise with her own theatre group, 
projecting the gift she had inherited into new creative spaces: 
A lot of the stuff we did – like the methods or systems that we used – I 
then relayed quite a lot of that stuff to my company – so I was like ‘oh, 
let’s try this’ – cos we were getting stuck in the process and it was good 
to try different methods. I would set up an exercise and they’d be like 
‘what do you mean?!’ – and I’m like ‘well, I was thinking that, but just 
do it’…And also – like those experiences made more sense when you 
then become the teacher as well – or the facilitator or whatever – so I 
would do something – you would relay it to me and I’d do it and then in 
the act of actually trying to facilitate it you also then learn something 
more. Because you remember things that you’d done – physically in the 
body or something that’s helped you hook into what you’re doing – so I 
guess that’s an extra layer when that role changes.109  
As this example illustrates, my person is distributed as the gift of the Totem 
Build exercise is passed on. Likewise, Zara’s person is distributed as she 
passes her version of the Totem Build on to others. The spatial expansion 
that results from this gift-giving need not be seen merely as an expansion of 
the ‘fame’ of the person who has given the gift. Instead, I see it as building 
potential for a greater array of relational connections that can support zones 
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109 ‘Zara’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Theatre Delicatessen, London (23 July 2018). See 
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of proximal development for further creative learning. In addition to 
providing learning opportunities for others, I suggest that the most salient 
point that can be drawn from this example is that Zara’s subjectivity was 
altered through the process of giving the gift. Rather than simply passing on 
existing knowledge, the act of gift-giving enabled her to ‘learn something 
more’ and, effectively, alter her subjectivity as a practitioner, even if only 
slightly, in the process. Similarly, Jack’s gifting of the Neighbourhood larp 
prompted new reflections on whether he wished to produce fully immersive 
performances. In contrast with his usual approach, in which all facilitation 
of the audience experience would be delivered within the fictional diegesis, 
the facilitation of the Neighbourhood larp, which requires the facilitator to 
break immersion and give instructions from outside the fiction, led him to 
reconsider how he might approach future works: 
Jack: What I needed to get over throughout the course was the fact that 
not every bit of the setup – it doesn’t have to be dramatic in itself, or 
theatrical. And none of it has to be theatrical is the other thing that I 
struggled with as well. Generally, when I was making the things we 
played I was always trying to find ways…like menus that would tell 
you things and plates that would say something or a cup with 
something inside it that would give you information – and no one else 
seemed to care about integrating it into the fiction (he laughs)…but in 
your larp…it was just like ‘Now you’re doing this’ and I was like ‘Okay!’ 
So, I definitely let go of having to have like – an in-world way of 
explaining things – actually just saying it. 
JH: So, being able to step outside the fiction and say: ‘Now we’re gonna 
play a scene with x, y, z?’ 
Jack: Yeah. Learning that was a challenge. But I did learn it.110 
Another example of subjectivity being altered through the bricolage of gift 
exchange can be found in Meg’s comments about the new forms of 
collaborative relation she had developed over the course of the Playground 
project. She suggested that her collaborations enabled her to become less 
protective of cherished ideas, embracing ‘darling killing’ (which can be 
understood as a method of dispensing with fixed concepts) and relinquishing 
a fixed sense of her own subjectivity as an artist: 
                                                          




The whole thing has made me more conscious of how I collaborate. I 
was able to sit back – and be on the outside of myself a little bit and 
think ‘okay – that’s how I manage things’. And then – being able to have 
a multitude of examples of ways you can work…I remember learning 
about killing your darlings – I feel like – particularly working with Josh, I 
remember coming up with this idea and I was super interested in it and 
then we threw it out and that is something that I never do…and I had a 
real moment of like – ‘oh my goodness – okay.’ So that was a really 
practical experience of going through a process in a way that I don’t 
normally go through a process and that was really important.111 
Meg’s reflection on finding new forms of collaboration that enabled her to 
embrace ‘darling killing’ exemplifies the process of bricolage whereby she 
was able to reformulate her subjectivity by entering into new relational 
connections and assembling new ways of working for herself.  
Within the overall Playground project, the play experiences of 
participants were stored as both embodied memories and more conventional 
documents and gifted to each other as a call for response and reciprocal 
response-ability in the unfolding creative process. The documents that 
emerged from Playground should not, therefore, be seen as commodities that 
conceal the translation of labour into object as is the case with Marx’s model 
of commodity fetishism. Instead, treating play documentation as a gift 
(whether it is through ongoing performance play as a reiteration of previous 
performances, embodied memory, or written notes) enables gifted knowledge 
to travel through space and time as a manifestation of the distributed 
person. In exploring the potential of play to generate cultural transformation, 
the documentary gift as a form of social debt necessitates a concurrent 
consideration of the spatial and temporal composition of pedagogical 
projects. An expanded sense of relational space offers the prospect of fertile 
bricolage as evolving subjects reform themselves by establishing new 
connections with the world around them, receiving gifts and responding in 
turn. Likewise, the reflexivity of syncopated time enables gift givers to 
recursively draw upon past play experiences and reassemble them in new 
performances that not only document the play that has gone before but also 
                                                          




offer templates for playful learning in an imagined future, reiterating the call 
for response-ability from players who are yet to come. 
 
5.11 Summary 
To conclude, I have argued in this chapter that the culturally 
transformative potential of play depends on how it is remembered and 
documented by players to enable further learning to take place in 
pedagogical contexts. Conventional approaches to archiving hold that valued 
knowledge of the world should be recorded in the form of artefacts in order 
for pedagogues to transmit learning to students, but I have suggested, 
through reference to the work of Rebecca Schneider and Diana Taylor, that it 
is also possible for knowledge to be held in embodied memory and ongoing 
cultural performances that pass the past on to successive generations of 
learners. The commonalities between Schneider’s ideas of performance as 
being fundamentally reiterative and Lev Vygotsky’s conviction that play is 
always composed of imitation creates a strong sense that theatrical play 
performances are fundamental to learning as players reconfigure the 
substance of the world as they have encountered it to sculpt the ongoing 
social construction of culture.  
Regarding the role of the pedagogue, I have argued that Jerome 
Bruner’s concept of scaffolding, combined with contemporary art theories of 
the curatorial, provide a strong basis for reconceiving the facilitator of play 
pedagogy as a context provider, offering space and time for groups of 
individuals to create zones of proximal development in which they can learn 
through intersubjective exchange. The Playground project has provided a 
platform for the participants, and me, to experiment with how knowledge 
can be co-created. As the facilitator, I have curatorially pointed to various 
creative forms and participants have then reappropriated these methods in a 
tool and result process of discovering tools and concurrently discovering 
their potential to create new ones. In my investigation of the aesthetics of 
curatorial pedagogy, I have argued that considerations of spatial and 
temporal framing are extremely important. By offering a space that is social 
and relational, but also with scope for spatial distanciation and 
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defamiliarization, I contend that players are able to receive stimuli from 
other performers and critically reflect on these stimuli through the external 
and internal use of meta-communicative language. Similarly, the concept of 
syncopated time, that combines recursion and projection, allows players to 
compare their experience in the now with historical precedents as the basis 
for future imaginings.  
Within the Playground space, players did not simply play, they also 
documented their play through ongoing reiterative performances, embodied 
memory and written documents and I have argued that these documents 
function as gifts that are exchanged to create social debt. The notion of debt 
need not be viewed as coercive obligation. Instead, I propose that the call for 
response-ability that is issued by the gift acts in service of relational sociality 
that enables the imitative performance that is central to learning. As 
participants give and receive their documentary gifts, they engage in 
bricolage, reforming their emergent subjectivity by receiving the offer of new 
relational connections and reaching out for more such connections as the 
network of the distributed person expands. As Rancière suggests, this is a 
theatrical process of performing new roles ‘as if’ each player could become 
someone else.112 Rather seeing this as an autonomous breach in temporal 
immediacy, however, my vision of theatrical play calls for an expanding field 
of relational space, with a proliferation of players who repurpose the past 
through their play and collaboratively create the culture of the future as they 
do so.      
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Chapter 6. Aesthetics & Agency: 
Reflexive Space & Time in Play
 
The act of play can be understood in the most elemental sense as the 
endeavour to impart some impact on the material fabric of the world. When 
players play, they reconfigure the substance of their lived experience and 
take action, either consciously or unconsciously, to move the world in ways 
that are satisfying to them.1 In this chapter, I argue that the fundamental 
materials of play are space and time, both of which are composed and 
recomposed by the bodies of players as they enter into relation with other 
objects on their various trajectories. This embodied activity of relationally 
composing space and time in play can be seen as an aesthetic process, 
following Terry Eagleton’s claim that ‘aesthetics is born as a discourse of the 
body’ comprising ‘nothing less than the whole of our sensate life - the 
business of affections and aversions, of how the world strikes the body on its 
sensory surfaces’.2 The aesthetic reconfiguration of space and time is 
concurrently political, however, since distributions of sensible forms also 
shape the capital affordances of agents that enable and limit their powers of 
action. In considering both the aesthetics and politics of play, this chapter 
investigates how the capacity to play with space and time in variable ways 
can promote the reflexive agency of players, and thereby the potential of 
participatory performance to enable cultural transformations, in response to 
my third subsidiary research question: 
How can the aesthetic compositions of space and time in the play of 
participatory performance promote reflexive agency? 
 
My analysis of compositions of space and time in play is informed by 
the philosophy of Jacques Rancière, whose theory of the redistribution of the 
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sensible proposes a radical politics based on aesthetic reordering of sensible 
forms. As I have discussed in previous chapters, Rancière’s vision of a 
redistribution of the sensible in artistic contexts calls for perceptual 
autonomy of the spectator as a means of preserving their interpretive 
independence. This autonomy also requires an a priori assumption of 
equality between spectators, since an erosion of autonomy will result in a 
return to a hierarchisation of interpretations. Despite the emancipatory 
intent that lies behind Rancière’s theory, I have suggested that his emphasis 
on autonomy undermines the relational space that makes learning possible. 
I have also argued that theoretical equality necessitates the expungement of 
the variable capital affordances of the habitus that are composed of the past 
experiences of individuals. In temporal terms, therefore, equality elides 
history and places the performer of the ‘theatrical will’ in a decontextualized 
now,3 while in spatial terms, the isolation of autonomy sets the emancipated 
spectator in the ‘atopic space of the stranger’.4 Consequently, Rancière’s 
theory offers, I contend, an aesthetics of immediacy that emphasises 
instantaneous time and an isolated space that is limited to what is 
immediately proximal.  
In contrast to the aesthetics of immediacy presented by Rancière, I 
argue in this chapter for spatio-temporal reflexivity in play through reference 
to the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Spinoza states that human beings are 
rendered increasingly ‘passive’ when they are ‘assailed’ solely by the 
‘passions’ of external causes in the immediate present and he proposes that 
the reason of the mind must be applied to generate active, self-determined 
behaviour.5 In spatial terms, I apply Spinoza’s ideas to argue that rational 
self-determination requires perception that looks beyond the immediate, 
proximal and familiar to encounter a wider diversity of affects. Similarly, I 
propose that his work suggests the value of depth perspective on time 
whereby individuals can link past, present and future, promoting the 
enabling multiplicity of affects that temporally varied imagination can 
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provide. These ideas are reified in this chapter through discussions of forms 
of theatrical performance and digital works that valorise temporal and 
spatial immediacy which will subsequently link to considerations of how I 
have pursued spatio-temporal reflexivity in my practical work. 
Analyses of my practical activities focus primarily on the spatio-
temporal experiences of players in projects at Trumpington Community 
Orchard and the Peartree Bridge estate in Milton Keynes. The Trumpington 
project was hosted by the members of a small committee of volunteers who 
had created the orchard in 2006, following a long campaign to raise funds 
and obtain the necessary permissions from the local council to renovate the 
site and plant a selection of Cambridgeshire heritage apple trees. The 
housing estate bordering the orchard was constructed in the 1950s, but 
during my residency the neighbourhood was in the process of rapid 
expansion with thousands of new houses being built. Judging from my 
interactions with members of the small committee managing the orchard 
space, there appeared to be a veiled hostility towards this new community. 
Consequently, the collision of natives and strangers was something that I 
endeavoured to explore in my practical work, fuelling the design of a simple 
two-player larp which involved the intersecting journeys through space and 
time of two strangers. I will describe how this work invited playful 
manipulation of the aesthetic materials of space and time and supported the 
development of my ideas around pursuing a greater multiplicity of affects.  
The Peartree Bridge residency was a commission from Arts for Health, 
Milton Keynes, an organisation focused on providing participatory art 
opportunities in Milton Keynes Hospital and its surrounding areas. The brief 
for the project suggested that Peartree Bridge is a very isolated community 
and, in my explorations of the neighbourhood, I found this description to be 
accurate, which stimulated my interest in making play activities that might 
enable participants to expand their view of the local space and forge new 
relational connections in the process. The level of uptake for my workshops 
was extremely low, however, limited to a handful of (mostly older) residents. 
At the conclusion of the project, I contacted a participant called Laura, who 
was chair of the Residents Association, to explore the possibility of arranging 
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some form of follow up activity, but her reply crystallised the difficulty of 
engaging with local people: 
The events were well advertised so I’m not sure offering another one will 
receive better attendance, especially now the weather is colder. I don’t 
think this is a reflection of you, rather it reflects the spirit of Peartree 
Bridge – the activity was not for them…a deep sense of apathy resides 
in PTB and it’s difficult to break people out of their routine.6 
In reading these comments, it would be reasonable to conclude that the 
Peartree Bridge project was a failure, but the fact that the project was 
generally characterised by a failure to generate play throws into relief the 
value of occasions when play did enable participants to transcend ‘apathy’ 
and the familiarity of habitual ‘routine’. Consequently, these instances 
offered useful insights on how the spatio-temporal aesthetics of play might 
help or hinder participation and reflexive agency.  
In addition to discussing the Trumington and Peartree Bridge projects, 
I offer examples from the second iteration of the Playground project and 
Migrations of Cool, a street game that I designed as part of a residency at the 
Arebyte Gallery in Hackney Wick. Both of these projects investigated the 
impact of spatio-temporal reflexivity in play, but it is important to state that 
my conception of reflexivity does not reject the immediate pleasures of play 
in the here and now, or the habits that are necessarily forged in immediate 
action. Rather, I propose that a spatially expansive movement between ‘here’ 
and ‘there’, alongside a temporal movement between ‘now’ and ‘then’ can 
enable habitual practices to be productively re-forged. In spatial terms, an 
oscillation between ‘here’ and ‘there’ offers potential to move beyond the 
proximal to engage with a wider relationality in space. Aesthetically, this 
spatial expansion is based on distancing, diversification and 
defamiliarization, with the aim of enabling individuals to encounter more 
than what is close and familiar. In temporal terms, shifts between ‘now’ and 
‘then’ promote a combined consideration of past, present and future that 
stimulates the reflexive reconfiguration of memory in future projections that 
can inform creative action in the present. 
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Notions of reflexivity can appear to affirm a cognitive distancing that 
separates the minds of individuals from the material actualities of their 
world. I argue, however, through reference to neurobiologist Antonio 
Damasio’s writings on Spinoza, that reflexive rationality does not require 
remote detachment of the mind from the body. Rather, it is a matter of 
linking the emotional body states that affects produce to conscious 
awareness of feelings,7 as a form of second-order observation that functions 
as the basis for self-determined action. Lev Vygotsky’s work on language also 
suggests that the use of words in inner speech plays a key role in enabling 
humans to combine primary emotions with more critically self-conscious 
feelings. For Vygotsky, whose later work was strongly influenced by 
Spinoza’s philosophy, language is vital for generating abstract thinking that 
enables human beings to transcend the concrete limitations of the present 
and visualise new pathways of agential action.8 Consequently, I suggest that 
the use of language in inner speech is an essential aspect of the human 
ability to move beyond un-reflexive, automatic responses to the affects of 
immediate circumstances. 
My arguments for spatio-temporal reflexivity, facilitated by internal 
language use, support my broader exploration of how play can enable 
transformations of habitual action, but in the latter sections of this chapter I 
suggest that habit is not antithetical to reflexive changeability. Instead, I 
argue that habit can serve as a foundation for change, as existing knowledge 
and capitals are reconfigured. Subsequently, in the final section of the 
chapter, I set out a model for play, combining habit and reflexivity, that I 
term anchorage-leverage. Anchorage can be understood as analogous with 
the habitus, composed of the accumulated affects that an individual has 
encountered over the course of their life trajectory. The choice of this term 
might seem to imply a deadening weight that enforces stasis, but I see 
anchorage as a platform for leverage as agents reposition themselves 
through reorganisations of the sensible forms at their disposal. The 
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8 Lev S. Vygotsky, ‘Imagination and creativity of the adolescent’, in The Vygotsky Reader, ed. 
by René van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner, trans. by Theresa Prout and René van der Veer 
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oscillation between anchorage and leverage requires spatial reflexivity, 
however, so that players can exercise greater intentionality in seeking out a 
broader plurality of affects in a wider relational space. Similarly, I argue that 
temporal reflexivity is needed to afford leverage, whereby conscious memory 
and projection into imagined futures can inform agential action in the 
present. As a whole, the concept of anchorage-leverage offers a theory of play 
in participatory performance that combines the joy of playing in here and 
now with a critical awareness of how this activity can go beyond immediate 
satisfactions to enable more substantial transformative impact.  
 
6.1 Constraints of Immediacy in Space and Time 
In this section, I argue that immediacy in space and time can 
constrain the agency of individuals by hindering their capacities for 
reflexivity and self-determined action. In setting out this argument I refer to 
Pierre Bourdieu’s logic of practice, which downplays reflexivity and 
emphasises practical action in response to the urgent necessity of immediate 
circumstances.9 Spinoza’s philosophy arguably has similarities with 
Bourdieu’s theories in its description of humans being held in ‘servitude’10 
by the affects of external forces in the present that render the body passive.11 
In contrast to Bourdieu’s scepticism towards reflexivity, however, Spinoza 
asserts that it is possible for affects to be controlled by reason and I draw 
upon his discussions of space and time to argue that a movement away from 
spatio-temporal immediacy can aid rational criticality.  
The primary importance of what is immediately proximal in space is 
strongly apparent in Bourdieu’s discussions of the habitus and the 
acquisition of taste. He asserts that the habitus ‘is constituted in practice 
and is always orientated towards practical functions’12 and argues that these 
                                                          
9 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990), pp. 86-91. 
10 Spinoza, p. 141, part IV, pref. 
11 Spinoza, p. 146, part IV, prop. II, proof. 
12 Bourdieu, Logic, p. 52. 
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practical functions are focused on immediate needs so that the ‘ultimate 
values’ of social groups:  
…are never anything other than the primary primitive dispositions of 
the body, ‘visceral’ tastes and distastes, in which the group’s most 
vital interests are embedded, the things for which one is prepared to 
stake one’s own and other people’s bodies.13  
In other words, the habitus is a set of dispositions that emerge in practice in 
response to immediate conditions and the ‘vital interests’ of bodily needs 
within the close proximity of social groupings. This focus on the necessity of 
responding to the material conditions that define an individual’s immediate 
requirements grounds Bourdieu’s logic of practice in the ‘time of action’14 
which can be clearly seen in his references to game play, in which he 
suggests that ‘a player who is involved and caught up the game’ makes his 
ludic choices ‘“on the spot”, “in the twinkling of an eye”, “in the heat of the 
moment”, that is, in conditions which exclude distance, perspective, 
detachment and reflexion’.15 
In a similar vein to Bourdieu’s logic of practice, Spinoza’s philosophy 
asserts the primacy of events in the spatio-temporal present in determining 
the actions of human beings. Before offering my analysis of Spinoza’s ideas 
on space and time, however, it is necessary to give a brief summary of his 
theory of affects. At the heart of Spinoza’s philosophy is the contention that 
the primary endeavour of human beings is to persevere in being, which leads 
them to seek out affects that give pleasure and avoid those that give pain.16 
By receiving joyful affects, Spinoza asserts that the potentia,17 or power of 
action, of the individual is increased. In order to maximise potentia, 
Spinoza’s argues that it is necessary to mark a distinction between self-
determined activity, which he describes as active, and actions that are 
primarily driven by external causes, which he describes as passive. Spinoza 
states that we are passive ‘when something takes place in us…of which we 
                                                          
13 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. by Richard 
Nice (Abingdon: Routledge Classics, 2010), p. 476. 
14 Bourdieu, Logic, p. 81. 
15 Bourdieu, Logic, p. 82. 
16 Spinoza, p. 103, part III, prop. XXVIII. 
17 Spinoza, p. 145, part IV, def. VIII. 
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are only the partial cause’18 and claims that being driven by external causes 
alone is symptomatic of ‘inadequate ideas’, or confused knowledge.19 Affects 
that are primarily driven by external causes are termed ‘passions’ and 
Spinoza contrasts the passions that induce passivity with rational thought 
that enables human beings to actively seek out beneficial affects.20 
Essentially, the freedom that Spinoza argues for is the rational pursuit of 
joyful affects that support the endeavour to persevere in being and I will now 
suggest that the rational control of passions can be supported by shifting 
perception beyond the immediate affects of the spatio-temporal present. 
Spinoza is explicit that events in the temporally immediate present 
have the strongest affects on the body, stating that ‘the image of a thing 
future or past…is…weaker than the image of a thing present, and 
consequently the emotion towards a thing future or past is…less intense 
than the emotion towards a thing present’.21 He goes on to assert, however, 
that a limited temporal horizon is disabling to the powers of self-determined 
action, stating that ‘when we follow our emotions, we count as primary that 
which is pleasant in the present, nor can we estimate a future thing with an 
equal emotion of mind’.22 Consequently, ‘the desires by which we are most 
bound have regard only to present, not to future time’.23 The suggestion that 
we are ‘bound’ by the emotion of the present implies a negative view of 
perception that is held in the immediacy of now, and Spinoza makes this 
point clear by arguing that ‘it is not wonderful that desire which arises from 
the knowledge of good or bad, in so far as this has reference to the future, 
can be more easily restrained by the desire of things which are pleasant in 
the present’.24 In other words, the affects of pleasant passions in the present 
can undermine knowledge that enables self-determined action orientated 
towards future time.   
                                                          
18 Spinoza, p. 146, part IV, prop. II, proof. 
19 Spinoza, pp. 157-158, part IV, prop. XIII, proof. 
20 Spinoza, pp. 202-203, part IV, prop. IV, note. 
21 Spinoza, p. 150, part IV, prop. IX, coroll. 
22 Spinoza, p. 196, part IV, app. XXX. 
23 Spinoza, p. 182, part IV, prop. LX, note. 
24 Spinoza, p. 184, part IV, prop. LXII, note. 
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In contrast to the aesthetics of temporal immediacy, Spinoza’s ideas 
on reason suggest that if the mind is to have adequate ideas that are the 
basis for self-determined action, it must be equally affected by imaginings of 
the future or past, rather than being solely ‘bound’ by affects in the present. 
He states that ‘in so far as the mind conceives a thing according to the 
dictate of reason, it will be equally affected whether the idea be of a thing 
present, past or future’.25 This notion of controlling the assailment of 
passions by thinking in syncopated time is echoed by Moira Gatens and 
Genevieve Lloyd’s discussions of Spinoza’s views on temporality. Gatens and 
Lloyd argue that ‘the intensity of the present can eclipse all thought of the 
future’ but they also suggest that by ‘rendering the object of emotion distant 
from us in time – in excluding it from present existence – our understanding 
of causes reduces the intensity of the image’.26 Consequently, I suggest that 
temporal distancing is one means by which passions might be overcome.  
In the same way that temporal immediacy can be seen to undermine 
rational thinking and the power of action, Spinoza’s theories suggest that 
spatial immediacy can serve as a harmful constraint. He asserts that ‘the 
more the body is apt to be affected in many ways or to affect external bodies 
in many ways, the more apt is the mind for thinking’.27 This suggests that 
the powers of reasoned thought and self-determined action are supported by 
moving beyond a narrow spatial immediacy to perceive a broader multiplicity 
of affects in a wider relational space. Nigel Thrift affirms this argument, 
building on Spinoza’s ideas to call for an expansive spatiality of manifold 
relations. He argues that a ‘complex body’ can only emerge from a wide 
plurality of relationships in social space, suggesting that: 
The simple political imperative is to widen the potential number of 
interactions a living thing can enter into, to widen the margin of 
‘play’…increasing the number of transformations of the effects of one 
sensory mode into another.28 
                                                          
25 Spinoza, p. 183, part IV, prop. LXII. 
26 Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 52-53. 
27 Spinoza, p. 195, part IV, app. XXVII. 
28 Nigel Thrift, ‘Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect’, Geografiska 
Analer: Human Geography, 86:1 (2004), 57-78 (p. 70). 
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In other words, by pursuing an expansion of relational space, manifold 
affective exchanges are enabled. Subsequently, as beings increase their 
ability to be affected and to affect others in a great many ways, their potentia 
is increased.  
To summarise this section, Spinoza’s philosophy suggests that 
although the affects of immediate space and time have the strongest impact 
on the body, rational self-determination is aided by perception that shifts 
beyond the spatio-temporal present. By seeking a multiplicity of affects in a 
wider relational space and thinking with a depth perspective on time that 
combines past, present and future, the potentia of beings to persevere in 
being is enhanced. Having set out these theoretical propositions, the 
following section concretises my ideas by offering a critique of spatial 
immediacy in theatre and games which will subsequently serve as a 
foundation for presenting ideas drawn from my practical explorations of 
spatial reflexivity in play.  
 
6.2 Problematising Spatial Immediacy in Theatre & Games 
Recent analyses of immersive theatre practices have strongly 
emphasised the potency of spatial immediacy, foregrounding the value of 
close-up, haptic engagement between performers and audience-participants. 
Josephine Machon, for example, draws on Wagner’s concept of 
gesamtkunstwerk alongside the ‘total theatre’ aesthetics of Antonin Artaud29 
to affirm her arguments against reflexive criticality in favour of full sensory 
envelopment: 
The immersive experience arises when medium and message are 
fused, resulting in the totalisation of the artwork. This ludically 
subverts aesthetic and critical distance, placing the perceiver of the art 
within the art.30  
Although Machon’s sees the subversion of critical distance as a positive, 
Rainer Mühlhoff and Theresa Schütz argue that immersive practices can 
                                                          
29 Josephine Machon, Immersive Theatres: Intimacy and Immediacy in Contemporary 
Performance. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 29-30 
30 Machon, p. 34.  
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disable the critical faculties of individuals by creating situations in which 
‘any possibility of distancing on the part of the subject is temporarily 
blocked’ leaving them ‘“at the mercy of” the inter-affective context’.31 They 
discuss the immersive works of the Danish theatre collective Signa and 
claim that the company’s performance installations are so ‘hyper-realistic’ 
that the ‘frame’ that distinguishes the fictive world from reality dissolves as a 
result of ‘the bare immediacy of acting and reacting in an intense affective 
dynamic’.32 Mühlhoff and Schütz go on to suggest that such immersive 
blurring of frames can be problematic when applied in work environments. 
They argue that immersive strategies are employed in human resource 
management to create socially convivial working spaces that blur boundaries 
between work and leisure and claim that ‘this facilitates a form of micro-
governance that modulates people’s behaviour for the company’s benefit by 
stimulating dynamics that strategically prevent moments of distancing and 
critique’.33 In other words, by creating a seamless overlap between work and 
leisure, workers find themselves continuously (and apparently voluntarily) 
working for the company’s profit. 
As Mühlhoff and Schütz suggest, immersive strategies of spatial 
immediacy can be applied in a wide variety of contexts. This diversity of 
immersive practices is also apparent by Oliver Grau’s work which illustrates 
that techniques of immersion are as old as illusionist art itself, from Roman 
revel rooms to nineteenth century naturalism in theatre,34 raising the 
important point that insights on immersive immediacy can be applied across 
a variety of cultural forms. Nonetheless, I suggest that the most thorough 
analyses of immersion can be found in recent game studies and media 
scholarship. Gordon Calleja’s work on the experience of ‘presence’ in 
videogames foregrounds the issue of mediation, noting that the pursuit of 
immersion involves the attempt to elide awareness of an interface and create 
transparent spatial immediacy so that users feel like they are really ‘present’ 
                                                          
31 Rainer Mühlhoff and Theresa Schütz, ‘Immersion, immersive power’, in Affective Societies: 
Key Concepts, ed. by Jan Slaby and Christian von Scheve (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), pp. 
231-240 (p. 231). 
32 Mühlhoff and Schütz, p. 235. 
33 Mühlhoff and Schütz, p. 232. 
34 Oliver Grau, Virtual Art: from illusion to immersion, trans. by Gloria Custance (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2003). 
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in the game. Calleja states that ‘transparency erases the interface and offers 
the viewer or user as direct an experience of the represented space as 
possible’35 drawing players ‘so deeply into the game that they feel as if they 
are part of it’.36 Jason Farman makes similar arguments about the 
transparency of digital game interfaces. Referencing the design of Grand 
Theft Auto: San Andreas, which offers a digital simulation of the actual street 
layout of Los Angeles, he argues that: 
With the mapping of virtual space onto material space…the cultural 
metaphor of the interface is altered so that ‘digital’ and ‘natural’ space 
are no longer distinct, but instead inform and influence one another to 
the extent that the border between them appears to dissolve.37 
Another example of such dissolution of interface mediation can be found in 
Jakob Linaa Jensen’s discussions of Google Earth. Jensen claims that in 
their engagement with this digital simulation of space ‘users do not 
distinguish between Google Earth and “real earth”. Instead, physical, 
mediated and imaginary experiences seamlessly merge’ which results in ‘a 
certain feeling of embodiment, of actually being there’.38  
What is striking about the descriptions of GTA: San Andreas and 
Google Earth offered by Farman and Jensen, respectively, is that the pursuit 
of immersive immediacy in the experience of space excludes awareness of a 
distinction between real terrain and its mapped representation and this has 
substantial implications for the reflexive potential of play. Gregory Bateson, 
in his previously cited work on meta-communication in animal play, 
discusses the relationship between map and territory, arguing that: 
Play marks a step forward in the evolution of communication – the 
crucial step in the discovery of map territory relations. In primary 
process, map and territory are equated; in secondary process they can 
be discriminated.39  
                                                          
35 Gordon Calleja, In Game: From immersion to incorporation (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
2011), p. 23. 
36 Calleja, p. 25. 
37 Jason Farman, ‘Hypermediating the game interface: The alienation effect in violent 
videogames and the problem of serious play’, Communication Quarterly, 58:1 (2010), 96-109 
(p. 98). 
38 Jakob Linaa Jensen, ‘Augmentation of Space: Four Dimensions of Spatial Experiences of 
Google Earth’, Space and Culture, 13:1 (2010), 121-133 (p. 131). 
39 Gregory Bateson, ‘A Theory of Play and Fantasy’, in The Game Studies Reader: A Rules of 
Play Anthology, ed. by Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 
pp. 314-328 (p. 321). 
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In other words, play enables players to mark a distinction between actuality 
and its ludic representation. Consequently, the endeavour to create spatial 
immediacy by dissolving any mediating distinction between map and 
territory would seem to undercut the reflexive ability to make a second-order 
observation that delineates actual terrain and its mapped representation. 
Given that this capacity is, according to Bateson, a major step in the 
development of complex communications, the pursuit of spatial immediacy 
seems to prompt a regression in human perceptual capabilities. Effectively, 
it leaves users ‘at the mercy’ of spatially immediate affects, or the assailment 
by passions, with a reduced capacity to apply rational criticality and an 
equally reduced power to undertake self-determined action. 
In considering the notion that spatial immediacy might promote the 
assailment by passions, analyses of the methods that digital interface 
designers use to focus the spatial perceptions of their users are instructive. 
In his discussion of digital interfaces, James Ash uses the term ‘resolution’ 
to describe how game designers shape perception of objects within the 
horizon of play. He offers the example of the first-person shooter game 
Battefield 3, describing the combination of high and low resolution objects, 
noting that ‘the grass on the ground appears in low resolution as more or 
less homogenised clumps that cannot be affected by the player’, in contrast 
to the high resolution of enemy combatants who are the intended objects of 
attention within the game.40 The emphasis here is on directing the focus of 
players towards highly singularised points of space, which directly opposes 
the more expansive spatiality advocated by Spinoza, who states that: 
An emotion is bad or harmful only in so far as the mind is prevented 
by it from thinking. And therefore that emotion by which the mind is 
determined for regarding many objects at the same time is less 
harmful than another equally great which detains the mind in the 
contemplations of one alone or fewer objects in such a manner that it 
cannot think of others.41 
Arguably, therefore, an interface design that intentionally ‘detains the mind 
in the contemplation of one alone or fewer objects’ through the pursuit of 
                                                          
40 James Ash, The Interface Envelope: Gaming, Technology, Power (London: Bloomsbury, 
2015), pp. 43-44. 
41 Spinoza, p. 205, part V, prop. IX, proof. 
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high resolution spatial focus can be seen to hinder the capacity for thinking. 
By extension, the limitation to thinking caused by the external force of 
perceiving digital objects at high resolution arguably promotes assailment by 
passions and limits capacities for self-determined action. 
Ash comments on the political implications of high resolution 
spatiality by referencing Warren Neidich’s concept of neuropower.42 
Neuropower can be understood as the process by which interfaces shape 
‘habits and practices on a fairly implicit, unconscious level’.43 Essentially, 
Neidich’s argument is that the composition of objects in an interface 
establishes expectations in the mind of the user, generating patterns of 
habitual behaviour that subsequently deliver rewards to the user and power 
to the interface designer. This can be readily exemplified by the red bell of 
the Facebook notifications icon which stands out in high resolution against 
the blue background. When the notifications icon turns red, it is habitually 
clicked, yielding economic value for the company and experiential rewards 
for the user. For Neidich, this kind of tightly corralled spatial focus is 
‘essentially dulling, leading to less creatively able bodies’44 and I contend 
that high resolution spatiality combined with the collapse of spatial distance 
through the elision of mediation is conducive to passivity as it is described 
by Spinoza.  
Despite my problematisations of spatial immediacy, it is useful to 
consider examples of digital and non-digital play that interrupt immediacy in 
space. In his analysis of Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, Farman notes that 
it is possible for players to disrupt immersive immediacy by playfully altering 
the costume of their avatar. He argues that the donning of ridiculous 
costumes that do not fit with the crime world aesthetic of GTA, like Ian 
Bogost’s example from Chapter 4 of players wearing a priest’s habit and 
                                                          
42 Warren Niedich, ‘Neuropower: Art in the Age of Cognitive Capitalism’, in The 
Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism: Part One, ed by. Arne De Boever and Warren 
Niedich (Berlin: Archive Books), cited in Ash, p. 6.  
43 Ash, p. 40. 
44 Warren Niedich, ‘The Mind’s Eye in the Age of Cognitive Capitalism’, in Brain Theory: 
Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy, ed. by Charles T. Wolfe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014), cited in Ash, p. 53. 
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praying for crime victims,45 enacts a form of defamiliarization, following the 
ideas Bertolt Brecht,46 that disrupts the seamless spatiality of the 
‘interfaceless interface’.47 By doing so, Farman claims that the immediate 
enjoyment of play can combine with hypermediacy, whereby the game 
‘constantly calls attention to its own status and process as a mediated 
interface’.48 This argument for hypermediacy in games reaffirms my 
argument from Chapter 4 that conscious awareness of the distinction 
between play and non-play enables reflexivity through second-order 
observations.  
Arguments in favour of a hypermediacy that consciously distinguishes 
between play and non-play can be found in Bruce McConachie’s suggestion 
that play and performance both involve a ‘conceptual blending’49 whereby 
the player is able to oscillate between engagement in the immediacy of action 
and critical distanciation: 
Games, like other kinds of performances, depend on social 
conventions that locate players and spectators both in and out of the 
action – immersing themselves in competition one moment and pulling 
back to keep score or plan strategy in the next.50      
In other words, in the same way that Bateson’s monkeys throw themselves 
into play fighting whilst also establishing a meta-communicative frame that 
distinguishes playful activity from genuine violence,51 a fundamental aspect 
of human play in theatre and games is the capacity to oscillate between 
spatial immediacy and a reflexive criticality that recognises the frame that 
delineates play from non-play.  
The summarise this section, my analysis of spatial immediacy in 
theatre and games suggests that immersive designs that pursue close 
                                                          
45 Ian Bogost, Unit Operations: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 2008), p. 156. 
46 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John 
Willett (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), cited in Farman, pp. 103-105. 
47 Farman, pp. 99-100. 
48 Farman, p. 98. 
49 Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the 
Mind’s Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 179, cited in Bruce 
McConachie, ‘An Evolutionary Perspective on Play, Performance and Ritual’, The Drama 
Review, 55:4 (2011), 33-50 (p. 39). 
50 McConachie, p. 41. 
51 Bateson, pp. 316-317. 
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proximity and high resolution focus in space often promote the formation of 
habitual patterns of action that undercut the potential for reflexive agency. 
In response to the problematic aspects of spatial immediacy that I have 
described, my practical work has pursued distance, diversification and 
defamiliarization of space. In doing so, my aim has been to promote active 
reflexivity in play that overcomes the passive affects of spatial immediacy, 
enabling players to generate self-determined action, and the next section 
describes the outcomes of these explorations of spatial aesthetics. 
 
6.3 Spatial Reflexivity in Practical Work 
As I have outlined in the introduction to this chapter, my interactions 
with participants during the Trumpington Community Orchard project 
suggested that the existing community felt a strong a resistance to change in 
the local area and a veiled hostility towards the new communities created by 
rapid housing development. In responding to this context, my practical work 
played with spatial diversification and encounters with unfamiliar others, 
exploring the potential of participants to reflexively adapt their outlook 
towards changing circumstances. At the start of the residency, Samantha, 
one of the members of the small committee who managed the orchard, led 
me on a walk around the village, which enabled me to view the scale of 
development activity. She also took me to an event at a local community 
centre, organised by the local council, which focused on integrating the new 
residents with the established community of Trumpington. The theme of this 
event was ‘resilience’ which the facilitators defined as the ability to bounce 
back from disruptions. The explicit aim of the session was to encourage 
neighbours to help each other in times of difficulty, but it also became 
apparent from my conversation with one of the organisers that the implicit 
aim of the event was to build resilience so that the state could incrementally 
withdraw its services from the neighbourhood.  
In contrast to the apparently conservative view of resilience that the 
Trumpington event sought to promote, I conceive resilience, not as the 
ability of a system to ‘bounce back’ from shocks and resume its original 
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form, but to radically reconfigure itself.52 This reconfiguration can only 
occur, however, if the system in question is sufficiently diverse to be able to 
apply varied capacities to meet a variety of challenges.53 My considerations of 
resilient changeability were further informed by the biological composition of 
the orchard, which was populated by Cambridgeshire heritage apple trees. In 
discussing the emphasis on local varieties of apple, one of the committee 
members, Cerys, made strong arguments for maintaining biodiversity (a key 
feature of ecological resilience) but this localisation, focusing on apples 
native to Cambridgeshire, also connoted a somewhat exclusionary attitude. 
This was further highlighted by discussions of Brexit (which Cerys had voted 
in favour of as a way of championing ‘localism’) and the expansion of the 
village, which, in her view, threatened to undermine it as a ‘cohesive 
community’.54 This defensive attitude towards change in the local space was 
something that I sought to explore by creating a two-player role-play about 
the meeting of strangers, called Passage.55 Essentially, this piece was about 
an encounter with difference, inviting two players to go on separate journeys 
during which they would meet, decide (for whatever reason) to spend a 
winter together and then either proceed on their journey together or go their 
separate ways. My aim in designing this piece was to investigate how spatial 
diversification through encounters with the unfamiliar might promote 
resilient changeability and a reflexive awareness of culturally transformative 
potential. 
The preparation for the role-play invited players to share stories from 
their own past to provide stimuli for the creation of fictional characters. The 
process began with three questions: Where have you come from today? Where 
have you come from as an adult? Where have you come from since childhood? 
Following the sharing of responses to these questions, players made a 
drawing of a character about to go on a journey, based on what they had 
                                                          
52 Jonathan Joseph, ‘Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality approach’, 
International Policies, Practices and Discourses, 1:1 (2013), 38-52. 
53 Nancy J. Turner, Iain J. Davidson-Hunt and Michael O’Flaherty, ‘Living on the Edge: 
Ecological and Cultural Edges as Sources of Diversity for Social-Ecological Resilience, 
Human Ecology, 31:3 (2003), 439-461. 
54 ‘Cerys’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Trumpington Community Orchard, Cambridge (23 
September 2017). See Appendix A: ‘TrumpingtonCommunityOrchard1’. 
55 See Appendix B.13 for the play script of Passage. 
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heard from their play partner. Participants were then asked to imagine 
possible landscapes that characters might pass through and possible 
feelings that they might have in these new landscapes. The possible 
landscapes and feelings were written on cards that players drew randomly at 
certain points during play. In other words, they would not know in advance 
what type of landscape they would arrive in next and the feelings they would 
encounter in these places. When Cerys played this piece with me, she 
invented a character called Celia who had left her husband and come to a 
new town with her two young children. Along the way, she met my character, 
a brooding young man called Jan, who had fled the war-torn context of his 
childhood. Celia subsequently helped Jan to find a place of safety over the 
winter by working for a farmer living next to her home, before he proceeded 
on his way the following spring. In reflecting on the meeting of trajectories 
between Celia and Jan, Cerys commented on how this new relation changed 
Celia which, in turn, invited her to reflect on her own changeability: 
I didn’t know what to do with you at first…I thought ‘he’s quite difficult 
to deal with’ and then suddenly I became much more – I became like – 
quite a together person and I realised I was quite together and had quite 
a lot to offer this rather – sort of troubled young man – which is kind of – 
not like how I feel in life so maybe that’s something I need to take 
seriously… But with this troubled young man – although I wasn’t 100% 
about you and I wasn’t sure it was what I wanted it felt good to help – 
you know – getting you a job and a place to stay with the farmer – Mr 
McGinnis – and then it was really nice that you – as you became less 
troubled when you stayed with Mr McGinnis you started to make your 
journey and then you looked as if – I started to feel quite warm towards 
you by the end and I really wanted to know what happened to you in 
the future. I wanted you to come back – and to include you in my 
family.56 
As this example indicates, the Passage role-play invited Cerys to respond to 
an encounter with an unfamiliar place (the imaginary landscape of the new 
town) and an unfamiliar person. As a result of this diversification in her 
relational connections in space, she seemed to develop new capacities, 
becoming ‘quite a together person’ in order to help Jan. It cannot be claimed 
that this exercise transformed Cerys’ attitudes towards encounters with 
unfamiliar others in the ‘real world’ spaces of Trumpington, but I suggest 
                                                          
56 ‘Cerys’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Trumpington Community Orchard, Cambridge (23 
September 2017). See Appendix A: ‘TrumpingtonCommunityOrchard2’. 
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that it does illustrate the potential of spatial diversification in play to prompt 
reflexive awareness of resilient changeability, enabling players to recognise 
how they can develop new capital affordances by forming new connections 
with others. 
In a similar vein to the Trumpington project, the work at Peartree 
Bridge created defamiliarized compositions of space to take the perceptions 
of players beyond the confines of habitual familiarity. The challenge of 
looking beyond the familiar to compose a more affectively diverse space was 
highlighted by one of the early workshop sessions, which featured a play 
activity which I called Platform.57 This exercise involved laying a blanket on 
the ground and inviting participants, one by one, to place objects (the same 
assortment of things used in previous projects) onto the platform to build an 
imaginary landscape. Players added further objects to represent characters 
in the landscape, then narrated a sequence of actions and reactions between 
the characters, using the environmental context of the platform as an 
imaginative stimulus. One participant, James, began his contribution to the 
platform by selecting an object which was not part of my assortment of 
things. His selection was a brick which was lying around in the park space 
in which we were playing, and when placing the object on the platform he 
described it as a power station because the colour tone of the brick was 
similar to the visual texture of the iconic Battersea Power Station. In 
reflecting on the exercise, James expressed frustration at the choices he had 
made, stating that his power of imagination was limited by his inability to 
look beyond the familiarity of objects and their literal function: 
I wasn’t very creative…I think I’m just feeling a bit dull today, I 
suppose. Couldn’t see much further than the next moment or two. So, ah 
– suffering from a lack of imagination, I think…Maybe – being stuck in 
the house all day looking at the screen – maybe that’s what’s – sort of 
dulled me. 
I went on to ask James some further questions about what aspects of the 
imaginary landscape he had found to be valuable and his answers prompted 
me to think about the imaginative limitations of looking at familiar objects: 
                                                          
57 See Appendix B.15 for the structure of the Platform play exercise. 
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It’s nice to see some water there (referring to a river that had been 
constructed on the platform). I guess that’s the most attractive thing to 
me, personally…I used to be an oceanographer…and I was born near 
the sea. So, with the river, being literal, having identified the brick as 
Battersea, then obviously that’s the Thames and the sea is down there 
somewhere – but that’s been my problem today – I’ve been very literal – 
not very inventive.58 
These comments suggest that James’ choice to deploy a familiar object (the 
brick), rather than choosing something more unfamiliar from my assorted 
junk, limited the diversity of his powers of thought. By identifying the object 
as something very similar to the brick itself (a power station composed of red 
bricks) and then creating more landscapes that were familiar to him (in the 
form of the river Thames and the sea), he seemed to limit his power to create 
a diversified imaginative space. This was made manifest within the fictional 
story when James converted the power station into an art gallery, mapping 
onto the transition of another former power station on the banks of the real-
world river Thames: the Tate Modern Gallery. In another session, however, 
he experienced something different by taking on a highly unfamiliar role. The 
exercise in question involved collaborative drawing between pairs which 
again invited players to create an imaginary landscape and also a character 
for their partner.59 In this instance, James’ partner made the somewhat 
surprising choice of giving him the character of a sheep and he reflected 
positively on the experience of playing this unfamiliar role: 
I think I concentrated too much on the actual drawing…but then in the 
conversation it was easier being a sheep than a human being (everyone 
laughs). There was greater freedom in where my imagination could go – 
instead of sort of being – bound to – bound too much to reality.60   
As this example shows, being bound to the realities of familiar roles in 
familiar social spaces was a limitation that could, to a certain extent, be 
overcome by composing unfamiliar spaces of encounter and establishing 
relations between a broader multiplicity of beings.  
                                                          
58 ‘James’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Peartree Bridge, Milton Keynes (20 June 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘PeartreeBridge3’. 
59 See Appendix B.11 for the structure of the Palimpsest Drawing exercise. 
60 ‘James’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Peartree Bridge, Milton Keynes (13 June 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘PeartreeBridge1’. 
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As the workshops progressed, engagement with unfamiliar relations in 
space, in the form of animals, become something of a running theme. At the 
end of one session, I asked one of the participants, Lysbeth, what topics the 
next workshop might focus on and she replied that she would like to play 
with the theme of pets. When I asked her why, she replied: 
Lysbeth: I’ll tell you one thing – my friend got a Yorkshire terrier. I’ve got 
two Border terriers. They’re supposed to be the same – they’re not the 
same. They’re terriers – that’s it. 
JH: So, you’re interested in the differences between different types of 
animals? 
Lysbeth: Yeah. 
JH: Why’s that interesting to you? 
Lysbeth: Well – my little Frodo (one of her dogs) likes hedgehogs – now 
how crazy can you get? Full of fleas and – horrible. But he curls up and 
goes to sleep with them – confusing or what? 
JH: Interesting.61 
Lysbeth’s description of the surprising relational connections that her dog 
could establish with other animals chimed with a comment that another 
local resident, Susan, had made when she took me for a walk around the 
neighbourhood. She spoke about her perception that although people in the 
area were relatively isolated from each other, their pets helped them to 
expand into new spaces and form new relations with people: 
Susan: We’ve recently got a dog – so we’re walking more, and I thought 
I knew Peartree Bridge really well – but we’ve found all these new 
spaces. 
JH: That’s interesting – so the walking of the dog took you somewhere – 
to find something that you hadn’t experienced before? 
Susan: Yeah, cos with a dog you’ve got an excuse, haven’t you? To go 
and see what’s happening somewhere…and I would say I know quite a 
lot of people in Peartree Bridge, but I’ve got to know more people since 
having a dog. 
JH: Why do you think that is? 
Susan: Cos people come and talk to you, don’t they? When dogs stop 
and want to meet each other – the people do the same thing.62 
                                                          
61 ‘Lysbeth’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Peartree Bridge, Milton Keynes (4 July 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘PeartreeBridge4’. 
62 ‘Susan’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Peartree Bridge, Milton Keynes (23 July 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘PeartreeBridge6’. 
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Working with the idea that pets could bring people into contact with the 
unfamiliar in wider relational spaces, I created a workshop activity called 
Superpets which invited participants to draw a landscape, create human and 
animal characters and then collaboratively narrate a story about the 
superpets taking their humans into new territories.63 In playing this activity, 
Lysbeth created a cat character called Eyes. Thanks to her night vision, Eyes 
was able to lead their human through the night to the local pub, which was 
the centre of social life within the fiction, even though the human character 
was afraid of the dark. When I asked her to reflect on her play experience, 
this was her reply: 
Lysbeth: Interesting. Really interesting. Cos I never knew I could creep 
in my cat’s skin so much that I’m so like a cat. Friendly one minute and 
the next (she makes a scratching action, and everyone laughs). 
JH: What was it like to creep in the cat’s skin? 
Lysbeth: Well, you know what they say – an owner takes after their pet 
– and the beautiful eyes. Looking into the dark – to be like that – it’s 
nice. Never need any lights – just look in the dark with the beautiful 
eyes.64 
These examples suggest that remaining bound by a focus on the familiar 
objects, beings and social spaces can limit the scope of imagination, but by 
seeking out a wider multiplicity of unfamiliar affects, the power of 
imaginative thought can be strengthened, as new territories are explored, 
and new relational connections are made with both the human and non-
human. 
In addition to spatial diversification and defamiliarization, the value of 
a distanced perspective on space was illustrated by the activities of 
Playground 2. For scheduling reasons, the first session of the project took 
place, not in the usual venue of Theatre Delicatessen, but at The Nursery 
Training Centre, a set of rehearsal studios located on the sixth floor of a 
former office building overlooking the roof of London Bridge railway station. 
In reflecting on their experiences of space over the course of the project, 
participants commented on the affective impact of the view from the Nursery, 
                                                          
63 See Appendix B.20 for the structure of the Superpets play exercise.  
64 ‘Lysbeth’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Peartree Bridge, Milton Keynes (18 July 2018). 
See Appendix A: ‘PeartreeBridge5’. 
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echoing Meg’s comments from the previous chapter on the potential benefits 
of distance in supporting reflexive thought. One participant, Luke, 
commented that: 
I actually really liked that space – it felt really exciting to me. Maybe it 
was the elevation of it – being high up…I’ve always found that like – 
sitting on top of a hill and looking over a landscape – or being in a tall 
building – somewhere high where you can look across and see over a 
far distance – I’ve always found that you can kind of see the scale of 
things in comparison to – to yourself, I guess. And I find myself doing 
that in my own mind as well – almost like a tool – a bit of coping tool 
sometimes. Seeing everything and trying to see things in perspective 
and zoom out to see all the parts of a whole – or see the whole that 
makes up all them parts.65 
In a similar vein to Luke’s comments on the expansion of perspective he 
found in the Nursery space, another participant, Catryn, reflected on how 
this distanced space was incorporated into the imaginative landscape of the 
Neighbourhood larp and how this expanded perspective actually changed her 
perception of the immediately proximal space of the Nursery studio: 
Catryn: The Nursery space was quite cold…it was absolutely awful 
weather outside – the rain and everything and it was grey and 
miserable – and it didn’t encourage playfulness…However – what was 
really interesting is how that Neighbourhood game – because I 
remember coming into that space and thinking this is a fairly bleak view 
with that weird roof –  
JH: London Bridge station. 
Catryn: Exactly – but part of that Neighbourhood game asked us to look 
beyond the town and imagine and translate that real landscape into 
imaginary markers – geographical markers – and that kind of turned it 
round – so all of a sudden, the weird curved roof became the sea – and 
then I was okay...it kind of poetised the space.66 
The salient point that emerges from this example is that Catryn’s imaginative 
engagement with the distanced space of the view over London Bridge station, 
which ‘poetised’ the space, enabled her to alter her perception of her 
surroundings. Effectively, she stopped focusing on the immediate actuality of 
coldness by supplanting this powerful negative affect with the pleasurable 
                                                          
65 ‘Luke’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Theatre Delicatessen, London (24 October 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘Playground2.2’. 




affect of imagining an expansive seascape within the fiction which, quite 
literally, increased her power of action as a participant in the larp.  
In sum, I argue that the examples cited from Playground 2 and the 
Peartree Bridge and Trumpington projects suggest that whereas high 
resolution focus on the familiar objects of an immediately proximal space 
can limit imagination and the power of action, a distanced and diversified 
view of space that embraces unfamiliar connections can promote 
imagination. This enables players to be affected in an increased variety of 
ways which, in turn, strengthens their power to take self-determined action 
to redistribute the sensible forms in their horizon of perception. 
 
6.4 Problematising Temporal Immediacy in Theatre & Games 
In this section, I argue that immediacy in time can limit reflexive 
agency and culturally transformative potential. In the same way that spatial 
immediacy often holds subject agents in a proximal, familiar and over-
focused ‘here’, I contend that temporal immediacy in theatre and games 
creates an imminent ‘now’ that limits the ability to reflexively compare 
present and past and imaginatively project into the future. My alternative 
argument is that reflexivity in time deepens the imaginative scope of players, 
enabling them to seek out a greater multiplicity of temporal affects. By 
accessing affective diversity in time, potentia is increased, enabling players to 
reconfigure their past into future imaginings that inform self-determined 
action in the present. 
As I have noted in my Literature Review, the quest for temporal 
immediacy is strongly apparent in contemporary theatre practices. David 
Wiles affirms this view, arguing that ‘today’s culture is preoccupied…by the 
pursuit of an indivisible now, detached from past and future time’.67 
Similarly, Josephine Machon argues that immersive theatre disrupts 
chronological time in favour of immanent ‘becoming’ in an ‘ongoing present’ 
that enables ‘dwelling in the moment; moment by moment’.68 This attempt to 
                                                          
67 David Wiles, Theatre & Time (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 15. 
68 Machon, p. 130. 
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dechronologise time is also clearly apparent in digital games. James Ash 
highlights the trend in digital game design ‘towards attempting to encourage 
players to concentrate on a modulating present moment, in an increasingly 
narrow spatio-temporal envelope of perception’.69 In setting out his ideas on 
the temporal immediacy of digital games, he references the work of literary 
theorist Katherine Hayles who suggests that ‘rather than developing “deep” 
modes of attention, based around temporally elongated activities such as 
reading, these industries create a “hyper” attention, where increasing levels 
of stimulation are required to keep viewers interested’.70 Ash subsequently 
links the ‘hyper’ attention of the ‘perceptual now’ to the recent proliferation 
of gamification strategies that use digital technologies in work and leisure 
activities to increase productive participation and economic value. Ash 
suggests that ‘the problem with these systems is how they attempt to…focus 
users’ perception on a continuously modulating present tense at the expense 
of creative thinking in relation to future or present possibilities’.71 The 
analysis offered by Ash is similar to that of Emily Keightley who argues that 
in a contemporary context dominated by high-speed communications 
technology ‘the very real temporal conditions of past, present and future 
disintegrate, producing ‘passive spectators deprived of any sense of time’.72  
The potentially damaging effects of temporal immediacy are further 
exemplified by philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s concept of psychopower, as 
described by Ash, which highlights the implications of temporal immediacy 
for memory and future projection. Stiegler’s argument is that consciousness 
is composed of ‘primary retentions’, which refer to the immediate perceptions 
of experience, alongside ‘secondary retentions’, which refer to memories of 
past experiences. Subsequently, primary and secondary retentions are 
combined to produce ‘protentions’ as anticipations of the future.73 This 
process is short-circuited, in Stiegler’s view, as digital technologies replace 
                                                          
69 Ash, p. 4. 
70 N. Katherine Hayles, ‘Hyper and Deep Attention: The Generational Divide in Cognitive 
Modes’, Profession (2007), 187-199, cited in Ash, p. 4. 
71 Ash, p. 13. 
72 Emily Keightley, ‘From immediacy to intermediacy: the mediation of lived time’, Time & 
Society, 22:1 (2013), pp. 56-57. 
73 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), p. 18, cited in Ash, p. 64. 
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primary and secondary retentions with ‘tertiary retentions’ that are provided 
by the interface. Tertiary retentions essentially refer to the virtual memory 
that is created so that, for example, a person does not have to draw on their 
own secondary retentions of an urban landscape to find their anticipated 
destination because GPS devices remember the landscape for them.74 
According to Stiegler, in Ash’s articulation, ‘the result of this 
dechronologisation for the human beings implicated in these technical 
systems is that “there tends to be less consciousness of the past and there 
also tends to be less of a feeling for the future”’.75 Subsequently, because 
users are held in temporal immediacy, with future protentions being 
managed by the interface itself, Stiegler claims that users’ perceptions 
become ‘standardised and particularizable, meaning they are formalizable, 
calculable and finally controllable’.76 Stiegler’s account of psychopower 
creates a vision of temporal immediacy in which reflexive agency is eroded as 
players’ access to memory and future projection is limited. This enables 
digital interface designers to exercise considerable control on the distribution 
of sensible forms and the way that users perceive them. In considering the 
concept of psychopower in relation to Spinoza’s work, it seems clear that the 
orchestration of temporal immediacy in digital interfaces functions as 
assailment by passions. Spinoza states that ‘it is not wonderful that desire 
which…has reference to the future, can be more easily restrained by the 
desire of things which are pleasant in the present’77 and, since the 
techniques of psychopower actively pursue temporal immediacy to diminish 
thinking in relation to the future, I suggest that the use of such techniques 
‘is not wonderful’. 
Although the technologies of contemporary culture clearly place strong 
emphasis on temporal immediacy, Keightley and Ash both offer compelling 
arguments that entrapment in a ‘perpetual now’ can be resisted. Keightley 
suggests that instances of temporal disjuncture, when digital devices are 
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disrupted, can interrupt the ‘time of the instant’ and stimulate reflexive 
thinking: 
It is through…an awareness of temporal difference or distance that we 
come to experience time. The historical drama interrupted by 
contemporary advertisements; the overloaded broadband network that 
distorts a conversation over Skype…it is a liminal condition which 
opens up at the juncture of different temporal modes, rhythms or 
representations.78 
Whereas Keightley focuses on disruption, however, Ash argues that digital 
interfaces can be designed with the express intention of opening up an 
expanded perception of both space and time by modulating between spatio-
temporal immediacy and a more expansive spatial focus with less intent 
attention on the now moment. Ash also proposes that interface users might 
create this spatio-temporal expansion for themselves which ‘could open a 
space in which potential futures’ are ‘not anticipated from within the logics 
of the interface design’.79 As an example of an interface design that enables 
players to modulate space and time on their own terms, he references 
Minecraft, a game that celebrates its low resolution spatiality and slow, open-
ended temporality. He describes the ‘graphically simplistic cubes’ that 
players use to sculpt their environment, noting that: 
Unlike the glossy environments of AAA games that carefully try to hide 
their artifice from the player, Minecraft revels in its artificiality. Indeed, 
the clear exposure of the game’s artificial, constructed nature is key to 
its capacity to generate new horizons of protention.80  
In other words, the low resolution spatiality and temporal expansiveness of 
the game radically departs from the immersive aesthetics of big-budget 
games that seek to cultivate habits to generate ongoing user engagement. 
Instead, Minecraft invites an open-ended range of play activities that enable 
players, quite literally, to redistribute the sensible forms of the digital world 
in myriad ways.  
To summarise this section, in the same way that spatial immediacy 
seeks to hold individuals in the close proximity of ‘here’, temporal immediacy 
pursues a ‘perpetual now’ in the perception of time with the result, I suggest, 
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that human bodies are more likely to be assailed by passions and less able 
to exercise reflexivity. Nonetheless, just as spatial immediacy can be 
disrupted by spatial diversification, distance and defamiliarization, 
interruptions of seamless instantaneity that create a more expansive 
temporality can invite thinking in a syncopated time that combines the 
immediacy of the present with past retentions and future protentions. In my 
practical work, I have applied strategies that pursue syncopated temporality 
as a depth perspective on time and the following section describes the 
outcomes of my explorations of temporal reflexivity in play. 
 
6.5 Temporal Reflexivity in Practical Work 
In Playground 2, the attractiveness of temporal immediacy in play was 
apparent in Catryn’s reflections on the overall project. When I asked her 
which aspects of our activities she remembered most strongly she 
immediately replied that the process of using post-it notes (in which 
participants write down as many ideas as possible in response to a given 
prompt within a limited time period) was the most memorable play activity 
she had encountered. When I asked her why this activity was memorable for 
her, she invoked Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow, describing a 
satisfying experience of instinctive, immediate action:   
Carrie: Because you have the time pressure you have to go with your 
instinct – you have to go with a certain flow. And I have to say to you – 
I’m so sorry – I’ve nicked it quite often already (she laughs). 
JH: Oh, nick away. Nick everything. 
Carrie: Because it is really – it is – I’ve used it because there is 
something about working under a certain time pressure and having to 
find that flow. Cos when you look at the concept of flow, the whole point 
is that actually you forget about – you forget to check yourself – you just 
follow that instinct. And in a way – when you do the post-it noting – 
because you have the time pressure you enter that state of flow – of not 
checking – in order to be productive – in order to give numerous 
suggestions – cos as soon as you begin to explain them too much or 
understand them too much you end up not writing anything. 
As this example shows, in contrast with my positive valuation of reflexivity, 
Catryn clearly valued the immediacy of flow and held a critical view of ‘self-
checking’. In describing her experience of designing her final piece at the end 
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of the project, however, she acknowledged that the ‘stop-start’ nature of the 
collaborative design process stimulated reflexivity, which enabled her to let 
go of some of her ideas and adapt to those of others: 
The self-checking when you start to collaboratively create something for 
someone else…there was an interruption of flow. I think I would have 
found a very big flow if I had to do this game by myself – because then 
you really have to work it out step by step, almost like a mathematical 
puzzle – but because you’re working collaboratively – it’s a constant 
negotiation between letting go and suggesting – yielding and resisting to 
a certain extent…and that is something that stops and starts the flow.81  
The salient point that can be drawn from this example is that the 
interruption of temporally immediate flow prompted Catryn to respond to the 
ideas of others rather than autonomously pursuing her own instincts. 
Consequently, in spite of her desire to find a flow state in play (and also in 
the design of play activities), I suggest that shifting beyond temporal 
immediacy was conducive to a relational reflexivity that supported the 
adaptation of her ideas in a collaborative process. 
   In the Peartree Bridge project, I had a similar interest in inviting 
participants to strengthen their reflexive agency by taking time out from the 
flow of everyday life to explore the possibility of shifting their habitual 
perceptions of the area. For the final piece that concluded the project, I 
developed a two-player role-play entitled Ridge Walk.82 This piece invited 
players to walk through the neighbourhood together and reimagine it as an 
alternative society called Ridge, which was divided into two culturally 
isolated regions: East and West Ridge. The play involved the use of a map of 
Ridge that was overlaid onto the actual layout of Peartree Bridge and, over 
the course of the walk, players were invited to navigate a set route that criss-
crossed between East and West. As they walked, they followed written 
instructions that prompted them to respond to their surroundings and 
imagine the fictional history of their region and also make future projections 
of how the two communities would evolve. One playing of the Ridge Walk 
was enacted by two residents who had lived in the area for over twenty-five 
years: James (who I have mentioned earlier in this chapter) and a woman 
                                                          
81 ‘Catryn’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, London (26 October 2018). See Appendix A: 
‘Playground2.1’. 
82 See Appendix B.18 for the play script of Ridge Walk. 
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called Lottie. In reflecting on their play experience, they commented that 
although they had both lived in the same small neighbourhood for a 
considerable period, they were strangers. Despite their initial hesitancy in 
playing together, they managed to create a quite complex story of two 
societies recovering from a war that had created the separation between east 
and west. James created a female character who had been a victim of 
violence and Lottie described his story contributions as ‘quite mythical – 
almost fantastical’.83 Despite the dark subject matter that they chose to play 
with, however, in reflecting on his experience of the Ridge Walk, James 
commented that the slow pace of the activity had enabled him to recognise 
some of the positive features of the landscape that he would normally 
overlook: 
James: I noticed aspects of the area that I hadn’t grasped before – 
because I don’t walk around with my eyes open, I suppose…looking in 
the evening when its quiet like this – it has made me think that parts of 
this – territory – are quite attractive. 
JH: What did you find yourself being drawn to?  
James: Mainly the trees. During the daytime, if you work and commute 
as most people do here – you don’t pay much attention to the actual 
surroundings. It’s a very still evening, very quiet – and looking around 
I’ve appreciated the actual shapes of the trees more than I normally 
would – dashing around during the day…you can see the sort of – 
sculptural forms of things rather than everything being in motion like it 
is in the day when you’re rushing around.84 
The key point that emerges here is that the slowness and stillness of the 
activity invited James to expand his perceptual horizon beyond everyday 
objects of attention and notice things that would ordinarily be disregarded. 
Consequently, I suggest that because the temporality of the play interrupted 
the fast-paced flow of day-to-day experience, James was able to access the 
pleasurable affects of the ‘sculptural forms’ of trees which seemed to override 
his generally negative view of the neighbourhood.  
 As I have noted in an earlier section of this chapter, the Passage role-
play at Trumpington Community Orchard was founded on a consideration of 
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time, beginning with three questions: Where have you come from today? 
Where have you come from as an adult? Where have you come from since 
childhood?  The responses to these questions formed the basis of the fiction, 
providing stimuli for players to invent their characters, but I suggest that 
they also established a mindset of depth perspective on time that combined 
considerations of the past alongside an imagined future towards which the 
characters were travelling. In Cerys’ play experience, her character, Celia, 
established a busy life, driven by the need to work as a teacher to provide for 
her young family. Towards the end of the play, however, she reached a new 
(randomly selected) location, a plateau, which offered Celia (and Cerys) time 
to think about what they wanted in their future lives: 
All these things in the role-play are about our inner landscape. Like – in 
the summer, I got the plateau (she holds up the randomly selected 
landscape card) and the desire to learn (she holds up the randomly 
selected feeling card) so then I thought – where is it – (she reads from 
Celia’s journal) ‘I’m settled and happy, but now it’s time to make my 
mark on the world’ – this is really – my life at the moment – I feel like I’m 
on a bit of a plateau and I want more variety and inspiration. Most of 
my life has been about learning – like the pressure to learn more new 
things – more and more…but you know – I’m not gonna be here in 
twenty-five years – that’s very – you get to my age – life speeds up at 
such a rate and every year goes – I mean god its nearly winter again – 
already. I’ve always had this big need to feel like I’ve done 
something…and when I was on the plateau – on the plateau is actually 
being stuck and taking the time to recognise my stuck-ness. So, it’s like 
– recognising that I’m ready to act – but these are the things – the 
qualities I need when I act to be able to – to make a good end to life. And 
to enjoy it on the way.85 
What is notable about this example, other than the highly personal nature of 
what Cerys had to say, was her emphasis on taking time, as a departure 
from the increasing speed of life, to reflect on past and future. Her thoughts 
on the past mention ‘pressure’ to learn ‘more and more’ but her imaginative 
projection of the future was about acquiring ‘qualities’ that would enable her 
to act meaningfully. Referring to Spinoza’s ideas, Cerys’ reflections seem 
redolent of his distinction between the inadequate ideas that can result from 
being driven by temporally immediate affects and the adequate ideas that 
can be attained by giving equal consideration to the imaginings of past and 
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future. It was clear that Cerys’ play experience made her think quite deeply 
about her future and it seemed that this was conducive to seeking out 
beneficial affects that would strengthen her power of action ‘to make a good 
end to life’.  
These examples from Playground 2 and the Trumpington and Peartree 
Bridge projects suggest that a depth perspective on time, in contrast to the 
aesthetics of temporal immediacy, increases the power of imagination and 
reflexive agency. Despite her valorisation of flow, the interrupted temporality 
of the design process in Playground 2 enabled Catryn to exercise a reflexive 
capacity to critically appraise her ideas in relation to those of others.   
Similarly, Passage and Ridge Walk both invited players to take time in order 
to reflect in depth about time, constructing play activities built on past 
experiences but which also stimulated future-oriented imagination. I suggest 
that this depth of temporality enabled players to be affected in an increased 
variety of ways which appeared to strengthen their power to reconfigure the 
substance of sensory experience and generate consciously self-determined 
action.  
The notion that sensory affects can be reflexively reconfigured in play 
resonates with the theories of Brian Sutton-Smith whose discussion of 
animal play makes a simple, but compelling, argument that the evolutionary 
invention of play enables beings to move beyond automatic reflex responses 
to sensory stimuli and think before they act.86 In other words, play acts as a 
mechanism that combines the primary emotions of immediate instinct with 
second-order observations that serve to regulate and, potentially, adapt 
these instincts in service of more beneficial strategies of action. Following 
Sutton-Smith’s ideas, I contend that the conscious regulation of emotion can 
be seen in the examples of temporal reflexivity in this section. Cerys’ 
reflections on her play experience enabled her to step out of the quick tempo 
of daily activities to consider the future time of her life and visualise the 
‘qualities’ that might enable her to live it well. Likewise, the slow tempo of 
James’ play during the Ridge Walk departed from habitual ‘rushing around’ 
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and enabled him to partially overcome his negative outlook on the 
neighbourhood by observing the trees and recognising the pleasure that they 
gave him. 
 
6.6 Unifying Emotional Immediacy & Rational Reflexivity 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have argued that reflexivity 
in spatial and temporal perception supports imaginative agency in the play 
of participatory performance. For many scholars, however, the type of 
reflexivity I have argued for is suggestive of a problematic mind/body 
dualism whereby the mind seeks to control the body as an object. Pierre 
Bourdieu, for example, is critical of reflexivity, because it smacks of a 
Kantian ‘pure gaze’,87 that sees the mind and its disinterested contemplation 
as standing in distanced separation from the world. These arguments can be 
countered, however, through reference to scholars such as Antonio Damasio 
who compellingly links Spinoza’s philosophy with twenty-first century 
neuroscience to argue that the affects of the body and the reason of the mind 
are not separate, but rather operate in a continuum that connects primary 
affects of immediate sensation to self-aware feelings in the conscious mind.88 
Drawing on the work of Damasio and other recent Spinozist scholars, I argue 
in this section that rational reflexivity in play involves the integration of 
primary affects and second-order observations that recognise how the 
sensible forms of the world are composed and how they might be 
redistributed.  
Spinoza’s conception of reason involves the ability of the mind to 
consciously seek beneficial affects that strengthen the power to take self-
determined action. Damasio brings these ideas vividly to life, suggesting that 
through human evolution, primary emotions have led to feelings as a more 
complex mental awareness of bodily affects: 
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The first device, emotion, enabled organisms to respond efficiently but 
not creatively to a number of circumstances conducive or threatening 
to life…The second device, feeling, introduced a mental alert for the 
good or bad circumstances and prolonged the impact of emotions by 
affecting attention and memory lastingly. Eventually, in a fruitful 
combination with past memories, imagination, and reasoning, feeling 
led to the emergence of foresight and the possibility of creating novel, 
non-stereotyped responses.89 
Damasio suggests that his conception of feelings can be seen as analogous 
to Spinoza’s conception of reason, whereby conscious self-awareness of 
feelings generates mental power over the emotional process. He makes it 
clear, however, that Spinozist reason remains connected to the immediate 
emotional affects of the body, arguing that ‘central to his thinking was the 
notion that the subduing of passions should be accompanied by reason-
induced emotion and not by pure reason alone’.90 These arguments are 
affirmed by Mark Johnson who combines a discussion of Damasio’s work 
with the philosophy of John Dewey whose ‘principle of continuity’ between 
body and mind ‘denies any ontological gaps between various levels of 
functional complexity’.91 Consequently: 
If the ways of the body are actually constitutive of what and how we 
think, the logics (plural) have only as much validity as the shared 
patterns of bodily experience on which they rest. Logic doesn’t drop 
down from the heavens of pure reason; rather, it rises up from 
recurring patterns of embodied enquiry.92  
Essentially, in the same way that the immediacy of primary emotion is the 
source material for rational, conscious feelings (according to Damasio), for 
Johnson, mental logic is inseparably bound up in the body. 
A crucial aspect of Johnson’s argument linking the primary affective 
processes of the body and rational thinking is the development of 
communication through language. Building on Dewey’s ideas, he claims that 
‘“mind” is an added property assumed by a feeling creature, when it reaches 
that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, 
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communication’.93 This idea resonates closely with the late work of Lev 
Vygotsky whose studies of language use were strongly influenced by 
Spinoza’s philosophy. Vygotsky’s Spinozist turn was based on the 
recognition that the capacity to use language in internal thought processes 
enables individuals to reconfigure the stimuli that the body receives from its 
immediate surroundings. In discussing Spinoza’s influence on Vygotsky, Jan 
Derry suggests that ‘in the end, Vygotsky flirts with the idea that the use of 
language creates consciousness and even free will’.94 Her argument is that 
whereas the actions of animals appear to be determined by external forces in 
their immediate environment, for humans, ‘the basis of freedom is man's 
ability to separate himself from his passions, from the contingencies of 
nature, and to make for himself a space within which he can determine his 
actions’.95 Derry contends that this is made possible, according to Vygotsky’s 
theory, by the human construction of tools and signs96 and this point is 
reaffirmed by several other scholars of Vygotsky and Spinoza. Andrey 
Maidansky argues that the use of language enables humans to convert 
affects into concepts in a ‘contradictory unity…of reason and passion’ that 
frees human beings from determination by external forces.97 Similarly, 
Ekaterina Zavershneva argues that, for Vygotsky, ‘thought and word, by 
shedding light on the affect, interfere with it and change it’98 and she goes on 
to claim that ‘it is the meaningful word, added to the primary affect, that 
connects it with other conditions and the world; which elucidates it, makes it 
transparent and visible and, therefore, manageable and conscious’.99 In 
other words, by applying language in internal thinking, humans are able to 
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gain conscious awareness of embodied emotional states through second-
order observations which serve as the basis for voluntary action.  
In considering the theoretical ideas noted above in relation to my 
practical work, I argue that many of the activities undertaken invited 
internal language use as a means of transforming the emotions of spatio-
temporal immediacy into conscious feelings. In the Passage role-play, the 
majority of Cerys’ play took place in an internalised thought process and it 
seems clear that her internal conversations generated reflexive awareness of 
emotions. On the plateau, for example, her sense of ‘being stuck - and taking 
time to recognise my stuckness’ is indicative of having an emotion and 
making a second-order observation of it that might subsequently lead to 
conscious action to overcome the external forces that had caused her to 
become stuck. Similarly, the slow play of James’ Ridge Walk not only gave 
him a pleasurable emotion in observing the trees but also the critically self-
conscious recognition that he did not ordinarily give himself time to observe 
and appreciate his surroundings.  
Although Vygotsky’s ideas on the role of language in consciousness 
focus strongly on its internalised use, it is important to stress that this does 
not imply another form of dualism separating the subjective mind from the 
objects that it regards. Wolff-Michael Roth and Alfredo Jornet argue that 
Vygotsky’s understanding of language involves a movement between the 
intersubjective and the intrasubjective, whereby the individual learns 
language socially then develops the capacity to apply it in internal 
thinking.100 They are explicit, however, that internal thinking is never 
separate from the material world; rather it is always geared towards external 
action.101 Roth and Jornet go further in asserting Vygotsky’s opposition to 
mind/body dualism by suggesting that whereas his early work saw language 
as a form of mediation between objects and psychological understanding, 
under the later influence of Spinoza, he rejected this idea. For Vygotsky, in 
Roth and Jornet’s articulation, the notion that the universe is composed of 
one substance, as Spinoza’s monism asserts, necessarily precludes the idea 
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that language mediates between the mind and the physical world.102 They 
argue that ‘in real relations, signs generally and language specifically do not 
mediate and stand between the individual and her world, between the 
individual and others. Instead, language is an integral part of this world’.103  
Roth and Jornet’s rejection of mediation in favour of ‘real relations’ is 
strongly redolent of the work of media theorist Richard Grusin. Grusin’s 
argument for ‘radical mediation’ proposes that mediation is fundamentally 
about relations.104 He takes a critical stance towards proponents of 
immediacy who pursue the transparent dissolution of digital interfaces and 
argues for a hypermediacy105 which foregrounds conscious recognition of 
how relational connections bring objects and the subjects who perceive them 
into existence: 
Mediation should not be understood as standing between already 
actualised subjects, objects, actants or entities…but rather…as the 
process, action, or event that generates or provides the conditions for 
the emergence of subjects and objects, for the individuation of entities 
within the world.106 
Grusin’s ideas on radical mediation as relational connectivity resonate with 
scholars who argue that Vygotsky’s psychology is geared towards 
understanding how the human mind operates in relation with a wider 
environmental context. Zavershneva notes the influence of one of Vygotsky’s 
collaborators, the gestalt theorist Kurt Lewin, and argues that he wanted to 
investigate how the human mind might strive to ‘reach the highest level of 
analysis, the level of the whole that determines its parts’.107 Similarly, Andy 
Blunden argues that Vygotsky’s psychology is not simply focused on the 
thoughts and actions of individuals but rather on a broader relational 
system in which ‘social practice, individual consciousness, and material 
culture…mutually constitute one another, as part of a Gestalt’.108  
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The notion of an approach to psychology based on gestalt perception 
shares commonalities with arguments from scholars of Spinoza that his 
concept of reason is based on gaining adequate ideas by understanding the 
causes, or mechanisms, of affects.109 Stuart Pethick argues that ‘the 
question of knowledge is…the question of the composition of our affective 
relations’110 and he offers a striking example of relational understanding 
through Spinoza’s discussion of an imaginary circle. Spinoza offers two 
descriptions of a circle: one that already exists, and can be confirmed as a 
circle if it is measured to be ‘a plane curve everywhere equidistant from a 
central fixed point’, and one that might come into existence which can be 
‘described by any one line of which one end is fixed and the other 
moveable’.111 What this rather cryptic example illustrates is the distinction 
between a ‘general notion’ which offers the concrete image of a circle as a 
pre-existing object and a more abstract ‘common notion’ that contains ‘its 
conditions of coming into being’.112 In other words, the second example 
refers to the mechanism of ‘how’ a circle might be actualised, not merely a 
description of ‘what’ it is, and this is significant in relation to Spinoza’s wider 
advocacy of reasoned thinking. In the same way that Vygotsky argues that 
internal language enables thinking in abstract concepts that allows human 
imagination to escape the limitations of concrete circumstances, Spinoza, in 
Pethick’s account, argues that ‘we need to find “common notions” that can 
understand the geneses of bodies and how these can be composed’.113 
Essentially, this is an argument for reflexive thinking that shifts beyond the 
spatio-temporal immediacy of experience to seek an understanding of the 
affective mechanisms at play in the relational composition of objects in our 
field of perception, as the foundation for volitional action that might enable 
human beings to transform these objects.  
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In Playground 2, conscious awareness of the mechanisms of affects 
was apparent in participants’ replies in response to the question of whether 
any aspects of the process had felt particularly pleasurable or painful. As 
part of her discussion of ‘self-checking’, Catryn spoke about the pain of 
seeing her final piece fail to achieve what she had intended, but also the 
pleasure of recognising why it had failed: 
I’m still amazed by how wrong it went and how I enjoyed it! It was 
really insightful for me. It was so interesting to be so convinced that it 
was a really good idea and then seeing how it didn’t work and why it 
didn’t work.114 
Similarly, Luke commented on the pleasure that he experienced when 
watching his piece being played and reflected on the creative process that 
had created that pleasurable emotion: 
That last afternoon, watching players play the larp that we created – 
that was pleasurable. It felt like – we’d worked hard on this thing and 
its actually unfolding in front of us…the only way I can think about it is 
like – kind of – dressing up like a superhero when you’re young – 
especially a superhero with a cape (he laughs) – and like – you stand 
up, bolt upright – stick your arms out and stand your ground – just 
feeling strong. That’s the only way I can – sort of like feeling as 
thought…a proud feeling – creating something and then – in a social 
sense – seeing the ramifications of how it unfolded.115 
Drawing on Luke’s notion of ‘feeling as thought’, these examples suggest the 
value of making second-order observations of emotion, which, for Luke and 
Catryn, involved reflexive considerations of the processes that had caused 
feelings of pleasure or pain. I suggest that such reflections build 
participants’ awareness of their potentia, prompting them to consider how 
their pleasurable or painful affects had been created and how they might 
approach their work in future to maximise their experience of creative joy.  
To summarise this section, rational reflexivity can be understood to 
operate in a continuum with emotional affects in the spatio-temporal 
immediacy of embodied action. Rather than seeing reason as being 
analytically separate from the life of the body, Damasio’s work asserts that 
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rational feelings are inseparably related to emotional affects and Vygotsky’s 
theories suggest that language is the vital link that enables humans to 
reconfigure primary emotions through the second-order thinking of the 
conscious mind. This emphasis on language need not imply a mediation that 
imposes a dualistic separation of mind and body. Rather, language is a 
means of establishing awareness of relations in a gestalt perception, or 
hypermediacy, whereby humans can understand the affective mechanisms 
that bring objects into existence or produce the emotions that they 
experience. This hypermediacy of perception is a rational reflexivity that 
converts primary affects into second-order observations, enabling human 
beings to escape automatic responses to stimuli, overcome the assailment by 
passions and develop schemes of self-determined action that enhance 
potentia. 
 
6.7 Habit & Change 
The arguments that I have made in the preceding sections of this 
chapter have focused on the potential for rational reflexivity to enable 
individuals to move beyond habitual patterns of action as part of my wider 
concern with investigating the culturally transformative potential of play. In 
the same way that primary emotional affects serve as the foundation for 
rational feelings, however, it is important to recognise that habit is not 
antithetical to cultural transformation. In this section, I argue that habit can 
be seen as the base from which any changes in cultural practices must 
necessarily come. In making this argument, I return to Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus and draw on examples from my practical work to suggest that 
habitual practices produced by the dispositions of the habitus serve as the 
ground from which cultural transformations might emerge. 
As I have noted previously, Bourdieu’s logic of practice downplays the 
possibilities of reflexivity, suggesting that the ability to apply reflexive 
criticality is an affordance that is typically limited to people with high levels 
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of cultural and educational capital.116 Critics of Bourdieu’s work such as 
Margaret Archer take issue with this sceptical attitude and suggest that 
reflexivity is the essence of all human agency and that automatic habit can 
only be broken through reflexive thought.117 The binary between habit and 
reflexivity that Archer’s draws is problematic, however, because it disregards 
the necessity of habit for performing basic daily activities. Sadiya Akram and 
Anthony Hogan argue, for example, that: 
Routine habitual action is necessary for everyday living and the 
functioning of the taken-for-granted, in that adherence to habits 
developed over the life course guide behaviour, providing daily 
reinforcement of routine and often useful habits.118 
Similarly, Ian Burkitt argues that even highly reflexive individuals need the 
foundation of habit to function successfully, claiming that if habit is absent 
from daily life ‘even predominantly meta-reflexives will struggle…to establish 
purposeful projects and sustainable practices’.119 Burkitt also challenges 
Archer’s sharp separation between the reflexive mind of the individual and 
the practices of the body in the social world, claiming that reflexivity cannot 
function as an individual cognitive process. Rather, he suggests that it 
occurs intersubjectively ‘as a dialogical process’ that ‘should be understood 
as an aspect of the relational fabric in which bodily selves are embedded’.120 
Subsequently, in the same way that the habits of language are learned 
through social relations, reflexivity also functions as a social activity, 
whereby individuals adapt their habits based on what they imagine other 
people think of them.121 In other words, in the same way that Vygotsky 
maintains that the use of internal language in thinking is always directed 
towards the social world, the habits that develop through social relations are 
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rarely adapted by individual reflection alone, they are most commonly 
adapted by social reflexivity based on relational connectivity with others. 
In my practical work at Peartree Bridge, the value of social reflexivity 
was apparent in conversations about the Ridge Walk between James and his 
play partner, Lottie. In reflecting on their experience, Lottie mentioned that 
because her meeting with James occurred in the context of a dialogic role-
play, this enabled them to reflect on their feelings about the area in ways 
that they would not normally feel able to, given that they were strangers: 
Playing a game as an adult is really quite difficult – it takes a real leap 
of faith – especially when you’re talking to a stranger. But actually – it – 
you know – gave us a bit of insight and made us use words about the 
area that we wouldn’t have said if we hadn’t done it through a story…I 
think both of us have sort of – negative views on things – that we kind of 
played out through the story. They weren’t sort of like – constantly 
berating the area – but they were kind of – like very dark and the story 
kind of evolved that way. It enabled both of us to use these words that 
we wouldn’t normally with a stranger…in my story the landscape 
started off quite barren and then grew and matured as the character did 
– but then was broken, but not beyond repair – it was then evolving 
again, kind of like a continuous cycle which is how I think the 
community is…and just the opportunity to walk through it, talking about 
it to somebody rather than walking alone in it or talking to somebody 
about something different – I was talking about the actual place. So, the 
actual fact that it was driven to talk about that – it made me then reflect 
on my experience in the area.122 
What this example suggests is that the dialogical play between Lottie and 
James enabled them to engage with habitually embedded attitudes (a 
generally negative view of the area) and habitual practices (retaining a 
certain reserve in relation to strangers) and explore the possibility of 
changing them. The change that occurred in Lottie’s case was the discovery 
of an ability to talk about the area in a way that she would not normally feel 
able to because the frame of play implicitly gave her permission to express a 
‘dark’ perspective, but also enabled her to recognise that the war torn 
landscape within the fiction, like the landscape of Peartree Bridge itself, was 
‘not beyond repair’. 
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Further discussion of the value of habit can be found in James Ash’s 
writing on digital interfaces. He suggests, in contrast to Warren Neidich’s 
pessimistic account of the habits that are imposed by neuropower, that habit 
can be a source of creativity: 
Habit can be understood as a dynamic force that is ‘both the site of 
change and movement, as well as incorporating the potential for bodily 
forms of fixity, continuity and stability.’ As such, habit is a productive 
process through which new skills are enabled and created.123 
In considering habit, Ash’s offers a useful discussion of Martin Heidegger’s 
concept of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand objects. In Ash’s articulation 
of Heidegger’s theory, ready-to-hand objects are utilised in habitual action 
that does not require conscious thought. By contrast, ‘humans can 
encounter objects in a present-at-hand way. This is experienced when 
individuals step back from their involvement in a situation and consider 
objects as distant things rather than part of a broader task’.124 With regard 
to my practical work as a whole, my consistent use of an inchoate 
assortment of junk has invited players to encounter objects in a present-at-
hand way and I suggest that, in contrast to the high resolution focus that 
Ash describes when discussing digital objects, my utilisation of present-at-
hand objects can be seen as an intentionally low resolution form of play 
design. This does not imply an outright rejection of high resolution spatiality, 
however. Rather, I propose that it is the players who bring space into 
resolution through the appropriation and redeployment of objects and I 
contend that this redeployment enables players to move the objects of play 
beyond their habitual function.  
In Playground 2, Luke spoke about his interest, as a practicing artist, 
in a low resolution aesthetic of reappropriating scrap objects to take them 
beyond the ready-to-hand functionality of habitual use: 
Luke: There’s something about – a kind of ‘make do’ approach. These 
materials – I describe them as scraps – they’re things that have 
function, but maybe not hugely significant…and I’ve found it fascinating 
how something that’s seen as everyday junk – or not seen – overlooked 
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– something can be overlooked but then with attention given to it – it can 
kind of highlight it – and shift the focus of that. 
JH: Shift into what? 
Luke: Anything. 
Luke subsequently went on to connect his enthusiasm (in his own practice) 
for present-at-hand redeployment of familiar objects with the use of scrap 
materials in the spatial composition of play activities during the Playground 
workshops. In describing a role-play in which he and his partners created a 
well as the secret base for a group of children’s party entertainers plotting a 
revolution, he commented that: 
I was really interested in how the use of objects or props can curate the 
space…like when we used the big tarpaulin to create the well (he 
laughs)…I just really enjoy being given the potential to create a space – 
actually try and replicate a space we kind of know – with limited 
resources. I find that quite captivating. There’s something about the 
limitation of having only a certain amount of things to make a new place 
with – and the endless possibilities of how you can do that with these 
limited resources.125 
The key points that can be drawn from Luke’s reflections on making spaces 
with scrap objects are his engagement with the familiar or habitual (in 
imagining places that are known) alongside their construction in a relatively 
abstract, defamiliarized form. As Luke suggests, the low resolution poverty of 
‘limited resources’ does not restrict the imaginative agency of the player in 
assembling and reassembling the space, it decisively enables it. 
Consequently, I contend that the utilisation of present-at-hand objects has 
facilitated an open-ended play culture in which players have been invited to 
reappropriate objects, take them beyond their habitual function and 
transform their uses to bring new spaces into resolution.  
In arguing that habits, forged in the immediacy of everyday action, can 
be the foundation for change, Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of ‘striated’ 
and ‘smooth’ space are instructive.126 In Doreen Massey’s discussion of these 
terms, she describes ‘smooth’ spaces as being relatively open to change in 
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contrast to ‘striated’ spaces that are relatively resistant to it.127 Although her 
ideas seek to mobilise a ‘more variegated politics’128 Massey recognises that 
‘the impetus to motion and mobility, for a space of flows, can only be 
achieved through the construction of (temporary, provisional) 
stabilisations’.129 In other words, stabilisation, like habit, need not been seen 
as ossification. Instead, it can serve as the foundation for mobility, offering 
the texture, or grip, that is required to produce momentum. Massey’s 
arguments for the reciprocal relationship between striated and smooth space 
resonate with the work of Martin Jones who argues that although space is in 
a continuous process of relational composition, the construction of 
provisional striations is necessary for people to be able to visualise political 
activism. He claims that ‘when performing their practical politics, agents 
imagine and identify a discrete, bounded space characterized by a shared 
understanding of the opportunities or problems that are motivating the very 
nature of political action’.130 In other words, conceiving a territory as a 
discrete region, or neighbourhood, imposes a necessary stabilisation that 
creates the foundation for effective political action. Jones subsequently 
proposes the concept of ‘phase space’ as a ‘conceptual middle road between 
space as territorial anchorage and fixity and conceptions of space as 
topological, fluid and relationally mobile’.131 Essentially, his proposition is 
that space can be productively considered in terms of a ‘co-existence of 
structure and flow’,132 or a combination of striated and smooth, in 
recognition of the need to base transformative activities in already existing 
habitual practices of a given context.    
The combination of smoothness and striation is significant for a study 
of play because, arguably, all ludic activities require a degree of striation to 
establish, however provisionally, a defined play space. Tauel Harper suggests 
that although play should not be seen as fully separate from the outside 
world, the conceptual boundary of the magic circle is a necessary 
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stabilisation that nonetheless enables ‘transgressive transformations to take 
place’, arguing that ‘the magic circle depends upon a striation from the real 
world to exist and enforces a number of striations in the form of “rules” and 
yet, it encourages the continual renegotiation and smoothing out of these 
striations’.133 This notion of a combination of striation and smoothness can 
be exemplified by my previously cited Platform play exercise. Each object 
selection that is added to the platform marks a formal distinction that 
establishes a striation of the play space. These striations do not imply fixity 
or stasis, they serve as the foundation (or platform) for continual smoothing, 
as new distinctions are made that open the form of play to unpredictable 
new developments. In other words, although the establishment of a magic 
circle, or the formal distinctions that define the play space, impose 
striations, these stabilisations create the foundations for transformative 
actions to occur.  
To summarise this section, I have argued for an oscillation between 
habit and change alongside a movement between immediacy and reflexivity 
in play. My essential proposition is that although habits (like the habitus) 
develop through the spatio-temporal immediacy of ready-to-hand activity, it 
is possible to shift into a more reflexive, present-at-hand perspective on 
space and time that enables alteration of habits. My ideas on the movement 
between habit and change, are subsequently reified in the final section of 
this chapter, which sets out a model of reflexive play as an oscillation 
between anchorage in the established practices of the habitus and leverage 
as rational criticality than opens potential for cultural transformation.  
 
6.8 Anchorage & Leverage 
My argument in this section is that reflexive agency in the play of 
participatory performance is supported by oscillation between anchorage in 
space and time and reflexive leverage that shifts agents into new temporal 
and spatial perspectives. In making this argument, I define anchorage as 
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essentially analogous with the habitus and leverage as the reflexive capacity 
for rational thought that supports self-determined action. Bourdieu’s vision 
of habitus formation can be seen as a form of anchorage whereby individuals 
tend to remain constrained by a limited range of possibilities that they 
mimetically reproduce. He argues that the practices produced by the habitus 
are ‘relatively unpredictable’ but ‘also limited in their diversity’.134 
Consequently, within the limited horizon of experience that he envisages, 
‘the evocative power of bodily mimesis’ produces a ‘universe of ready-made 
feelings and experiences’ which, despite appearing to be ‘choices’ actually 
‘imply no acts of choosing’.135 In contrast to this apparently deterministic 
position, Damasio’s response to Spinoza’s philosophy offers convincing ideas 
on how, in the broad span of evolutionary history, the development of self-
conscious feelings has enabled human beings to break with habits that have 
become deeply embedded in the body. Taking racism as an example, he 
argues that racial prejudice may be based on the important evolutionary 
development of the ability ‘to detect difference in others because difference 
may signal risk or danger and promote withdrawal or aggression’. He goes on 
to argue, however, that although this ability might once have been vital to 
survival, in contemporary society ‘we can learn to disregard such emotions 
and persuade others to do the same’.136 Damasio’s argument is that 
although habits that are anchored in the body are highly durable, they can 
be altered through rational feeling. My contention is that such alteration 
requires leverage out of habit, but that this leverage still depends on the 
anchorage of habit as a foundation. As I have suggested previously, adaptive 
variability in play involves repurposing the substance of the habitus, so the 
anchorage that habitus imposes is also the material with which leverage out 
of anchorage must be performed.  
In temporal terms, leverage requires a reflexive perspective on time 
that moves beyond the present tense to delve into the anchorage of past 
experience and imaginatively reorder it as a projection of desired futures. 
Damasio makes precisely this point when he argues that: 
                                                          
134 Bourdieu, Logic, p. 55 
135 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 476 
136 Damasio, p. 40. 
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One of the main tenets of civilised human behaviour is thinking in 
terms of the future. Our baggage of accumulated knowledge and our 
ability to compare past and present have opened the possibility of 
‘minding’ the future…We trade instantaneous gratification and defer 
immediate pleasure for a brighter future, and we make immediate 
sacrifices on the same basis.137 
As this quotation illustrates, ‘minding’ the future requires shifting beyond a 
temporally immediate perspective in an oscillation between considering the 
‘now’ of the moment and the twin ‘thens’ of past and future. This process is 
clearly based on an interrogation of the anchorage of ‘accumulated 
knowledge’ but the reflexivity of combined considerations of ‘now’ and ‘then’ 
enables leverage beyond the limitations of past and present to generate 
visions of future potential.  
Linking the ideas noted above with my practical work, I will now 
describe a project that attempted to create anchorage-leverage in play. The 
piece in question, Migrations of Cool, was a street game, designed for a small 
festival at the Arebyte Gallery in Hackney Wick, which focused on the role of 
artists in processes of gentrification.138 Hackney Wick is an area that has 
seen rapid transformation in recent years, from a dilapidated industrial 
zone, to a haven for artists, and, most recently, to an area of large-scale 
residential property development. The core premise of the game was that 
artists play a role in stimulating gentrification by creating an ‘aura of cool’ in 
the areas they populate, which attracts the attention of developers who wish 
to create high-value properties in ‘cool’ areas. Consequently, the design of 
the game, which was structured around a grid map overlaid on the 
landscape of Hackney Wick, invited property developers to pursue the aura 
of cool, while the artists tried to evade their moves by seeking increasingly 
remote areas where they could make their work at low cost. Beyond the 
system logic of the game, the key formal device of the play experience was 
that all players were required to play artists and also property developers. In 
effect, this meant switching roles at specific points in play and pursuing two 
radically different sets of objectives. 
                                                          
137 Damasio, p. 146. 
138 See Appendix B.7 for the rule set of Migrations of Cool.  
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All the participants who played Migrations of Cool came from artistic 
backgrounds and, as such, they carried with them, to great or lesser extents, 
the habitus (or anchorage) of artists. In preparation for play, participants 
were asked to create fictional artistic collectives which allowed them to 
express their stereotypical ideas of what Hackney Wick artists are like. 
Similarly, they created fictional property development companies which also 
displayed their artistic habitus through the creation of stereotypically 
greedy, corporate entities. In the process of play, however, the formal device 
of role-swapping invited players to defamiliarize their perspective and 
reflexively shift beyond their anchorage to take a different view of artists and 
property developers. One participant, Nadia, recalled, in written 
correspondence, that in the post-game debrief several people had 
‘sympathised with the developers as it was very competitive and fast’. She 
also noted that players were ‘surprised by themselves being cynical and 
ruthless towards artists during the game’ noting that ‘employees of 
development companies also need to make a living’.139 As this example 
indicates, the design of the game invited oscillation between anchorage and 
leverage as the artistic habitus of the players was challenged by playing with 
an alternative perspective.  
In spatial terms, anchorage-leverage oscillation manifested itself in 
shifts between different physical relationships to the urban environment. 
Artists were asked to make playful sculptural interventions in space, 
photograph them and send pictures to the game facilitator, while property 
developers were required to make video presentations of their development 
plans in particular zones of the play space. In simple terms, this created an 
oscillation of perspective between space as a playground and space as a 
territory of economic value, as is made apparent from the written feedback of 
another participant, Meg, (who later joined the Playground project): 
As an artist I definitely moved around space with an eye to what I could 
create in the environments I was moving into. I wanted the spaces to be 
cheap, but I also needed there to be something creatively stimulating in 
them. As a property developer my focus was more direct: money and 
                                                          
139 ‘Nadia’, ‘Re: Toxicool art’, email to Jamie Harper (24 July 2017). 
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potential mark up. I was more focused on the map and the overlaid 
value as opposed to the quality of the spaces themselves.140  
What is interesting about this reflection from Meg, is that the immediacy of 
property development action led to a conflation of map and territory (to 
borrow Gregory Bateson’s terms). By contrast, the more reflexive perspective 
of artists recognised the distinction between the aesthetic detail of the actual 
terrain in contrast to its abstract representation on the map. 
Reflexivity was further promoted by the creation of different time 
registers, with property developers having less time to make their moves in 
comparison with artists. In considering her experience of time Meg 
commented that:  
I made my artist decisions much slower than as a property developer as 
I felt I had more to weigh up in space and environment as opposed to 
value on a map. I felt time was valuable as an artist to create, whereas 
as a developer I didn't want to waste any time, I had to move as quickly 
as I could. 
Meg went on to comment on how she used the extended time of artistic play 
to think relationally about the composition of the urban space and how her 
artistic activity (within the fiction) might impact upon it and people within it: 
I remember when I made an artist purchase (renting a zone on the grid 
map of the game) outside a local primary school and thought quite a lot 
about how students at the school would engage with the artwork and 
how I could make it something that spoke to them and involved them as 
opposed to just happening near them.141  
This example is illustrative, I suggest, of the kind of rational thinking that 
Spinoza advocates. Rather than passively receiving the affects of the 
immediate environment and recognising a school for what it is (like 
recognising the form of an already existing circle), Meg’s reflections with 
regard to the primary school included a deeper consideration of how the 
neighbourhood might be relationally reconfigured by her creative presence to 
create beneficial affects for both artist and local children. In other words, the 
slow time of her artistic play enabled her to convert immediate primary 
                                                          
140 ‘Meg’, ‘Lima Collective’, email to Jamie Harper (27 July 2017). 
141 ‘Meg’, ‘Re: Lima Collective’, email to Jamie Harper (28 July 2017). 
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affects into second-order observations of her actions and the longer-term 
ramifications they might have in a wider relational space. 
As a case study, Migrations of Cool offers an example of how spatio-
temporal reflexivity can enable players to leverage themselves beyond 
familiar, habitual perspectives. In the same way that Damasio argues for 
conscious awareness of feelings, my concept of anchorage-leverage suggests 
that reflexive consciousness of habitual modes of activity can stimulate 
considerations of how these practices might be altered. Such reflexivity is 
not, as Bourdieu argues, detached from the material actuality of practice, it 
remains embodied and emotional, but it does require an oscillation between 
habitual, ready-to-hand activity and more distanced, diversified and 
defamiliarized perspectives on space and time. My argument is that a 
reflexive consciousness of one’s position in social space and temporal 
trajectory offers the possibility for a diversification of the affects that can be 
received and an equal diversification of capacities for affective action. This 
diversification is the essence of adaptive variability in play, enabling the 
reflexive agency of conscious position-taking that can redistribute the 




To conclude, in this chapter I have argued that reflexive agency in the 
play of participatory performance is supported by compositions of space that 
are distanced, diversified and defamiliarized, and compositions of time that 
encourage syncopated combination of past, present and future imagination. 
This contrasts with the aesthetics of spatio-temporal immediacy which 
foreground close proximity, high resolution focus, habitual engagement with 
the familiar and the instantaneousness of the now-moment. My contention 
is that temporal immediacy limits reflexive comparison of past and present 
and the capacity to reconfigure experience in future imaginings. I have also 
argued that reflexive agency is hindered by an immediacy in space that 
limits the establishment of new relational connections, which subsequently 
constrains the development of new capital affordances. 
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My discussion of space has recognised the importance of proximally 
immediate affects in the horizon of perception and noted Bourdieu’s 
convincing arguments that immediate material conditions play the primary 
role in shaping the habitus. I have suggested, however, that greater distance, 
defamiliarization and diversification of spatial perception can enable 
individuals to move beyond the constraints of their limited horizon. My 
conception of time, similarly, recognises the urgency of necessity that is 
emphasised in Bourdieu’s logic of practice, alongside Spinoza’s assertion 
that we are most strongly affected by external forces in the present moment. 
Again, however, I have suggested that a reflexive consideration of deep time 
allows memory to prompt imagination and helps individuals supersede the 
limitations of the present.  
With regard to creative practice, I have acknowledged the 
attractiveness of spatio-temporal immediacy in immersive theatre and digital 
games, but I have argued that these immediate gratifications represent what 
Spinoza terms the assailment of passions. It is important to emphasise that 
the play activities I have created are not wholly based on the pursuit of 
reflexive criticality. Rather, they combine the immediacy of play action with 
reflexive thinking in an oscillation that continuously shifts between the here 
and now and the ‘thens’ of past and future, alongside the ‘theres’ of a wider 
relational space. The reflexive rationality I have argued for is viewed 
sceptically by theorists like Bourdieu because it appears to create a 
separation between analytical thought and the immediacy of practice. As I 
have argued, however, the reflexive rationality which Damasio describes as 
‘feeling’ is inextricably linked to the emotional affects of the body. In making 
this argument, Vygotsky’s ideas on the use of language provide an essential 
link between primary affective experience and the second-order observations 
of rational thinking. His focus on internal speech does not imply that 
language mediates between the body and the mind, it establishes a relational 
continuum between the continually evolving objects of perception and the 
mental images of them that humans construct. Furthermore, the relational 
nature of Vygotsky’s gestalt approach to mind as a unity of person and 
environment links powerfully with Spinoza’s view of rational thinking as the 
understanding of causes and mechanisms, whereby the mind forms 
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‘common notions’, or adequate ideas, not only of what things are, but also of 
how they come into existence and how they might subsequently change.  
Although my overall study is focused on the potential of play to 
generate cultural transformation, I have proposed that transformative action 
driven by reflexive thinking is not antithetical to habit. Instead, I have 
suggested that play might enable an oscillation between habitual, ready-to-
hand activity and present-at-hand engagement with sensible forms that is 
more critically self-aware. I have termed this oscillation anchorage-leverage, 
recognising that the anchorage of the habitus is the essential material with 
which individuals act in the world, but also proposing that this material can 
be reconfigured through spatio-temporal reflexivity. In other words, 
anchorage, like the habitus, need not be seen as an ossified block of habitual 
practices that are predetermined to reproduce themselves. Rather, the 
insertion of rationality into Bourdieu’s theory through the ideas of Spinoza 
and Vygotsky offers scope for habitus alteration as reflexivity widens spatial 
perception and deepens temporal thinking, diversifying the affects we receive 
and the affective action we can perform, to enable self-determined agency in 








In this thesis, I have argued that the culturally transformative 
potential of play in participatory performance can be promoted by designing 
in response to the cultural particularities of players, pursuing spatio-
temporal reflexivity in play that enables them to diversify their affective 
potentia, and inviting participants to produce self-documentations of their 
experiences that can feed into ongoing creative learning. I have proposed 
that basing the design process on an investigation of their habitus invites 
players of participatory performances to actively consider issues of concern 
in their own lives. Within the play experience, I have suggested that an 
aesthetics of reflexivity prompts participants to look beyond the familiar 
within their horizon of perception and draw upon a more diverse range of 
affects to expand their capacities. Subsequently, my arguments for 
participatory self-documentation are based on the notion that the 
transformative potential of play goes beyond the act of play itself, as 
documentations, memories and performative reiterations are applied in 
pedagogical processes that extend the possibilities for learning, inviting 
playful experimentation with possible reconfigurations of cultural values and 
practices. 
 
7.1 Primary Research Question 
This research enquiry is founded on the premise that play reflects 
human cultures and also shapes their ongoing social construction. As such, 
play can be both a conservative activity that solidifies cultural values and a 
transformative activity that progressively alters them. Brian Sutton-Smith’s 
theory of adaptive variability makes a compelling case for the progressive 
potential of play, as individuals reconfigure the substance of their lived 
experience in preparation for uncertain futures.1 Applications of play in 
artistic contexts have displayed a similar progressive intent, with movements 
                                                          
1 Brian Sutton-Smith, The Ambiguity of Play (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997), pp. 221-224. 
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such as Situationism and relational aesthetics using playful, participatory 
approaches to seek liberation from consumerist spectacle2 and technological 
alienation,3 respectively. Several theorists, though, have questioned the 
liberating potential of active participation in artistic contexts. Jacques 
Rancière has argued that theatrical works which seek to activate audiences 
have tended to reinforce the artist’s agenda rather than emancipating 
spectators.4 Rancière’s ideas have subsequently influenced the work of 
Claire Bishop, who suggests that participatory art works, far from serving an 
emancipatory function, often enforce either communitarian consensus5 or 
the values of neoliberal self-sufficiency onto participants.6  In light of the 
conflicting visions of play in participatory art, my core concern in this project 
has been to investigate how play can promote the ‘ascending meaning’ of 
cultural changeability7 in line with Sutton-Smith’s theory of play as adaptive 
variability. This core focus frames the primary research question of this 
study: 
How can the design, enactment and documentation of play in the 
context of participatory performance create the potential for 
transformations of cultural values? 
 
7.2 Subsidiary Questions & Research Findings 
Within the primary research question noted above, I have focused on 
three subsidiary questions that inform the overall theme of this study. In 
this section, I reiterate these questions and set out the findings that have 
emerged in response to them, prior to drawing together the insights that my 
enquiries have produced to address the primary research question. 
                                                          
2 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Ken Knabb (Eastbourne: Soul Bay 
Press, 2009). 
3 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. by Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods 
with the participation of Mathieu Copeland (Dijon: Les Presses du Reel, 2002), pp. 16-17. 
4 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso 
Books, 2009), pp. 4-5. 
5 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: 
Verso Books, 2012), p. 25. 
6 Bishop, Artificial, p. 14. 
7 Thomas S. Henricks, Play and the Human Condition. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 




7.2.1 Play Design in Response to Cultural Particularity 
My first subsidiary research question starts from the premise that if 
cultural transformation through play is of central concern, there must be a 
consideration of whose cultural values are at stake and what kind of 
transformation players might wish to enact. It is important to state that this 
research has not proceeded from an assumption that cultural 
transformation is necessarily desirable or required. Rather, my focus has 
been to create play activities in which the essential content is determined by 
the interests of participants rather than the interests of the designer. This 
endeavour to enable players to actively reflect upon their own cultural values 
and express their agency in (potentially) transforming them, frames the first 
of my subsidiary research questions: 
How may the cultural particularity of participants inform the design of 
play in participatory performance works?  
In responding to this question, Jacques Rancière’s theory emancipated 
spectatorship has provided a productive provocation in its assumption of 
perceptual equality amongst spectators. In considering the play of 
participatory performance, Rancière’s emphasis on equality is problematic 
since it elides the differential capacities of each individual which will 
necessarily define their relative powers as players. By contrast, Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is useful in considering the variable capital 
affordances that individuals have acquired over their life trajectory. 
Furthermore, whereas Rancière emphasises perceptual and interpretive 
autonomy, Bourdieu’s field theory is fundamentally relational, promoting the 
notion that the capital affordances of the habitus are formed and continually 
reformed through relational connections in the fields that individuals 
occupy.8 Consequently, Bourdieu’s ideas on habitus formation have 
informed my design of play activities that engage the cultural particularity of 
participants and invite them to play with possible cultural transformations.    
                                                          
8 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. by Richard 
Nice (Abingdon: Routledge Classics, 2010), p. 87. 
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In my practical work, Bourdieu’s habitus concept has served as the 
basis for play design through a process that I have termed ‘habitus mining’. 
Habitus mining is, effectively, a reappropriation of Constantin Stanislavski’s 
process of ‘given circumstances’ analysis which seeks to excavate texts for 
contextual details of place, time and character biography.9 I have chosen to 
use given circumstances analysis because I see strong connections between 
this process and system analysis in game design as well as Bourdieu’s field 
theory. These analytical approaches seek to assess a system or social field by 
identifying the active objects (or agents) in the system and the attributes that 
they have acquired through relational connections with other agents and 
their inhabited environment. Rather than simply representing social 
scenarios, however, these approaches also consider the possibility for 
emergent changeability within them, as agents acquire new capacities by 
forming new relational connections with other objects in the system. 
Consequently, given my primary priority of investigating possible cultural 
transformations through play, hybridisation of given circumstances analysis, 
system design and field theory seemed to offer scope for creating play 
structures that might enable players to apply their agency in exploring 
emergent potential. 
In the Haringey Community Hub project, habitus mining proved to be 
effective in assessing the cultural particularity of participants, as simple 
questions about places of meaning yielded substantial insights into their life 
trajectories and the capital affordances that had shaped them. For example, 
Yamini’s description of her choice to emigrate from Tanzania to England to 
pursue further education illuminated her relatively high cultural capital, 
while Mrs Jadeja’s forced migration, prompted by Idi Amin’s persecution of 
the Asian population of Uganda suggested much lower capital affordances. 
Following the habitus mining process, my intention was to use the material 
gathered to create system-based games, with the aim of creating play 
structures offering agency and the potential for emergent narratives. It 
proved problematic, however, to assimilate a broad plurality of life 
trajectories within one unified system and this prompted a reconsideration of 
                                                          
9 Constantin Stanislavksi, An Actor Prepares, trans. by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 43-44. 
254 
 
the value, for my purposes, of system-based game design and Bourdieu’s 
field theory. This reconsideration suggested that the concept of the field can 
impose a reductive simplification on complex social phenomena. 
Furthermore, in Bourdieu’s theory, as fields become more autonomous from 
external influences, the doxa, or dominant ideology of field activity, becomes 
strengthened and increasingly resistant to change.10 Consequently, in the 
context of a study about cultural transformation, I recognised that field 
theory was much less useful for my practical work than the concept of 
habitus, since relative field autonomy implies relative cultural ossification. I 
was also prompted to reflect on the limitations of system design in 
developing games for diverse participant groups and this led me to draw on 
the work of Ian Bogost, whose theory of unit operations offers an alternative 
to systems thinking in the study of games. 
Bogost’s theory applies the concept of the meme as the elemental 
cultural unit,11 which interacts with other units to assemble structures in a 
bottom-up process of bricolage, in opposition to top-down visions of systems 
governed by universal laws that strive to provide totalizing determinations.12 
This theory has been influential for my design approach because, in contrast 
to methods of system design that can impose reductive simplification on 
complex issues, bricolage play creation invites players to assemble their own 
structures as the memes of one habitus interact with others to co-create a 
broader memeplex. Bogost’s unit operational theory is expanded through the 
concept of rhizomatic nomadism in which bodies are deterritorialized into 
new contexts, enabling an ‘overcoding’, or reconstitution, of the body in 
question.13 Subsequently, the bricolage play activities that I have designed 
have offered scope, I suggest, for players to deterritorialize themselves and 
                                                          
10 Louis Pinto, ‘The Field: a Leibnizian perspective in sociology’, in Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Social Fields: Concepts and Applications, ed. by Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015), pp. 102-118 (p.112). 
11 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 192, cited 
in Ian Bogost, Unit Operations: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2008), p. 45. 
12 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 22, 
cited in Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 49. 
13 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. by Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987), cited in Bogost, Unit Operations, p. 141. 
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reconstitute their subjectivity, even if only slightly, through intersubjective 
overcoding.  
In my work with Ravi and Mr Ganguly, the invitation for both players 
to reappropriate each other’s stories enabled them to insert their subjectivity 
into a new context, with the possibility that they might alter their cultural 
particularity and that of their play partner. Ravi’s renovation of Mr Ganguly’s 
story of working as a guard on the platform of King’s Cross station created a 
dramatic narrative of trying to rescue a woman from the train tracks, which 
challenged Mr Ganguly to consider with a more impulsive and less rule-
bound version of himself. Similarly, in the work at the Haringey Sheltered 
Housing schemes, the collision of familiar stories with unfamiliar images 
from other people’s narratives challenged players to deterritorialize 
themselves. This was particularly evident in Brenda’s story of near-drowning 
at the pond in Epping Forest, which made a substantial imaginative 
departure through the overcoding of Daniel’s image of an aeroplane flying 
over water. This image prompted Brenda to take her story to Paris, as Mavis, 
the young woman who was the caretaker of her childhood self, fled her 
responsibilities for a weekend of fun in a place that Brenda (who did not 
even have a passport) had never visited. The key point that emerges from 
these examples is that bricolage play design frameworks enabled players to 
express their cultural particularity in relation to cultural memes provided by 
others. This created intersubjective palimpsests that offered scope for 
imaginative adaptation of the habitus and the potential, however slight, for 
cultural transformation. 
 
7.2.2 Participatory Self-Documentation and Curatorial Pedagogy 
Beyond the act of play itself, play performances are remembered and 
documented and these recordings can subsequently be used in pedagogical 
processes through which individuals gain knowledge that informs their 
power of acting in the world. It follows that if play is to be culturally 
transformative, there must be a consideration of how it is documented and 
how the records of play are applied in ongoing learning about play and 
through play. This focus on extending the culturally transformative potential 
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of play through documentation and pedagogy frames the second of my 
subsidiary research questions: 
How can play documentation and play design pedagogy further the 
culture building potential of play in the context of participatory 
performance?  
In approaching this question, my research has responded to critiques of 
conventional performance archives and conventional models of pedagogy. 
For performance theorists like Diana Taylor, the archive often consolidates 
the control of historical narratives by figures of power, which prevents 
ordinary people from expressing their agency in recording their own 
experience.14 In the context of participatory performance, I have argued that 
conventional documentation forms such as photography and video are 
particularly problematic since they create archives that distil the experience 
of participants into art objects. These art objects are often then utilised to 
present the artist’s version of the work, which implicitly undercuts the ability 
of participants to give their own account of it. In the same way that the 
archive can consolidate artistic agency, conventional models of education 
foreground the agency of the pedagogue as the ‘master explicator’ who 
imparts knowledge to students with the putative objective of reducing their 
ignorance. This arguably undermines the agency of learners in shaping their 
own educational experience. In response to these conservative perspectives 
on performance documentation and pedagogy, I have created pedagogically 
focused play projects in which participants could self-document their 
experience and subsequently apply these documentations in ongoing 
learning. 
Rancière’s theory of emancipated studentship has been influential in 
stimulating my pedagogical research, but in contrast to his emphasis on 
autonomous learning undertaken by students who are assumed to be equal, 
I have found greater value in the pedagogical theories of Lev Vygotsky. 
Vygotsky’s concept of the zone of proximal development views learning as a 
fundamentally social process in which groups of individuals with differing 
                                                          
14 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 74. 
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capacities develop new knowledge by creatively imitating each other, 
performing what they cannot (yet) do in order to acquire new capacities.15 In 
the Playground project, the prevalence of performative imitation in a group 
learning context was clearly apparent. In reflecting on the early workshop 
exercises, Josh and Zara both commented on the value of copying others 
who seemed to know what they were doing, as a way of overcoming their 
initial inhibitions. In addition to foregrounding the relational space of 
learning, Vygotsky’s approach to imaginative time has presented a fertile 
contrast to Rancière’s preference for temporal immediacy. Whereas Rancière 
favours the immediacy of curiosity which requires no prior unveiling from 
the master explicator,16 Vygotsky makes it clear that learning in the present 
requires imaginative recollection of past experiences in order to construct 
future projections.17 This notion of imaginative time that combines past, 
present and future has been significant in the Playground project as 
participants recalled various exercises and projected these memories into the 
future by applying them in new creative contexts, such as Zara’s recycling of 
my Totem Build exercise with her own theatre company. 
My design of the Playground projects has been informed by Jerome 
Bruner’s ‘scaffolding’ concept, which can be seen as an extension of 
Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development.18 In the Playground projects, my 
scaffolding involved setting out a range of play design methods that 
participants could test and reappropriate as they saw fit and I have argued 
that this pedagogical approach can also be understood as a form of 
‘curatorial’ practice. In fine art discourses, the curatorial describes the 
endeavour to create contexts for the ‘event of knowledge’19 in which 
participants co-create the content of their experience, just as learners co-
create new ideas and methods. This notion of curatorial scaffolding in 
pedagogy creates a context for the bricolage of knowledge in much the same 
                                                          
15 Lois Holzman, Vygotsky At Work and Play (Hove: Routledge, 2009), p. 30. 
16 Tyson E. Lewis, The Aesthetics of Education: Theatre, Curiosity and Politics in the work of 
Jacques Rancière and Paulo Freire (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), p. 95. 
17 Lev S. Vygotsky, ‘Imagination and Creativity in Childhood’, Journal of Russian and East 
European Psychology, 42:1 (2004), 7-97 (p. 16). 
18 Holzman, Vygotsky, p. 28. 
19 Irit Rogoff, ‘The Expanding Field’, in The Curatorial: The Philosophy of Curating, ed. by 
John Paul Martinon (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 41-48 (p. 46). 
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way that bricolage as a design process invites co-creation of play structures, 
and I contend that this concept is valuable in framing both the design of play 
and the teaching of play design. 
With regard to documentation, this research has considered debates 
between performance studies scholars who view performance as ephemeral 
and unrecordable and those who argue for the necessity of archival 
documentation to preserve and pass on knowledge. Alternatives to these 
polarised positions are offered by the works of Diana Taylor and Rebecca 
Schneider who argue that performance can serve as a form of embodied 
recording in itself. Similarly, Richard Schechner’s notion of performance as 
‘twice-behaved behaviour’ suggests that performative activity in the now 
necessarily holds traces of the past.20 These ideas have enabled me to forego 
photographic or video documentation of my practical work and invite 
participants in the Playground projects to self-document their experience 
through written notes, verbal reflection, embodied memory or reiterative 
performances. I have subsequently argued, drawing on the work of 
anthropologist Roger Sansi, that such documentations can function as gifts 
of the ‘distributed person’21 that extend knowledge into the future in a wider 
relational space, creating a social debt and issuing a call for ‘response-
ability’22 from those who receive these gifts. The notion that documentary 
gifts can function as social debt has been evident in the Playground projects 
as participants represented their experience to each other and called for a 
response. For example, Josh’s written documentation of the development of 
his group project issued a call for response-ability to his colleagues, 
prompting them to undertake their own research and then document their 
findings. Similarly, the various offshoots of Playground exercises into new 
creative contexts exemplified the concept of the distributed person, as 
embodied memories of play were gifted to others, inviting them to playfully 
                                                          
20 Richard Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), p. 36. 
21 Alfred Gell, Art and Agency (London: Clarendon Press), cited in Roger Sansi, Art, 
Anthropology and the Gift (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 11-12. 
22 Roger I. Simon, A Pedagogy of Witnessing: Curatorial Practice and the Pursuit of Social 
Justice (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2014), p. 19. 
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respond and thereby extending the agency of players into new spaces and 
times. 
 
7.2.3 Aesthetics of Reflexivity in Play 
The third of my subsidiary research questions is premised on the 
notion that play is, essentially, an endeavour to make some impact on the 
material fabric of the world.23 This marks play as an aesthetic, yet 
concurrently political, process, whereby players reconfigure the material of 
their experience in pursuit of desired futures. In considering the capacity of 
players to reconfigure the world, I have explored how the aesthetic materials 
of space and time can be composed and recomposed in play. This 
exploration has investigated how an aesthetics of reflexivity might enhance 
players’ agential capacities to consciously reorder the sensory forms within 
their horizon of perception, alongside the cultural constructions that are 
bound up in them, in response to my third subsidiary research question: 
How can the aesthetic compositions of space and time in the play of 
participatory performance promote reflexive agency? 
My response to this question has been informed by Rancière’s concept of the 
redistribution of the sensible which sets out a radical vision for how 
individuals can reconfigure the hierarchical organisation of the sensible 
forms of the world.24 Rancière’s theory rests on the assumption of equality 
between individuals and the preservation of their autonomy, but I have 
argued that presumed equality elides the history of the habitus and 
autonomy undercuts the relationality of social space. This contraction of 
space and expungement of past time presents an aesthetics of immediacy, 
and I contend that immediacy in space and time undermines the ability of 
individuals to reflexively think beyond the spatio-temporal present and 
thereby impedes their power of action. In response to the aesthetics of 
immediacy, I have explored spatio-temporal reflexivity in play, inviting 
participants to look beyond the immediate here and now to access a wider 
                                                          
23 Henricks, Human Condition, p. 24. 
24 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, ed. and trans. by Steven 
Corcoran (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 139. 
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diversity of affects that can expand their agential capacities to effect cultural 
transformations. In developing my ideas on spatio-temporal reflexivity, the 
philosophy of Baruch Spinoza has been of primary importance. Spinoza 
argues that human beings are most strongly affected by that which is 
present in space and time.25 He also asserts, however, that if beings are 
solely affected by what is immediately present, they are, effectively, caught in 
a passive enslavement to external forces.26 By contrast, directing the mind to 
things that are beyond the spatio-temporal present enables beings to receive 
a broader diversity of affects.27 Subsequently, as the body increases its 
capacity to be affected in a many ways, its potentia is similarly increased.28 It 
follows from this that reflexive agency is promoted by an expansive spatial 
perspective and a depth perspective on time, both of which enable affective 
diversification and strengthened power of action. 
In the Trumpington and Peartree Bridge projects I have sought to reify 
my ideas on facilitating reflexive agency in play by extending the spatio-
temporal perspective of players. In the Passage role-play at Trumpington, 
the source material for play was ‘mined’ by asking three time-based 
questions about the immediate and more distant past: ‘Where have you come 
from today?’ ‘Where have you come from as an adult?’ and ‘Where have you 
come from since childhood?’ Subsequently, the play itself reconfigured the 
material gathered in response to these questions in an imagining of desired 
futures of the characters that were created. In Cerys’ reflections on playing 
this piece, it was evident that she appreciated being able to take time, in 
contrast to the typically quick tempo of everyday action, to think deeply 
about her own temporal trajectory and what she wished to do to ‘make a 
good end to life’. Consequently, I argue that the temporal framing of this play 
activity serves as an example of how temporal reflexivity in play can promote 
agency, producing affective diversification that increases the potential to 
take self-determined action. In Peartree Bridge, spatial diversification took a 
                                                          
25 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics: Proved in Geometric Order, ed. by G.H.R. Parkinson, trans. by 
Andrew Boyle and G.H.R. Parkinson (London: Everyman Classics, 1992), p. 196, part IV, 
app. XXX. 
26 Spinoza, p. 182, part IV, prop. LX, note. 
27 Spinoza, p. 183, part IV, prop. LXII, note. 
28 Spinoza, pp. 168-169, part IV, prop. XXXVIII. 
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somewhat unusual form in discussions of how animals can enable people to 
move beyond the immediate familiarity of the spatial present. During our 
walk around the neighbourhood, Susan suggested that, for her, having a dog 
not only opened new spaces that had previously been unexplored, it also 
helped her make connections with new people in the area. Similarly, the 
Superpets role-play invited participants to create animal characters as 
guides who could bring their humans into a wider relational space. Lysbeth’s 
reflections on having the night vision of a cat, for example, are suggestive of 
the possibilities of imaginatively playing with a wider plurality of relational 
connections (both human and non-human) and the new affordances that 
these imagined connections might confer. 
The diversification of relational play space to include a broader 
plurality of affective influences, beyond those that are immediately familiar, 
implies the value of pursuing the defamiliarization of space. In Playground 2, 
Luke reflected on his appreciation of using relatively abstract objects, 
suggesting that this offered scope to redeploy objects beyond their familiar 
function. This chimes closely with Martin Heidegger’s delineation of ready-to-
hand and present-at-hand objects, with the present-at-hand inviting 
reflexive thought about how to deploy the object, as opposed to immediate 
and automatic ready-to-hand use of it.29 I suggest that a present-at-hand 
approach to space is valuable because it offers scope for transcending spatial 
familiarity and invites reflexive consideration of potential reappropriations of 
sensible forms. In addition to defamiliarization of space, the work of 
Playground 2 illustrated the potential of spatial distancing for promoting 
reflexivity. In discussing the view over London Bridge station from the 
Nursery Training Centre, Luke noted the value of looking over a wide 
distance to gain a broader sense of perspective. Similarly, Catryn highlighted 
that an expanded spatial horizon can alter perception of what is proximal, as 
was evident from the fact that her imaginative reconfiguration of the roof of 
London Bridge into the sea (within the fiction of the Neighbourhood larp) 
                                                          
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1962), cited in James 




produced pleasurable affects that ‘poetised’ the space, displacing her painful 
awareness of the coldness of the studio in which the larp was being played. 
All the aesthetic strategies noted above, which have pursued depth 
perspective on time and diversified, distanced or defamiliarized spatial 
perception are in line with Spinoza’s call for the rational intentionality of the 
mind to seek a broader array of affects beyond the spatio-temporal present. 
This does not require an outright rejection of immediacy, however. Rather, 
my argument has been for oscillation between immediacy and reflexivity in 
play. As Bourdieu’s logic of practice suggests, habitual action is developed in 
the immediacy of action in the here and now. Whereas Bourdieu downplays 
the possibility for reflexivity to alter habit,30 however, I have argued that the 
application of Spinozist rationality via the internalised use of language 
described by Vygotsky, offers potential for habit to oscillate with alteration as 
primary affects are reshaped by second-order observations. I have described 
this oscillation as anchorage-leverage, with the idea that the anchorage of 
habitual action can be altered through the leverage of spatio-temporal 
reflexivity that produces affective diversification and the emergence of a 
diversified habitus. 
 
7.2.4 Synergising Research Findings 
The ideas that I have developed regarding the aesthetics of space and 
time in play provide a thematic link between the several stages of this 
research enquiry, enabling me to draw together my findings in response to 
the primary research question. In the same way that the projects featured in 
Chapter 6 have focused on spatio-temporal reflexivity with a view to 
enhancing the potentia of players, the activities undertaken in response to 
the first and second questions (detailed in Chapters 4 and 5) have also 
employed aesthetic strategies that pursued redistributions of the sensible 
and potential habitus alteration. At Haringey Community Hub, my work with 
Mr Ganguly gave an early indication of the limitations of an aesthetics of 
                                                          
30 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990), pp. 86-91. 
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immediacy. When I invited him to look at a picture of a train travelling 
through snowy mountains whilst listening to the sound of a train clanking 
over the tracks, I recognised that I had unwittingly immersed him in the here 
and now of his memory of travelling home from boarding school when he 
was a young man. Although this appeared to be highly satisfying for him, it 
was clear that the spatio-temporal immediacy I had created was not 
conducive to reflexive thinking. By contrast, the Islands game invited players 
to find depth perspective on time by comparing the ‘now’ of living in England 
with the ‘then’ of their childhoods in other countries. In Ravi’s reflections on 
playing the game, it seemed that the experience had prompted him to think 
quite deeply about whether he was happier in London or whether he would 
like to return to Mauritius and buy the big farm that his family had lacked 
when he was a child. This subsequently led me to reflect that, even at his 
advanced age, playing with depth perspective on the past could prompt Ravi 
to make imaginative projections of alternative futures. With regard to space, 
a key focus in my work in the Haringey Sheltered Housing schemes was to 
create play contexts that invited spatial expansion into unfamiliar territory 
through intersubjective exchanges with new relational connections. Brenda’s 
play with Daniel provided an example of this spatial expansion as his story 
of seeing an aeroplane for the first time fed into her story of Mavis’ flight 
from Epping Forest to Paris, which imaginatively transported her well 
beyond her own horizon of experience.  
In the Playground projects, although the setting of the workshops was 
a relatively familiar artistic context, spatial expansion occurred through the 
composition of a group learning environment that contained a wide variety of 
expertise, enabling participants to creatively imitate others with different 
capacities and thereby diversify their own capitals. Beyond the social 
relationality of the group itself, the use of distanced perspectives, such as 
Meg’s gaze out of the window to the foyer space outside the studio, which 
was similar to the gazes of Luke and Catryn over London Bridge, promoted 
reflexivity and ‘letting go’ of creative habits. Similarly, the use of abstract 
objects created a defamiliarization of space that enabled participants, in 
Zara’s words, to ‘see beyond the object’ and transform space beyond 
immediate familiarity. Regarding time, although the Playground workshops 
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tended to focus on the immediate practical action of play design tasks, the 
gifting of play documentation created depth perspective, as participants 
remembered their play and projected it into the future, either in their own 
practical work, or in the reiterative activity of facilitating the Playground 2 
workshops. The significance of using aesthetic strategies of spatio-temporal 
reflexivity across this body of work is that they have all been applied with the 
aim of enabling participants to look beyond the familiarity of their immediate 
horizon of experience. By enacting this looking beyond, players have opened 
new possibilities for being affected in a great many ways, strengthening their 
power of action and creating potential for cultural transformation.  
In sum, my response to the question of how the design, enactment and 
documentation of play in participatory performance can create the potential 
for the transformation of cultural values is based on the application of 
aesthetic strategies of spatio-temporal reflexivity in all stages of the process: 
design, play, documentation and play pedagogy. A curatorial scaffolding that 
encourages a wider and deeper spatio-temporal horizon enables designers, 
players and learners to apply their cultural particularity as a precursor to 
potential habitus alterations in the anchorage-leverage process that engages 
with existing subjectivities but also offers scope for transforming them. The 
habitus, forged in the immediacy of practical action, is the foundation for 
this process, but rational reflexivity allows players to oscillate between action 
and thought, habit and alteration. As a result, they can engage with a wider 
plurality of affects, strengthen their power of action and play their way 
towards a diversified habitus that enhances their agential capacity to 
redistribute the sensible forms of the world.  
 
7.3 Research Limitations 
The main limitation to my arguments in this study is that the practical 
work undertaken involved quite small numbers of participants, particularly 
in the Trumpington and Peartree Bridge projects. The difficulty of inviting 
people to play has led me to consider that, in planning certain parts of this 
research, I could have endeavoured to engage people on more familiar terrain 
through more familiar activities, prior to undertaking more ambitious 
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activity that might be conducive to culturally transformative possibilities. My 
consideration of alternative approaches has been informed by email 
correspondence with Laura, the chair of the Peartree Bridge Residents 
Association. In discussing a possible follow-up activity to the workshops that 
were undertaken in the summer of 2018, Laura suggested that a Halloween 
themed workshop about ghost stories in the local pub might be popular 
since ‘the local pub where residents have a beer in hand is the most obvious 
comfort zone for most in PTB!’31 In considering this suggestion, it was 
tempting to look askance at the idea of a workshop about ghost stories, but I 
thought further about the idea of engaging participants within their ‘comfort 
zone’ and, if scheduling had permitted, I would have undertaken this 
proposed activity. 
The tension between participant interests and those of the 
practitioner-researcher was also evident in the Playground project. It was 
clear that, in most cases, the participants had joined the activity with the 
desire to learn new skills, but this conflicted, at times, with my experimental 
‘search for method’, which risked failure and participant frustration. 
Consequently, it was tempting to pragmatically give the participants the 
tools they wished to acquire rather than pursuing my more unstable and 
unpredictable research interests. Similarly, in Playground 2, some of the 
original participants who came back as facilitators commented that 
limitations on their time prompted them to pragmatically repeat activities 
that they had done in the first iteration rather than trying out something 
new in pursuit of their own interests. Subsequently, in speculating on a 
possible Playground 3, Josh suggested that it might be beneficial to run the 
project within an entirely new set of parameters in order to move beyond 
being ‘a cover band for Jamie’s greatest hits’.32 In considering the balance 
between meeting participants on familiar ground and pursuing an 
experimental research agenda, perhaps the most instructive example is the 
project at Haringey Community Hub. Given that this context was so 
unfamiliar to me, I had to let go of all artistic pretensions and simply 
                                                          
31 ‘Laura’, ‘Re: Walking Project in Peartree Bridge’, email to Jamie Harper (3 October 2018). 
32 ‘Josh’, interviewed by Jamie Harper, Theatre Delicatessen, London (6 October 2018). See 
Appendix A: ‘Playground2.4’.   
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attempt to establish relationships with participants. Despite the difficulties 
that were presented by working in this unfamiliar context, my work at 
Haringey Community Hub has informed the development of my anchorage-
leverage concept by highlighting the value of seeking to engage participants 
in the anchorage of familiar places and activities, as a precursor to pursuing 
a leverage that invites them to play beyond their comfort zones. 
 
7.4 Contributions to Knowledge 
This section sets out the contributions of this research to scholarship 
and creative practice in participatory performance. The primary contribution 
to knowledge that this study makes is an exploration of spatio-temporal 
reflexivity in play, which serves to challenge the prevalence of immersive 
aesthetics in contemporary participatory performance. Although immersive 
immediacy is widely prized, immediacy of time and space in participatory 
performance works can undermine the agency of participants by limiting 
their perception to the here and now. My alternative propositions advocate a 
more expansive spatial perspective that looks beyond what is immediately 
proximal, alongside a depth perspective on time that combines imaginings of 
past and future to inform creative action in the present. My contention is 
that spatio-temporal reflexivity can enable players to transcend the 
anchorage of the habitus and diversify their capacities, enhancing their 
potential to affect others in a great many ways and thereby leverage 
transformations in the cultural values and practices of social groups. 
My arguments for an aesthetics of reflexivity inform all of the 
contributions to knowledge that are presented by this study. Regarding 
narrative design, I propose that the methods I have used provide useful 
alternatives to linear models of narrative in interactive performance. My 
explorations of bricolage play suggest that, in contrast to the totalising 
determinations of singular authorship or top-down systems design, 
intersubjective story-making, in which participants reflexively adapt their 
stories in relation to the contributions of others, can offer potential for 
emergent narrative development that may be more conducive to cultural 
transformation. With regard to the enactment of participatory performance, 
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my focus on creating play in response to the cultural particularity of 
participants foregrounds the notion that participant experience can be seen 
as the locus of aesthetic value in participatory art. In contrast to the 
normative primacy of the art object, this study proposes that the reflexive 
meaning-making that participants engage in, both as individuals and as 
groups, should take priority over external valuations of the relative quality of 
the work. Given that participant experience is of central importance in my 
practice, I have invited participants to take the lead in documenting their 
activity. The use of such documents in ongoing learning processes also 
contributes to understandings of creative pedagogy, offering a self-reflexive 
and cyclical model of participatory arts culture in which players can expand 
the culturally transformative impact of play by applying their self-
documentations in teaching others about play and through play. 
 
7.4.1 An Alternative to the Aesthetics of Immersion 
This research enquiry challenges the aesthetics of immersion in 
participatory performance and presents an alternative aesthetics of spatio-
temporal reflexivity. Theatre studies scholars like Josephine Machon have 
praised the exciting instantaneity of ‘the moment’ in immersive theatre 
works33 and valorised the spatial immediacy of immersive communitas, 
arguing that this kind of theatrical communitarianism offers radical political 
potential.34 Digital media scholarship provides compelling counter-
arguments, however, that spatio-temporal immediacy is not necessarily 
conducive to political agency since it is often used by digital interface 
designers to steer users into habitual patterns that serve economic profit.35 
Although the experiences of participating in immersive theatre and playing 
video games are not the same, I argue that it is useful to transpose insights 
gleaned from digital media to live performance contexts in order to question 
the assumptions held by proponents of aesthetic immediacy that ever-
increasing immersion equates to enhanced experiences. My research has 
                                                          
33 Jospehine Machon, Immersive Theatres: Intimacy and Immediacy in Contemporary 
Performance. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 130. 
34 Machon, p. 144. 
35 Ash, p. 78. 
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suggested that the aesthetics of immediacy in participatory performance can 
constrain participants in a limited spatio-temporal horizon that hinders 
reflexive criticality. By contrast, spatio-temporal reflexivity in play can create 
wider and deeper horizons of space and time, enabling players to be affected 
in a great many ways and strengthen their powers of action. Building on this 
research, I suggest that the challenge for practitioners and researchers in 
participatory performance is to question assumptions about the value of 
immersion and create works that experiment further with the aesthetics of 
spatio-temporal reflexivity in the endeavour to offer greater creative agency 
to participants. 
 
7.4.2 Non-Linear Play Design of Bricolage 
This research poses a challenge to the linearity of structure that 
permeates much participatory performance, offering the alternative concept 
of bricolage play design, in which players reflexively co-create the content of 
their play within a curatorial framework provided by the designer. In my 
Literature Review, I have suggested that theatre studies scholars have quite 
partial understandings of how participatory narrative structures can be 
designed to promote the agency of participants. Consequently, I have argued 
that performance practitioners who wish to include playful participation in 
their work might usefully pursue greater knowledge of how games are 
designed as systems that afford emergent narrative potential and player 
agency. Despite my advocacy of using system-thinking in participatory 
performance design, this research has recognised that systems can be as 
totalising as linear narratives. Ian Bogost’s work has highlighted that many 
games function as closed systems with immutable rules that limit 
transformative potential and his theory of unit operations has prompted me 
to pursue looser play design processes, informed by the concept of bricolage, 
in which participants assemble their own play contexts within a curatorial 
framework. My development of bricolage play design has been strongly 
informed by the co-creative workshop practices of Nordic larp and, in 
making arguments against the deployment of pre-prepared content and 
linear narrative structures in participatory performance, my encouragement 
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to scholars and practitioners in this field is to seek out the practical 
knowledge that Nordic larp has pioneered and apply it, as I have attempted 
to do, to further their understandings of how participatory narrative design 
can support participant agency. 
 
7.4.3 Cultural Particularity and Aesthetic Experience 
This research contributes to knowledge in the field of participatory 
performance by proposing that the cultural particularity of participants can 
be the source and substance of the work and that their subjective play 
experience should be seen as the locus of aesthetic value. This proposition 
challenges the tendency of fine art critics like Claire Bishop to treat 
participants as material for artists to complete their participatory works.36 
Instead, this enquiry has suggested habitus mining as a process for gaining 
insight into the cultural particularity of participants, which can then serve 
as the foundation for the design of the performance work in question. It 
must be acknowledged that many applied theatre practices are based on 
long term engagement with the cultural particularity of their participants,37 
but I argue that, in theatrical contexts, the dominant tendency is to focus 
this participatory engagement on the final output of an art object that is 
presented as Performance for an audience. Clearly, there are exceptions to 
this, but I propose that participatory performance makers can benefit from 
the insights of writers like Grant Kester whose discussion of dialogical 
aesthetics in participatory art focuses on the aesthetic value of participant 
experience.38 In arguing for the primacy of aesthetic experience in 
participatory performance, I encourage practitioners and scholars to 
question the hierarchies of artistic judgement in which critics, academics 
and persons in positions of artistic leadership are assigned the role of 
defining artistic worth. My contrary proposition is that the subjective 
reflections of participants should determine the aesthetic value of a given 
                                                          
36 Bishop, Artificial, p. 237. 
37 Gareth White, Applied Theatre: Aesthetics (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 76. 
38 Grant Kester, Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art. 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004). 
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work and it is the voices of participants that should come to the fore in 
describing its success or failure. 
 
7.4.4 Cyclical Processes of Play Documentation & Pedagogy 
In developing my approach to play documentation, I have referenced 
work on performance documentation by Diana Taylor and Rebecca 
Schneider whose ideas on performance as embodied memory have been 
extremely valuable to this study. I propose that my research adds to this 
work by explicitly linking play documentation to play pedagogy, with the 
argument that participatory self-documentation through reiterative 
performance is a key stimulus to ongoing learning about play and through 
play. I have suggested that self-documentation can function as a gift that 
creates social debt and calls for reciprocal response-ability, which implies an 
ongoing learning process, as gifts are received and passed on. The 
Playground projects have exemplified a self-reflexive and cyclical process of 
learning by inviting players to become designers, then teachers, and, finally, 
to become players again as a new group of makers comes to the fore. This is 
a model of participatory culture that seeks to collapse the divide between 
artists and audiences so that everyone can be an agent, if they so choose, in 
an evolving community of practice. This model of participatory culture is 
already practiced in Nordic larp communities, where there is little perceived 
distinction, I suggest, between individuals defined as players and those 
defined as designers. My proposition is to bring this approach into new 
performance settings with an explicitly pedagogical intent to create a 
broadened zone of proximal development in which everyone can be a player 
and also a maker.  
  
7.5 Impact of Research on Personal Creative Practice 
Having worked for over ten years as a theatre director, this research 
has led me to transition from viewing myself as an artist towards viewing 
myself as a curator of co-created play experiences. This transition has been 
a highly reflexive process that is both professional and personal. In addition 
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to letting go of many of my prior convictions about performance and the role 
of the theatre director, I have been prompted to look back into my family 
history and my parents’ work in education. Having previously held the 
dismissive view that they were ‘just teachers’ my pedagogical research has 
created a newfound admiration for the creativity and passion of their 
pedagogical practice, which I have sought to emulate. Necessarily, a child 
emulates their parents to some extent, but my endeavour to carry forward 
some of the pedagogical insights of my parents has led me to think in terms 
of a genealogy of learning which has strongly influenced my ideas on the 
pedagogical cycle of play, as players pass on their experience to others 
through documentary gifts and reiterative performances. Reiterative 
performance can be found at the very start of this thesis in the quotation, 
included in my acknowledgements, from Ruth Ludemann about the balance 
between answers and questions in research.39 My father found this quote on 
a door at the University of Ulster in Coleraine in the early 1990s when he 
worked there as an educational researcher. A few years later, when my older 
sister was completing her PhD, he passed this quote on to her and she made 
it the epigram for her thesis. She has subsequently passed this gift on to me 
and I now accept the response-ability of using it to frame my research as a 
combination of answers and questions for further research. 
 
7.6 Questions & Answers 
In concluding my response to the question of how play might create 
potential for the transformation of cultural values, my answers begin with an 
argument for developing curatorial frameworks for all stages of the play 
process, whether it is the design, enactment, documentation or teaching of 
it. Curatorial frameworks provide a structure for the co-creative design 
process of bricolage, whereby participants are able to make their cultural 
particularity the source and substance of play. This bricolage approach 
brings the habitus of participants into contact with new relational 
connections on alternative trajectories, offering scope for deterritorialization 
                                                          
39 Ruth Ludemann, ‘The Paradoxical Nature of Nursing Research’, Image: The Journal of 
Nursing Scholarship, 11:1 (1979), 2-8. 
272 
 
of cultural particularities as the habitus is altered by intersubjective 
exchange. Beyond the process of co-creative design, in the play itself, I have 
argued for an aesthetics of spatio-temporal reflexivity so that players can 
look beyond their limited horizon, and the anchorage of their habitus, to 
leverage new possibilities from the imagination of deep time and the affective 
diversification of expanded space. Once play is concluded, the invitation for 
participants to document their experience foregrounds the importance of 
player agency, not only in play, but in the retrospective narrativization of 
play experience. This documentation can take any form that the players 
choose, but I have suggested that the embodied memory of play and its 
reiterative performance can fulfil an important role in the pedagogical 
promulgation of playful transformative potential.  
As the documentary gifts of the distributed person are extended in 
space and time, the cyclical process of playing, remembering, making and 
playing again is perpetuated, offering further possibilities for players and 
their successors to play on, interrogating new questions and continuing to 
ludically redistribute the sensible forms of the world. Fundamentally, this 
redistribution is an aesthetic, yet concurrently political, process that rests 
on a spatio-temporal reflexivity that enables players to look beyond the 
familiar and incorporate the strange into their horizon of experience. By 
widening our perspective on space, we open the possibility of making new 
connections that diversify our capitals as a plurality of affects strengthen our 
power of acting, while a depth perspective on time enables us to reconfigure 
past and present in imaginative projections of desired futures. The future-
oriented focus of play illustrates that play activities do not simply offer 
reflections of cultures, they also fulfil a vital role in their ongoing social 
construction, and the ongoing task for players, designers and scholars alike 
is to continue questioning how playful performance can widen our horizons 
and strengthen our power to create a culture of joy for all who play, and all 
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Appendix A: Audio Recordings of Participant Interviews 
 
Please see the enclosed DVDs for access to the audio files listed below.  
Note: these DVDs will not be made publicly accessible alongside the 
published version of this thesis, in order to maintain participant 
confidentiality. 
 
A.1: Audio Files for projects in Chapter 1 
 
A.1.1 Haringey Community Hub 
HaringeyCommunityHub1     3 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub2     3 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub3     3 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub4     3 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub5     10 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub6     10 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub7     10 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub8     10 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub9     17 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub10     17 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub11     24 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub12     24 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub13     24 July 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub14     7 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub15     7 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub16     7 August 2017 
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HaringeyCommunityHub17     7 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub18     7 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub19     7 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub20     7 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub21     7 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub22     14 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub23     14 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub24     21 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub25     21 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub26     21 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub27     21 August 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub28     4 September 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub29     4 September 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub30     27 November 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub31     4 December 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub32     4 December 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub33     4 December 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub34     4 December 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub35     4 December 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub36     11 December 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub37     11 December 2017 
HaringeyCommunityHub38     12 March 2018 
HaringeyCommunityHub39     12 March 2018 
HaringeyCommunityHub40     12 March 2018 
HaringeyCommunityHub41     12 March 2018 
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HaringeyCommunityHub42     19 March 2018 
HaringeyCommunityHub43     26 March 2018 
HaringeyCommunityHub44     23 April 2018 
 
A.1.2 Haringey Sheltered Housing Schemes 
HaringeyCranleyDene1      22 November 2017 
HaringeyClementsHouse1     11 December 2017 
HaringeyClementsHouse2     15 January 2018 
HaringeyCranleyDene2      17 January 2018 
HaringeyClementsHouse3     22 January 2018 
HaringeyClementsHouse4     29 January 2018 
HaringeyClementsHouse5     12 February 2018 
HaringeyClementsHouse6     26 February 2018 
 
A.2: Audio Files for projects in Chapter 2 
 
A.2.1 Playground 
Playground1       13 March 2018 
Playground2       13 March 2018 
Playground3       27 March 2018 
Playground4       27 March 2018 
Playground5       27 March 2018 
Playground6       3 April 2018 
Playground7       3 April 2018 
Playground8       17 April 2018 
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Playground9       24 April 2018 
Playground10       8 May 2018 
Playground11       15 May 2018 
Playground12       22 May 2018 
Playground13       19 June 2018 
Playground14       23 June 2018 
Playground 15       27 June 2018 
Playground 16       28 June 2018 
Playground17       12 July 2018 
Playground18       23 July 2018 
 
A.3: Audio Files for projects in Chapter 3 
 
A.3.1 Migrations of Cool 
MigrationsOfCoolDevelopment1    8 July 2017 
MigrationsOfCoolDevelopment2    8 July 2017 
MigrationsOfCoolDevelopment3    8 July 2017 
MigrationsOfCoolDevelopment4    8 July 2017 
MigrationsOfCoolDevelopment5    8 July 2017 
MigrationsOfCoolDevelopment6    8 July 2017 
MigrationsOfCoolDevelopment7    8 July 2017 
 
A.3.2 Trumpington Community Orchard 
TrumpingtonCommunityOrchard1    23 September 2017 




A.3.3 Peartree Bridge 
PeartreeBridge1       13 June 2018 
PeartreeBridge2       13 June 2018 
PeartreeBridge3       20 June 2018 
PeartreeBridge4       4 July 2018 
PeartreeBridge5       18 July 2018 
PeartreeBridge6       23 July 2018 
PeartreeBridge7       23 July 2018 
PeartreeBridge8       30 August 2018 
 
A.3.4 Playground 2 
Playground2.1       26 October 2018 
Playground2.2       24 October 2018 
Playground2.3       24 October 2018 
Playground2.4       6 October 2018 
Playground2.5       23 September 2018 






Appendix B: Game Rule Sets & Play Scripts 
 
B.1 Deterritorialization 
The Deterritorialization exercise was played at Haringey Community Hub in 
London in November 2017. 
 
This exercise was played in pairs. To begin, I laid out four images relating to 
stories that each player had told me. I then asked the other player to pick 
the image that they were most interested in. 
Once the image was selected, I asked the player to whom the image related 
(the original storyteller) to describe the place and their relationship to the 
place. 
The new player was then invited to imagine a fictional character in the 
location. As a stimulus, they were invited to pick two characteristics (one 
positive, one negative) which were written on small slips of paper. 
Using these characteristics, the new player was asked to give the character a 
name and describe them. 
At this point, the original character was asked to imagine and describe two 
more people in the location who have some important relationship with the 
fictional character. 
The new player was then invited to discuss the hopes and fears of the 
fictional character. 
*** 
The new player decides which of the two new people they would like the 
fictional character to go and speak to (for whatever reason). 
The new player then describes this meeting and the original player says what 
the outcome of the meeting will be. 
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The new player describes what happens when the fictional character goes to 
speak to the other person with whom they have an important relationship 
and the original player, again, describes the outcome of this meeting. 
The new player gives a final description of the hopes and fears of the fictional 
character. 
Debrief: Players were invited to reflect on their experience of the play 
exercise. What was it like to work with someone else’s story? What was it like 





B.2 Gestalt World Building 
The Gestalt World Building exercise was played at Theatre Delicatessen in 
London in April 2018. 
 
To begin, players were separated into groups of 4. I placed a randomly 
selected stimulus image in the centre of a space for each group. Players were 
invited to pick a random object that somehow responded to the image. 
Players were given a number: 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
1. Player 1 was invited to place their object in the space and describe it as a 
feature of an imaginary landscape.  
2. Players 2, 3 and 4 were invited to add their object (one at a time) and give 
an additional description of the landscape. 
3. Having built a landscape with the arrangement of the objects, players 
were invited to move the objects further apart to expand the range of the 
space. 
4. Player 1 was invited to make a movement into the space and find a place 
to stop within it that they liked, or where they felt safe or strong. 
5. Player 1 was then invited to give a description of a character (Character A) 
that they imagined in this space – giving them a name. 
6. Player 2 was invited to make a movement into the space and find a place 
to stop within it that they liked, or where they felt safe or strong. 
7. Player 2 was then invited to give a description of a character (Character B) 
that they imagined in this space – giving them a name. 
8. The next person (Player 3) was invited to go and replace the person 
playing Character A, then make a journey through space and find their way 
towards a frozen image in which they make a gesture towards the other 
character that expressed a relationship. 
9. The other player was invited to give a description of the relationship. 
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10. The next person (Player 4) was invited to go and replace the person 
playing Character B, then make a journey through space and find their way 
towards a frozen image in which they make a gesture towards the other 
character that expressed a relationship. 
11. The other player was invited to give a further description of the 
relationship 
12. The next person was invited to go and replace the person playing 
Character A. They then made another journey in space, finding their way 
towards a frozen image in which they made physical contact with the other 
in a way that expressed the needs or weaknesses of Character A. 
13. The other player was invited to describe the needs and weaknesses of 
Character A. 
14. The next person was invited to go and replace the person playing 
Character B, then make another journey in space, finding their way towards 
a frozen image in which they made physical contact with the other in a way 
that expressed the needs or weaknesses of Character B. 
15. The other player was invited to describe the needs and weaknesses of 
Character B. 
16. At this point, I told players that we would shortly begin a role-play that 
would include verbal communication, with the invitation that players could 
replace each other at any point in time by tapping the existing player on the 
shoulder. 
17. The next person was invited to go and replace the person playing 
Character A, then begin moving through the space in a way that expressed 
their character’s behaviour. 
18. The other player was invited to describe the behaviour of Character A. 
19. The next person was invited to go and replace the person playing 
Character B, then begin moving through space in a way that expressed their 
characters’ behaviour.   
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20. The other player (whilst still moving) was invited to describe the 
behaviour of Character B. 
21. Play Begins. The players tap in and out whenever they feel the impulse to 
do so. 
22. Play Ends. 
Debrief: Players were invited to reflect on what it was like to take part in the 





B.3 Image Collision 
The Image Collision exercise was played at Clements House Sheltered 
Housing scheme in Tottenham in February 2018. 
 
Participants played this exercise individually, but within a group workshop 
context. To begin, they were asked to look at a range of images relating to 
stories that members of the group had told and select the one that they 
responded to most strongly. 
Once they had selected the image, they were invited to listen to a 
soundscape relating to the image. 
They were invited to tell the story that the picture and sounds suggested to 
them whilst looking at the image and listening to the soundscape. 
Having gone through the looking and listening process, participants were 
invited to describe a character in the landscape. 
Next, participants were asked to pick another image from the selection of 
pictures and imagine it to be a new location that their character would travel 
to. 
Having selected this image, participants were invited to look at it whilst 
listening to the accompanying soundscape and describe what they imagined 
would happen when their character travelled to the new location. 
Debrief: Players were invited to reflect on what it was like to invent a story 







Islands was played at Haringey Community Hub in London in March 2018. 
 
Part One – The Village 
Islands is a board game about 3 children growing up in a village on a small 
island. One child is quite poor, one is quite rich, the other is somewhere in 
the middle. 
Sometimes the children need to work on the farm to help their family make 
money, but they also want to go to school so that they can get a good job in 
future. Aside from work and school, they like to play at the seaside to make 
friends and be happy. 
The game starts when the children are 11 years old. Each round of the game 
represents 1 year of their life. Each round costs 1 coin. In each round, the 
children can either work to make money, go to school or go to play at the 
seaside. 
Each child has a certain amount of money, education tokens and happiness 
points: 
Kid A has 2 coins, 1 education token and 3 happiness points. 
Kid B has 4 coins, 2 education tokens and 2 happiness points. 
Kid C has 6 coins, 3 education tokens and 1 happiness point. 
You can increase your education tokens by going to school. Each time you 
go to school, you get 1, 2 or 3 education tokens, depending on a dice roll. If 
you get to 6 education tokens, you qualify to work at the factory in town. If 
you get to 9 education tokens, you qualify to work at the port. Both of these 
jobs pay more money than farm work. 
The family of Kid C has a big farm. If Kid C chooses to work, they will earn 
either 2, 3 or 4 coins, depending on a dice roll. 
The family of Kid B has a small farm. If Kid B chooses to work, they will earn 
either 1, 2 or 3 coins, depending on a dice roll. 
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The family of Kid C does not have a farm. If Kid C chooses to work, they can 
work at Farm B or Farm C. They earn the normal amount of money when 
they work, but Kid B or Kid C will also receive the same amount. In other 
words, when Kid A works at Farm B or C, they also work for Kid B or Kid C. 
Playing at the seaside is important for making friends and being happy. 
Whoever has the most happiness points can ask for a favour from another 
player at certain times. The favour can be about getting help with education 
or asking for money. 
If a child asks for help with education, they get to take 1, 2 or 3 education 
tokens from their friend; if a child asks for help with money, they get to take 
1, 2 or 3 coins from their friend, both of which depend on a dice roll. 
The Kid who is asked for help can refuse, but if they do so, they lose 1, 2 or 
3 happiness points, depending on a dice roll. 
Every time the children go to play, their happiness (and popularity) increases 
by 1, 2 or 3 points, depending on a dice roll. 
 
Play Structure 
Assign roles to the players and ask them to create a character name, starting 
with the letter A, B or C, depending on which of the Kids they are playing. 
Ask the players to imagine what the kids are like, what they like and what 
they dislike.  
Players draw their picture and then give a short introduction to their 
character avatar.  
The first phase of play proceeds over 6 rounds, punctuated by short 
interludes for the most popular player to call in favours. 
Age 11 Work / School / Play 
Age 12 Work / School / Play 
Age 13 Work / School / Play 
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Favour The child with the most happiness points can call in a favour to 
help them boost their levels of education and money. 
Age 14 Work / School / Play 
Age 15 Work / School / Play 
Age 16 Work / School / Play 
Favour The child with the most happiness points can call in a favour to 
help them boost their levels of education and money. 
 
Part Two – The Town 
Now that the children have become young adults, some of them can move 
into town to work at a new job. Living in the town is more expensive. It costs 
2 coins per round, but the jobs are more highly paid. 
If you have 6+ education tokens, you can work in the factory and earn 3, 4 
or 5 coins, depending on a dice roll. 
The factory belongs to the family of Kid C, so they get the same amount that 
you earn for working there. 
If you have 9+ education tokens, you can work in the port, where you earn 4, 
5 or 6 coins, depending on a dice roll. 
You can also choose to stay in the village and work on the farm as before. It 
is also possible to buy your own farm. A small farm (which can earn between 
1 and 3 coins each round) costs 8 coins. A big farm (which can earn between 
2, 3 and 4 coins) costs 12. 
Aside from work, you can continue your education at the college in town. If 
you get to 12 education tokens you qualify for a visa to move to the city on 
the big island. The trip to the big island costs 5 coins. Life on the big island 
is expensive, costing 3 coins per round, but the jobs there are very highly 
paid. 
Playing is also still important. You can go to the dance hall to make friends 
or maybe even meet someone special!  
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If you go dancing and roll a 6, it means that you have met that special 
someone. If this happens, you can choose to start a family, if you wish. This 
adds to your living costs by 1 coin per round but gives you a one-off 
happiness boost of between 4 and 6 points. 
 
Play Structure 
Aged 20 Work / College / Dance Hall 
Aged 22 Work / College / Dance Hall 
Aged 24 Work / College / Dance Hall 
Favour The player with the most happiness points can call in a favour 
to help them boost their levels of education and money. 
Aged 26 Work / College / Dance Hall 
Aged 28 Work / College / Dance Hall 
Aged 30 Work / College / Dance Hall 
Favour The player with the most happiness points can call in a favour 
to help them boos their levels of education and money. 
 
Part Three – The Big Island 
Now that the children are fully grown up, some of them can move to the big 
island. Living on the big island costs 3 coins per round, but the jobs are 
highly paid.  
Working at the warehouse earns 5, 6 or 7 coins per round. If you get to 15 
education tokens you can work at the Power Plant, which earns 6, 7 or 8 
coins per round. If you get all the way to 18 education tokens you can work 
at the Laboratory, which earns 8, 9 or 10 coins per round!  




Aside from work, you can continue your education at the college in town or 
at the University if you live on the big island. 
Playing is also still important for living a happy life. You can go to the social 
club on the big island or continue going to the dance hall in the town.  
 
Play Structure 
Aged 30 Work / Education / Social Life 
Aged 32 Work / Education / Social Life 
Aged 34 Work / Education / Social Life 
Favour The player with the most happiness points can call in a favour 
to help them boost their levels of education and money. 
Aged 36 Work / Education / Social Life 
Aged 38 Work / Education / Social Life 
Aged 40 Work / Education / Social Life 
Favour The player with the most happiness points can call in a favour 
to help them boos their levels of education and money. 
 
Debrief 
Players are invited to summarise of how the life of their character has 
progressed. They are also invited to reflect on how the content of the game 




B.5 Journey Dialogue 
The Journey Dialogue exercise was played at Haringey Community Hub in 
London in June 2017. 
 
Participants played this exercise in pairs. To begin, each player was asked to 
choose a picture that they found interesting from a selection of images based 
on stories they had told me previously. 
Players are asked to look at their chosen image and try to imagine someone 
in the picture who is about to go on a journey of some kind. 
Who are they? Each player describes the character they are imagining. 
Next, players are asked to think further about their character: what is their 
job or role? What do they do on an ordinary day? 
What kind of personality do they have? Each player describes the character 
they are imagining. 
* 
At this point, the participants switch pictures and start to work with the 
image and character that the other player has described. 
Players are asked to imagine where the character is leaving from. Are they in 
a city, town or village? Who are they leaving behind? Are they happy or sad 
to go? 
Each player describes what they are imagining. 
Players are asked to imagine where the character is going to. Is it far away or 
close? Have they been to this place before? 
Each player describes what they are imagining. 
* 
At this point, the participants switch pictures again and the images are 
returned to the person who originally chose it. 
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Players are asked to think about why the character is going on this journey. 
Is it for work, for family, or just for fun? Are they excited or fearful to be 
going on this journey? 
Each player describes what they are imagining. 
* 






B.6 Journey to the Centre of the Earth 
Journey to the Centre of the Earth was played at Haringey Community Hub in 
September 2017. 
 
This piece was a storytelling board game, which challenged players to make 
a journey to the centre of the earth (Haringey Community Hub) by moving 
their avatar around the game board (according to a dice roll) to collect 
objects (represented by mini-images) that related to locations (represented by 
larger images) that they had told me about. 
The game board was an arrangement of large images showing locations. The 
board comprised an outer ring of pictures relating to stories from the more 
distant past, an inner ring of pictures relating to stories from the more 
recent past and, lastly, an image of Haringey Community Hub in the centre. 
A mini-image of an object was placed on each of the large images. The task 
of the players was to work out which of the large location images related to 
their stories and which object images related to those locations, then move 
their avatar around the board to collect the relevant objects. Once they had 
collected a relevant object, they could tell one of their stories to the group of 
players. When they had told two of their stories on the outer ring, they could 
move into the inner ring and tell their final story. 
At this point, the last task was to proceed to the centre of the earth. The 
player who arrived there first was to be awarded the prize or a cup of tea, 
made by myself. 
As well as collecting their own object-images, players were told that they 
could collect other people’s objects and exchange them, if they wished to do 
so. They could also withhold other people’s objects, though, to make things 
harder for other players. 
Debrief: At the end of the game, players were asked what it was like to tell 
their stories to the group and hear the stories of other players.  
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B.7 Migrations of Cool 
Migrations of Cool was played at the Arebyte Gallery and the surrounding 
areas of Hackney Wick, East London in July 2017 
 
Introduction 
Migrations of Cool is a street game about the migrations of artists around 
London and the waves of property development that seem to follow in their 
wake. 
In this game, you will play two different roles: You will play artists, AND 
property developers, at various times. 
The game will be played in Hackney Wick on the area shown on this map. 
The map is broken into 16 zones. Each zone represents a unit of territory in 
the game. 
The aim of the artists is to find space to make their work and max out their 
artistic cred, without losing their financial sustainability by paying 
exorbitant rents. 
The aim of the property developers is to max out on financial capital, 
building new apartments in cool areas that will be attractive to buyers. 
The aim of the resident groups is to generate community projects that will 
help their area, working with artists and property developers to see what 
benefits they can offer. 
 
General Guidelines for Play 
Artists 
There will be 4 groups, groups A, B, C, and D, representing 4 artist 
collectives. 
Each artist collective needs to find a zone in which to make their work. At 
the start of the game, 12 semi-derelict industrial zones are available for rent. 
There are 4 residential zones which are unavailable to rent. 
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Each of the available zones has a rental cost of between 1 and 4 Cred per 
round. Each artist collective has a starting Cred of between 1 and 6 Cred.  
Cred is the universal system of value in the game, encompassing artistic 
Cred, economic Cred, political Cred etc. All these values are rolled into one 
number which represents the group SCORE. 
There will be 6 rounds in the game, but I will say more on the time 
structure, a little later. 
You can find the rental cost of a zone, by locating a white balloon at the spot 
marked on the map, and reading the Cred cost, between 1 and 4, that is 
written on it. 
If you wish to rent the zone, you need to call the Local Authority (me) to 
complete the transaction. Before the game begins, I will take a phone 
number for each group so that I can stay in contact with you. Once you have 
rented a zone for the round, you can make art. 
Making an artistic work is done by making some type of sculptural piece, 
photographing it and sending the picture via Twitter to @hobotheatre using 
the hashtag #migrationsofcool. If you would prefer not to publicly tweet, you 
can email me at jamie@hobotheatre.co.uk 
This work will then be critically evaluated and given a Cred score, which will 
hopefully be higher than the rental cost you have paid. At the end of the 
round, I will tweet the overall CRED scores for each artist collective on 
@hobotheatre 
It is worth noting that if you have an artistic collective in the zone next to 
you, it will increase the artistic Cred that you are likely to accrue. 
Equally, if property developments pop up in the zones next to you, the rental 
cost of your zone is likely to increase considerably. 
  
Property Developers 
There will be two property developer companies, formed by groups A & C 
working together, and groups B & D working together.  
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Each company needs to find zones in which to create property developments. 
For the property developers, the game starts in round 2, when there will be 8 
semi-derelict industrial zones available for purchase. 
There will also be 4 residential zones and 4 artistic zones which are not 
available for purchase at this stage of the game. 
Each of the available zones has a purchase cost of between 18 and 36 Cred. 
Each developer starts off with between 18 and 36 Cred. 
You can find the purchase cost of a zone, by locating a white balloon at the 
spot marked on the map, and reading the Cred cost, between 18 and 36, 
that is written on it in small numbers. 
If you wish to purchase the zone, call the Local Authority (me) to complete 
the transaction. Once you have purchased a zone, you can make a property 
development. 
The public announcement of a property development is done by making a 
short film, that somehow expresses your redevelopment proposal. This film 
should be sent via Twitter to @hobotheatre with the hashtag 
#migrationsofcool. If you would prefer not to publicly tweet, you can email 
me at jamie@hobotheatre.co.uk 
The proposal will be critically evaluated and given a Cred score, which will 
probably be between 1 and 10. At the end of the round, I will tweet the 
overall CRED scores for each property company on @hobotheatre 
It is worth noting that if you have an artistic collective in the zone next to 
your development, your Cred is likely to be higher, as buyers flock to snap 
up units in a cool area.  
Equally, if your developments are built next to the residential zones, you 
Cred is likely to be lower as buyers are less keen to live next to problematic 
estates. 
Zones that have been occupied by artists are not available for purchase in 




If an artist zone is purchased, the artist collective will be displaced and must 
find another zone to rent. 
 
Residents 
There will be four communities of residents. Each resident community has a 
pre-assigned zone which is their home. 
The game starts for residents in rounds 3 and 4. During these rounds, 
residents – who will be represented by me, can seek to work with developers 
or artists to hatch community projects that are beneficial to residents. 
If a resident group requests a partnership with an artist collective or 
property developer, the artist or property developer can either choose to 
engage with the residents or ignore them. 
Community engagement projects are enacted by going to the residential zone 
and conducting some productive artistic or recreational activity, 
photographing this action and sending the photo to @hobotheatre with the 
hashtag #migrationsofcool. 
If artists engage with resident groups, they will benefit from a substantial 
reduction in their rent, but they will receive lower artistic cred because 
community art projects aren’t seen as being particularly cool. 
If property developers engage with resident groups, their next purchase will 
be half price. 
If resident groups are ignored, they become alienated. An alienated resident 
community substantially reduces the profitability of a property development 
located in the next zone. 
Alienated residents do not have any negative impact on artists located in the 
next zone. 
Residential zones are not available for purchase in rounds 1, 2 and 3, but 
they can be purchased in rounds 4, 5 and 6. 
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The purchase price of a residential zone starts at between 24 and 42 Cred. 
Although - if a residential zone becomes alienated, its purchase price falls by 
half as the Local Authority is increasingly keen to regenerate a bad area. 
 
Game Structure 
The game is played over 6 rounds. Each round will last for either 15 or 30 
minutes, which means that you have a limited amount of time to make your 
choices and do what you need to do. The game will finish at 5.30pm. At that 
time, everyone should return here to hear the final scores and have a short 
debrief (which is optional) on what the experience was like. 
 
Round 1: 3.30-4.00pm 
Group A: Artists 
Group B: Artists 
Group C: Artists 
Group D: Artists 
 
Round 2: 4.00-4.15pm 
Groups A & C: Property Development Company 1 
Groups B & D: Property Development Company 2 
 
Round 3: 4.15-4.30pm 
Group A: Artists 
Group B: Artists 
Group C: Property Development Company 1 




Round 4: 4.30-4.45pm 
Group A: Property Development Company 1 
Group B: Property Development Company 2 
Group C: Artists 
Group D: Artists 
 
Round 5: 4.45-5.15pm 
Group A: Artists 
Group B: Artists 
Group C: Artists 
Group D: Artists 
 
Round 6: 5.15-5.30pm 
Groups A & C: Property Development Company 1 
Groups B & D: Property Development Company 2 
 





Neighbourhood was first played at Theatre Delicatessen in London in March 
2018. Another version was facilitated by a Playground participant at the 
National Student Drama Festival in Leicester in April 2018. 
 
Facilitator Preparation 
The larp can be played by between 6 and 16 participants. 
To play this larp, you will need an open classroom sized space with some 
tables and chairs and a large pile of random junk (enough to fill a big 
suitcase).  
You will need to compile a list of job occupations, including unemployed, 
retired and student (written on slips of paper). 
You’ll also need to compile a list of positive and negative characteristics 
(written on slips of paper). 
Set out the play materials around the periphery of the room.  
Gather a stack of post-it notes, some paper for writing and some pens. 
 
Introduction 
The basic introduction is that the group will build a neighbourhood, invent 
characters who live there and play out a year in the life of the community.  
Explain that players can opt out at any time with no questions asked. An 
opt-out can be temporary (to go to the bathroom or have a quick break) or if 
they want to leave entirely that’s also fine.  
Let participants know that if anything happens in the play activity that they 







1  There is a pile of notes with various jobs or occupations on them. Ask 
players to pick one of these pieces of paper. This determines the 
occupation of the character they will play.  
2  Players are invited to build an abstract ‘home’ for their character 
based on their occupation, using the random junk in the room. 
3 When this is done, tell the players that half of them live in the south 
side of the neighbourhood and the other half live in the north side. IE 
half of the players are designated as southerners and half are 
northerners. 
4  Invite players to imagine features of the landscape that might exist 
around their neighbourhood. They each propose 2 features by writing 
them on post-it notes and sticking them on the wall. 
5 Players then vote for 3 features of the landscape that they like, which 
have been proposed by other players. Votes are indicated by putting a 
‘tick’ on the relevant post-it note.  
6  The facilitator chooses the 4 most popular features of the landscape 
and announces the place in the room where each feature is located, IE 
– for each of the four walls, we imagine a ‘feature of the landscape’ that 
lies beyond the edge of the neighbourhood. 
7  There are 2 piles of notes with positive and negative characteristics. 
The players pick one good characteristic and one bad one. 
8  The players are invited to write for 2 minutes about who they imagine 
their character to be. The facilitator encourages players to approach 
this as ‘free writing’, jotting down anything that comes into their 
heads. 
9  Players give a short presentation of their character, giving their name 
and other key biographical details like their job, age, family status. 
(The Facilitator should note down the names of characters so that they 
can refer to a player with their character name during play). 
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10  Players propose ideas of major local issues. They are invited to write 
proposals on two post-it notes for the best thing about the area (2 
ideas) and the worst thing (2 ideas). 
11 Players are then invited to vote on proposals made by other players, 
with 3 votes each for the best thing and 3 votes for the worst thing. 
The facilitator then determines what the most popular options are, 
articulating the best thing about the area and the worst thing about 
the area. 
(The facilitator keeps a note of what the best and worst thing are – it 
will become relevant for development of the role-play). 
12  Players are invited to think about a hobby that their character might 
like to do, then find an abstract way to physically enact this hobby. 
Whilst enacting their hobby they are invited to imagine the hopes and 
fears of their character. 
13  Players are invited to build relations between residents of the 
neighbourhood. The player who starts gestures to another player who 
then describes the nature of the relationship between the two 
characters. Everything that is articulated becomes true within the 
world of the story. Once the player has finished their description, they 
pass the baton to another player who describes another relational 
connection. This continues until all players have described a 
connection between their character and another character. 
14 The facilitator gathers the group together to tell them that they will 
have a short break before running the role-play. Before breaking, 
explain the structure of play. 
 Play will take place over one year in the life of the neighbourhood, 
marked by four phases of play over the four seasons.  
Tell the players that during play you will clap your hands to signal to 
them that they should go back to their home and listen for details of 
the next phase of play. 





1 Spring: Play will start in springtime, with characters on the south side 
of the neighbourhood paying a visit to one of their neighbours on the 
north side. Any character who doesn’t receive a visit can spend time 
doing their hobby. (5 minutes) 
At the end of this first passage – clap your hands and ask players to 
return home. As they go home, tell them that time is passing from 
spring to summer. 
2  Interlude: During this interlude, the facilitator randomly selects 3 
players on the south side who receive BAD news of some kind. 3 
players from the north side are also randomly selected to receive 
GOOD news. The facilitator then invites the players concerned to 
describe their imagining of what this good or bad news entails. 
3  Summer: At the end of the interlude, the facilitator asks one character 
to volunteer to be the host of a summer party by raising their hand. 
The first player to do so becomes the host for the next phase of play. 
When play resumes, players can choose to attend the summer party or 
stay home and do their hobby. (10 minutes) 
4 At the end of this period clap your hands again and invite the players 
to return home. Tell them that time is passing again from summer into 
autumn. 
5 Interlude: Following the summer party there is another interlude, 
during which the facilitator announces GOOD news for the 
neighbourhood. This news is drawn from the worst thing about the 
area. Essentially, the good news is that the worst thing about the area 
gets rectified, somehow. This is for YOU to invent! 
6  Autumn: At the end of the interlude, characters on the north side of 
the neighbourhood are invited to pay a visit to one of their neighbours 
on the south side. Any character who doesn’t receive a visit can spend 
time doing their hobby. (5 minutes) 
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7  Interlude: Following the period of play in the autumn, there is an 
interlude during which the facilitator randomly selects 3 players on 
the north side who receive BAD news of some kind and 3 players on 
the south side who receive GOOD news of some kind. The facilitator 
then invites the players concerned to describe their imagining of what 
this good or bad news entails.  
The facilitator then announces some bad news for the neighbourhood. 
This is based on the best thing about the area. Essentially, the bad 
news is that the best thing about the area turns into a problem, 
somehow. Again, this if for you to INVENT! 
8  Winter: At the end of the interlude, the facilitator asks two characters 
to volunteer to host festive parties by raising their hands. The first two 
players to do so become the hosts for the next phase of play. When 
play resumes, players can choose to attend either party or stay home 
and do their hobby. (10 minutes) 
9  At the end of this period clap your hands again and invite the players 
to return home. Tell them that time is passing again into a new year. 
10  Epilogue: Following the festive parties, all players are invited to 
articulate their hopes and fears for the future. 
 
Debrief  
The play finishes and all players are invited to offer a short reflection on 





B.9 Object Montage 
The Object Montage exercise was played at Clements House in Tottenham in 
February 2018. 
 
Participants played this exercise individually. To begin, a selection of random 
objects was spread out across a large table. 
Players were asked to start by selecting an object that made them think 
about their past. Once they had made a selection, they were invited to 
describe the place and time they were imagining. 
Players were then asked to select an object that represents the future and 
describe what they were imagining. 
Players were asked to pick an object that made them think of a place that 
was important to them and describe what they were imagining. 
Players were then asked to pick an object that could represent a young 
person in this place and give a description of the young person’s hopes and 
fears. 
Players were asked to pick another object representing a new place that the 
young person could go to where they might find some kind of opportunity 
and give a description of the new place. 
Players were then asked to pick a final object that would represent some 
kind of challenge that the character would face in this new place and 
describe how the character coped with the challenge. 
Debrief: Players were invited to talk about what it was like to play the Object 






The Overcoding exercise was played at Peartree Bridge in Milton Keynes in 
July 2018. 
 
The Overcoding exercise was designed for 4 players. To begin, players were 
asked to think of the most important locations in the neighbourhood and 
write down 3 options on post-it notes. 
Next, players were asked to select one idea that had been contributed by 
another participant. 
Having selected a location, players were asked to build it by laying a blanket 
on the ground and constructing an abstract representation of the place 
using a selection of random objects. Each player was then invited to give a 
description of their location.  
Players were invited to move into a location that another participant had 
built and imagine a fictional character in this place by drawing a sketch of 
them in that landscape. 
Players then passed their sketch on and received someone else’s sketch. At 
this point, they were asked to write for one minute about the character in 
the sketch. 
The sketches were passed on again and the next player wrote for another 
minute about the hopes of the character in the sketch. 
Sketches were passed on one more time and the last of the four players 
wrote for another minute about the fears of the character. 
At this point, the sketches were returned to the original drawer and they 
were invited to read the descriptions of the character that had been offered 
by the other players. 
Next, they were asked to choose an object to represent the character, place it 
in the location and give a description of the character. 
Players were invited to go and pick up one of the other character objects and 
imagine that the character they were holding had a positive attitude towards 
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one of the other characters and a negative attitude towards a second 
character. Players were then asked to articulate these positive and negative 
attitudes. 
Players were then given a letter: A, B, C or D. 
Player A was invited to pick one of the 4 characters and take them on a visit 
to another one of the characters in the location that they occupied. Player B 
took on the role of this other character and A/B played out a short role-play 
in that location. 
At the end of the short role-play, Player B summarised the action and Player 
A described how their character had been affected by the exchange. 
At this point, Player C selected a character and took them on a visit to 
another one of the characters in the location that they occupied. Player D 
took on the role of this other character and C/D played out a short role-play 
in that location. 
At the end of the short role-play, Player D summarised the action and Player 
C described how their character had been affected by the exchange. 
This process was repeated with players B and C, then players D and A, then 
players A and C, then players B and D. 
At the end of this sequence of role-plays, each player was invited to pick one 
character and deliver a monologue about the sights and sounds of the 
landscape they occupied and describe whether the place had changed for the 
better or the worse. 
Debrief: Players were invited to reflect on how the content of the role-play 
related to their perceptions of the area and describe what it was like to take 





B.11 Palimpsest Drawing 
The Palimpsest Drawing exercise was played at Theatre Delicatessen in 
London in March 2018 and also at Peartree Bridge in Milton Keynes in June 
2018. 
 
To begin, participants were invited to make a small sculpture using three 
objects from their bag. Each participant was invited to comment on one 
other sculpture that caught their eye. 
Each participant was invited to pick one of the objects from their personal 
sculpture. They were then invited to form groups of 2 or 3 with other people 
whose objects seemed to connect somehow with their object.  
We then created some role-plays from drawing, using the following process: 
1. Players were invited to spend a few minutes drawing a place that really 
mattered to them. They described these pictures, then passed them on to the 
player on their left whilst also receiving a new picture from the player on 
their right. 
2. Players were invited to draw two characters into the picture they had 
received. They named these characters and gave a description of them, then 
passed the picture on to the person on their left. 
3. Working with their new picture, players were invited to imagine another 
character who really matters to one of the two original characters in the 
picture. They described this new character and their relation to one of the 
original characters. 
4. The pictures were passed back to the original drawer. They were then 
invited to pick which character they would like to play in a role-play (either 
the new character or the original character with whom the new character 
has a relationship). The original drawer would also ask another player to 
take on the other character. 
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5. The two players then played a role-play with the two characters until the 
original drawer felt that the scene should finish. Following the first role play, 
the second and third role-plays were played out.  
Debrief: Players were invited to reflect on what it was like to construct and 
play these role-plays, with a specific focus on what it was like to draw upon 






B.12 Palimpsest Storymaking 
The Palimpsest Storymaking exercise was played at the Cranley Dene 
Sheltered Housing scheme in Highgate in January 2018. 
 
Participants were told that the exercise would involve telling a story about an 
adventure from their own experience, then use these stories as a stimulus to 
invent new fictional stories. 
Participants were asked to think of an adventure that they had experienced 
at some point in their life. They were invited to draw a sketch of this 
adventure showing one of the locations in which it took place, then describe 
it to members of the group. 
Once everyone had described their adventure, the sketches were passed on 
to the next person in the group. This participant was asked to draw a 
fictional character in the location depicted by the sketch. This new character 
could be similar to the person described in the original adventure story or 
very different from them.  
Participants were asked to describe the fictional character, articulating their 
hopes and fears within the adventure scenario. 
At this point, the sketches were passed on again and the next player was 
invited to draw a new character into the scenario. This new character could 
be a stranger or someone with a pre-existing relationship with the original 
(fictional) character.  
Participants were asked to describe this new character, giving an indication 
of whether they were a stranger or someone familiar to the other character. 
At this point, the sketches were passed on again and the next player was 
invited to draw some action that took place between the two characters and 
describe what took place. 
Next, the sketches were passed on again and the next player was invited to 




At this point, the person who had told the original adventure story was 
invited to take part in a two-player role-play between the two characters in 
the new location. They could choose which of the two characters they would 
play and another participant could volunteer to play the other. 
The two players started the role-play and could bring it to an end whenever 
they felt like it. 
Debrief: Participants were asked what it was like to take part in the 
Palimpsest Storymaking, with a specific focus on what it was like to 







Passage was played at Trumpington Community Orchard in Cambridge in 
September 2017. 
 
Instructions for Play 
Passage is a role-play about journeys and unexpected encounters, designed 
for two players. 
The play will involve fictional characters who both undertake journeys 
through imagined landscapes. During these journeys, the two characters will 
meet each other and spend a winter together before travelling on together, or 
alone. 
Either player should feel free to opt-out of the activity at any time, and for 
whatever reason, with no questions asked. 
The instructions below are intended to be carried out, one at a time. It isn’t 
necessary to read the full document in order to start playing. 
*** 
To begin, each player should speak to the other for approximately one 
minute in response to the question: ‘Where have you come from today?’ In 
other words, players should tell each other briefly about their journey 
through the current day. 
Next, each player should speak to the other for approximately two minutes 
in response to the question: ‘Where have you come from as an adult?’ This 
question can be addressed in whatever way the players wish. 
Then, each player should speak to the other for approximately three minutes 
in response to the question: ‘Where have you come from since childhood?’ 
Again, players should feel free to say as much, or as little, about their 
personal lives as they wish. 
At this point, both players are invited to making a drawing based on the 
stories they have heard from the other person. This drawing should feature a 
fictional character in a specific place, from a long time ago who is about to 
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set off on a journey. Players do not need to know where this journey is 
leading them, they just need to draw the place that the character is 
departing from. The sketching process should last for around five minutes. 
Next, the players are invited to imagine some NEEDS and FEARS that their 
characters might have. Each player should write down five NEEDS and five 
FEARS on ten post-it notes.  
Then, these post-it notes should be crumpled up and placed in two 
combined piles, one pile for NEEDS and one pile for FEARS. Each player 
should pick two NEEDS and two FEARS.  
At this point, having discovered the NEEDS and FEARS of their emerging 
characters, players are invited to write for two minutes on the subject of 
what their character is leaving behind as they set off on their journey. Also, 
if they have not already done so, players should select a name for their 
character. 
Players are invited to read what they have written to each other, so that they 
have some knowledge of the two characters that have been created. 
At this point, players are invited to choose a physical location in the play 
space as the starting point for their journey. Imagine this location to be the 
‘well spring’ from which the journey starts. 
Next, the players are invited to imagine some LANDSCAPES that their 
characters might pass through on their journey. Each player should write 
down five LANDSCAPES on five post-it notes. 
Then, these post-it notes should be crumpled up and placed in a combined 
pile. Each player should pick three LANDSCAPES, but they should not look 
at them yet. The crumpled up post-it notes should be stowed away in their 
pocket. 
At this point, players are invited to imagine the place that their character 
hopes to reach at the end of their journey. This place should not be 
somewhere that the character has been to before, it should be a place that is 
hoped for, a place that will meet their needs and allay their fears.  
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To aid the imagining of this place, players are invited to make another 
drawing, spending about five minutes on their sketch. 
Next, players are invited to imagine some FEELINGS that they might 
encounter as they pass through various landscapes on their journey. Each 
player should write down five FEELINGS on five post-it notes. 
Then, these post-it notes should be crumpled up and placed in a combined 
pile. Each player should pick three FEELINGS, but they should not look at 
them yet. Rather, the crumpled up post-it notes should be stowed away in 
another pocket. This pocket should be separate to the one used for 
LANDSCAPES to avoid getting the two sets of post-its mixed up. 
*** 
At this point, it is time for the characters to go on their journey. The 
progression of the journey will take the form of seasons. The play will begin 
in springtime, with the characters setting off on their journey. Summer will 
arrive and they will reach a new landscape. In the autumn, they will meet 
each other and spend the winter together. Spring will come and they will set 
off on their journey again, either alone or together. Summer will bring a new 
landscape. Finally, in autumn, the characters will arrive at their final 
destination. 
In making these journeys, players are invited to move through the space in 
whatever way they wish. The only rule is that their paths must converge in 
the autumn, when the characters will meet and (for whatever reason) decide 
to spend a winter together. 
*** 
In order to progress through play, one player should read the following 
instructions: 
Spring 
It is spring and you are about to begin your journey. As you prepare to 
depart, spend five minutes writing in your journal about your feelings, your 
hopes and fears for what lies ahead. 
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(Allow 5 minutes of writing). 
Now its time to set off, begin your journey slowly and start to move into a 
new space. 
(Allow 2 minutes of journeying). 
Summer 
At this point, it is summertime and you have arrived in a new landscape. 
Draw one of your LANDSCAPE post-it notes to tell you where you are.  
Then draw one of your FEELINGS notes to suggest how you might feel in this 
place. Now, spend five minutes making a drawing of this landscape. 
(Allow 5 minutes of drawing) 
Now its time to set off again. Begin moving on into a new space. 
Autumn 
Now it is autumn and you have arrived in a new landscape. But at this point 
you have both arrived in the same place. The character whose name comes 
first alphabetically should pick a LANDSCAPE note and announce the 
location where both characters have arrived. Both players should also draw 
a FEELINGS note to suggest how they might feel in this place.  
Now, it is time to meet each other. Find away to approach each other and 
spend 10 minutes getting to know this new person.  
(Allow 10 minutes of talking) 
At this point, you are invited to voice your thoughts on what it feels like to 
have arrived in this place and to have met this new person. Describe the 
reasons why you would want to stay with them over the winter. 
Winter 
It is winter and you have decided to pass the colder months together. The 
place where you are is the place that you have found or constructed as a 
temporary home.  
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Now spend ten minutes together and find out more about each other. Try to 
understand the other person’s history and their hopes for the future. During 
this conversation, you should determine whether you wish to travel together 
on your onward journey or go your separate ways when the spring comes. 
(Allow ten minutes of talking) 
Spring 
It is spring and you are about to travel onwards, either alone or together. 
Spend five minutes writing in your journal about your feelings as you 
prepare to depart. 
(Allow five minutes of writing) 
Now its time to move on – either alone or together. Slowly start to move off in 
a new direction. 
(Allow two minutes of journeying) 
Summer 
It is summer and you have arrived in a new landscape. If you are travelling 
alone, both of you should pick another LANDSCAPE note from your pocket. 
If you are together, the character whose name is closest to the end of the 
alphabet should draw the LANSCAPE note. Both characters should draw a 
FEELING note to suggest how you might feel in this landscape. Now, spend 
five minutes making another drawing of this landscape. 
(Allow five minutes for drawing) 
Now its time to set off again. Begin moving on into a new space. 
Autumn 
It is autumn and you are arriving in your final destination. Is it how you 
imagined it would be? Or is it very different?  
Either way, for whatever reason, this is the place where you are going to 
stay. Now, spend five minutes describing, in the voice of your character, your 
feelings on arriving in this place.  
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Have your hopes been realised? Have your fears been allayed? Or are you 




At the end of the play, you are invited to speak for around two minutes, 
without interruption, about your experience of Passage. You can say as 
much, or as little, as you like. Both players should have the opportunity to 
reflect on their experience before the activity concludes. This is simply a 






The Pathways exercise was played at Haringey Community Hub in London 
in December 2017. 
 
Participants played this exercise individually. To begin, players were shown a 
selection of images related to stories they had told me and asked to pick the 
one they were most drawn to. 
Participants were then asked to describe the place and their relationship to 
the place, then invent a fictional character in that place. 
Having created a character, participants were invited to imagine a new place 
that the character would go to. This new place could be the mountains, the 
forest, the sea, the city or a village. 
Participants were asked to describe the journey to the new place, then 
imagine a new character that the original character would meet there. This 
new character could be a family member, a friend, a work colleague or 
something else – provided that they had some pre-existing relationship with 
the original character. 
Participants were asked to describe what happened in the meeting of the two 
characters. Perhaps the original character might make a request, tell a 
secret, give a gift or make some decision. 
Debrief: Participants were invited to reflect on what it was like to tell a story 
that started from a familiar place. Did the journey go somewhere unfamiliar, 







The Platform exercise was played at the Peartree Bridge estate in Milton 
Keynes in July 2018. 
 
Play Instructions 
Platform is a play activity about imagining a landscape and characters 
through the use of objects. 
It should be played by 3 or 4 players. 
By way of preparation, lay a plain blanket on the ground and scatter an 
assortment of random objects in the space around it. 
Number the players. Tell them that the blanket is a ‘platform’ on which they 
will build an imaginary landscape. 
Ask the first player to select an object and place it on the platform – 
imagining it to be a feature of the imaginary landscape. Invite them to 
describe the landscape feature they have created. 
Ask the next player to select another object, add it to the landscape and 
describe what they imagine it to be. Continue until all players have added a 
detail to the landscape and described it. 
Next, ask the first player to select an object that they can imagine as a 
character within the landscape. Invite the player to place the character 
within the landscape and describe who they are. Invite the other players, in 
turn, to do the same. 
Ask the first player to take an imaginary action on behalf of one of the 
characters towards another character on the platform. Invite them to move 
the object representing the character in a way that shows this action and 
describe what the action is. 
Ask the second player to describe the reaction of the character who has been 
acted upon and move the relevant object in a way that shows this reaction. 
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Ask the next player to take another action on behalf of one of the characters 
towards another character on the platform. Invite them to move the object 
representing the character in a way that shows this action and describe 
what the action is. 
Ask the next player to describe the reaction of the character who has been 
acted upon and move the relevant object in a way that shows this reaction. 
Ask the next player to take another action on behalf of one of the characters 
towards another character on the platform. Invite them to move the object 
representing the character in a way that shows this action and describe 
what the action is. 
Ask the next player to describe the reaction of the character who has been 
acted upon and move the relevant object in a way that shows this reaction. 
Ask each player, in sequence, to reflect on how the landscape on the 
platform has changed as a result of the actions that have occurred. 
 
Debrief  






B.16 Random Objects 
The Random Objects exercise was played at Haringey Community Hub in 
July 2017. 
 
Participants played this exercise individually. To begin, a scattered 
assemblage of random objects was placed on the table. 
Participants were invited to look at the objects and examine them. 
Participants were then invited to pick up to three objects that seemed 
meaningful to them. 
Participants were invited to construct an arrangement of the three objects on 
the table in front of them. This arrangement could refer to which of three 
objects was most important or just look nice. 
Participants were asked to describe why each of the objects was important to 
them – starting with the object they liked the most and moving through the 
other objects. 
Lastly, participants were invited to imagine and describe a place where all 




B.17 ‘Retreating Army’ 
The ‘Retreating Army’ design exercise was run at Theatre Delicatessen in 
London in April 2018. 
 
In this exercise, groups devised a role-play, with a narrative design based on 
three different approaches: rules based narrative progression, an episode 
based narrative progression and an imagination based narrative progression. 
I stated that the overall goal of the retreating army troop would be to get to a 
safe destination without being caught. I also said that the troop could not go 
back to resume fighting and said that the troop must stay together. 
 
Part 1: Rules Based Narrative Progression 
To begin, I invited groups to generate ideas on where the army was retreating 
from and the identity of the troop. Participants wrote ideas on post-it notes 
and decided upon a preferred option. 
Next, I invited groups to generate an idea of where the army was fleeing to. 
Participants wrote ideas on post-it notes and decided upon a preferred 
option. 
I then invited groups to generate an idea of where the troop is now (what’s 
the location of the scenario). Participants wrote ideas on post-it notes and 
decided on a preferred option. 
Next, I invited groups to generate ideas of landscapes that the army might 
pass through over the course of their retreat. Participants wrote multiple 
options on post-it notes and selected three landscapes. 
I also invited groups to develop a generic sense of who the individuals in the 
troop might be, by creating character archetypes. Participants wrote multiple 




At this point, the task was to create rules that would shape the decision-
making of the troop as they plan their escape. I told the groups that we 
would not play the scenario like a game, but rather as a scene in which the 
characters would consider their next move as if they were playing a game of 
retreat. 
I encouraged the groups to think about these rules in terms of spatial / 
temporal and mechanical considerations. IE – retreating through the 
mountains is safer because it is a deserted space, but it will slow down the 
retreat OR escaping by car (a valuable mechanic) along the highway is fast, 
but there is a risk of being stopped by roadblocks. 
Having designed their rules, I invited groups to present their scenario and 
the rules that might shape character decisions of how to begin the retreat 
(where to go next) and thus inform the next stage of the narrative. 
 
Part 2:  Episode Based Narrative Progression 
At this point, I invited the groups to swap and work on the other group’s 
scenario. 
The task was to create three new scenarios based on the three options for 
where players could go as they began their retreat. 
The focus here was to design three new CONTEXTS for action. I encouraged 
the design groups to think less about the next destination - the next 
destination of the retreating army should already be determined. In other 
words, the focus of play should not be on the quantitative question of ‘where 
do we go next?’ but rather on the qualitative question of ‘what do we do while 
we’re here?’  
Essentially, the creation of the three new episodes was based on the local 
circumstances in each of the three locations, so that the players (having 
made a strategic choice about where to go in Part 1) would arrive in their 
chosen place, discover whether or not they had made a good decision, and 




After the players had designed their three CONTEXTS, I invited them to do 
some thinking about how they could help the players to develop characters 
in the preparatory process before the playing of Part 1. 
I asked participants to begin by picking three of the previously created 
character archetypes as the basis for the creation of three characters within 
the scenario. 
Then, I asked participants to design a stimulus that would enable players to 
generate a sense of character back story. 
Next, I asked participants to design a stimulus that would enable players to 
develop interpersonal relations within the group. 
 
Part 3: Imagination Based Narrative Progression 
Groups continued to work on the same scenarios that they had worked on in 
Part 2.  
The design task for Part 3 was to develop stimuli that could invite the 
players to imagine the circumstances of a third scenario. 
The premise of this third scenario was that something had gone wrong as 
the group progressed towards their intended destination. The players would 
then be invited to imagine: 
a) what had gone wrong 
b) where they had gone instead. 
I also asked the participants to design a stimulus to help the players 
generate a sense of their interpersonal goals for Part 3. 
*** 
Having developed ideas for stimulating the imaginations of players in moving 
the narrative forward to Part 3, I asked the participants to do some further 
thinking about how they could help players develop their character before 
the beginning of play in Part 1. 
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Specifically, I asked them to consider a stimulus that would help players 
develop a sense of their character’s: 
a) Hopes and Fear for the future 
b) Strengths and weaknesses 
*** 
Having gone through the design process, two scenarios were play-tested. In 
debriefing the workshop, participants were invited to reflect on what they 
had experienced as players of the other group’s role-play and what they had 













B.18 Ridge Walk 




Two walkers, two A4 pages, two pencils.  
 
Instructions: 
To begin, sit on the swings at the START point on the map. During the walk, 
one of you will need to read the instructions aloud to the other. Please 
choose who the reader will be. Whenever you see the * symbol, it means that 
it is time to do whatever the most recent instruction has asked you to do.  
 
Welcome to Ridge. 
Imagine that Ridge is an alternative version of Peartree Bridge. Perhaps it 
exists in the future, or maybe in a parallel universe. 
Whatever it is, things appear to be a bit different in Ridge. As you undertake 
the Ridge Walk, everything you see and hear will be as it is now, but you can 
IMAGINE that things look and sound like something else. 
A tall tree could be a communications tower and a telegraph pole could be a 
skyscraper. In other words, you get to INVENT the fictional world you’re 
walking through. Take a moment to practice this. Look around for something 
that catches your eye.  
Once you’ve seen something interesting, try to imagine something else that it 





The land of Ridge has two regions, East Ridge and West Ridge. The map will 
show you where the border lies between East Ridge and West Ridge. 
The border between the two regions isn’t a strictly guarded frontier, but the 
two regions are different and the people on either side tend to keep to 
themselves.  
On this walk, however, two citizens from East and West will walk through 
Ridge together. If you are sitting in the more Easterly swing you are the 
Easterner. If you’re in the Westerly one, you’re the Westerner. 
When you begin the Ridge Walk, you won’t know much about your regions 
or about who you are as a citizen of East or West Ridge. 
As you walk, though, the instructions will give you prompts to imagine new 
things about the imaginary place you’re in – and the imaginary character 
whose shoes you’re walking in. 
When you read BEGIN, you will start the Ridge Walk by walking north 
towards the first stopping point marked on the map. 
As you walk, look for objects that seem to represent your landscape of East 
or West Ridge. Try to find objects on your side of the border that you can 
pick up.  
Think of these objects as symbols of your region and imagine what your 
region is like. When you reach the first stopping point, stop and follow the 
next instructions. 
BEGIN 
*   
1. 
It’s time to stop. Use the objects that you have picked up to make a small 
sculptural arrangement that shows what your region is like. 
* 
Now take your piece of A4 paper and fold it three times so that you end up 




Now write for about one minute about your home region in the first small 
rectangle of your paper. What is it like as a landscape? What is it like as a 
community? When you have both finished, show your sculptures and share 
your thoughts about your region with your partner. 
* 
It’s time to move on. As you walk, look at the landscape far away and find 
something pleasant that catches your eye. 
Imagine that the thing you see somehow represents the past of your region. 




Stop. Spend a minute drawing a sketch of your region’s history in the next 
mini-rectangle on your A4 page. 
What kind of history has your region had? Is it happy or sad? When you’ve 
both finished, share your histories.  
* 
It’s time to move on. As you walk, look for objects on your side of the border 
than you really like. Find a nice object that you can pick up and imagine 
that it is a symbol of a fictional character. A fictional citizen of East Ridge or 
West Ridge. 
Try to imagine what this fictional character is like. Who are they? What’s 
their name? At the next stopping point, pause for instructions. 
* 
3. 
Stop. Draw a sketch of your character. When you have both finished, 




It’s time to move on. Now look for far away sights that are beautiful to you. 
Imagine that these sights somehow represent the history of your character. 
What is their past? At the next stopping point, pause for instructions. 
* 
4. 
Stop. Sit on the swings and face south. Spend a minute writing the history of 
your character. Write this history as if it is YOUR history. As the fictional 
character, what are the important details from that past that have made 
YOU who YOU are? 
When you’ve both finished, read your writings to each other. 
* 
Now it’s time for the citizen of West Ridge to visit the East. As you enter East 
Ridge, the HOST can point out to the VISITOR things that show the strength 
of the region. 
This pointing can be done by literally pointing at things that seem to 
represent the best aspects of the region. In looking at the things that are 
pointed out, you are reminded that your imagination can turn them into 
something different than what they really are. 
Now begin the visit. 
* 
5. 
Stop. Take a minute to draw a sketch of the region’s strengths. The VISITOR 
is invited to describe the strengths of the HOST’S region. 
* 
It’s time to continue. As you walk, the HOST can offer a series of small 
objects to the VISITOR as GIFTS. Imagine how these gifts represent the 





Stop. Take a minute to write about the relationship between you and your 
neighbour. Are you friends? The VISITOR is invited to describe the 
relationship as they see it. 
* 
At this point, the visitor will lead the host across the border into West Ridge. 
As you walk, the new HOST can offer a series of GIFTS to the new VISITOR. 
Imagine how these gifts represent the ongoing relationship between the two 
of you. What kind of relationship are you building?  
* 
7. 
Stop. Take a minute to write about the relationship between you and your 
neighbour. Are you friends? Allies? Something else? 
Now the new VISITOR can describe the relationship as they see it. 
* 
At this point, the new visitor will lead the host back across the border into 
East Ridge. As you walk, the visitor can point out things in the region that 
show its weakness. 
As you walk, imagine what makes this region weak. 
* 
8. 
Stop. Take a minute to draw a sketch of the weaknesses that you see in this 
region. The HOST can describe these weaknesses. 
* 
It’s time cross over into West Ridge again. As you walk, the host can point 






Stop. Draw a sketch of the strengths that you see in this region. The HOST 
can describe these strengths. 
* 
To continue, the walkers will cross the border again into East Ridge. 
As you walk, think about the things that you admire about the other region 
and think about your region’s needs. Talk to your walking partner and tell 
them what you are thinking.  
* 
10. 
Stop. Take a minute to write about something you would like to take from 
the other region but DO NOT share what you have written.  
* 
Continue. For the final time, cross the border into West Ridge. As you walk, 




Stop. Write about the weaknesses of this region. The VISITOR can describe 
these weaknesses as they see them. 
* 
Continue. As you walk, try to look beyond the things that are right in front of 
you to find some sight that strongly catches your eye. Use this image to 






Stop. You are invited to imagine that the ACTION you have thought about 
has, in fact, happened. 
Draw a sketch of what this action was. What did your region do? Share your 
sketches with each other.  
* 
At this point, the Ridge Walk will go back onto the border pathway, walking 
south towards the starting point. 
As you walk, talk about how your regions REACT to the action that your 
neighbours have taken. Is it a positive or negative reaction? 
* 
13. 
Stop. Write about your personal feelings about the other region’s action. 
Share your writings. 
* 
Continue. This time, the citizen of East Ridge will walk in front and the 
citizen of West Ridge will follow in their footsteps. 
The Easterner can imagine that this pathway somehow represents their 
actions towards the citizen of West Ridge. 
If they want to treat them kindly, the pathway will be pleasant and playful. If 
they want to treat them harshly, the pathway will be rough and difficult. 
During this journey, Westerner is invited to imagine what actions the 
Easterner has taken towards them. 
* 
14. 
Stop. The Easterner is invited to draw patterns of shapes that symbolise the 
action they have taken towards the Westerner. 
The Westerner is invited to draw a sketch of the action that the Easterner 




To continue, the citizen from West Ridge is invited to walk a pathway that is 
directly followed by the citizen of East Ridge. 
Again, if they want to treat them kindly, the pathway will be pleasant. If they 
want to treat them harshly, the pathway will be rough. 
The citizen of East Ridge is invited to imagine what actions the Westerner 
has taken towards them.  
* 
15. 
Stop. The Westerner is invited to draw patterns of shapes that symbolise the 
action they have taken towards the Easterner. 
The Easterner is invited to draw a sketch of the action that the Westerner 
has taken towards them. The Easterner is invited to describe this action. 
* 
It’s the last stage of the Ridge Walk. As you move, listen to the sounds 
around you. Imagine that these sounds represent the future of the other 
region. Does it sound good, bad, or simply neutral? 
What events will unfold in the future of your neighbours?  
* 
16. 
Stop and sit on the swings. Write about the future of the other region. How 
will your neighbours fare in the future? Share your writings.  
* 
The Ridge Walk is now over. You are invited to introduce yourself to your 
partner using your real name. If you would like to, spend five minutes 




B.19 Sound and Image 
The Sound and Image exercise was played at Haringey Community Hub in 
August 2017. 
 
Participants played this exercise individually. To begin, they were shown a 
selection of images based on stories that they had told me previously. 
Once they had selected the image, they were invited to listen to a 
soundscape relating to the image. 
They were invited to tell the story that the picture and sounds suggested to 







Superpets was played at the Peartree Bridge estate in Milton Keynes in July 
2018. 
 
Superpets is story-making play activity for 4 players. It is played around a 
table. To play the game, paper, pens and post-it notes are needed.  
The facilitator will also need to create a selection of positive and negative 
characteristics (each written on a small slip of paper)  
Start by inviting players to imagine the worst places in the Peartree Bridge 
area. Ask them to write down 2 ideas on 2 post-it notes and stick them to 
the table. 
Then, ask them to vote for 3 ideas proposed by other players that they 
strongly agree with. 
The facilitator selects the 4 most disliked places in the area and asks the 
players to pick one of them then draw a picture of it. 
Players describe their sketch then pass it on to the person on their left. 
Working with this new drawing, ask players to draw a house of some kind 
within the existing landscape picture – then describe the house and pass the 
picture on. 
Next, invite each player to draw a positive and negative characteristic. 
Working with their new sketch, imagine a character with these 
characteristics who lives in the house in the picture. Ask players to draw 
this character into the picture, then describe them – articulating their 
problems in life. 
The pictures are passed on again. At this point, players are invited to 
imagine a pet who lives with (or near to) the character – who has some kind 
of special power. This special power should give the pet the capacity to help 
the character solve their problems somehow. Ask players to draw the pet 
into the sketch – then describe them. 
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The pictures are passed on again so that each player receives their original 
sketch. 
The facilitator states that all of the locations in the drawings are located 
fairly close to each other in the same village or town. Players are invited to 
give a brief reiteration of the terrible places that the characters live in. 
Each player is invited to imagine the pet in their picture taking the human to 
one of the other places with the aim of somehow helping their human to do 
something that will be beneficial for them or make them feel better about 
their area. 
Once each player has selected a destination for this journey, they take the 
picture of that destination and draw what happens when the pet takes the 
human there. Once this is done, they describe what happened. 
Next, the pets choose to pay a visit to one of the other pets, to compare notes 
on their human friends. Players enact a five-minute role-play with one of the 
other pet characters to talk about what’s going on. 
At this point, players are invited to imagine (based on what their pet knows 
about the people in the area) how their human character feels about their 
neighbours. They’re asked to describe one person they like and one person 
they dislike. 
Next, the pets take the humans on another journey to a new place to meet 
one of the other human characters – with the aim of helping their human 
feel better, somehow. 
Each player receives the picture of the location that their human is taken to, 
draws a sketch of what happens when the human goes there and describes 
what happens. 
Next, the pets get together with another of their peers to compare notes on 
what’s going down in the neighbourhood. 
At this point, one of the humans (whoever wants to go first) decides (based 
on what they learn from their pet) to pay a visit to another of their 




They play out a five-minute role-play to try to make this good thing happen. 
The other two players play out another five-minute role play at the same 
time – which also seeks to make things better somehow. 
At this point, each player is invited to narrate the outcomes of these 
interactions.  
Next the pets describe how their humans feel. Lastly, the humans and pets 
describe what will happen in their respective personal futures. 





B.21 Totem Build 
The Totem Build exercise was played at Theatre Delicatessen in London in 
March 2018. 
 
The Totem Build is played as a group exercise. To begin, a large number of 
random objects are scattered around the outside of the play space. 
Participants are told that the exercise will involve building a monument, or 
totem, somewhere in the room, using the random objects and anything else 
that players can find (other than people’s personal belongings). 
All objects used to construct the totem must connect with each other so that 
a unified structure is created. The building process must be done without 
verbal negotiation about how the totem should be constructed. 
Once play begins, players are invited to seek out objects that they find 
interesting, but also notice the objects that other players find interesting. 
Players are invited to be selfish in sculpting the totem in ways that they find 
pleasing. They are given permission to change the contributions that others 
have made. 
Players are told that when they are happy with the totem, they can stand 
back and look at. 
Next, players are invited to come into contact with the totem in some way – 
either by touching it or sitting within it. 
Players are then invited to notice the presence of other members of the 
group, possibly with eye contact. Lastly, players are invited to step back from 
the totem. 
Debrief: Players are invited to reflect on what it was like to go through the 






The ‘Visitors’ play design exercise was run at Theatre Delicatessen in London 
in April 2018. 
 
Scenario Task:  
We worked on creating an interactive performance scenario in which a 
GROUP with a dilemma, invite VISITORS to come and help them in some 
way, leading to a narrative progression based on a bifurcating narrative tree 
(like a Choose Your Own Adventure story or Twine structure). 
*** 
We broke into small groups and each person was asked to write 2 proposals 
of generic GROUPS which might become the focus on the design task. 
Each person picked 1 GROUP proposal offered by another member of their 
team. Then, they imagined a dilemma that the group is facing, focusing on 
an EITHER/OR choice that the group might make in responding to their 
dilemma. 
Each person presented their group dilemma and passed it on to the person 
on their left. Next, each person (working with a new group/dilemma) 
imagined VISITORS who might be invited to come and help the group in 
some way. 
Each person presented their group/dilemma/visitors and the team chose 
their preferred option. 
 
Dilemma and Narrative Structure 
First, the group clarified the initial dilemma that the group faced and the 
EITHER/OR choice that they could make. Then, they imagined two 
secondary scenarios based on the initial EITHER/OR choice. 
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At this point, I invited the groups to split in half, with one half working on a 
SCENARIO A (resulting from choosing the EITHER branch) and the other 
half working on a SCENARIO B (resulting from the OR branch).  
In both new scenarios, I asked participants to imagine another EITHER/OR 
choice. Ultimately, this would lead to a branching narrative structure in 
which an initial scenario would lead (via the initial EITHER/OR choice) to 
Scenario A or Scenario B and then another EITHER/OR choice would lead to 
a third scenario (with a total of 4 possible options for this third scene). 
 
Who Are the Visitors? 
I then asked participants to write for a minute about the Visitors, responding 
to the following questions: 
What is the reason why they were invited by the Group?  
What are their reasons / motivations for coming to help?  
What is their role in the interactive performance? 
Participants compared their responses to these questions and worked out 
their preferred options. 
 
Who Are the Characters and What are their Internal Relations? 
I invited participants to design their own characters, using any method that 
seemed most suitable to them. Similarly, I invited participants to design the 
internal relations between their characters in whatever way they saw fit. 
 
How is the Interactive Performance Facilitated? 
I asked participants to consider how they would facilitate the performance, 
both in terms of briefing the audience at the start and steering the 





How are Decisions Made? 
I asked participants to consider how narrative progression decisions would 
be made, either by the characters (under the influence of the audience) or by 
the audience (in which case they would need to consider what authority the 
audience have, in terms of their ROLE, to make the decisions). 
 
Watching / Performing 
I asked the participants to consider the extent to which the audience could 
sit back and watch the performance (as opposed to more direct participation) 
and the extent to which the characters would ‘perform’ / tell the story. 
*** 
Following the design process, three interactive performances were play-
tested. Participants were then invited to reflect on their experience as players 
and also their experience of designing their piece and seeing it being play-
tested. 
